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Cover
Cover photograph by Yoko Ikeda, a view of Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo from the Bunkyo Civic Center

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Local Governance in Japan

Social Science Japan newsletter 53 examines case studies of local governance in Japan historically and contemporaneously. What are the best ways to provide public services? How should efforts be coordinated? What does it take to achieve effective local governance? Local governance is a concept and practice widely applied throughout the world. This issue offers the chance to revisit and rethink this important theme in the context of Japan.

The first two articles survey the role of local governance in modern Japan. Uno Shigeki points out that while the concept began receiving attention in the mid-1990s in Japan, the practice of local governance has long been the norm throughout Japan's modern history. Observing local governance through the lens of local autonomy, Uno calls for a new, 21st century local governance. Similarly arguing that local governance has always been a part of modern Japanese society, Iokibe Kaoru offers hypotheses that historically explore how the benefits and burdens of local governance have been balanced in rural areas-hamlet and villages.

The next four case studies refer to the current practice of local governance in different regions. Ito Masatsugu discusses the development of interests in governance research in the field of public administration and looks at Japan's employment support services as a case study of interagency collaboration. Sunahara Yosuke discusses metropolitan governance, depicting the power struggle between the central government and local metropolitan governments as the latter seeks a greater say over the wealth their cities generate. Sunahara points to the potential that electoral reforms and decentralization can bring to metropolitan governance and what may impede such transformation.

Noting the economic success and social achievement of the Hokuriku region, especially Toyama-prefecture, Ide Eisaku probes the "Hokuriku model" of economic and social welfare. He argues that traditional values and conservatism need not be an impediment to progressive changes. His case study of Toyama show that the prefecture's traditional familialism and conservatism lay out a foundation upon which progressive changes can rest. Finally, Miyazaki Masato studies four municipalities in Fukui prefecture, all of whose budgets are affected by the subsidies it receives for hosting a nuclear power plant and by income taxes from the site. Highlighting the differences in fiscal condition and management in these four towns, Miyazaki asks what accounts for their variation.

In the ISS Research Report, Jackie F. Steele writes about her multi-lingual academic and research background and discusses her varied research on the topics of liberty and equality in the legal and political systems of Japan and Canada. The section on the ISS Contemporary Japan Group introduces four recent speakers and their lectures. Recent publications by ISS staff are listed as well. This issue's Focus on ISS is the final installment of the series on the special collections of the ISS library. Goda Koichi and Asahina Shinichi introduce collections associated with German and French history.

Managing Editor, Ikeda Yoko

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Re-examining Local Governance

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What Is Local Governance?

When did we first begin to hear about "local governance"? In the case of Japan, the idea took hold in 1995. In May of that year, the Decentralization Promotion Law was enacted. Through the process of decentralization reforms, local governments came to be seen as on par with the national government.

Another major event in 1995 was the tragic Hanshin-Awaji earthquake in January. Help for the victims of the quake was provided not only by police and fire departments, regular citizens and non-governmental organizations also played major roles in providing relief. This experience led to greater citizen involvement in government planning and problem solving and gave renewed credence to the merit of public-private cooperation.

As a result, the idea that relationships between levels of government and between government and civil society were undergoing major changes gained wide currency. The concept of "local governance" emerged from this discourse. One could say that the age of "government" had been supplanted by the age of "governance."

Today, the government cannot be the sole provider or defender of the public good. Businesses, non-profit organizations, local communities, and other non-governmental actors must also be active in serving the greater good. To be effective, the relationship between the government and civic actors cannot be top-down. Instead, negotiation and coordination carried out across horizontal networks will produce the best results. This line of reasoning led to "local governance" becoming common in political discourse.

However, glancing back at the history of local autonomy in Japan, one is left in doubt whether there was ever a time when government single-handedly provided public services. When Japan was modernizing, "local autonomy" meant leaving private citizens and organizations to provide most public services. One could argue that, rather than being a new phenomenon, local governance has long been the norm and not the exception in Japan.

In addition, many of the discussions of local governance are built on the assumptions that, until recently, the national government was very much in control of local affairs and that citizen autonomy was weak. These assumptions set the stage for the presumed shift to more horizontal intergovernmental relations and a greater emphasis on cooperation between citizens and government officials. The history of local autonomy in Japan, however, leaves room for doubt as to whether a strict hierarchy between the national government and local communities existed in the past. There are many instances of national-local interactions that do not fit into a top-down flowchart, examples of which are presented below. These descriptions of local governance in the context of Japanese history lead to a reconsideration of what we mean by "local autonomy."

The Historical Template for Local Autonomy in Japan

During the Edo period, Japan had a version of local autonomy. Under the Tokugawa shogunate, 300 clans controlled their own domains, and therefore the political system was decentralized. Authority within domains was also distributed. If a farming village could meet its annual tax obligations, then the shogunate and daimyo would not interfere in the village's internal affairs.

However, it would not be correct to call this traditional Japanese practice "local autonomy" because Tokugawa "villagers" were members of a particular class or caste (*mibun*) rather than just inhabitants of a settlement. In other words, not everyone who lived in a settlement was a member of the village with the same rights as any other local resident. As a result, there is no exact Tokugawa analogue for local political units as we know them today. Moreover, in the Edo period, local government was completely detached from central political authority. The authority of the samurai class and the autonomy of villages formed a dual structure, and the ties between the two tiers were not necessarily strong.

This dual structure was not immediately altered by the Meiji Restoration. It may seem as if the Meiji government promptly centralized power to create a political system that could modernize quickly, but the government initially left local communities untouched. When the feudal *han* domains were abolished in 1871, they were replaced by prefectures with borders that did not match those of the old domains. As entities created by the central government to integrate shogunate and clan domains, prefectures were political abstractions, and the government could not easily exert its authority at the local level.

The prefectures were largely left to their own devices and had to wait until 1878 to be placed into a somewhat unified system. That year, prefectural assemblies were elected for the first time, and their source of revenue (local taxes) was established. 1878 can thus be seen as the inception of local governance in modern Japan.

Incidentally, it is worth noting that the regions had more wealth than the national government in the early Meiji era. The Meiji government laid claim to the regions' resources and forced them to raise local taxes to meet the national government's demands. These funds were not spent on the regions' needs; instead, they went towards the Meiji government's overriding "rich country, strong army" nation building goal. Improving education was also important to the central government, but it offered limited financial support to carry out its policies, leaving towns and villages to shoulder most of the sharply higher costs of education.

Much of the credit for the creation of the Meiji local government system goes to Yamagata Aritomo, who played a central role in its establishment. Yamagata was motivated by what he feared the most—the rise of the Freedom and People's Rights Movement. In 1890, the Meiji constitution took effect, and the first lower house elections were held, adding to Yamagata's sense of crisis. When Yamagata was casting about for ways to ensure the stability of the government, he struck upon the solution of restructuring local governments.

There are two aspects to the Meiji local government system created by Yamagata. On the positive side, his reforms made local governments more stable and served as the foundation for Japan's prewar local government system. On the negative side, Yamagata designed the Meiji local government system primarily to absorb and diffuse the energies of popular democratic movements and thereby "depoliticize" local governments. Political theorist Maruyama Masao and his intellectual protégés called the modern Japanese state a dualistic "emperor-system state" in which bureaucratic structures supported a modern state apparatus while at the same time village communities remained trapped in the lowest tier of a feudalistic system. Although some have criticized Maruyama's thesis on how the Meiji local government system operated, there is no denying that Yamagata's reforms led to "apolitical" local government. As a result, local government was split off from national politics to the point that "one-nation autonomy" was seen as unrelated to local autonomy.

Afterwards, local government in Japan changed dramatically as Hara Takashi developed patronage-based political parties that influenced local government appointments, and corruption related to railroad construction expanded the politics

of profit. Economic changes were also under way as industrialization shifted the national balance of wealth to large cities and less developed areas were forced to bear a heavier tax burden, further undermining their economies. This uneven structure was tweaked in various ways, but it largely remained in place until the early Showa period and postwar reforms.

Postwar Democratization and Local Government

Reforms instituted by the Allied Occupation brought drastic change to local governance in Japan. The most fundamental change was giving local government a constitutional basis. The old Home Ministry was broken up, and control over education, police, and other matters was transferred to local governments. Prefectures that the national government had treated as extensions of itself gained the same degree of autonomy as other units of local government.

Of course, revamped institutions do not immediately cause significant changes in how local communities function. The significant change was the redefinition of local government. Communities that had managed their own affairs since the Edo period watched the political folkways they had long followed being gradually supplanted by the Meiji government's modernization efforts. Where local government once consisted of residents tackling the issues that mattered most to them, in the Meiji era the goal of local government was carrying out the national government's edicts as efficiently as possible.

In the aftermath of total war and postwar reforms, the role of the state extended further and the nature, number, and size of subsidies grew. Consequently, the heads of every unit of local government became more involved in carrying out the policies of central government ministries. With this institutional structure in place, especially after the high economic growth period, it is abundantly clear that local governments actively executed various central government initiatives in order to secure subsidies. Not surprisingly, the expansion of local programs paid for by national subsidies heightened the dependency of local governments on the central government. While local communities may have benefitted economically from subsidy funded programs, they were weakened as political entities.

Local Autonomy and Local Governance in Japan Today

Subsidy politics in local government has suffered two major blows. First, decentralization reforms eliminated the "agency delegated functions" (*kikan inin jimu*), in which local government officials had to work under the direction of central ministries. Second, Japan's budget deficits have continued to grow. The subsidy ties that connected local governments to the center are clearly unraveling.

