

# Social Science

# Japan



## *Gender*



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Deliberation on the implementation  
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Courtesy of the Gender Equality  
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**Editorial Notes**  
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George Bush.

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A quarter century has passed since Japan ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, and enacted the Equal Employment Opportunity Law. It is also more than ten years since the Basic Law for a Gender-equal Society took effect. There are, however, various unsolved gender-related issues in many aspects of Japanese society such as employment, social security and work-life balance. In addition, gender is the one of the topics which have attracted much attention from researchers and students across the globe who are interested in contemporary Japanese society.

To date, ISS has affiliated with several experts in gender-related studies in a variety of disciplines, and has been a partner in Tohoku University's Global COE program, "Gender Equality and Multicultural Conviviality in the Age of Globalization." This issue of the *Social Science Japan Newsletter* focuses on gender in contemporary Japanese society. First, Mari Osawa discusses how poverty in Japanese society is affected by the government's redistribution policies and its conceptions of gender. Secondly, Yuichiro Mizumachi summarises problems concerning employment non-discrimination legislation in Japan. Hiroki Sato argues for the necessity of providing work-life balance support to give women more opportunities in their workplaces. Makiko Fuwa then presents an international comparative study on women's work patterns—in and out of the home—during and after child rearing. Finally Kana Takamatsu draws our attention to the relationships between nations' gender relations and the foreign developmental assistance activities of their governments.

In the "Research Report" section, Tomonobu Hayashi presents his path to becoming an expert researcher in constitutional law, and Hiroyuki Hoshiro discusses his current research interest in the integration of history and theory in the area of international relations.

In addition to presenting abstracts of the ISS Contemporary Japan Group (CJG) and recently published books written by members of our research staff at the ISS, we feature a new section detailing ISS research activities, "Focus on ISS." The first installment covers the activities of the ISS Branch of the Global COE Program.

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# It is the Government That Has Bigger Problems—Gender Issues in Japanese Society

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## **1. Gender and the Problems Facing an Economic Powerhouse**

With the second or third largest economy after the United States, there is no doubt that Japan is an economic powerhouse, but it is also well-known that this economic powerhouse faces a host of big problems. For instance, Japan's outstanding public debt is the largest among advanced nations. Countries around the world sustained damage from the economic and financial crisis brought on by the "Lehman shock" in September 2008, but among major nations, the drop in gross domestic product was greatest in Japan. Japan is the only major nation unable to escape from a sustained deflationary slump, and compared with Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States, stock prices are recovering at a slower rate.

When Japan's problems viewed at the level of people's daily lives, one can see, for example, that its suicide rate is the highest among countries

from which statistics are available and that its birthrate is the lowest in the world. Even though Japan boasts the longest lifespans in the world, it is difficult for people to live out their lives fully and for people to bear and raise children. In addition, the relative poverty rate is one of the highest among advanced nations. In this manner, the problems in people's daily lives become interwoven, and they manifest themselves in the macro-level problems mentioned above.

What I would like to emphasize here is that life issues are strongly correlated with gender. First, the enterprise of bearing and raising children is directly related to gender. While the majority of people who commit suicide are men, an international comparison of World Health Organization data shows that Japan ranks second in female suicide rate and seventh in male suicide rate. Furthermore, although people tend to think that poverty is tied to men losing their jobs, an international comparison of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) data reveals a remarkable feature of Japan's poor in households with heads of working age (18-64): a steep 40% of poor working age households include two or more employed adults. In other countries, the working age poor consist mostly of households without working members or lone-parent households. It should also be noted that the poverty rate of Japan's lone-parent households is the highest among OECD nations, although the percentage of lone-parent households is low. Most households with two or more employed adults are probably households in which both the husband and the wife work. This means that the working-age poor in Japan stay poor while employed and even when a couple dually earns. Poverty of lone-parent households which are overwhelmingly headed by mothers, as well as poverty of dual earning households reflects a same serious gender issue--Japanese women have very limited earning power.

Relative poverty refers to the status of households where the equivalent income (i.e., household

income adjusted by the number of household members) is less than 50% of the median income. This is the indicator used in international comparisons by the OECD and other institutions. Obviously, suicide and difficulties in bearing and raising children are not merely issues of income, but in Japan they are closely linked to low income. To reiterate, the problem of low income is a gender issue.

## **2. The DPJ Administration and the Basic Plan for Gender Equality**

Japan experienced a historic change of government in September 2009 when the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) cabinet took office with slogans such as "putting people's lives first," "from concrete to people" and "leadership by politicians." There is no doubt that this change in government was due to the sentiment of voters who felt that the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) could no longer be charged with tackling the myriad issues that Japan faced. So, what is the DPJ administration's take on the intersection of gender and the problems that Japan faces and how does it plan to resolve these issues?

The Third Basic Plan for Gender Equality, enacted by the cabinet on December 17, 2010, sheds some light on these questions. Basic plans for gender equality are formulated every five years in accordance with the Basic Law for a Gender-Equal Society that was promulgated in 1999. Deliberations in the Council for Gender Equality—one of the major councils established by the Cabinet Office—on the Third Basic Plan began in March 2009, before the change in government, at the behest of then-prime minister Taro Aso of the LDP. The bulk of discussions were held after the DPJ came into power, and a report on those deliberations was issued on July 23, 2010. The Third Basic Plan was finalized based on this report. Let us now look at the plan's main features.

According to the Cabinet Office Gender Equality Bureau, the plan has four main components: 1) new priorities were established in response to socioeconomic changes, 2) targets were defined for each area of focus to ensure effectiveness, 3) additional efforts were planned to achieve the goal of filling at least 30% of leadership positions with women, and 4) emphasis was placed on invigorating society and

the economy through the activation of women and on clearing up the "M-shaped curve" in the labor participation ratio of women (<http://www.gender.go.jp/kihon-keikaku/3rd/3-24.pdf>).

The priority fields in (1) are as follows: Gender Equality for Men and Children; Support for Men and Women Facing Poverty and Other Lifestyle Issues; Improvements to Living Environments for the Elderly, the Disabled and Foreigners; Gender Equality in Science, Technology and Academia; Promotion of Gender Equality in Regional Communities, Disaster Prevention, the Environment and Other Fields (ibid.).

The hand of the DPJ administration is evident in the plan's focus on poverty and its aim to "alleviate the M-shaped curve," the phenomenon in which a high percentage of women in their 30s leave the labor force for several years. It should be noted that the DPJ emphasized poverty, because the LDP had been very reluctant to recognize the existence of poverty in Japanese society until 2009. Upon seizing the reins of power, the DPJ immediately released the results of the government's poverty rate measurements which had never been officially calculated under the LDP government (Osawa 2010). As for M-shaped curve, while the LDP government had provided support to help women find employment, it had never advocated its clearing up.

I served as a member of the Prime Minister's Office's Advisory Council for Gender Equality until 2000 and was involved in the formulation of both the Basic Law for a Gender-Equal Society and the First Basic Plan for Gender Equality. I also served as a member of a Specialist Committee under the Council for Gender Equality from 2001 until 2004. In those years I felt limitations in promoting gender equality under a basically conservative government. Hence, I welcome the fact that the DPJ administration's Third Basic Plan for Gender Equality contains the aforementioned features.

## **3. Is the Public Consciousness Really What Requires "Reflection"?**

There are a few points in the Third Basic Plan, however, that concern me. The first ideal set forth in the plan is a "gender-equal society without



stereotyped notion of gender division of roles." This ideal reflects the July 2010 Council for Gender Equality report which stated "gender equality has not necessarily made sufficient progress" despite the myriad initiatives undertaken in the ten years since the enactment of the Basic Law for a Gender-Equal Society:

Japan ranks a low 57th out of 109 countries in the United Nations' Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM). In addition, 60% of working women quit when they become pregnant or give birth, and one out of two women are in irregular employment....The working population is declining due to the dwindling birthrate and aging, and there is an increasing sense of economic stagnation. With an increase in irregular employment and poverty as well as the expansion of disparity, the social and economic climate of Japan is in flux. Against this backdrop, the nation faces urgent issues such as invigorating society by activating women, promoting gender equality for men and children and assisting people who find themselves in a variety of difficult situations.

So the report emphasizes, "we have to seriously reflect that gender equality has not made sufficient progress" (<http://www.gender.go.jp/danjo-kaigi/siryoka35-1-2.pdf>). I share the same concerns. Where my opinion differs from the report is on the subject of reflection. The section entitled "Reflection of 10 Years after the Enactment of the Basic Act" states "the notion of a stereotyped gender division of roles is still deeply rooted, and efforts towards its elimination were insufficient" and "the idea that husbands should work while women care for the home remains strong, despite its gradual weakening." Thus the Third Basic Plan has set forth as its first ideal a "gender-equal society without stereotyped notion of gender division of roles."

However, an examination of the Basic Law for a Gender-Equal Society reveals that it does not include eliminating stereotyping as its basic principle. Regarding the issue of the stereotyped gender division of roles, the law states:

In consideration that social systems or practices can become factors impeding formation

of a gender-equal society by reflecting the stereotyped division of roles on the basis of gender, etc., thus having a non-neutral effect on the selection of social activities by women and men, care should be taken so that social systems and practices have as neutral an impact as possible on this selection of social activities ([http://www.gender.go.jp/english\\_contents/basic\\_law/chapter1.html](http://www.gender.go.jp/english_contents/basic_law/chapter1.html)).

The "stereotyped division of roles on the basis of gender, etc.," in Article 4 does not include the word "notion," and the target for reform should not be "the stereotyped division of roles" but rather the "social systems or practices," that "reflect" those roles. The Basic Law recognizes that these systems and practices, which influence personal choice, are what is hindering the realization of gender equality.

Simply put, Article 4 of the Basic Act contains the excuse that Japanese politicians and bureaucrats often use to explain why, no matter how hard they try, necessary reforms make no progress: lagging public awareness. After a decade since the enactment of the Basic Law for a Gender-Equal Society, and even after a historic change in government, should the issue of gender equality in Japan end up being reduced to a matter of "public consciousness"? This is my reservations about the Third Basic Plan.