These shifts also led local governments to change. Prefectures that had long acted as agents of the central government have begun to look inward for direction. Nearly 150 years after they were created, prefectures are finally developing independent identities based on the communities within their borders. At the same time, people are becoming more sensitive to the interests of their own communities. A large number of municipalities merged in the 2000s, but the merger campaign has since stalled because neighboring municipalities have conflicting interests that remain unresolved despite the national government's various institutional initiatives. It remains to be seen whether the stand-offs between neighboring municipalities are due to nothing more than local egotism or if they are proof of community consciousness and a commitment to achieve self-determination.

The key is to jettison the practice of giving citizens the responsibility of performing whatever tasks the government cannot perform. Instead, communities should be able to obtain government help on important matters that they cannot manage themselves. Setting priorities is an intrinsic part of local autonomy and must be restored. Most importantly, communities need to work to resolve problems on their own before seeking help from external government agencies. Furthermore, the government can no longer treat its citizens as its agents. 21st century local governance requires residents to recognize what their community's needs are and to use the levers of government to meet those needs. By taking their affairs into their own hands and using local, regional, national, and transnational governments to serve their communities' interests, citizens will lay the groundwork for truly modern local governance.

Local Governance in Modernizing Japan

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Introduction

The intended audience for this short essay are people who remain skeptical about the topic of local governance, despite its being part of political discourse for years. This essay offers a historical perspective that may respond to their skepticism.

As the government's budget problems grew worse and civil society grew stronger, a great many people began discussing and demanding local governance. On the other hand, many regard the same discourse as spin for imposing greater burdens on the public. Both discourses have some truth, but they are far from the whole story.

This essay argues that, in modern Japanese society, the responsibility to take on local governance has always been forced on rural areas. For many decades, Japan's local governance ranged from the spontaneous to the irrational. Tracing these shifts over time will give us a basis to evaluate the aforementioned opposing views.

My historical account is still hypothetical, and it does not include cities because they change too drastically in the course of urbanization. Instead, I look at rural areas that are more amenable to fixed point observation. Also, due to space limitations, the following is only an outline of historical developments. If the reader is interested in any of the topics mentioned below, I suggest my article, "*Kindai Nihon no rōkaru gabanansu: Futan to jueki no kinkō o motomete*" (Local governance in modern Japan: In search of equilibrium between burden and benefit) in *Rōkaru kara no saishuppatsu* (Local governance in Japan), edited by Shigeki Uno and Kaoru Iokibe and published in 2014 by Yuhikaku. An English language article I have written with a slightly different focus will appear as "Local Governance of Modern Japan: In search of equilibrium between burden and benefit" in *University of Tokyo Journal of Law and Politics*, Vol. 12, Summer 2015.

I. Meiji local government system presented a fictitious equilibrium between burden and benefit.

As the Meiji government launched a new form of local government, it sought to show the public that the burdens imposed by the new institutions would not outweigh their benefits.

In 1871, the feudal domains were abolished and replaced by prefectures that merged territory that had been controlled directly by the Tokugawa bakufu with domains once under clan control. Combining different social classes, however, took more time to accomplish.

Peasants viewed themselves unequivocally as "those who are ruled" and made no attempt to overthrow the government. That same sense of disempowerment, however, led peasants to react passively to the Meiji government's ambitious initiatives. This passivity was a major hindrance to the government's efforts to mobilize local communities to support nation building and industrialization.

During the early Meiji period, the passivity of the peasantry worsened a crisis that emerged from

the removal of feudal institutions. When harvests were poor, peasants received some aid from their feudal lords, but Meiji reforms eliminated this source of support. Then the land tax reform fixed property rights and tax obligations, which reduced the ability of village officials to provide emergency aid, deepening the sense of unrest in the countryside.

Through trial and error, the government settled on two main strategies to defuse the crisis, both of which were elements of a new system for local government. First, representative local assemblies were introduced in 1878, when the Prefectural Assembly Act required each prefecture to establish a legislature.

Representative government was further localized by the Town and Village Organization Act (1888), Municipal Organization Act (1888), Prefecture Organization Act (1890), and County Organization Act (1890). These laws institutionalized a chain of representative assemblies from the prefectural level to the village level.

In deciding on budgets and taxes, local assemblies also had to decide what they would give taxpayers in return, such as the type of administrative services and programs that would be provided by local governments. People were no longer expected to respond docilely to the orders of the powerful. Instead they were called upon to exercise agency to find equilibrium between tax burdens and social benefits in their communities.

The Meiji government's second task was to break up the class-based opposition among the peasantry that was organized village by village. Prior to the implementation of the Municipal Organization Act and the Town and Village Organization Act in 1889, the government overrode local opposition and merged towns and villages into new, arbitrarily determined "administrative villages." Former villages within these new units of local government were considered hamlets with no legal status.

II. Hamlets buckle under heavy burden of governance.

The new administrative villages were by no means an immediate success. Lingering attachment to the old villages was not the only problem. Village officials, including mayors and other important officials, did not receive salaries. The lack of compensation was a means to exclude less affluent residents who may have been more supportive of the Freedom and People's Rights movement or activists not originally from the area from becoming official village leaders. However, the imbalance between the costs and benefits of local governance experienced by these local leaders led many people to refuse to become mayors and many others to quit before their terms in office ended.

Unsurprisingly, this ongoing recruiting problem meant that new village governments often failed to provide adequate services. The hamlets had been stripped of their legal status, but they still collected taxes and arranged for basic public works to be performed by volunteers or at nominal wages. Naturally, this state of affairs meant that the hamlets had an important voice in local affairs. In addition, the hamlets carried out a substantial portion of local government functions. Looking at the hamlets' administrative functions and their influence over local affairs, we can see that the villages the Meiji government demoted turned out to be an important part of local governance in the late 19th century.

During and after the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95), rural administrative tasks increased as did the importance of villages working to meet the new demands. However, later, when the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05) ended without Russia paying an indemnity to Japan, the resulting fiscal shortfalls were expected to be picked up by the villages, worsening their budget problems.

The Ministry of Home Affairs launched an initiative called the "Local Improvement Movement" that emphasized the interests of the nation and the need for self-sacrifice to achieve regional development. The ministry publicly recognized people who made the requisite level of sacrifice. It also declared that any communal property in hamlets—fields and forests held in common, as well as Shinto shrines—belonged to the villages and thereby bolstered the villages' tax base. These policies amounted to a public declaration that the supposed rationale for the local government sys-

tem, the balancing of the burdens and benefits of government, was nothing more than a convenient fiction.

III. Obvious overburdening leads to blatant demands for more benefits.

Strangely, even as the local improvement movement was asking rural communities to contribute yet more to the state, residents of those same communities were openly demanding more benefits from the government. If the balancing of burdens and benefits is neglected even once, there will be no limits on the benefits demanded by citizens as well as no limits on the burdens imposed by the state.

The people recognized as "benefactors" embodied the tension between the government's demand for revenue and rural citizens' demands for benefits. The benefactors tended to be less wealthy than local notables, and they worked assiduously to win government subsidies. Their efforts and energy were not limited to discovering local resources and making them available; benefactors also threw themselves wholeheartedly into the nationwide competition for external subsidies. Local branches of political parties such as Seiyukai mobilized in response to this outpouring of non-national interests and, despite the nation's difficult fiscal situation, developed their own bases of support.

IV. Obvious overburdening leads to burden rationalization.

The clear imbalance between costs and benefits led to calls for the government to rationalize how it decided what people had to contribute.

As urbanization advanced during and after World War I (1914-19), the Ministry of Education spearheaded the "Campaign for the Improvement of Living Conditions." Using Western urban lifestyles as a model, the campaign aimed to reduce wasteful household spending. The appeal of city life grew beyond the campaign's ambitions. In the 1920s, tenant protests escalated as farmers realized they were earning less for their efforts than day laborers in cities.

Farming villages in Japan suffered greatly from financial panics but were able to recover quickly. However, bearing the burden of Japan's all-out war effort pushed these villages back into poverty. The government scrambled to find ways to quell farmer protests, reduce unemployment, design and execute plans for restructuring the economy, mobilize people, and compel the delivery of goods. The government was no longer concerned about the administrative villages of the Local Improvement Movement. In the "Economic Revitalization of Agricultural, Mountain, and Fishing Villages Project," the government treated hamlets as the primary loci of economic mobilization. Hamlets were treated as important, if they were the most useful unit of organization. If organizing people in units smaller than hamlets proved to be more useful, then those units were given precedence. During this period, the burden placed on rural villages became unreasonably onerous, but one could say that the government's method of distributing that burden became more rational.

V. In the postwar era, local society seems to have increased its capability to balance burdens and benefits.

In 1955, Hatoyama Ichiro took the initiative to launch the New Life Movement. The movement's original non-partisan proponents called for achieving economic independence through thrift, grassroots cultivation of a patriotic sense, creation of new citizens who fit the new constitution, and a mix of other postwar ideals. The movement did not enjoy explicit political support, but it was flexible enough to shift between cities and the countryside, taking its experiments and experiences from one arena and applying them to the other as needed.

Beginning in the 1970s, a number of hamlets attained success. Achieving a high level of economizing and saving required the voluntary cooperation of all residents. This cooperation could only be secured if the views of everyone—including people with low socioeconomic status, women, and young people—were reflected in the planning stage and every stage thereafter. This was democratization in action. The seeds of rural democracy could be found in the prewar period, but they did not take root due to class conflicts between landlords and tenant farmers, conflicts that were extinguished by the postwar land reforms that allowed democratization to advance.