Of course, the Third Plan—like the plans before it—does contain a policy for "reviewing social systems and practices through the lens of gender equality" in accordance with Article 4 of the Basic Law. It also targets the same social systems and practices as the previous plans, namely, family law issues such as the spouse deduction in personal income taxes, the National Pension Class 3 insured system and surnames of married persons.

For the record, the spouse deduction on income taxes and resident taxes refers to a deduction (currently ¥380,000) from the income of taxpayers whose spouses' annual earning is less than the designated threshold (currently ¥1.03 million). Since Japan employs progressive taxation, this is a big tax break for high income earners. Class 3 insured persons are individuals who can receive a basic pension benefit without paying contributions themselves provided they are the "dependent spouse" of

an insured person who is a full-time employee. Currently, the annual income limit to be considered eligible as a dependent is ¥1.3 million. Regarding the surnames of married persons, the Civil Code dictates that, upon marrying, one person must give up his or her original surname and take the surname of the other, and over 95% of couples use the husband's surname. Since the mid-1990s, whether to adopt a system of "selective surnames," in which husbands and wives can choose to continue using their original surnames, if they mutually agree to do so, has been a perennial issue.

In sum, the Third Basic Plan has not retreated from its stated aim of "reviewing social systems and practices through the lens of gender equality," but there are no sections that are the obvious handiwork of the new administration. It does not convey a strong sense of awareness that gender equality is the key to overcoming the various issues facing Japanese society.

#### 4. In Japan, income redistribution is increasing the poverty rate


Let us now consider the problem of low incomes. Looking at OECD nations in the mid-2000s, the relative poverty rate was the highest in Anglo-Saxon countries, excluding Great Britain, followed by Japan, South Korea and the countries of Southern Europe. Poverty rates in Scandinavia

were low, while rates in Western continental Europe were higher but still lower than the OECD average (except for Germany which was slightly higher). Countries with high poverty rates for the entire population also posted rates exceeding 20% for people past retirement age; South Korea reached 48.51% and Japan 20.55%.

Figure 1 shows working-age population poverty rates according to market income (wages and other private sector earnings) and disposable income (market income plus government or social security cash benefits minus direct taxes and social security contributions). In other words, disposable income is the amount individuals have left after government income transfers, not including indirect taxes. Figure 1 also shows the impact of government and social security benefits and direct taxes. Comparing poverty rates at the market income and disposable income levels, one can see the effect of redistribution from government income transfers.

In most European countries, government transfers reduced the poverty rate from market income levels by more than 50% and kept the poverty rate at the disposable income level below 10%. Countries of different pattern include Mexico, the United States, Canada, Spain and South Korea, and especially Japan. At 12.47%, Japan's poverty rate calculated by disposable income ranked sixth highest among these countries. As stated earlier, one char-

Figure 1: Poverty Rates, Poverty Reduction Rates for Working-Age Populations in OECD Countries, Mid-2000s



Notes: Countries are ordered by poverty rates at the disposable income level from highest to lowest.

Source: Based on Figure 3-9 in "OECD 2009"

acteristic of Japan's working-age poor is that 40% live in households with two or more employed adults. Japan's poverty reduction rate of 8.2% is the lowest after Mexico. The poverty rate at the level of market income is 13.58%, which is the lowest after South Korea, but the poverty rate at the level of disposable income is only slightly smaller.

One concern is that the recent shift to non-regular work in Japan has increased income disparity and poverty at the market income level. That being said, one achievement of Japan's private sector is low market income poverty levels among OECD nations. One factor is the unemployment rate which, while it has risen since the mid-1990s, remains at 5.44% as opposed to the OECD average of 7.27% (the unemployment rate in South Korea is 3.92%). This means that Japan's problem lies with government income transfers, namely, its tax and social security systems.

Figure 2 examines two groups within the working-age population: households with all adults working and one-earner couple households. Households with all adults working include dual-earner households, lone-parent households and single person households. Astonishingly, the poverty reduction rate for Japan's households with all adults working is negative. Given that redistribution through government income transfers is supposed to reduce poverty and alleviate inequality, an increased poverty rate after redistribution means the system has, in fact, reverse function. There are no other OECD countries that manifest this trend.


The overwhelming majority of one-earner couple households are probably male breadwinner households. As the figure shows, the poverty reduction rate for male breadwinner households in most countries is much larger than that for households with all adults working. Countries where this does not apply include Anglo-Saxon countries, South Korea, Spain, Greece, Italy and Sweden. In Japan's male breadwinner households, as well, there is only slight poverty reduction via redistribution, but since the reduction rate for households with all adults working is negative, one must admit that the disparity between these groups is significant. This clearly shows that Japan's social systems and practices are the most male breadwinner-oriented among OECD nations and that its male breadwinner orientation is rather a product of government income transfers than of private sector practices.

There is no escaping the fact that these kinds of public policies promote a stereotyped notion of gender division of roles. The Japanese government has much policymaking work to do before it issues a call to raise public awareness.

## Reference

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**Figure 2: Poverty Reduction Rates in OECD Countries by Working-Age Population Household Type, Mid-2000s**



Notes: Countries are ordered by poverty reduction rates for households with all working adults from lowest to highest.

Source: Created based on Figure 3-9 in "OECD 2009"

# Issue Brief: Employment Non-Discrimination Legislation in Japan

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## 1. The Importance of Employment Non-Discrimination Laws

### *Trends in the United States and Europe*

Employment non-discrimination has achieved an important position in the employment laws of various countries. In the United States, for example, all aspects of employment discrimination from the time of hiring until the time of termination are prohibited. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex and national origin, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 prohibits discrimination based on age, and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 prohibits discrimination against qualified individuals with disabilities. In the European Union (EU), the Equal Pay Directive (75/117/EEC) prohibits discrimination based on sex, the Racial Equality Directive (2000/43/EC) prohibits discrimination based on race and ethnic origin, and the Employment Framework Directive (2000/78/EC) prohibits dis-

crimination on the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation. These Directives require all member nations to prohibit all aspects of employment discrimination from the time of hiring until the time of termination, and each country has formulated domestic laws based thereupon. The EU has also adopted the Directive on Part-time Work (997/81/EC), the Directive on Fixed-term Work (999/70/EC) and the Directive on Temporary and Agency Work (2008/104/EC).

### *Basic Principles of Employment Non-Discrimination*

What are the basic principles that underlie these employment non-discrimination laws? In the United States, two types of discrimination are prohibited: (1) discrimination based on "immutable characteristics" that a person cannot change by his own effort or intention, and (2) discrimination based on "fundamental rights" such as suffrage rights, freedom of religion and the right to privacy. The idea is that actions that violate the legal philosophy of "personal dignity" are not condonable. In the EU, employment non-discrimination is also promoted as an employment measure to spur economic growth and increase employment, since maximizing human resources leads to improved competition among companies.

## 2. Employment Non-Discrimination Law in Japan: Background and Issues

In contrast, Japan has not enacted legislation that comprehensively bans employment discrimination. Only the following laws and legal provisions explicitly prohibit employment discrimination.

*Labor Standards Act and the Gender Equality Doctrine*  
Formulated in 1947, the original Labor Standards Act prohibited discrimination with respect to working conditions by reason of nationality, creed or social status (Article 3) and gender wage discrimination (Article 4). The reason that the 1947 Labor Standards Act only banned gender wage discrimination instead of stipulating a comprehensive ban on gender discrimination was



because it was thought that the law would lack consistency since it actually provided several stipulations that gave women special protection with regard to overtime work, night work and the like. Since then, court rulings have sought to regulate discrimination against women to a certain degree without the existence of legislation prohibiting discrimination beyond wages.

These rulings have developed what has come to be called the "gender equality doctrine." Examples include the *Sumitomo Cement* case, in which the systematic firing of married women was invalidated as a "violation of the public order" (Tokyo District Court ruling of December 20, 1966), and the *Nissan Motors* case, in which a system of different retirement ages for men (60 years) and women (55 years) was likewise deemed null and void as a violation of the public order (Supreme Court ruling of March 24, 1981).

#### *The Equal Opportunity Act*

In 1985, Japan formulated the Act on Equal Employment Opportunity between Men and Women (hereafter the "Equal Opportunity Act") as part of the legislative changes required to ratify the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. The Equal Opportunity Act prohibited gender discrimination with regard to retirement, termination and some forms of training and benefits, but had no penalties for non-compliance. It only stipulated that firms had non-binding obligations to work towards achieving non-discrimination—taking into consideration the status of male-female relationships and differences in awareness of the time—in recruitment, hiring, assignments and promotion. Furthermore, since the Act stated a basic principle of "promoting the welfare and raising the status of women" who were in a position inferior to men, it only prohibited the disadvantageous treatment of women. Giving no heed to the possibility of the favorable treatment of women, the Act possessed an element of "one-sided prohibition of discrimination."

Since the Equal Opportunity Act contained numerous deficiencies with regard to realizing

gender equality in employment, it was significantly revised in 1997. These revisions banned discrimination in recruitment, hiring, assignments, promotion and training, and bolstered methods to ensure the effective elimination of discrimination by providing more robust dispute settlement procedures. Also, the 1985 law only offered women protection from workplace discrimination (i.e., provided a type of favorable treatment towards women) which was deemed as violating the guidelines of the revised Equal Opportunity Act. Corrections were made to remedy the one-sided prohibition of discrimination. However, since the revised stipulations in the Equal Opportunity Act continued to take the form of banning discrimination against women, some one-sidedness remained and the legislation was still inadequate in comparison to the equal opportunity legislation in the United States and Europe.

Given these shortcomings, the Equal Opportunity Act was drastically revised again in 2006. Major points in the 2006 revisions included: (1) the prohibition of discrimination against men in a provision stipulating a "two-sided" ban on gender discrimination; (2) in addition to the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex (i.e., direct discrimination), a new stipulation prohibiting substantive discrimination on the basis of physical traits such as height, weight, or physical strength (i.e., indirect discrimination) was added (Article 7); and (3) disadvantageous treatment for reasons of marriage, pregnancy and childbirth was clearly prohibited (Article 9).