In this way, there was no contradiction between increasing people's burdens and increasing the benefits they received. Towns and villages had to raise funds for local public works, but in return those funds often helped them to qualify for subsidies from the national government.

VI. In the sphere of fiscal policy, on the other hand, rural areas received a disproportionate amount of benefits, but the nation's budget woes today do not permit such generosity.

Notwithstanding the inner change of local society, government policies clearly transferred wealth from cities to rural areas for decades. For example, the 1961 Agricultural Basic Law guaranteed that rice prices would continue to climb despite the end of postwar food shortages.

As Japanese dietary habits became more Westernized, rice consumption fell rapidly. This drop in demand pushed up the cost of rice price supports. In 1968, rice price supports were curtailed, and, in 1970, the policy of rice acreage reduction was introduced. In 1990, in the Uruguay round of GATT negotiations, Japan agreed to import rice and then dismantled its rice support programs.

As the merits of growing rice dwindled, so did the appeal of investing in improving crop yields. Despite this, Liberal Democratic Party governments continued to subsidize farming villages to shore up their political base. Such a policy was maintained because they lagged behind urban areas and because the rapid economic growth period produced higher tax revenue. Instead of crop subsidies, the LDP provided funds to build roads and sewers and gave other grants that reduced local tax burdens. The government's fiscal outlook is now too bleak for such expenditures, and therefore the government is reducing the benefits given to rural areas. The recent emphasis on local governance is best understood in this context of fiscal retrenchment.

Conclusion

We can draw some preliminary conclusions. First, local governance is not new to Japan (II). Second, the government's various attempts to extract more wealth from its citizens left their mark and produced an unimaginable variety of profound effects. Foremost of these effects is, ironically, the weakening of the norm against the pursuit of self-interest (III). Another outcome was the cumulative result of efforts to rationalize the burden placed on citizens (IV).

These rationalization efforts continued after the war, and, taking a macroscopic perspective, it appears that local communities that decide how to balance the burdens and benefits of government have become more adept at striking this balance (V). However, in the postwar era, demands for higher standards of living were generally satisfied, and therefore the level of effort invested in reaching equilibrium declined (VI). Worsening fiscal conditions no longer permit this lackadaisical approach. Local communities are being shaken up, and calls for "local governance" are growing louder.

Even if we reflect and look at the history of local governance in Japan with open eyes, we will not be at the starting point of over a century ago. Depending on the past path, the current crisis will have a range of serious consequences for Japan's struggling regions. At the very least, one or more of the following responses, or some complicated combination thereof, can be expected to shape each individual local government, hamlet, and household's finances.

V-1. Existing capacity to reach a new equilibrium will be utilized, and the difficulties will be overcome.
V-2. The old equilibrium will leave little room for new burdens.
VI-1. Ingrained idleness will preclude any attempt to deal with the problem.
VI-2. Excessive benefits of the past will be treated as a surplus, and a new balance will be reached.

The reader may object if more hypotheses are piled on here. Those already listed include many theories that need to be tested and re-evaluated. Over the past four and a half years, we have felt the pain and misery brought on by events once deemed as "unforeseeable." Reducing this suffering even slightly requires social scientists to try every available option. Knowing history does not allow one to predict the future clearly, but it does facilitate the creation of more original and insightful "expectations" of what the future holds.

Local Governance as Interagency Collaboration

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The field of Public Administration began discussing the topic of governance in the early 1990s. Members of the field regard governance as distinct from both traditional public administration, which was predicated on making integrated bureaucratic organizations efficient, and New Public Management (NPM), which touted the use of market mechanisms and business management methods in government agencies. The chief focus of governance research is how various actors in and out of government coordinate and cooperate in providing public services. Research on local governance takes as its starting point that it is a new way of delivering public service in which local governments coordinate with nonprofit organizations, local autonomous organizations, and businesses.

However, the pluralistic organization of public service delivery has long been recognized, especially in American Public Administration. Discussions of local governance tend to focus on cooperation between the public and private sectors, meaning that too little attention has been given to multi-organizational arrangements within the public sector. In addition, although the cooperation and coordination among pluralistic organizations receives considerable attention, empirical studies on how such collaborations actually work are not all that common.

To move empirical research on local governance one step forward, this essay presents a case study of interagency collaboration in employment support services in Japan, a study that is mindful of the theories on interagency collaboration among pluralistic organizations within the public sector.

Theory and Practice of Interagency Collaboration

Beginning in the 1980s, NPM was the leading model of administrative reforms in developed nations. The NPM model, which calls for breaking apart large-scale bureaucracies along functional lines and instituting performance-based management, fell out of favor in the late1990s. Critics argued that NPM was causing more harm than good for several reasons: administrative organizations were becoming too fragmented; central ministries were unable to gather enough information and feedback from front-line agencies, making it more difficult for them to draft effective policy proposals; and the overly narrow focus of government employees was undermining their future career development.

After Tony Blair became the British prime minister in 1997, his administration criticized NPM's excesses and proposed "joined-up government" as a better way to organize how national and local government agencies worked together to tackle complex problems such as drug crimes and social exclusion (Bogdanor 2005). NPM also fell out of favor in New Zealand, especially in the 2000s. Leaders there called for the re-integration of the administrative apparatus for social welfare and labor policies that had been broken apart under NPM reforms and proposed collaborative governance with private industry and nonprofit organizations (Eppel 2013).

There were also proposals to build networks among New Zealand's government agencies to develop policy goals and expand sharing of policy information in fields such as education, health

care, and youth development. Proponents argued that interagency collaboration would improve the quality of services and make it easier for citizens to access those services (Majumdar 2006). Interagency collaboration as a means to bring together related policy areas is intended to improve the delivery of services in pluralistically structured administrative organizations (Bardach 1998).

Such interagency collaboration efforts are already underway in Japan. As in the United Kingdom and New Zealand, Japanese government officials have been searching for ways to improve the quality of government services by increasing cooperation between national, prefectural, and municipal agencies.

In the field of child abuse prevention, for example, 2004 amendments to the Child Welfare Act and the Child Abuse Prevention Act required municipalities to establish frontline offices to provide direct parenting support and handle child abuse cases. These new municipal offices were expected to work with already established prefectural "child guidance offices," and the first results of this intergovernmental cooperation were Regional Councils of Countermeasures for Children Requiring Aid. Other examples of experimental interagency structures include positive youth development programs and integrated community care for elderly people.

Interagency Collaboration in Employment Assistance Services

In Japan, several agencies, including public employment security offices (PESOs), run by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW), and prefectural and municipal employment support agencies, are involved in helping people find work. PESO offices were slated for transfer to prefectural control as part of decentralization reform, but the transfer did not occur. Instead, local governments are currently able to apply to combine their counseling services with the free job placement services provided by PESOs in their area. As of May 2015, 33 prefectures, 113 municipalities, and one prefecture-city partnership were working jointly with PESO officials under the terms of local government applications to MHLW.[1]

More specifically, prefectures generally seek to join with PESOs in providing job training, employment support, and job placement services especially to older workers, women, young people, and people with disabilities. Cities tend to propose integrating PESOs' free employment placement services with the cities' social welfare offices that provide public assistance and support services.

The only prefecture-city-PESO partnership was proposed by Niigata Prefecture and Niigata City. The Niigata plan was to create a "one-stop" office that would make it easier for people needing income support and other welfare services to access employment assistance from MHLW. To seamlessly integrate these services, "Workport Niigata" was opened in Niigata City's Higashi Ward Office and staffed with city employees, one prefectural job training counselor (two days a week), and three MHLW employment counselors. Consistent service delivery is maintained by a coordinating committee with representatives from Niigata Prefecture, Niigata City, and the Niigata Labour Bureau of the MHLW that operates out of the Niigata PESO.[2]

Interagency collaboration on employment assistance has also been discussed in relation to disaster recovery following the Great East Japan Earthquake. Employment mismatches are especially acute in the affected areas. Moreover, there is also the question of how to help people forced out of the region find work in their new surroundings.

How are the relationships between local governments, PESOs, and other agencies evolving in the face of challenges such as executing reconstruction projects and attending to the people displaced by the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster? By the start of May 2015, the municipalities in Fukushima Prefecture, with the one exception of Koriyama City and the prefecture itself, have yet to propose integrating their employment support programs with PESOs in the area. All three levels of government, however, are communicating with each other and sharing information as they work to help victims of the disaster, including those displaced outside of the prefecture.

Fukushima Prefecture has contracted with a private

[1] http://www.cao.go.jp/bunken-suishin/jimukengenijo/hellowork.html
[2] http://www.cao.go.jp/bunken-suishin/doc/hw-94-niigata-jirei.pdf

company to run the Fukushima Employment Assistance Center. The company has hired career counselors who act as case workers and meet with residents by appointment. Job seekers are given enough time to describe their situations in detail and receive advice. The center also provides outreach programs such as employment advice sessions, which are held in temporary housing sites, and it works proactively to increase hiring among businesses in Fukushima. The center also offers regularly scheduled employment counseling sessions outside of Fukushima for displaced residents. Because the staff at the Fukushima Employment Assistance Center are case workers who offer counseling continuity to clients, they are able to meet with clients by appointment and offer expanded outreach programs. It appears that the center is aiming to distinguish itself from the Fukushima PESO.