#### *Laws Concerning Other Forms of Employment Discrimination*

In 2007, the Part-Time Work Act of 1993 was almost completely overhauled. The revised legislation prohibited the discriminatory treatment of part-time workers employed under term-limited contracts who performed the same work under the same human resource systems and processes as regular workers (i.e., full-time employees with indefinite-term contracts) (Article 8). Furthermore, the 2007 revisions to the Employment Policy Act banned, in principle, age discrimination in the recruitment and hiring of workers<sup>1</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> Employers are allowed to have an age limit in recruiting as an exceptional case if they have specific reasons such as long-term plans to develop young employees' careers based on extensive years of service at their companies.

As for types of employment discrimination not covered in these laws (such as discrimination on the basis of disability and discrimination on the basis of age in areas other than recruitment and appointment), their legality is determined by the courts within a framework of whether or not the public order (Civil Code, Article 90) has been violated, giving due consideration to the spirit of personal rights in the Constitution (Articles 13 and 14).

### **3. Future Policy Issues**

Policy issues surrounding Japan's employment non-discrimination legislation include: (1) whether to create all-inclusive legislation, along the lines of American and European laws, banning discrimination including discrimination at the time of hiring and discrimination on the basis of age and disability; (2) clarifying the burden of proof in discrimination cases by requiring employers to show objective reasons for discrimination; (3) systematizing legal incentives to promote self-directed initiatives to help remedy discrimination (e.g., planning and implementing "action plans" in the workplace); and (4) develop-

ing other structural foundations to effectively resolve the issues of employment discrimination.

The Democratic Party of Japan, which took control of the government after the 2009 general elections, outlined the following concept in their manifesto: "We will realize equal treatment such that people doing the same work at the same workplace can receive the same wage, regardless of whether they are regular or non-regular workers." Accordingly, the "New Growth Strategy" that the government approved in June 2010 declared that "action to guarantee the equal treatment of part-time workers, fixed-term workers and temporary workers and to promote their transition to regular positions" should be taken by FY2013. Based on this, one can expect revisions to the Part-Time Work Act and the Worker Dispatching Act as well as the formulation of a Fixed-Term Labor Contract Act going forward. The question remains as to whether these pieces of legislation will employ the EU-style principle of prohibiting the discriminatory treatment of part-time workers, term-limited workers and temporary workers or rely on a different type of equal treatment principle based on Japanese employment practices.

# Supporting Work-Life Balance and Expanding the Playing Field for Women<sup>1</sup>

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## *Introduction*

In this article I would like to examine the need for companies to support the work-life balance of their employees to improve human resource utilization and expand the playing field for women. I would also like to discuss the issues involved in bringing such support to fruition. Corporate measures for work-life balance develop, maintain, and improve employee motivation and contribute to increased work efficiency. At the same time, they also provide opportunities for both men and women to demonstrate their abilities while allowing men to secure time to participate in family and community activities.

## *The Need for Work-Life Balance Support*

Workplaces which promote work-life balance are environments where workers can fulfill the occu-

pational responsibilities that their company and their superiors expect them to fulfill and where they can also engage in non-work life activities that they want to or have to undertake. On the other hand, workplaces in which the work-life balance has yet to be realized are environments in which workers striving to fulfill the occupational responsibilities that their company and their superiors expect of them do so at the expense of non-work activities that they want or have to undertake, thereby resulting in work-life conflict.

Major transformations in workers' personal life interests and desired lifestyles have given rise to increasing support for work-life balance and the alleviation of work-life conflict has become important in the management of human resources. Due to the increasing number of women entering the workforce and the subsequent rise in dual-earner households, there are more male and female workers who now need or wish to spend more time on personal and community activities. Looking at personal time distribution, there is a growing segment of workers who need more time or wish to spend more time on activities outside of work.

On the other hand, when one examines the features of human resource utilization in Japanese companies, the ideal worker has been an individual who—regardless of marital status—can work any number of hours when the company needs him or her to do so. Underlying this ideal is the concept of men's work, established during the period of rapid economic growth, based on the division of labor in which men worked while women kept house and raised children. The majority of men led lifestyles centered on work, and this remained the predominant approach until the early 1980s.

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<sup>1</sup> For details, please refer to Hiroki Sato and Emiko Takeishi, *Shokuba no Wāku Raifu Baransu* (The work-life balance at work). Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shinbunsha, 2010 and Hiroki Sato and Emiko Takeishi, *Hito wo Ikasu Kigyō ga Nobiru: Jinji Senryaku toshite no Wāku Raifu Baransu* (Companies grow with motivated employees: Human resource strategies for achieving work-life balance). Tokyo: Keisō Shobō, 2008.

In the 1980s, the preferred lifestyles of women changed, and both the number of women entering the workforce and the number of dual-earner households increased. As a result, the number of women who require time for childrearing and other activities outside of work has risen as has the number of men who want to participate in raising their children. This trend does not stop with childrearing. The number of employed individuals who want time for self-improvement or who have found they need time to care for elderly parents is also on the rise.

Despite this increase in employees who have limits on the time they can devote to work, human resource practices and company workplace cultures that function on the assumption that their employees have unlimited time for work remain firmly in place. One of the reasons for this situation is that many of today's middle managers developed their careers working under superiors who felt that a work-centered lifestyle was preferable. Not only did these workers get promoted into managerial positions, they also assumed a preference for a work-centered lifestyle for themselves.

Employees with limits on the time they can devote to their jobs who work for managers who prefer employees with no such limits often cannot find the time they need, or want, for non-work activities when striving to meet the expectations of their companies or bosses, leaving them to face work-life conflicts. On the other hand, a wide variety of research shows that if these work-life conflicts continue, workers experience negative consequences such as a decline in their quality of life and reduced efficiency at work. Companies are increasingly finding they need to support work-life balance and eliminate work-life conflict to avoid decreasing employees' quality of life and to help employees maintain high levels of productivity.

#### *The Key Lies with How Managers Manage*

To realize work-life balance support, companies must do more than just adopt support systems for childcare leave and the like. Companies cannot assume that employees can always work overtime or on weekends. To ensure the smooth implementation of work-life balance support

measures such as leave systems and part-time working, it is essential to share information and expand the scope of work assignments so that employees are able to cover each other's duties.

This kind of human resource utilization will make all employees, including management, aware of the effective use of time and will contribute to greater work efficiency and productivity through the prioritization of tasks and the elimination of unnecessary work.

#### *Why Men's Participation in Childrearing is Important*

Work-life balance concerns both men and women, but many companies operate programs with women, namely married women, in mind. The reason for this is that many companies are still highly conscious of the division of labor between men and women in which women are responsible for childcare and elder care.

Some feel that the participation of men in childrearing is a problem for married couples that does not require support from society or companies. However, when looking at working women who are raising children, balancing work and childrearing is something that they have not undertaken on their own but with the support and understanding of their workplace colleagues. Given this, if the spouse of a working mother works long hours at another company and does not participate in childrearing whatsoever, then only his wife's company bears the cost of providing support for childrearing. As a result, this can lead to companies that try, as much as possible, to avoid hiring women, creating gender-based employment discrimination. For this reason, it is important that all companies encourage men to participate in childrearing while enhancing work-life balance support measures.

#### *Supporting Work-Life Balance and Expanding the Playing Field for Women*

Depending on how it is managed, work-life balance support can run the risk of ossifying the gender-based division of labor. Even if companies provide enhanced work-life balance support measures, these measures can reinforce gender divisions if the way men work does not change or job categories for women are not expanded. For example, companies that have high retention rates



for female employees, that is, large numbers of women who continue working after getting married or giving birth, can be commended for providing robust work-life balance support. However, when examining the job categories for women at these companies, one finds that they are limited to low-level positions that do not require much skill and that there are no female managers. These kinds of companies treat work-life balance support as measures applying only to women, and men taking advantage of these policies is generally the exception to the rule. Companies cannot be commended for sufficiently expanding opportunities for women by simply enhancing their work-life balance support measures.

On the other hand, there are companies that have expanded the playing field for women and subsequently increased the number of female managers, but have low retention rates for women and few female employees who are married or have children. While these types of companies have made progress in providing equal employment opportunities for men and women, many of them have been slow in adopting and establishing work-life balance measures. In sum, what companies need to do is concurrently enhance both gender-based equal employment opportunities and work-life balance measures.

# Effect of Child-related Intermittent Employment on the Division of Housework in Japan, Sweden and the United States

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Most economically advanced countries experienced rapid increases in female labor force participation between the 1960s and 1990s. However, there are still wide cross-national differences in how much married women work, especially those with young children. Previous studies report that the intermittent nature of married women's employment has a grave impact on women's wages as well as their career options. This is particularly the case in Japan, as the opportunity cost of child-related intermittent employment on a woman's lifetime wages is estimated to be more than 200 million yen if she re-enters the labor market as a part-time worker once her children start school (Cabinet Office 2006).

Social policies and labor market regulations that support married women's labor force participation have become the focus of recent work-family research. For instance, comparative studies indicate that generous family policies such as public childcare services and parental leave support

women's employment (see, for example, Gornick, Meyers, and Ross 1998). Also, labor market regulations such as limits on the number of hours worked affect the division of labor. The division of housework between married and cohabiting partners is more egalitarian in countries with shorter average working hours (Hook 2010). Japan has the largest proportion of workers who work more than 50 hours per week among economically advanced countries and long working hours have made it extremely difficult for married women with young children to balance work and family life. Nearly 75 percent of employed Japanese women exit the labor market when they marry or have a child, and 90 percent of those who re-enter the workforce do so as low wage, part-time employees (Cabinet Office 2007).

Thus far, work-family research has investigated the impact of women's child-related intermittent employment on their occupational careers. However, much less attention has been paid to the impact of women's employment patterns on the division of labor *within* the household. The effect of women's child-related intermittent labor force attachment on the distribution of housework is a crucial issue, as employed women's undue burden of household labor could further disadvantage women's careers in the labor market. The fact that many women give up jobs to care for their children signals their role as primary caregivers. This role may have lingering effects on the division of housework even after women re-enter the labor market. In fact, women do more housework than men among dual-earner couples (IPSS 2010). This article examines the impact of women's past child-related employment intermittence on the gendered division of household labor in Japan, Sweden, and the United States--countries with distinct social policies and labor market conditions with regard to women's employment.

Figure 1 shows women's employment status when raising under school-age children.<sup>1</sup> In the


US, almost 50 percent are employed full-time and 30 percent are part-time workers. In Sweden, although little more than 10 percent are out of the labor force, most employed women are part-time workers. In contrast, more than 50 percent of Japanese women are outside the labor force and only 20 percent are in full-time employment. The research suggests that 75 percent of Japanese women who quit their jobs re-enter the labor market as their children grow up, forming the so-called M-shaped curves of women's labor force participation (IPSS 2010).

These cross-national variances in women's labor force participation and types of employment may reflect differences in workplace conditions and social policies across countries. For example, the Swedish government provides paid parental leave with part-time work options and generous public childcare. Although there are policies that encourage fathers' participation in childcare, child-related employment adjustments such as reducing work hours and taking parental leave are mostly made by women in Sweden (Henz and

Sundström 2001). In the US, there is no national policy of paid parental leave and, given the scarcity of public childcare, many dual-earner households depend on private childcare services. As a result, many American mothers keep working full-time in order to maintain their employment status and pay for childcare. In Japan, the combination of low parental leave benefits, scarce public childcare, and long working hours may have led many women with young children to simply exit the labor market and specialize in domestic labor.

These striking differences in maternal employment patterns also reflect the division of labor within the household. Figure 2 shows dual-earner couples' average division of housework in the three countries. In the US, women spend 11.5 hours and men spend about 6 hours on household labor per week. In Sweden, women spend about 13 hours a week on household labor while men spend about 8 hours. In other words, American and Swedish women spend nearly twice as much time on housework than men do. In Japan,

**Figure 1. Employment status of women with under school-age children in the US, Sweden, and Japan**



Notes: Responses to question: "Did you work outside the home when your child was under school age?" Sample is limited to married or cohabiting respondents, age 20-54, who worked before having a child.

<sup>1</sup> The data for these three countries are derived from the 2002 International Social Survey Programme.


however, women do a much greater share of housework—23 hours per week—while men spend less than 3 hours. This means that the gendered division of housework is still maintained even among dual-earner households, especially in Japan.

However, these differences may be due to the differences in women's characteristics and attitudes across the countries. Thus, to analyze the effect of intermittent employment due to child care needs on the current division of housework, I perform Tobit regression analyses for the three countries. The sample is limited to respondents in dual-earner married or cohabiting couples, between the ages of 20 and 54 years, and who had ever had a child, but did not have children under school-age in the household at the time of survey. In the analysis, I examine the effect of women's past child-related employment adjustments on their current share of housework, controlling for

the couples' current working hours and other conditions.<sup>2</sup>

Table 1 shows the effect of women's employment status (one of three categories: not in the labor market, part-time, or full-time; full-time employment is the reference category) while raising under school-age children on the division of housework. Higher scores indicate that wives do more housework than their husbands. The results show that in the US and Sweden, having left the labor market or having worked part-time when raising under school-age children does not have significant effects on the current division of housework. In these countries, couples' current working hours and other current situations determine how the housework is divided between them. Although most Swedish women were employed as part-time workers when their children were very young, various social policies and workplace regulations that support women's

Figure 2. Gender Gap in the Average Hours Per Week Spent on Housework



Notes: Sample limited to dual-earner couples, age 20-54, not self-employed.

<sup>2</sup> Control variables are defined as follows. Husband and wife work hours indicate current work hours. Husband's and wife's BA are dummy variables indicating that he or she has a four-year college degree. Relative income is derived from the reported income difference between a husband and wife. Self-employed is a dummy variable indicating that the respondent is self-employed. Gender ideology is measured by the response to the statement: "A man's job is to earn money; a woman's job is to look after the home and family." Higher scores reflect more egalitarian attitudes. I also control for the number of children in the household and the age and sex of respondents.



Table 1. Tobit Regression Results on Wives' Share of Housework in the US, Sweden, and Japan

	<u>USA</u>			<u>Sweden</u>			<u>Japan</u>		
	Coefficient	SE		Coefficient	SE		Coefficient	SE	
Intercept	0.751	0.115	***	0.448	0.140	**	0.554	0.214	**
Past Employment Status (Reference category: Full-time employed)									
Not in labor force	-0.016	0.038		-0.058	0.044		0.069	0.040	†
Part-time employed	-0.045	0.033		-0.002	0.029		0.104	0.044	*
Wife work hour	-0.003	0.001	**	-0.005	0.002	**	-0.001	0.001	
Husband work hour	0.002	0.001		0.003	0.002	*	0.004	0.001	**
Wife BA	-0.005	0.034		-0.033	0.026		-0.055	0.049	
Husband BA	-0.011	0.034		-0.041	0.029		-0.007	0.035	
Relative income	0.004	0.010		0.004	0.009		0.008	0.018	
Self-employed	0.091	0.042	*	0.050	0.037		0.049	0.056	
Gender ideology	-0.036	0.018	*	0.021	0.022		-0.035	0.019	†
Number of Children	0.005	0.014		0.013	0.012		0.006	0.018	
Age	0.001	0.002		0.005	0.002	*	0.005	0.003	
Male	-0.064	0.032	*	-0.056	0.023	*	0.010	0.031	
N	145			171			141		

† P<0.1 \*P<0.05 \*\*P<0.01 \*\*\*P<0.001

employment may have buffered the negative impact of their past weak labor market attachment on the current division of housework.

In contrast, having left the labor market or having worked part-time has significant positive effects on a wife's share of housework in Japan. Wives who had exited the labor market or had cut back to part-time work do a larger share of housework than wives who remained employed full-time when raising young children. The fact that the effect of past employment status is significant even after controlling for the effects of current work hours and other socio-economic characteristics suggests that child-related employment adjustments have an irreversible impact on the gendered division of housework for Japanese couples. In other words, while the division of housework is more reflective of the current situations of couples in Sweden and the US, for Japanese couples, once a wife exits the labor market, the gendered division of housework becomes nearly permanent. Employed Japanese women's heavy burden of domestic labor, in turn, could further disadvantage their careers in the labor market.

This study has revealed that work pattern adjustments due to child-care have lingering negative effects on Japanese couples' division of house-

work, but not for that of American and Swedish couples. This finding suggests that Japan's social policies and workplace conditions that are based on the male breadwinner model may not only impede women's careers in the labor market, but also disadvantage women in negotiations over the division of household labor. Because many Japanese companies still maintain the seniority system and expect their employees to work long hours, women's intermittent employment severely limits their career prospects even if they re-enter the workforce as full-time employees.

To put it differently, these findings suggest that the enhancement of social policies and labor market regulations that support women's continuous employment may be one of the keys to realizing an egalitarian division of labor *within* the household. Policy makers need to be aware of the impact of labor market conditions and social policy regarding women's employment on the division of labor within the household. Specifically, in addition to improving support for women's continuous employment such as childcare services and parental leave, we need to reduce the incompatibility of work and family life by changing male-centered workplace cultures. As the number of women in higher education increases and more women aspire to work until they reach retirement age, creating such an environment should be

given priority in order to realize gender equality both in the labor market and the household.

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# Development Assistance Policy and Gender Equality

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There has been much debate over quality and quantity of official development assistance (ODA). In 2006, Japan was the largest donor among the member states of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), but Japan's ODA has been on a downward trend since then. Japan's ODA disbursement in 2008 was US\$ 9.579 billion, the fifth largest, and its share was 7.9 percent in net disbursement basis.<sup>1</sup> The quality of any nation's development assistance can be evaluated from various perspectives, but that of gender is particularly important and revelatory. Moreover, both the quality and quantity of ODA are hugely influenced by the extent of gender equality in donor countries.

It has been pointed out that donor nations' lack of accountability regarding gender equality policies is a serious obstacle to ensuring that both women and men participate in and benefit from development activities (OECD-DAC Network on Gender Equality 2004),<sup>2</sup> thus understanding the extent to which gender equality has been achieved in donor countries is crucial to improving ODA implementation. An analysis of gender relations in donor countries is called for when discussing the quality of ODA.

The aim of this article is to examine Japan's ODA from a gender perspective. First, this article examines why a gender perspective is particularly important in development assistance. It then moves on to assess Japan's gender related policies in ODA. Lastly, the relationships between development assistance and gender equality are analyzed using various data. In Japan, women's advancement to the core of political and business spheres is still low and slow, and this article argues that this situation has undoubtedly affected the nation's current ODA activities.

### Gender is a Development Issue

In September 2000, the United Nations Millennium Declaration was adopted. This declaration committed its member states to work towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The MDGs were set out in line with international development goals adopted in the 1990s. The MDGs set goals for 2015 including eradicating extreme poverty and hunger, achieving universal primary education, promoting gender equality and empowering women, reducing child mortality, improving maternal health, combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases, ensuring environmental sustainability, and developing a global partnership for development.<sup>3</sup> Why does

<sup>1</sup> OECD-DAC Development Database. Retrieved 30 November 2010. ([http://stats.oecd.org/wbos/default.aspx?DatasetCode=ODA\\_DONOR](http://stats.oecd.org/wbos/default.aspx?DatasetCode=ODA_DONOR)).

<sup>2</sup> OECD-DAC Network on Gender Equality. Retrieved 19 January 2011. (<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/20/16/44750309.pdf>).