The degree of collaboration between cities and PESOs is not all that high. In Soma City, for example, while city officials are focused on reconstruction projects as a means to increase employment opportunities for victims of the 3.11 disaster, the local PESO office, Hello Work Soma, is prioritizing reducing employment mismatches and providing job placement support and employment counseling to disaster victims who use the national job postings network.

The extent of coordination between employment support agencies for disaster victims in Fukushima Prefecture varies. Instead of multi-agency partnerships, interagency ties are being established through bilateral collaborations, such as the collaborations between the Fukushima Employment Assistance Center and PESOs and between cities and PESOs.

Issues of Interagency Collaboration

This case study of employment support programs clearly shows that an interagency collaboration needs to overcome the following challenges in order to succeed. First, the agencies involved need to have a system for sharing information on policies and services. Systematic information sharing sustains mutual respect for the specific missions and practices of each agency and, at the same time, keeps agencies from losing sight of the potential benefits of their collaboration, such as gaining a deeper understanding of the needs of people seeking services.

The second challenge is effectively managing the interagency arena. Although employment support programs in Fukushima Prefecture are primarily bilateral, transforming these partnerships into networked multi-organizational collaborations requires establishing sites that will serve as hubs to promote effective and efficient management of the collaborations.

The third requirement involves developing human resources to support the multi-agency effort. In practice, multilateral projects generally involve people whose differences include, but are not limited to, their areas of expertise. For the collaboration to succeed, members of each professional tribe need to understand the viewpoints of others. Training people to deepen their understanding to better communicate with those from different organizational cultures is crucial to any multi-agency project.

Finally, given the limited amount of human and financial resources available, it would be less costly if public agencies worked out how they will work together before bringing in private sector organizations. Employment assistance programs are the only type of multi-organizational collaboration discussed in this paper. More research on the actual nature of such service delivery collaborations and local governance in other policy areas is needed.

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Governance in Metropolises

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1. The Two Faces of Metropolitan Governance

There are two aspects to governance in major cities with concentrated populations and industries. The first is the type of governance generally found in cities of all sizes. Residents elect their representatives and expect them to efficiently manage local government functions according to the residents' wishes. With their large populations and industrial sectors, major cities have much wealthier tax bases than smaller cities, but they also face greater demands for services. Despite these differences, the fundamental challenge of responding effectively to voters' demands is faced by cities of all sizes.

The second aspect of metropolitan governance involves the debate over how much control is being exerted by the central government. Major cities are engines of economic growth, and the central government cannot allow the wealth generated by that growth to be used only for the benefit of those cities. If the prosperity of metropolises is partly a result of reproductive work done outside of their borders, including education, health, and caregiving, then it is no surprise that the central government will intervene to keep these cities from thinking only of their own interests and require them to share the fruits of their growth with other regions. However, if the demands for wealth redistribution grow too severe, the metropolises will lose their dynamism and motivation to grow. How to avoid hindering major cities' economic growth while distributing the benefits of that growth is, from the central government's point of view, a critical governance issue.

2. Metropolises under the Long Reign of the LDP

Japan's metropolises have faced two types of state imposed constraints. The first, dating back to the 1970s, are laws enacted to limit the concentration of people and industry in large cities. When this concentration was deemed a problem, policies to control this growth and redirect people and investment towards economic development in other regions were carried out. The success of these policies was strikingly clear. The population shifts toward Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya fell drastically, to the point where the Osaka and Nagoya metropolitan areas started experiencing a net outflow of population.

The other constraint imposed by the state was its continual demand for revenues to transfer to other regions. Because people and industries are concentrated in the largest cities, they are the greatest sources of corporate tax revenue. However, most of the taxes paid by businesses are allotted to the national and prefectural governments. The share of taxes that metropolises can spend is not large. As a result, their governments operated under the difficult condition of having little discretion over how wealth that was generated by their citizens should be reinvested.

How was it possible for the central government to keep major cities in this fiscal bind for so long? A major reason was the decades-long rule of the LDP, which prioritized transferring wealth to rural areas that were the base of LDP electoral support. The major cities at the heart of Japan's megalopolises were unable to amass enough political power to correct this inequitable situation. One institution that kept the LDP in power and thwarted major

cities' efforts to increase their political clout was the multi-member districts with a single, non-transferrable voting (MMD/SNTV) electoral system.

As Scheiner (2005) points out, while the LDP was in power, the electoral system produced completely different forms of political competition in urban and rural areas. Because the LDP had overwhelming support in rural areas, political competitions there were intra-party contests among LDP candidates. Other parties could win seats in urban areas where the LDP's support was relatively weak, which led to fierce inter-party competition in these larger cities. Because SNTV was also used in local elections, those involving opposition parties were also intensely competitive. As a result, whereas rural areas were largely united in their support for the LDP, urban voters were unable to unite behind a single opposition party.

Another source of the LDP's longevity was the malapportionment of Diet seats under the SNTV system. Although urbanization continued throughout the era of rapid economic growth, electoral districts were not sufficiently redrawn to reflect the population shift. Malapportionment did more than tip the scales in the LDP's favor. The over-representation of rural areas was the most important factor driving the large amount of rural pork-barrel spending (Horiuchi and Saito 2003).

3. Government Structural Reform and Major Cities

The government structural reforms of the 1990s—electoral system and decentralization reform—also affected the political environment of major cities. To begin with, the reduction in malapportionment that was part of the electoral reform meant the views of urban voters carried more weight. In addition, the introduction of a plurality voting system to national elections prompted urban-based parties opposed to the LDP to coalesce. In reality, the opposition parties and the LDP have remained evenly matched in cities after the electoral reform.

Looking at local elections, we see similar trends in mayoral contests. In the 2000s, the LDP was rarely able to back a candidate who won a mayoral election in a *designated city* without the cooperation of other parties, especially Komeito. On the other hand, opposition parties and the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) attracted more support from city residents and launched candidates who won one mayor's race after another. Conversely, the situation in local assemblies, where the electoral system was left unaltered, scarcely changed. A fierce rivalry among non-LDP parties persists, now intensified by the emergence of new parties backed by the mayors of cities such as Osaka and Nagoya.

Electoral reform meant that metropolises that had been at a disadvantage in national politics could now consider loosening central government-imposed restrictions. The decentralization reforms beginning in the 1990s gave added momentum to the major cities' campaign for greater devolution of power. Metropolitan governments became more willing to publicly criticize central government control as decentralization proceeded. Reforms have created a new state of play in intergovernmental relations and empowered major cities to make greater demands for local control, including in the most critical area of fiscal decentralization.

One complication in the decentralization process is the lack of consensus, especially on fiscal matters, among local governments. Under centralized government, areas with large tax bases, primarily metropolitan regions, account for the bulk of tax collections which are then redistributed to other regions. However, once major cities are able to keep a greater share of tax revenue for themselves, the change amounts to a de facto transfer of wealth to the cities from the regions which had benefitted under the old system. The conflict of interest between donor and recipient localities has kept local governments from joining together to push for further fiscal decentralization.

This split among local governments obstructed comprehensive local government finance reform, and the reforms enacted in the 2000s were therefore incremental. The central government remains in charge of fiscal transfers, but its power to limit the autonomy of local expenditures has been reduced. The other changes that central and local governments could agree upon were increases in consumption taxes, including local consumption taxes. These gradual reforms did not go far enough to quell the dissatisfaction among major cities.

4. Debate over Expanding Metropolitan Autonomy

Because fiscal decentralization efforts stalled,

around 2010, major cities began to push for special status, official recognition setting them apart from smaller municipalities. Their objectives were to loosen the restraints imposed by the central government and to win approval to create new governance structures that matched the particular characteristics of major cities.

In February 2009, Yokohama, Osaka, and Nagoya jointly proposed such a restructuring. Their proposal, modeled after Germany's "city-states," called for the three metropolises to be granted special status and permitted to create a new fiscal-transfer system for which major cities are responsible and decentralized system within the cities to increase citizen autonomy. Although the DPJ, which had just taken control of the government, had ties to all three mayors, it did not seriously consider their proposal.

The DPJ was more responsive to other proposals by individual metropolises, most importantly the local government reorganization plan championed by Hashimoto Toru, governor of Osaka Prefecture, and his supporters in the Osaka Restoration Party (ORP). They proposed the creation of a new metro-area government that would replace the Osaka City and Osaka Prefectural governments and the division of Osaka City into several special wards. This reorganization would reduce red tape by consolidating local government decision making and thereby attract more private investment in the megalopolis. The new wards would localize many government services and give local residents more say in the delivery of those services.

This restructuring plan was created to ease Osaka City's budget problems by changing the relationship between a specific prefecture and a designated city whose functions overlapped; it was not intended to serve as a national model for decentralization reform. Nevertheless, not only did the Osaka plan inspire local governments in other regions, it also prompted the DPJ government to develop new legislation. The legislation was enacted with unusual speed, which can be credited to the political influence of the Osaka Restoration Party, which had amassed broad support in the Osaka area. Existing parties could not ignore their new rival given its popularity among voters in a major urban area, and thus they supported the legislation.

However, the new law did not, in and of itself, change metropolitan government. Instead, it established the procedures under which local government reorganizations could take place. As for what reorganization would actually entail, in Osaka, the restructuring movement became bogged down in inter-party conflict. All of the opposition parties except for the ORP eventually turned against the plan. Finally, the New Komeito Party partially compromised, and a makeshift plan was put up for a referendum. The plan was narrowly defeated, bringing to a halt the metropolitan reform initiative that was launched in Osaka.