<sup>3</sup> Retrieved 30 November 2010. (<http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/>).

gender matter to the MDGs? The answer is very clear given the following facts. Women represent 70 percent of the world's poor.<sup>4</sup> The global economic crisis is expected to plunge an additional 22 million women into unemployment, which would lead to a female unemployment rate of 7.4 percent (versus 7 percent of male unemployment) (ILO 2009).<sup>5</sup> As for human security, between 55 and 95 percent of women who had been physically abused by their partners never contacted NGOs, shelters or the police for help according to data collected from 24,000 women in 10 countries (WHO 2005: 74).<sup>6</sup> A UN report estimated that 250,000–500,000 women and girls were raped during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda (UN 1996).<sup>7</sup> Thus gender inequality is a major obstacle to meeting development goals, and a serious violation of one's dignity, security and existence itself. In short, gender is a development issue.

All UN member states and civil society partners are seeking to achieve the MDGs, and it is particularly important that major donor countries live up to their commitments. The G8 summit in 2010 has reaffirmed their commitments, including ODA and enhancing aid effectiveness.<sup>8</sup> Moreover, promoting gender equality and empowering women in their development assistance are central to the MDGs. Promoting gender mainstreaming in development assistance was discussed well before setting the MDGs. The Beijing Platform for Action adopted at the 4th World Conference on Women in 1995 states "countries involved in development cooperation should conduct a critical analysis of their assistance programs so as to improve the quality and effectiveness of aid through the integration of a gender approach" (Chapter VI "Financial Arrangements," C. International Level, Paragraph 353)<sup>9</sup> and "Human development, if not engendered, is endangered" (UNDP 1995: 1).<sup>10</sup> Therefore, the donor countries should take

responsibility for enhancing gender equality. What, then, is the status of Japan's ODA?

### Japan's Policy Framework of ODA for Gender Mainstreaming

The DAC Peer Review of Japan conducted in 1999 harshly criticizes Japan's weakness in its gender analytical capacity and skills mix, and found that a lack of underlying gender sensitivity within Japan's development framework is still largely affected by individual interests of staff members and departments. Furthermore, it concludes that Japan's ODA has given low priority to the area of gender equality because Japan has developed without achieving it (DAC 1999: 40).<sup>11</sup> This statement implies that gender mainstreaming in the domestic sphere is indispensable in order to integrate a gender perspective into development assistance.

After the harsh criticism of the peer review, the Japanese government tried to meet the DAC requirements. The current ODA charter, revised in 2003, clarifies the perspective of gender equality in its basic policies. The revised charter has made great strides forward compared to the original charter which only stated that "full consideration will be given to the active participation of women in development and to the securing of benefits for women from development," as one of the ways to effectively implement ODA.<sup>12</sup> In addition to the new charter, gender equality has been promoted in both national and ODA policies by creating a framework for promoting gender mainstreaming under the Basic Law for a Gender-Equal Society.

Japan's "Medium-Term Policy" on ODA announced in 2005 refers to "ensuring equity (including the perspective of gender and consid-

<sup>4</sup> Retrieved 30 November 2010. ([http://www.unifem.org/gender\\_issues/women\\_poverty\\_economics/](http://www.unifem.org/gender_issues/women_poverty_economics/)).

<sup>5</sup> ILO. 2009. *Global Employment Trends for Women*. Geneva.

<sup>6</sup> WHO, García-Moreno et al. 2005. *WHO Multi-country Study on Women's Health and Domestic Violence Against Women. Initial results on prevalence, health outcomes and women's responses*. Geneva.

<sup>7</sup> UN Special Rapporteur to the Commission on Human Rights. *Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda*. (E/CN.4/1996/68) para 16.

<sup>8</sup> G8 Muskoka Declaration Recovery and New Beginnings. Retrieved 30 November 2010. (<http://g8.gc.ca/g8-summit/summit-documents/g8-muskoka-declaration-recovery-and-new-beginnings/>).

<sup>9</sup> UN document. Retrieved 30 November 2010. (<http://www.un-documents.net/bpa-6.htm>).

<sup>10</sup> UNDP. 1995. *Human Development Report*. New York.

<sup>11</sup> DAC. 1999. *Development Co-operation Review Japan*.

<sup>12</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs. *ODA Charter*. Retrieved 30 November 2010. (<http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/reform/revision0308.pdf>).



eration of socially vulnerable people).” The Japanese government then announced the Initiative on Gender and Development (GAD Initiative) at the meeting of the UN Commission on the Status of Women in March 2005, the tenth anniversary of the Beijing Conference on Women. Japan’s Initiative on Women in Development, announced at the Beijing Conference in 1995, was a development approach mainly focusing on women and intended to promote assistance with an emphasis on women’s participation in development, ensuring women’s benefits, and women’s empowerment, whereas the GAD Initiative<sup>13</sup> mentions efforts toward gender equality and women’s empowerment.

Based on these initiatives, the Japanese government describes the integration of gender perspective and gender mainstreaming in ODA projects in the report to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women appreciates the fact that Japan has integrated a gender dimension into its development cooperation programs and is promoting women’s human rights within that framework.<sup>14</sup> Furthermore, the DAC peer review in 2010 found that Japan has a legal and regulatory basis for promoting gender equality, referring to the enactment of the Basic Law for a Gender Equal Society which includes gender mainstreaming in ODA, the ODA Charter and the Medium-Term Policy.

Thus, the perspective of gender equality was specified in the ODA Charter, and as a result, the framework and system for gender mainstreaming have been incorporated into Japan’s ODA policies, including the Medium-Term Policy and the GAD Initiative. Does this mean that Japan’s ODA is gender mainstreamed? This has to be examined

in the framework of “policy coherence for development” (PCD). PCD is defined as “the state in which all policies that affect developing countries, including developed countries’ policies and international rules, contribute to, or at least have no negative effect on, the progress of development economy and poverty reduction in the relevant country” (JBIC Institute 2005: 1).<sup>15</sup> However, although PCD evaluations can be based on DAC peer reviews or the Commitment to Development Index, they focus primarily on aid, trade and investment. Gender mainstreaming efforts have never been evaluated from a PCD perspective. Again, however, the DAC peer review of Japan in 1999 criticized the gender inequality in the domestic sphere. How is gender equality achieved in donor countries, and how does it influence ODA? In the next section, correlations between development assistance and gender equality will be examined.

## Analyzing Development Assistance and Gender

### 1) Data Sources

As stated in the introduction, the development assistance debates concern both the quality and the quantity of ODA. While it is important to carefully examine how gender equality impacts ODA, this section focuses on the correlations between ODA and gender equality in the donor countries. Since each country undertakes various kinds of projects and activities, assessing and comparing the quality of ODA efforts is difficult. In order to overcome these limitations in assessing the quality of ODA, I use various datasets in my examination. The datasets include OECD-DAC statistics,<sup>16</sup> the gender equality focused aid examined in the *Aid in Support of Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment 2010* (OECD-DAC Secretariat),<sup>17</sup> and the Gender Gap Index (GGI) (*Global Gender Gap Report 2010*, World Economic

<sup>13</sup> The GAD Initiative is the “sectoral assistance policy” under the ODA Charter and the Medium-Term Policy on ODA, as well as the policy paper designed to integrate the gender perspective into every phase of Japan’s ODA. It indicates five basic approaches to gender mainstreaming: (i) strengthening integration of the gender equality perspective in ODA policies, (ii) strengthening gender analysis and promoting women’s participation, (iii) assistance for policies and institutions that promote gender equality, (iv) strengthening cooperation with the international community and NGOs, and (v) organizational and institutional capacity building.

<sup>14</sup> Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women. 2008. *Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under article 18 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women: Sixth periodic report of states parties: Japan*. Retrieved 30 November 2010. (<http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/499/51/PDF/N0849951.pdf?OpenElement>).

<sup>15</sup> JBIC. 2005. *Chiikikeizai apurōchi wo fumaeta seisaku no ikkansei apurōchi* (Policy Coherence from the Regional Economic Approach).

<sup>16</sup> OECD/DAC Statistics Database. Retrieved 30 November 2010. (<http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=TABLE1>).

<sup>17</sup> OECD/DAC. Retrieved 30 November 2010. (<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/40/7/42759705.pdf>).


Forum),<sup>18</sup> which measures gender gaps based on economic, political, education and health-based criteria. In addition, the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) of the *Human Development Report (HDR) 2009* by UNDP,<sup>19</sup> which focuses on women's participation in decision making over political, managerial and economic resources, is also examined. Another index is the Gender Inequality Index (GII), which was just introduced in the *HDR 2010*.<sup>20</sup> GII measures the negative human development impact of deep social and economic disparities between men and women. In addition, the new *HDR 2010* introduces "perceptions of individual well-being and happiness" which consists of "overall life satisfaction," "satisfaction with personal dimensions of well-being," and an element of happiness."

## 2) GNI, Gender Empowerment Measures and ODA Achievement Rates

The five largest amounts of net ODA given in

2008 were, in US dollars, \$26.8 billion by the United States, \$13.98 billion from Germany, \$11.50 billion by the UK, \$10.91 billion from France and \$9.58 billion by Japan. It is true that larger economies contribute larger amounts of ODA, and their contributions should be highly evaluated. However ODA should also be evaluated by focusing on progressiveness. The world's governments have repeatedly committed to spending 0.7 percent of developed countries' GDP on ODA since 1970. The UN Millennium Project's analysis indicates that 0.7 percent of developed countries' gross national income (GNI) can provide enough resources to meet MDGs, could lead to dramatic progress in the fight against poverty and start on a path to achieve the MDGs to end extreme poverty within a generation.<sup>21</sup> As of June 2005, 16 out of the 22 donor countries have met or agreed to meet the 0.7 percent target by no later than 2015. Japan, as well as the USA, Australia, Canada, and Switzerland, have not yet, however, set

Figure 1 Gross Domestic Product and ODA Achievement Rates



Notes: GDP is at 2010 prices and purchasing power parity

An achievement rate of 100% indicates that the nation has met the UN's goal of spending 0.7 percent of GDP to ODA.

This figure excludes the USA due to its extremely high GDP.

<sup>18</sup> World Economic Forum. Retrieved 30 November 2010. (<http://www.weforum.org/pdf/gendergap/report2010.pdf>).

<sup>19</sup> UNDP. Retrieved 30 November 2010. ([http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR\\_2009\\_EN\\_Complete.pdf](http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2009_EN_Complete.pdf)).

<sup>20</sup> UNDP. Retrieved 30 November 2010. (<http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2010/>).

<sup>21</sup> <http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/press/07.htm>

their timetables for achieving the 0.7 percent goal.

What is the relationship between the size of a nation's economy and its ODA? Figure 1 shows the relationship between GDP and achievement rate. Achievement rate means how close a nation has come to the target of 0.7 percent of GNI, the international commitment. It shows that the achievement rate has no significant correlation with the size of an economy. Even if one excludes Scandinavian countries from the data due to their relatively high achievement rate, there is no significance. Nevertheless, if we exclude the USA, which has an extremely high GDP, the data shows that the larger economic countries tend to contribute less (significant at the 5 percent level).


What is the relationship between donor achievement rates and the Gender Gap Index? The association between achievement rates and GGI is significant at 1 percent, which means the countries with smaller gender gaps tend to contribute a higher percentage of their GDP to ODA.

If we look at the correlation between achievement rates and Gender Empowerment Measures, it is also significant at 1 percent. The countries where women are empowered according to the GEM scores contribute more ODA relative to the size of their economies (Figure 2). Among the three GEM dimensions, the dimension of "seats in parliament held by women" is the only significant factor at 1 percent. The association between achievement rate

and GII is significant at 5 percent, and the dimension of "seats in parliament by women" is the only factor significant at 1 percent. Even if we exclude Scandinavian countries where gender equality is addressed at high levels, the data again show no significant correlation between GGI, GEM, GII and ODA. However, the dimension of "seats in parliament held by women" has some impact on ODA disbursement at  $p=0.053>0.05$ . This fact may suggest that women's participation in policy making could influence a country's ODA disbursement policies. The importance of women's representation in the political sphere will also be discussed in the following section.

3) *Gender Equality and Gender Equality Focused Aid*  
Let us then examine the relationship between gender equality and gender equality focused aid. Comparing gender equality focused aid is problematic because the definition of these aid is not uniform across the DAC countries. Even so, this DAC data is the only data available on this topic. There are no significant correlations between GGI, GEM, GII and gender equality focused aid, viewed either with or without Scandinavian countries. However, the association between gender equality focused aid and "female legislators, senior officials and managers" is significant at 5 percent if we include Scandinavian countries in the analysis, and is significant at 1 percent excluding Scandinavian countries (Figures 3 and 4). The results suggest that the number of female legislators, senior officials and managers could be an

Figure 2 Gender Empowerment Measures and Achievement Rates



important factor for gender equality focused aid.

How, then, can we analyze the Japanese government's ODA practices from a gender perspective? As Figures 3 and 4 show, the number of gender equality focused aid Japan has ever implemented is particularly low among the DAC member countries. In addition, as noted above, Japan's ODA achievement rate is one of the lowest. If we look at gender related indicators, Japan has low GEM (Figure 2), and ranks extremely low in women's representation among legislators, senior officials and managers.

According to the *Global Gender Gap Report 2010* by the World Economic Forum,<sup>22</sup> Japan's female to male ratio of parliament members is only 0.13, and women in ministerial positions is also only 0.13. Regarding economic participation and opportunity, the female to male ratio among legislators, senior officials, and managers is only 0.1. Japan lags far behind in gender parity.

In order to achieve the ODA target of 0.7 percent


of GDP, and in order to improve the "quality" of ODA including gender focused projects, it is indispensable for Japan to promote gender equality. Moreover, more women should participate in the policy making processes.

#### 4) Other Dimensions

In terms of the relationships between poverty and ODA, the association between Gini coefficients, a measure of income disparity, and ODA achievement rates is significant at 1 percent. The countries with greater income disparities tend to be less interested in making ODA contributions relative to the size of their economy. The association between poverty rates, percentage of individuals living in households with disposable income below 50 % of the median income for the whole population in mid-2000, and ODA achievement rate is also significant at 1 percent.<sup>23</sup> The evidence suggests that the degree of domestic income disparity is deeply linked to a nation's ODA disbursement.

Although not discussed in this article, the data

Figure 3 Gender Equality Focused Aid and Female Legislators, Senior Officials and Managers




Notes: Gender equality focused aid is the percentage of total sector -allocable aid.  
Female Legislators etc: Female legislators, senior officials and managers (% of total)

<sup>22</sup> World Economic Forum. 2010. *Global Gender Gap Report 2010*. Retrieved 26 January 2011. (<http://www.weforum.org/issues/global-gender-gap>).

<sup>23</sup> OECD. 2009. *OECD Employment Outlook 2009: Tackling the Jobs Crisis*.



**Figure 4 Gender Equality Focused Aid and Female Legislators, Senior Officials and Managers (without Scandinavian countries)**



show some other important issues relating to gender relations in society, and further analyses of those issues are crucial in examining ODA activities in each country. For example, the association between “life satisfaction of females,” a newly introduced dimension in *HDR 2010*, and ODA achievement rates is significant at 5 percent. As for the agency of women, the association between the new dimension of the satisfaction with freedom of “choice by women” and achievement rates are significant at 5 percent. The countries which show high performance in the dimension of life satisfaction tend to contribute more ODA.

## Conclusion

Although gender perspectives have now been integrated into the policy framework of ODA, it is evident that Japan must effectively mainstream gender equality perspectives in every sphere of society rather than limiting mainstreaming to the country’s ODA policies and practices.

The analysis of development assistance and gender equality shows that income equality and gender equality within donor countries could be crucial dimensions influencing nations’ seriousness in meeting the 0.7 percent commitment level of ODA disbursement. Particularly, the above analysis showed that the dimension of women’s participation in political decision-making is relevant for the quantitative aspect of ODA. Qualitatively, moreover, it was observed that the number of female legislators, senior officials and managers could greatly influence the number of gender equality focused aid.

Unfortunately, all data and figures have so far proved that Japan’s gender equality lags far behind the other DAC member countries. For improving both the quality and the quantity of Japan’s ODA, raising the ratio of women among legislators, senior officials and managers could be crucial.

## In the Twilight of the Postwar Constitution

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### 1.

I was 15 when the Cold War ended in 1989. During the Cold War, Japanese intellectuals were predominantly left-wing, and they were generally viewed as sympathizing, to some degree, with socialism as they maintained a critical stance against the conservative, pro-American political system. But the countries that were founded on the principles of socialism collapsed with a bang. While socialism as an ideology was not viewed in the same light as the actual political structures of the Eastern Bloc, it seemed to me at the time that adults were in an uproar.

Then the Gulf War broke out in 1991. Japan's role in this conflict was limited to providing financial backing to the US-led coalition. Japan refused to

dispatch its Self-Defense Forces (SDF) due to constitutional restrictions, but questions were openly raised about Japan's inability to contribute militarily which, it was argued, undermined its national interests. In 1992, a law was passed in the Diet that would allow Japan's SDF to participate in United Nations peacekeeping operations. This was an attempt to expand the role of the SDF whose legitimacy had been all but stripped away due to long-held doubts about the constitutionality of its existence under the postwar constitution that prohibited Japan from maintaining armed forces, and respond to requests for international cooperation.

It goes without saying that this development was vehemently opposed by the leftists. Historically, the left wing criticized the creation and subsequent expansion of the SDF, done for the sake of strengthening cooperation with the United States in terms of security. However, there is no denying that their repeated demands to "uphold the Constitution" seemed to fade and lose their appeal as Japan sought the new direction it should take in the new, post-Cold War global environment.

The long era that had continued since the end of World War II, the "postwar" era, appeared to have run its course in Japan as well. There seems to have been a general feeling that the framework of thought and the structure of political conflict that had seemed self-evident until then were gradually losing their relevance. That being said, I think there was hardly anyone who was confident about finding a new paradigm to take the place of the old one.

### 2.

Personally, I feel that this murky situation of the 1990s continues to the present day. This is evident

even in Japan's party politics, for instance. The political party alignment generally referred to the '55 System—in which the conservative, US-friendly Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) held continuous control of the government counterbalanced by a coalition of opposition parties led by the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) that maintained over 1/3 of the seats in the Diet (the amount required to prevent revisions to the Constitution)—eventually lost its de facto power, and the LDP was unseated for the first time in 40 years in the 1993 election. However, the LDP formed a coalition and regained power the next year. The LDP would remain in power as the leading party, while changing its coalition partners, until 2009. Meanwhile, the JSP lost traction, and it would take many years until a new political party with the potential to engender a change in government could be formed. A clear picture for a new axis of political conflict never surfaced.

In short, Japan's political milieu from the 1990s until the present day appears to have been a long transition period of seeking a way forward from the Cold War era. This description also applies directly to the issues surrounding the 1947 constitution. In the domestic political conflicts of the Cold War era, the Constitution of Japan was a special point of contention. For the right wing, it was a symbol of shame that had been foisted on Japan after defeat. They rejected it for relying excessively on political principles that had originated in the West, and they felt it should be replaced with a new constitution. Conversely, the left wing saw the 1947 constitution as a document that embodied postwar idealism and thought it should be protected from the dynamics of real politics. That being said, the Japanese government chose a realistic path by maintaining the Constitution while interpreting it as "flexibly" as possible and cooperating with the United States insofar as it could manage to justify such actions under the Constitution's provisions.

The discourse surrounding Japan's Constitution was rigidly defined by these Cold War issues and, unable to break free from these fetters, it seemed to gradually fade away. I think this is because in the eyes of younger generations, the intellectual stimulation and appeal of pouring one's passion into the subject have long since disappeared,

making it appear like an old topic.

However, before I realized it, I ended up becoming a constitutional scholar, something that I as a 15-year old at the end of the Cold War would have never expected.