5. Conclusion

The two aspects of governance under discussion are closely entwined rather than mutually independent. First, unless metropolitan governments pursue the interests of the entire area in an integrated manner, it is difficult to imagine that a form of governance more favorable to the cities will be implemented. It seems reasonable to conclude that the continuing use of SNTV electoral system, which encourages fragmentation of political powers in local assembly, is an impediment to transforming metropolitan governance.

The national electoral system reforms of the 1990s energized the debate over the metropolitan system, but other institutions, starting with local assemblies, were left out of the discussions. Given this state of affairs, the expectations placed on metropolitan system reform were excessive, and the reformers set their sights needlessly high. Instead of aiming to ram through decentralization reforms, the first step should have been discussing how to integrate metropolitan political power through reforms in local government political systems, especially local assembly electoral systems.

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Prosperity and "Conservatism" in Hokuriku

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The liberal politics of the Democratic Party of Japan have foundered and been supplanted by the conservative politics of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). As the politics surrounding the US-Japan Security Treaty are becoming more convoluted, the push to amend the Constitution is gaining momentum. In the "mission statement" that the LDP issued at its founding in 1955, the party included its goal to "revise the current constitution independently."[1] Postwar conservative politics began to coalesce around debates on topics such as revising the constitution, the foundation of postwar democracy.

And yet, at the same time, it is becoming more difficult to distinguish between conservatism and progressivism, the two main streams of modern thought. Take, for example, the administration of Koizumi Junichiro, an archetype of conservative politics, proponent of small government based on paternalism, and re-igniter of the Yasukuni shrine problem. What did Koizumi call for constantly? Change and reform. The same can be said for the Japan Restoration Party led by Hashimoto Toru. These men are the embodiment of conservative political ideology, and yet their reform proposals are fundamentally radical.

The seeming paradox of conservatives calling for drastic reforms to the social and political status quo has a historical parallel in the socialist movement embraced by William Morris. In response to the mass production methods brought on by the Industrial Revolution, Morris helped launch the Arts and Crafts movement to challenge the new means of production. The Arts and Crafts movement presented its goal as restoring the "Gothic spirit." In the same fashion, the leaders of the Meiji Restoration claimed to be "restoring" imperial rule. Given that proponents of drastic change describe their goal as returning to a golden era, the meaning of conservative and progressive is context dependent, as is the relationship between the two.

Reconsidering conservatism and progressivism from this relativistic perspective, we find an especially interesting case in the conservatism that has supported the prosperous economy of the Hokuriku region. Careful reading of *100 no shihyō tōkei kara mita Toyama* (Toyama Prefecture in 100 statistics)[2] gives one a sense of Toyama's uniqueness.

Looking at data from 2010-2012, Toyama is clearly not a large prefecture. Its population is 1.08 million, making it the 11th smallest prefecture in the nation, and its annual gross production is the 17th smallest. However, Toyama's per capita income is the 14th highest in Japan, and the net income of households with one or more employed adults is the 5th highest. Finally, Toyama leads the nation in home ownership rates and average home size. Toyama is clearly a prosperous prefecture.

Note that Toyama ranks higher in per household

[1] Liberal Democratic Party of Japan (1955) "*Tō no Shimei*" [mission statement] https://www.jimin.jp/aboutus/declaration/100286.html
[2] http://www.pref.toyama.jp/sections/1015/lib/shihyo/index.html

income than per capita income. High household income indicates that older people and women in Toyama are more likely to be employed or self-employed. In fact, Toyama's female employment rate is the 6th highest in Japan, and the percentage of two-earner households is 4th highest. Yet Toyama is 14th in per capita income. These rankings indicate that Toyama's high household income is not due to high per capita income supported by high wages or salaries but rather the result of "work sharing"-like situations that provide more job opportunities for men and women and the young and elderly.

Why are so many women in the workforce? There are two reasons. First, the number of people per household is 4th highest in the country, which indicates that the number of three-generation households is also high. Mothers who can entrust their children to grandparents can work outside the home without worrying. Toyama is also noteworthy for the large number and high enrollment levels of its childcare facilities. The accessibility of childcare keeps the job separation rate of women after childbirth low.

Toyama also has a strong economic foundation. Hokuriku Bank and Hokuriku Electric Power are headquartered in Toyama, and its vast plains and ample water resources have fostered the growth of large corporations such as Sankyo Tateyama Aluminum and Fujikoshi. The ratio of manufacturing output to prefectural gross output is the highest in Japan. Toyama's high employment absorption is shown in the jobs-to-applicants ratio and the percentage of high school graduates who succeed in finding jobs in the prefecture. Another important factor is that the large manufacturing base enables women to work second and third shift jobs. In other words, Toyama's factories are part of the social infrastructure that makes it possible for women to work while raising children.

Economic wealth is also connected to social wealth. Consider income support programs. Recipients of such support are usually disabled people, elderly people without pensions, and single mothers. Due to Toyama's large number of three-generation households, high female labor participation rate, and strong economic foundation, the percentage of its residents receiving income support is the lowest in the entire nation. Evenly distributed economic wealth is essential to reducing disparities in social wealth.

Toyama is also successfully developing human capital. High incomes, grandparents' involvement in childcare, and a local culture dedicated to education have produced an outstanding level of academic achievement. Toyama occupies the top tier in Japan for both average academic achievement and per capita acceptance rate to the University of Tokyo. Students who excel are most likely to attend nearby public (prefectural) high schools. These schools keep the costs of education low for families and ensure that most students have access to a quality education.

Toyama's economic and social wealth are characteristic of the Hokuriku region. This fact was made perfectly clear by the "Prefecture Happiness Ranking" created by a team of researchers at Hosei University.[3] Because this happiness index is based on factors common to all prefectures, particular local problems such as being near nuclear power reactors or other worrisome facilities are not included. With this caveat in mind, the finding that the three happiest prefectures are all in the Hokuriku region is striking.

Looking at Toyama and the rest of the Hokuriku area, one is struck by the feeling that this region is designed for the benefit of working people. Women's workforce participation, work sharing, access to quality daycare and schools for children of all ages, high degree of socioeconomic equality—the presence of all these factors makes it seem as if Scandinavian society has taken root in Hokuriku.

Toyama's social service programs are another important factor. Toyama adopted a universal welfare model when it created a social welfare program, the Toyama-style Day Care Service, that

[3] See Sakamoto Koji & Kōfukudo Shisū Kenkyūkai (2011) *Nihon de Ichiban Shiawase na Kenmin* [The Prefectures with the Happiest Residents] PHP Kenkyujo.

provides care to the elderly, disabled, and children in one facility. Another groundbreaking initiative that has garnered much attention lately is "*Ashitanenomori*," an institution that goes one step further by offering nursing care for the aged, early childhood education, and education for disabled children in the same location. Toyama Prefecture is making real strides towards universality in social welfare.

What is really important to recognize is that the social achievements of Toyama and its Hokuriku neighbors are due to traditional familialism and conservatism, the polar opposite of Scandinavian style welfare policies. The large number of three-generation households shows that the cultural legacy of monocrop rice paddy farming and primogeniture is still influential. Local organizations such as clubs for elderly people, women's associations, and youth groups have remained vibrant. Neighborhood associations continue to collect fees from households to pay for important projects. By volunteering as firefighters and participating in local events in their school districts, residents complement government functions and create a communal order that wraps around society like a net.

From this point of view, the launching of innovative projects such as Toyama-style Day Care Service and *Ashitanenomori* seems like it was made possible by the strength of familial ties. If we consider families as single units, it goes without saying that elderly people, children, and people with disabilities live alongside their family members. The extension of this fundamental principle to the areas of welfare and education reflects the true character of Toyama society.

The political conservatism of the area is unmistakable. Known as a "conservative kingdom," Toyama has the best maintained and most improved roads in the country. The rate of private car ownership is second highest, and Toyama's sewer systems are the most extensive in Japan. One could regard these rankings negatively, seeing them as proof of Toyama's willingness to stay loyal to the LDP and the LDP's past willingness to secure that loyalty with pork barrel projects. Nevertheless, public works projects were a source of secondary employment for farming families and a critical provider of economic and social stability in their communities.

What seems at first glance to be a progressive society paradoxically turns out to have a conservative and traditional foundation, or so the evidence strongly suggests. This paradox causes us to recognize one fact: whether considering a Scandinavian-style universal model or a family- and village-centric communal order, both aim to provide what is "necessary for mankind" and differ only in form.

Looking back on history, we see that education, childcare, elder care, and nursing care—support that everyone needs—were provided by people within communal groups. The Scandinavian welfare states have simply socialized this tradition. The conservative model and the Scandinavian model may differ in many ways, but fundamentally they are both systems for providing mutual aid. Sweden's Social Democrats' cherished concept of *Folkhemmet* (the people's home) encapsulates how the two welfare models are two sides of the same coin.

This perspective makes one question whether conservatism and progressivism should be treated as opposing philosophies. To begin with, there is no need to posit patriotism and socioeconomic equality as irreconcilable values. Opposing women's participation in the work force in the name of conservativism while average incomes are falling is political posturing. We should be able to preserve community ties, traditions, and other values without having to deny the importance of fairness, human rights, and protecting the environment. Today, it should be possible to bring a greater sense of urgency to balancing traditional and progressive values than when LDP mission statements were written. The Hokuriku model, which brings progressive changes not by denying traditional values but by utilizing them, shows us the possibility of reconciling the two sets of values.