### 3.

When I entered the faculty of law at university and began studying highly specialized theories of the constitution, I found them to be nothing like the impression I had in high school, which I had formed by reading general discussions in newspapers and magazines. I was surprised to find that the field of constitutional studies was much more interesting than I had expected. The discipline is extremely interesting and intellectually stimulating. By studying a wide array of legal disputes between the state and individuals, one can shed light on the basic legal principles upon which Japanese society is built.

Meanwhile, the more I studied foreign constitutions as a young researcher (in Japan, young researchers typically train and develop research skills by studying the constitutions of Western nations such as Germany, France and the United States), the more I realized that the study of Japan's Constitution was a field that, when compared to other countries, was unique. Let me mention a few points on this as follows.

The first feature I would like to discuss is Japan's strong commitment to modernity. Starting with the formulation of the Meiji constitution in 1889, the history of constitutional law in Japan began with an effort to build a nation that could compete with Western powers that had, by the nineteenth century, expanded their influence to East Asia. The Meiji constitution was drafted by selecting appropriate content from the constitutions of these Western nations. That being the case, Japan had to identify the historical, ideological and social contexts that led to the formation of the principles and structures underlying Western constitutions in order to better understand them. This action had to be taken even further for the 1947 constitution for two reasons: it clearly indicated a strong commitment to modern values such as basic human rights and popular sover-

eighty, and it signaled a purposeful transition from the Meiji constitution, which had readily recognized restrictions on the rights of the subjects of the emperor who was the imperial sovereign. Constitutional scholars sought to elucidate the extent of Western modernism and what attributes Japan possessed in this regard, thereby forming a part of the intellectual currents that swept through postwar Japan (as typified by the likes of Maruyama Masao). I will refer to this trend as the modern orientation in constitutional theory.

The second feature is that constitutional studies, a sub-discipline of law, has come to play a major part in establishing the Constitution in Japanese society by providing interpretations that can withstand the practical application of law. However, constitutional studies has not accumulated many theoretical frameworks which are useful under the newly established judicial review system, especially with regard to the question of how to interpret provisions pertaining to the basic rights of the people. What has been attempted here is the adoption of foreign law, much in the same manner that interpretations of governance structures under the Meiji constitution were received. Since the 1960s, United States Supreme Court rulings and the theoretical debate associated therewith have been the subject of rigorous research, so much so that foreign words and phrases such as "clear and present danger" have found their way into textbooks on Japan's Constitution. That being said, legal interpretation in Japan has not been entirely blotted out by American influence. For example, the debate on the validity of basic rights provisions in the relationships between citizens has been strongly influenced by interpretations from Germany since the 1950s. I think one can see that Japan referred to and compared the legal situations of various countries before adopting principles thought suitable for Japan. Here, I will refer to this as the comparative orientation of constitutional interpretation.

Contrary to the ragings battle over the legitimacy of the postwar Constitution in Japanese politics and the press, constitutional studies in Japan generally dealt with the commitment to universal values, such as human rights and democracy, embodied in the Constitution, and scholars steadily engaged in the intellectual work required to estab-

lish these values. However, the overall image of the field that these efforts created left a somewhat strange impression. The discipline still faced the major question of "what is modernity" while it undertook the highly technical and intellectual task of analyzing precedents of the United States Supreme Court—a job for professional lawyers. Meanwhile, the influence of intellectual traditions from several foreign countries, which had lost their coherence over time, had become a patched together jumble of ideas. Rather than a neatly constructed, intellectual system, this system gives the impression of some kind of monster made by fusing a variety of alien elements together.

That being said, the patchwork nature of Japanese constitutional studies has gradually come under question in recent years. First, regarding the modern orientation in constitutional theory, awareness of this issue is hardly shared anymore because Japan has developed a well-off society on par with its Western counterparts and because the younger generation has been raised under the influence of the "post-modern" school of thought. In the 1990s, the cohort of young researchers born after the mid-1950s garnered attention for developing several new styles of debate in rapid succession. However, I think this trend shows that the loss of important topics that were once widely shared led to a dilution of the discussion.

On the other hand, it came to be recognized that the accumulated knowledge about the comparative orientation of constitutional interpretation had defects. The biggest reason for this was the gap between academic theory and actual judicial precedents. Japanese legal theorists have maintained a liberal political orientation while proposing various interpretations of the Constitution, based on insights into foreign laws, that they argued should be adopted by the judiciary. However, these proposals were only adopted partially by the extremely conservative Supreme Court. As a result, the split between predominant opinion in academia and the positions taken by judges has solidified with regard to a considerable number of points of contention—the biggest of which is probably freedom of expression. Some theorists have attempted to critically examine traditional constitutional interpretation in order to break this stalemate, but these endeavors have yet to bear



much fruit.

Put simply, I think Japanese constitutional studies has attempted to escape old methods and ideological frameworks since the end of the Cold War but remains mired in confusion. I feel that—as I have already said about Japan's overall political culture—we are in a long period of transition with no immediate end in sight.

#### 4.

In my 14 years as a researcher, I have focused primarily on the historical development of the German Constitution and the *Staatslehre* (theory of the state) from the nineteenth century to the present. There is a high level of discourse on Ger-

many in the field of constitutional studies that I found to be intellectually appealing. However, I think that delving into the intellectual traditions of a foreign country has made the attributes of my own country clearly stand out in contrast. When I was conducting research in Germany, I felt that I gained a clearer picture of Japan by being so far away, and it was a strange feeling indeed. That being said, this is precisely why studying foreign countries is important. Personally, I expect to gain a better understanding Japan's Constitution by furthering my research into the German Constitution and the *Staatslehre*. By doing this, I hope that I can gain some insight into the path that the Japanese Constitution and the field of constitutional studies should take beyond this long, ongoing period of transition.

## History and Theory in International Relations: Is Integration Possible?

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### 1. History versus Theory: Old yet New Tension

Many sociologists and political scientists (especially those referred to as historical sociologists and historical institutionalists) were influenced by Barrington Moore's 1969 work, *Social origins of dictatorship and democracy*, about the various routes that countries took in modernizing from pre-industrial agrarian societies, and this book is a classic that is still read to this day. However, this monumental work of research has not been immune to criticism from other researchers. Criticism from historians has been particularly acrimonious. They point out the problem that Moore's research merely treated the accumulated research of historians to date as "fact" and used it unquestioningly. Moreover, when delving into the history of the United States, the United Kingdom,

or in some instances, Japan, Moore shed no light on "new facts." Such criticism is a trend in the field of historical sociology evidenced by Goldthorpe's (1991) statement that historical sociologists such as Moore, "enjoy a delightful freedom to play 'pick-and-mix' in history's sweet-shop" (p. 225). Goldthorpe sharply criticized Moore by saying the difference between historians and sociologists was that the former draw "inferences from the relic" while the latter rely on the work of historians, or in other words, engage in the "interpretation of interpretations of, perhaps, interpretations" (pp. 213, 220-223).

Of course, this kind of tension between historians and social scientists is not limited to Moore's research and the criticism thereof, but has existed since the 19<sup>th</sup> century, as typified by the *Methodenstreit* in German economics. It is hardly surprising that social scientists who have attempted to theorize social phenomenon through the lens of history have been greeted with hostility and looked upon scornfully by historians who have criticized theorists for not being interested in facts themselves. Conversely, one can understand why some social scientists regarded historians as narrowly preoccupied with concrete historical details that do not contribute to overall understanding. Although social scientists use and cite the research of historians, historians almost never explicitly refer to the theoretical studies of social scientists, and one side rarely acknowledges the other as a serious opponent in a debate by confronting issues head-on and refuting each other's claims.

Moore's protégé, Theda Skocpol (1984), argued "It would be 'disastrous' for grand historical sociologists if they were to be forced back to primary sources....if excellent studies by specialists are already available in some profusion, secondary sources are appropriate as the basic source of evi-


dence for a given study" (p. 382). In making this statement, Skocpol drew a line between history and her discipline of sociology. In the same way, after political scientists and historians specializing in international relations gathered to hold a productive debate on the commonalities and differences between the two fields, Elman and Elman (2001) concluded, "Political scientists are not historians, nor should they be. There are real and enduring epistemological and methodological differences that divide the two groups" (p. 35). As shown in Figure 1, the fundamental relationship between historians who study original sources and present new facts and social scientists who use those facts to create theories has been treated as a given.

However, the question remains as to whether objective, or at the very least, intersubjective criteria exist for determining which of the many historical studies are what Skocpol calls "excellent." If such criteria exist, then it follows that all historians should conduct research according to those criteria, but then would their research not end up becoming stereotypical, subsequently inhibiting the free development of the discipline? Furthermore, it is a fact that historical research that was highly regarded in the past is often superseded by

later research based on newly discovered materials or new theories. In these instances, theorists come face to face with a major issue. According to Figure 1, if the work of Historians Y and Z are refuted by Historian X, then the research of Theorists A and B will probably fall apart since those studies were conducted based on refuted historical research (i.e., something outside of their realm of expertise). In short, are theorists individuals who must always stand on shaky ground? For social scientists who attempt to theorize historical phenomena, this is a major problem that cannot be ignored, but which has been neglected to date.

The research I am currently conducting seeks to close the gap between history and theory in international relations and to resolve the problem that I mentioned above. The answer is extremely simple. The functions of the historians and theorists in Figure 1 should be applied to the same research. In other words, we should conduct historical empirical analysis, while aiming to construct theories from these historical case studies we have created. To do this, some limited conditions and an explicit methodology are required, and the development of these is one of my research topics. In this short article I would like to shed some light on the differences between histo-

Figure 1: Positional Relationship between Historians and Sociologists



ry and theory that, thus far, have been thought to be unresolvable.

## **2. History versus Theory: An Unbridgeable Gap?**

The first reason that history and theory differ lies in the difference between idiosyncrasy and abstractness. Theory refers to systematic knowledge that explains in a unified, simplified and abstracted manner individual phenomena that are thought to occur repeatedly. For this reason, the historian who believes that history is a transient phenomenon thinks that theorizing historical analysis is inherently self-contradictory. Yesterday's self differs from today's self, and tomorrow's self will differ from today's. If that is the case, then there is no reason for similar patterns to emerge in the history of societies and theorizing about history is meaningless. Concerning this point, there exists a great schism between theorists who seek to conduct nomothetic research and idiographic historians who target specific, one-off phenomena for precise analysis.