We use the word "公共" (public). In historical perspective, people created various mutual aid arrangements (共together, including) that were then exploited by those in power (公 official). As we enter an age of population decline when eco-

nomic growth cannot be taken for granted, the scale of government cannot grow unboundedly. This is to say we should expect the government (公) to do less about providing aid to the people (共). For this reason, when we are debating what the role of government should be and what capacities communities should develop internally, we would do well to consider the Hokuriku prefectures which have created and sustained a favorable social cycle.

The "Japanese-style welfare society" proposed by the Ohira administration and the Hatoyama administration's "new public commons" were attempts to get people to cooperate to preserve communal order even as it was crumbling around them. The results of these campaigns were as insubstantial as the logic they were based on. On the other hand, even devoted fans of the Scandinavian model ought to realize that it cannot be imported wholesale because of Japan's cultural and social traditions, as the Democratic Party learned the hard way. How can the government help other regions to create a virtuous cycle like that in Toyama? Can it find ways to strengthen the conservative foundations of a community while creating a mechanism to make social justice a reality? This is not just a constitutional revision problem. The proper role of the public sector itself is in question, and the time when we must recast the public sector to fit current thought is now approaching.

Same Rules, Different Outcomes: How Local Governments Use Nuclear Siting Incentives

MIYAZAKI Masato



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This article explains what accounts for the budgeting differences among four municipalities, all in Fukui Prefecture, where nuclear power plants are located. The first step is identifying what is distinctive about the city of Tsuruga and the towns of Mihama, Takahama, and Oi; the second is tracing how those characteristics produced different outcomes in these nuclear site towns.

As identified in prior studies, the "three laws for electric power supply" provide subsidies to localities where nuclear power plants are built. Besides the subsidies, local governments collect property taxes from plant operators, which can add up to considerable sums.

Although the municipalities with nuclear power plants operate under the same rules, their fiscal management differs. The four sites in Fukui have their own ways of handling revenues and expenditures. Rather than describing what they have in common, this article focuses on the dissimilarities among the four municipalities, especially their expenditures, and what accounts for their divergences.

What Caused the Four Local Governments to Diverge?

1. Tsuruga

The Tsuruga city government sets itself apart from the other three sites in how it makes public investments. First, the share of the budget going towards expenditures for ordinary construction is low. Second, the aforementioned subsidies that Tsuruga receives as a nuclear plant site comprise only a small proportion of public investment outlays.[1] Both of these traits can be traced back to Tsuruga's highly developed social infrastructure and its budget making process.

If social infrastructure is under-developed in a city, the government must devote more of its budget to expenditure for ordinary construction works. Once the requisite public infrastructure is in place, funds can be transferred to other areas. By the 1980s, over 80 percent of Tsuruga's roads were paved. Because the nuclear plant in Tsuruga was built relatively early, the city has had several years to upgrade its public infrastructure.

Tsuruga's budget making process is another factor setting the city apart. According to interviews I conducted, the city's finance division has a great deal of clout, and it used this influence to keep Tsuruga's fiscal indicators from worsening by using nuclear site subsidies to pay for essential government services such as health clinics, wholesale markets, trash incinerators, landfills, and community centers.[2] The finance division's commitment to sound fiscal policy is another factor behind the city's low expenditures for ordinary construction and the relatively small share of public investment funds coming from nuclear site subsidies.

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[1] Nuclear siting subsidies are designated for the use of the local government where plants are built and neighboring areas. Funds are to be used for building public facilities and projects that will improve the welfare of local residents.

[2] Interviews I conducted also revealed that there was a period of time when the finance division alone determined how nuclear subsidies were appropriated. The planning and coordination division could only submit spending proposals to the finance division.

2. Mihama

Mihama spends a large share of its nuclear site subsidies on facility operating expenses. In fact, facility operating expenses account for almost all of the Mihama's non-investment spending of its nuclear subsidy. Mihama's particular spending patterns can be traced to its having the weakest fiscal position among the four municipalities.

Mihama's fiscal problems are longstanding. Except for a brief period in the late 1970s, the town's fiscal capability index has remained below 1.[3] Furthermore, property taxes collected from the nuclear plant have scarcely risen since the 1970s. Finally, the amount of nuclear subsidies Mihama receives is the smallest of all four municipalities.

Mihama is in a worse fiscal position than other nuclear towns because its local power plant predates the enactment of the "three laws" that provide subsidies to the towns in which the nuclear plants are located. The construction budget for the Mihama plant was limited, which matters because Mihama collects less in plant-generated property tax, which is steadily declining due to depreciation. The Mihama plant's electrical output is small, and subsidies to nuclear towns are based in part on the local plants' generating capacity. All in all, Mihama's nuclear plant has not been a significant contributor to its economy. Mihama's fiscal straits explain why the town spends a large fraction of its nuclear subsidies on facility operating expenses.

3. Takahama

Takahama's budgeting abruptly took on its distinctive qualities in the early 2000s. Until 2001, expenditures for ordinary construction comprised a large share of the town's spending. Beginning in 2002, however, public works spending began to fall and most of the non-investment spending of subsidies to the town for hosting the nuclear plant went towards facility operating expenses.

Prompting the change in spending was a rise in the town's ordinary balance ratio.[4] Takahama's ordinary balance ratio declined once the local nuclear plant began to operate, but incrementally rose again beginning in the 1990s. By 2003, Takahama's ordinary balance ratio was the highest among the four municipalities. The factors behind the rise include plant and equipment costs incurred in operating and maintaining public facilities and the transfer of more funds to sewer projects. Takahama's plant and equipment spending greatly exceeded the national average and the average for similar towns (Fukui Prefecture 2012)

For Takahama, becoming a nuclear site brought substantial financial benefits. Its nuclear power plant has four reactors, two of which went online in the 1970s, the others in the 1980s. As Takahama's power plant cost more to build and produces more electricity than the Mihama plant, it also generates more tax revenue for the town.

With the nuclear plant providing property tax revenues and nuclear subsidies, Takahama was able to build public facilities and install sewers. These public works require maintenance and so the town's ordinary balance ratio rises in sync with increasing maintenance costs. The costs of maintaining and operating capital investments made possible by the sizable revenues arising from the nuclear plant stretches Takahama's budget to the point where it cannot continue investing. As Shimizu (1992) and others point out, property taxes collected from nuclear plants shrink over time as the plants depreciate.[5] Towns are free to use property tax revenue as they see fit, but Takahama's discretionary spending budget is falling as its nuclear plant ages. At the same time, revisions to the nuclear subsidy system have eased restrictions on how towns can spend subsidies. This change has enabled municipalities to allocate a smaller percentage of their budgets to expenditures for ordinary construction in favor of spending more on facility maintenance and operations.

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[3] The fiscal capability index is calculated by dividing standard fiscal revenue (determined according to the Local Allocation Tax Act) by standard fiscal needs, averaged over three years.

[4] The ordinary balance ratio indicates how much flexibility exists in a local government's fiscal structure. It equals current expenditures (personnel costs, direct welfare payments, debt service costs, and other annual ordinary expenditures) paid out of general funds divided by current revenues (primarily local taxes and ordinary local allocation tax paid into general funds).

[5] As described in Shimizu (1992) and Kaneko et al. (2008), the decline in tax revenue gives municipalities an incentive to have more reactors built in their area.

4. Oi

Oi's approach to public investment has two notable characteristics. First, expenditure for ordinary construction consumes a large share of the town's expenditures. Second, Oi allocates a high percentage of subsidies it receives for hosting the nuclear plant for public investments. Oi's budgeting stands in contrast to Tsuruga's budgets, as the following comparison of their management of social infrastructure and budget-making indicates.

To begin with, there was little social infrastructure to speak of in Oi. In the 1980s, only around 40 percent of Oi's roads were paved, and therefore once the town began to receive property taxes and nuclear subsidies, it allocated these funds for capital improvement, thereby increasing the share of the budget spent on expenditures for ordinary construction.

Interviews I conducted revealed that Oi spent the subsidies it received for the siting of reactors 1 and 2 at the Oi power plant on schools, cable TV infrastructure, town roads, farm roads, sewers, and rural wastewater treatment plants. It used the subsides for reactors 3 and 4 to build a sports center, cable network updates, town and farm roads, sewers, and wastewater treatment plants.

By the end of the 1980s, more than 80 percent of Oi's roads were paved and other forms of infrastructure had similarly been developed. Despite this achievement, and despite the easing of restrictions on nuclear subsidy allocations, neither the share of the budget used for ordinary construction expenditures nor the share of the nuclear subsidies spent on public investment fell substantially. This factor can be traced back to Oi's budget-making process.

A questionnaire survey that I conducted asked respondents, "Whom do residents turn to in order to have their needs reflected in the town's budget?" In Tsuruga, Mihama, and Takahama respondents answered that "individual stakeholders lobby local government officials who oversee the policy area in question." Only in Oi did respondents answer that local district council leaders served as intermediaries who submit written requests to town officials and meet with them to convey what residents in their districts want. This pattern of direct citizen involvement and lobbying is likely behind the large share of Oi's budget going toward capital investment.

Conclusion

This article has highlighted how four municipalities where nuclear power plants are located vary in their public finances and analyzed the causes of their different spending patterns. The primary causes are differences in initial conditions, such as how much public infrastructure was in place before the nuclear plants were built or expanded, distinctive budget-making processes, and the amount of tax revenue and nuclear subsidies that a local plant generates for the local government. The Fukui nuclear towns demonstrate that local governments are using a single national framework for supporting nuclear expansion in a variety of ways.

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Janus and Gemini: The Challenges of Interdisciplinary Feminist Political Theory and Research on Diverse Citizenship in Canada and Japan

Jackie F. STEELE

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To attempt to speak new ways of thinking about the world is to run up against the limits of existing political and linguistic conventions. When asked about my research, I always feel the weight of simultaneously looking, as did Janus, to both the past and to the future. As a true Gemini, I am always of (at least) two minds when I approach a problem, and I enjoy the productive tensions that emerge from the interior debates between my various selves. Am I a political theorist or comparative political scientist? Am I a Canadian constitutionalist or a feminist political philosopher? Am I a Japan-Canada comparativist or a critical institutionalist? I will simply answer, "Yes. All of the above." Inspired primarily by political philosophy and electoral systems design, my field of inquiry does not fit neatly within one discipline, nor one school or linguistic tradition. In this short piece, I will first take you back to the places and people motivating my research questions, and then walk you forward to situate how my reflection on liberty speaks to critical debates on electoral systems design and institutional practices of diverse citizenship.

I pursued a joint political science/east asian studies degree at McGill University at the crux of the referendum on Quebec sovereignty. As the capital of Québec, Montreal is an arts and culture-rich, predominantly French-speaking city with a vibrant Québécois political culture, an English-speaking minority, an activist gay village, and a highly diverse Francophile/francophone immigrant population. This was a politically volatile time in Canadian history and the best place to live and breathe the political debates on Canadian constitutionalism, power-sharing and diversity. Following this crash course in Canadian *realpolitiks*, I moved to rural Nagano where I spent three years working for Koshoku City Hall. Through the multicultural diversity in the city, I learned of Japan's *zainichi* [resident] Chinese and Korean populations, of the plight of Filipino women brought over on entertainer visas, and of the recent waves of Brazilian workers. I learned of community struggles with *enjo kōsai* [compensated dating] and the problem of women's underemployment. None of these issues had turned up in my Japan studies courses. These experiences nurtured my reflections on national diversity, multiculturalism, gender equality and LGBT rights in Japan.

I was also socialized into the fierce spirit of voluntarism and civicism in rural Japan; I learned from astute residents how to *move* City Hall towards progressive projects, and I "wore the waving white gloves" for a municipal election campaign. I learned of the rich culinary and cultural heritage in Nagano and opened up space to discuss the origins of what constituted *traditional* Japanese culture. I was expected to share Canadian ideas with municipal colleagues and city residents. I spoke of the suffering imposed upon First

Nations, French-Canadians, Blacks, and Japanese-Canadians due to our racist white Anglo-Canadian past to help contextualize the contemporary consensus sustaining bilingualism, gender equality, multiculturalism, and aboriginal rights; it was an extremely rewarding three years.

Upon return to Canada, a parliamentary internship in the House of Commons left me deeply unsatisfied with the contradictory practices of equality and democracy in Canada. In light of the constitutional and political promises I had been conveying back in Nagano, I tried try to make sense of the loopholes affecting Canadian women's citizenship. I specialized in feminist legal philosophy, constitutionalism, and legal pluralism. My MA thesis evaluated the ways in which marriage laws trump women's equality and their rights to inviolate legal standing in Canada (common law), Québec (civil code), and also in Japan (*koseki seido*). I compared Canada and Quebec to Japan as I had met a young Japanese woman in Nagano who told me of her difficulties using her birth name. She and her husband quietly submitted a *paper*[1] divorce and a *paper* (re)marriage each time she needed to renew her ID. This individual act of resistance was fascinating. She was not a feminist lawyer or activist, but a housewife and mother of three who simply wanted the liberty to *be herself*; she cherished the beautiful name (green river) unto which she had been born and saw no legitimate reason why it ought to change upon marriage. Lucy Stone[2] would have agreed.

In Canada, we have similar contradictions. Although common law provinces offer *choice* in marital naming, the reality is that women are still often morally regulated by family and friends to choose patronymy. If they keep their birth name, their loyalty and love are often openly questioned. The legal framework of *free* choice is but an illusion in both Japan (*couples* choose a name) and Canada (*individuals* choose their names). I came to appreciate the Quebec civil code reform of 1980, which was grounded in the twin principles of *birth name permanence* and *gender equality*. By this logic, the relationship of a citizen to the state could not be trumped by a private contract, including marriage. The influence of the common law had meant that patronymy had become legally coercive in all of Canada. This was a deformation of the original practice, as Chief Justice Edward Coke stated in 1628 that although a person may have only one Christian name, "he may have divers surnames…at divers times" (Stannard 1984: footnote 1). A practice intended to offer men freedom over their family names had come to disenfranchise all marrying women of theirs. It assumed that women were to be publicly renamed as *wives* first, citizens second (see Steele 2008). Ultimately, the Quebec state, supported by the Quebec feminist movement, reformed its family law to legislatively and publicly counter the coercive practice of patroynymy; since 1980, marriage no longer constitutes justified grounds for a woman to change her last name.

In Japan, Fukushima Mizuho wrote her book on *fūfu bessei* [separate surnames] as early as 1993. In 2015, the discrimination against women like Midorikawa-san persists. Yet other progressive family registry reforms have advanced in neighbouring societies such as Korea (Shin 2006). As Japan flirts with the notion of a personal number for each citizen, the administrative benefits are separate surnames is worth noting. In Quebec, birth name permanence eliminated the redtape and administrative errors caused by multiple files being listed under different names due to marriage, divorce, re-marriage, and subsequent divorce, not to mention the name changes of children. Given the increasing rate of both divorce and of one-child families in Japan, and in light of the responsibilities of family inheritance and ancestral worship, the Quebec model offers both principled and pragmatic benefits that Japan may wish to consider.

This initial probing into women's *legal standing* within family law did not solve the question of women's *political liberty* within democratic institutions. I was confounded by the fact women were chronically under-represented in politics, despite

[1] A *paper* divorce and *paper* (re)marriage indicates that it was merely an administrative formality.

[2] Lucy Stone is the first American woman to have asserted her birth name after marriage; she formed the Lucy Stone League with other women so as to resist and contest the practice of patronymy (see Stannard 1977).

high levels of education. Why were so few Canadian (or Japanese) women chosen to be candidates? Were only Nordic women smart enough or deserving enough to lead their countries to greatness? Should we believe that political parties cannot find a mere 154 qualified women in all of Canada, or 240 in Japan, to serve as legislators in the Lower House? If the initial denial of women's suffrage was rationalized through family laws that placed women under the tutelage of fathers/husbands, why hadn't their subsequent access to suffrage/candidacy made a difference? Over two decades of federal Canadian stagnation at 20-25% elected women (Steele 2002) is anomalous given the constitutionality (Charter, Section 15.2) of legal measures. Quebec is anomalous for achieving a critical mass (30%) of elected women in 2003 despite the FPTP electoral system; moreover, the government proposed an electoral reform bill in 2005 that included financial incentives to parties ensuring greater gender balance and ethno-cultural diversity (Steele and Hébert 2006). Japan's stagnation is anomalous for other reasons. While electoral reforms worldwide (IDEA 2003a, 2003b, 2004, 2005) have addressed system failures related to women's under-representation, Japanese elites chose a mixed-PR parallel system that is largely unfavourable to women (Darcy and Nixon 1996). Further, they have chosen *one-off* voluntary measures (Steele 2007) and deem legal *gender* quotas to be unconstitutional, despite the ongoing use of legal *territorial* quotas to ensure regional representation (Steele 2014).

To solve these contradictions in democratic theory and practice, I back in time to study Roman republican conceptions of liberty. At the University of Ottawa, I was exposed to a rich multilingual training in the Francophone, Anglo-American, and European traditions of political thought from Cicéron and Machiavelli to contemporary neo-republican contributions of Jean-Fabien Spitz, Phillip Pettit and James Tully. Pettit's 1997 publication makes a passionate argument against the impoverished notion of *liberal* conceptions of liberty shackling contemporary democracies. Whereas *liberal* liberty focuses on a lack of "interference" by the state, *neo-Roman* republican liberty allows for a more nuanced understanding of the role of law to properly constitute relations of *non-domination* amongst any and all actors within the political community. This notion of liberty exposed the thin basis of liberal against the democratic use of the law to curtail discriminatory recruitment practices by political parties. Neo-republican liberty would allow us to re-align representative democracy through electoral laws that consciously foster relations of non-domination.

Over 100 countries worldwide have already chosen this path and use gender quotas. Canada has not yet formally opted for gender quotas, but it does practice power-sharing across other fault lines. As a hybrid offspring of the UK and France, with strong influences from the US, Canadian theories of difference (Taylor 1992; Kymlicka 1995; Tully 1995) and Canadian feminist intersectionality (Razack 1999; Morris and Bunjun 2007) have much to offer comparative citizenship theories. From the interculturalism commission in Quebec (Bouchard and Taylor 2008) to struggles with the hijab in France, from Japanese-style multicultural conviviality (Steele 2013b) to same-sex marriage certificates in Shibuya (Osaki 2015), these struggles of democratic inclusion are ongoing (Young 2000; Gagnon and Steele 2014). For the last three years, I have tracked the post-3.11 political advocacy of the *Japan Women's Network for Disaster Risk Reduction*. The advocacy of Domoto Akiko has revealed the key links between the descriptive and substantive representation (Pitkin 1967) of diverse women within the formal halls of Japanese power, and why the surrogate representation (Mansbridge 1999) of diverse Japanese women through social movement activism is crucial, if not a sufficient alternative. Recently, dissatisfaction with the dismally low levels of women's under-representation in Japan has materialized in the form of a new Parliamentary Group on Women's Political Empowerment (*Seiji bunya ni okeru josei no katsuyaku to seiji sankaku*). I look forward to their recommendations.

Liberty is a legal and a political phenomenon, but most importantly, it is a praxis that requires legal *and* institutional grounding. When taken seriously, liberty *in diversity* can renew the contest of ideas taken up by society, by political parties, and thus by our democratic institutions; it can re-invigorate representative democracy itself. If theory in an ivory tower is impoverished by its lack of grounding in the practical messiness of the

human condition, likewise, empirical research without philosophy seems to lack soul. *Practical philosophy* aims to find that middle ground of reflexive thinking between theory and practice, between past practice and future aspiration, between what is and what could be. From marital naming to constitutionalism, from liberty to electoral systems design, from diverse citizenship to representative institutions and back again, what does this tell you about my research and its relevance to debates on contemporary citizenship in Japan and Canada? I will let you decide.

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Florian Kohlbacher

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February 12, 2015

The Rise of the Ikumen Market: A Study of the Commercialisation of Japan's New Fathers and Their Identities

In recent decades, Japan has become a rapidly aging, low birthrate society. While fathers have traditionally held a distant position in the Japanese family, the last few years have seen changes in the image of fathers in Japanese society. The Japanese public increasingly recognizes the importance of paternal involvement in everyday family life, and more and more men are making efforts to actively engage in childcare. This is illustrated through ikumen, a popular term used in Japan to describe fathers who are actively involved in child-rearing. Ikumen has received widespread media attention as well as support from the Japanese government, which hopes to use these 'nurturing fathers' to counter declining birth rates. This presentation deals with the economic side of ikumen. starting with an outline of the emerging ikumen market and the commercialisation of Japan's new fathers and their identities. We triangulate quantitative and qualitative data gathered from secondary data analysis, expert interviews, a content analysis of the magazine FQ Japan as well as ethnographic research. Using actor-network theory, we examine a recent surge in ikumen goods, business initiatives that aim to bind involved fathers as customers and the economic potential of the ikumen market. Our results show that the ikumen market and the commercialisation of fatherhood cannot only be traced back to business-side innovation but to a larger extent to processes of transformation in Japanese society. Aiming to turn nurturing fathers into customers, businesses themselves are becoming participants in this ongoing example of social change, and partake in shaping a symbiotic relationship between the ikumen market and the ikumen phenomenon.

Miura Mari

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April 16, 2015

Neoliberal Motherhood: Care and Work in the Japanese Welfare State

Women in general, and working mothers in particular, occupy a strategic position in Japan's welfare capitalism. In order to generate economic growth amid the shrinking labor force, policy makers have recognized the importance of pushing women into the labor market. At the same time, the low birth rate has propelled them to pursue work-life balance policy as well as childcare policy. Recently, this "womenomics" discourse has also penetrated growth strategy and become a justification for positive measures. Nevertheless, these seemingly working-women friendly polices have not yielded concrete results. My presentation asks why numerous women-friendly policies are at best schizophrenic, if not mutually contradictory. More broadly, I explore why gender inequality has persisted in Japan, looking at the position of women in policy discourses and partisan debate. I focus on the blending of neoliberalism and statist family ideology held by the dominant Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which I label "neoliberal motherhood," to explain Japan's schizophrenic policy response. Women's bodies are objectified not just in statist family ideology but in the neoliberal project as well.



Nakano Koichi

(Professor of Political Science at the Faculty of Liberal Arts at Sophia University)

May 21, 2015

New Right Japan: The Neoliberal Path to Illiberal Politics

There is much discussion today over whether Japan is shifting to the right. Particularly since Prime Minister Abe Shinzo returned to office in December 2012, controversies surrounding the so-called "history" issues, including the Yasukuni Shrine and the comfort women (sex slaves) problems, returned to the center stage of domestic politics as well as international affairs, and combined with the territorial disputes and concerns over security, aggravated the tensions in the Northeast Asian region. While an increasing number of scholars and journalists started to express serious concerns over Abe's historical revisionism and authoritarian politics (and their potential implications), there are also those who contend that these concerns are exaggerated, if not simply misguided—that Japan is merely (and belatedly) becoming "normal." Nakano takes the view that there has indeed been a shift to the right in Japanese politics since the 1990s, both in terms of domestic, socioeconomic policies, and in terms of foreign and security policy. He further makes the case that the rightward shift has essentially been an elite-driven process with fits and starts, and in successive waves (rather than a unilinear progression rightward in one stroke). Superficially, the political system became more pluralistic and fragmented, even though the ideological parameters have in reality been shrinking and drifting to the right. In what he calls the New Right transformation, the nature of the right went through an important transformation as a new coalition of political illiberalism (revisionist nationalism) and neoliberalism replaced the Old Right that consisted of developmentalism and clientelism.

Frances McCall Rosenbluth

(Professor of Political Science at Yale University)

July 9, 2015

What Explains Bias toward Immigrants?: Evidence from a Conjoint Survey Experiment in Japan, with Seiki Tanaka (University of Amsterdam) and Reiko Kage (University of Tokyo)

An emerging academic consensus contends that economic self-interest alone cannot explain individual attitudes towards immigration in rich democracies. A recent welter of studies points to some combination of "sociotropic" concern for the nation's overall economy, generalized worries about fiscal drain, and/or fear of a dilution of cultural "purity" interacting with specific concerns about competition for wages or jobs (c.f. Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter 2007; Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; Tingley 2013; Malhotra, Margalit, and Mo 2013; Dancygier and Donnelly 2013; Goldstein and Peters 2014). Our study adds support to this psychologically-inflected view, finding that in Japan, as elsewhere, skilled workers prefer skilled immigrants to low-skilled immigrants. A preference for skilled immigrants, which is not unique to Japan but is common across rich countries, poses a double challenge to the standard tenets of neoclassical economics since low-skilled workers, provided they are not net welfare recipients, should both contribute to the economy as a whole and be less threatening to the jobs and wages of native high skilled workers. Although more research is needed to trace and verify the mechanisms, our findings are consistent with a socially constructed "sociotropic xenophobia" for electoral gain and business success.

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Bernard Gagnon et Jackie F. Steel (dir.)
『Concilier démocratie et diversité:
Essais de théorie politique』
（P.I.E.Peter Lang S.A）2014年6月25日

宇野重規・五百旗頭薫（編）
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（有斐閣）2015年1月25日



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『超大国・中国のゆくえ 4
経済大国化の軋みとインパクト』
（東京大学出版会）2015年2月10日

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

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『社会科学における善と正義：
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（東京大学出版会）2015年5月21日



橋本健二（編）（佐藤香、中川宗人）
『戦後日本社会の誕生』
（弘文堂）2015年6月15日

Focus on ISS

Institute of Social Science Library

GODA Koichi and ASAHINA Shinichi

In previous issues, we introduced special collections in three fields: 1) Japan's labor history, 2) Asia-Japan relations, and 3) Manchuria and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. In our fourth and final installment, we present three collections of materials from Europe.

Deutscher Gewerkschautsbund (DGB) Archives
Archives from the DGB (German Confederation of Trade Unions) Library were purchased in 1981. They include the papers collected by Johann Sassenbach, who served as both secretary and secretary general of the International Federation of Trade Unions.

The time span covered by the documents begins at the start of the twentieth century and ends in the 1970s. Insights into German and European politics, economies, and labor relations in Imperial Germany, the Weimar Republic, the Nazi era, and the postwar period are offered by the records, research papers, reports, and other materials that comprise this collection.

The portion of the DGB archives that merits the most attention is the "Unions" sub-collection. Over half of its books relate to labor unions with ties to the Social Democratic Party. Included are periodicals such as annual executive reports, convention reports, and convention proceedings published by variety of unions at various stages of growth and decline. The DGB archives also include a large number of pamphlets not easily accessed elsewhere in Japan, spanning several decades and addressing a wide range of topics.

France's February Revolution Collection (a collection of manuscripts, books, newspapers, and other printed matter concerning the period 1848-1851)
(Collection des manuscrits, livres, journaux et divers documents imprimés concernant la période 1848-1851)

This collection, which the ISS Library purchased in 1983, includes government edicts, legislative bills, newspapers, letters, and other original documents dating from the 1848 February Revolution to the start of the Second Empire under Louis Napoleon in 1851.

The heart of the collection consists of political posters, magazines of the period, bills submitted in the Constituent Assembly, reports, manuscripts, and correspondence collected by Léon de Chazelles (1786-1857), who was active in politics at the time of the February Revolution, and H. Feugueray (1813-1854), a journalist.

F. Baade Collection
In 1985, the ISS Library purchased the papers of Fritz Baade (1893-1974), a professor at Kiel University in Germany. Baade served in the Bundestag as a member of the Social Democratic Party and was one of Germany's leading economic theorists. He was also well-known as a policy advocate, and his research, especially in the fields of German agricultural policy and land economics, was internationally acclaimed.

How to use the collections
To access these collections, patrons must submit a "request to use special colelctions" to obtain a permit from the library in advance. Please consult the library for more information on how to use the materials: counter@iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp. Our website is http://library.iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp/index_e.html.

This concludes our series introducing featured collections in the ISS Library. More information about special collections in our library can be found online at http://library.iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp/collection/