The second point I must mention is the vast difference between theorists and historians in the semantic content of "explanations." The basic goal for political scientists, especially the majority of those labeled positivists (who hail primarily from North America), is the elucidation of the causal relations of political phenomena. The many great philosophers of science who have taken their places among the positivists and modern textbooks on social science methodology all stress that "scientific explanation" is the answering of "why questions," or the clarification of causal relations. That is to say, there is an ontological agreement that a given social phenomenon has a particular set of causes on the one hand, and there is an epistemological agreement that the role of social scientists is to illuminate these causal mechanisms on the other. However, there exists an understanding that causal mechanisms will always be inexact, forcing theorists to stop at hypotheses or inferences. In contrast, there are many historians who do not think that general acceptance is the basis for elucidating causal relations and dismiss this argument. In addition to the lack of the aforementioned ontological arguments that positivists hold, historians treat "explanations" as both describing and under-

standing a given social phenomenon (Dray, 1959). For example, characterizing the national identity of a given country or the spirit of a particular era, or interpreting the intentions and aims of a certain policy, are thought to be explanations (describing what occurred) as well as important academic contributions even if the scholars had not sought to elucidate causal relations. Since the 1970s in particular, historiography has been to shifting from "scientific historiography"—typified by traditional state-centrism, the quantitative historiography of the Annales School and Marxist history—to the description of identifiable, individual events in social history and life history as well as events concerning women and other minorities who had been overlooked. Historiography around the world (including the history of international relations) has been moving increasingly in this direction. As a result, the conventional methodological awareness of "historical research as the study of causes" seems to have taken its place as one of many research programs for historiography, rather than remaining the dominant paradigm.

The third issue is the disagreement over inductive and deductive methods. That a given theory or historical analysis must be supported with empirical facts is a norm that is generally accepted by the majority of researchers. Where historians and theorists clash is on the temporal relationship between theory and observation. The problem lies in whether to use the inductive method, in which conclusions are drawn from the accumulation of observed facts, or the deductive method, in which assumptions and hypotheses are defined a priori (in the social sciences, this is followed by testing hypotheses against data and observed social phenomena). Most historians discover facts by poring over large volumes of materials and probably use the inductive method to reach conclusions. Many political scientists claim that the inductive method does not yield sound, long-lasting theories. The reasons for this disagreement can be explained from two points of view: the "inductive-leap" and "theory-ladenness." The former refers to the inductive generalization of a universal statement from a singular statement obtained through observation, but this kind of generalization of (infinite) unknown cases from known cases cannot be justified according to any princi-



ples (Popper 2002). The latter refers to the idea that the interpretation of data—the original meaning of the word "data" in Latin was "something given"—is not a passive activity, but rather the product of the exponent's subjective awareness. As such, we—whether social scientists or historians—cannot escape theory-ladenness. Assuming there was a pure inductive method from which subjectivity had been eliminated, it would not be permissible for historians using the same resources to have differing opinions. This shows that historians conduct research by forming theories and hypotheses from often-observed facts. In other words, they, too, are plagued by theory-ladenness.

The fourth issue is research design. Appropriate research design is absolutely necessary for testing theories. Since the 1990s, in particular, as the number of research papers published on case selection in the field of political science increased, political scientists could no longer select cases for analysis unconsciously. For example, it has practically become taboo to select so-called easy cases, that is, cases used to disprove a traditional theory, because they are known in advance to be inexplicable under said theory. If theorists do not provide a persuasive argument for why they selected a case, then there is no way to prevent their research from being devalued, no matter how meticulous they are in their presentation of proof.

Conversely, one could say that historians have been generally complacent about research design. Historians do not conduct research with the aim of developing or disproving theories, but rather seek to discover new facts about cases or refute traditional interpretations. For this reason, the need to analyze cases for the sake of a theory and select methods does not exist (in fact, subjects of analysis are rarely referred to as "cases"). Furthermore, historians believe that they can make scholarly contributions, that is, expand our knowledge, with the empirical analysis of fields into which no researcher has yet delved. However, while a singular case is often regarded as playing a heuristic role for theorization (heuristic meaning "serving to find out") it is obviously an excessive leap to build a theory by generalizing from a singular case. Statistically speaking, given the same number of independent variables, the so-called

"degrees of freedom" increase with more observations, significantly increasing the probability of said theory. Therefore, the proposal to "increase the number of observations" (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994) is a persuasive one. Given this, the question still remains: Is it possible to develop an appropriate design for historical analysis?

The final issue that I will mention is arbitrariness in the selection of resources. As I mentioned above, most political scientists analyze cases by starting with an awareness of the theoretical issues. As a result, when using a resource to test a theory, theorists gravitate toward evidence that supports their hypotheses, while averting their eyes from resources that detract from their arguments. Sometimes they even flagrantly ignore conflicting materials. Historians using the induction method are careful in choosing materials as a biased selection of sources would not be forgiven. In other words, this is one area where theorists could learn a great deal from historians.

### 3. Is Integration Possible?

The aforementioned issues are where I think history and theory differ vastly. Of course, some researchers might include more differences while others may not consider these differences to be that significant. That being said, I think there is, for the most part, a general agreement on the five points mentioned above. The question remains as to whether these differences can be resolved so that history and social science research can be integrated. I believe it is possible.

However, I choose not to discuss the solution here. Some of my ideas have not been fully developed to where I could present them, not to mention I do not have enough space in this article to adequately present the issue. I have already experimented with theorizing historical analysis in a book based on a revision of my doctoral thesis (Hoshiro 2008) and a short paper published thereafter (Hoshiro 2010). Interested persons who can read Japanese should refer to these works. That being said, I am still developing my ideas and would like to publish my findings after further research.

Contemporary political science has come to

encompass a variety of approaches such as computer simulations, and incorporate various disciplines, such as neuropsychology, in addition to statistical and mathematical analysis. This has generated a synergistic effect which has led to the publication of some outstanding research results heretofore unseen in the discipline. Given this, there is no reason to keep history and theory locked away in separate compartments. It is my sincere hope that a new academic frontier can be opened up by integrating the two disciplines, and this is what I strive for daily.

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# Questions and Answers with Visiting Professor

## Margarita Estévez-Abe



**Margarita Estévez-Abe is an Associate Professor at Maxwell School of Citizenship & Public Affairs, Syracuse University and visiting Shaken from September 15, 2010 to January 14, 2011 under the auspices of the Global COE program.**

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**Q.** How did you come to know about Shaken?

I first learned about Shaken through its publications. For someone interested in Japan, the occasional multi-volume publications put together by Shaken provided a mine of information and insights. Back in the early 1990s, as a graduate student at Harvard University, I used to spend hours in the library stacks reading each tome of the *Gendai Nihon Shakai* series as well as the *Fukushi Kokka* series in particular. When my fellow PhD students began leaving for Japan for their fieldwork, Shaken came to my attention again—this time as the destination for graduate students doing research on Japan.

Numerous PhD students from the US have benefited greatly from the intellectual infrastructure of Shaken. The fact that Shaken boasts a first rate interdisciplinary faculty means that it has mentored a whole generation of multi-disciplinary

foreign researchers. There is no other institution like this in Japan, so I've always had a very high regard for Shaken. (My alma mater in Japan is Keio, so I used Keio as my base during my PhD fieldwork.) Much later on, in 2003, I visited Shaken for the first time thanks to Professor Hiwatari who arranged an affiliation for me during my research leave. Since 2006 I have been involved in Professor Osawa's project, and Shaken became a more frequent and closer presence for me.

**Q.** What are your research interests?

I consider myself both as a scholar of comparative politics of advanced industrial societies and a specialist of Japanese politics. I'm fascinated by how institutions affect human behavior both in the economy and politics. Different types of capitalist democracies are made up of specific sets of institutions, and many scholars have delved into the study of institutional complementarities. In fact, there is a genre of studies called the 'varieties of capitalism' that investigates institutional complementarities and their economic consequences. This literature has treated Japan and Germany as prototypes of a well-organized type of capitalism called 'coordinated market economies' as opposed to the more laissez-faire 'liberal market economies' such as the UK and the US. So Japan has been a very important case for people interested in the varieties of capitalism.

My work is closely related to this genre in two different ways. In my first line of research, I explore the link between institutions, politics and the economy in Japan. For instance, my book, *Welfare and Capitalism in Postwar Japan*, showed how Japan's social protection system forms a key part of capitalism in Japan, and also explained the political factors that shaped it.

My second line of research concerns the gendered effects of economic institutions. Here, I am mainly interested in how different labor market institutions impact the economic opportunities of men and women differently. Although my knowledge of Japanese political economy inspired me to initi-

ate this new line of research, in my work on gender I go beyond Japan and compare other advanced industrial countries. My soon to be finished book, *Gender and the Varieties of Capitalism*, discusses how well (or badly) women do in different types of labor markets. The upshot of this research is that rigid labor markets and compressed wage structures produce negative consequences for women. To put it briefly, this institutional arrangement suppresses the supply of relatively unskilled female labor, while restricting the number of hours highly skilled women are able to work.

**Q.** What is the purpose of your visit?

I have been awarded an Abe Fellowship for a new comparative research project, *The Rise and Fall of the Housewife* and I am in Japan to collect materials for it. I am comparing five countries—Japan, German, Italy, Sweden and the US. These five countries represent five different trajectories in which married women were—or were not—mobilized as workers in the postwar years. All of these countries, except for Italy, experienced a postwar economic boom and a shortage of young male workers. They all tapped into married women's labor to make up for this shortage. That said, some countries mobilized women more fully while others gave women part-time work. The nature of the part-time work also varied from country to country.

I am investigating the political mechanisms that put countries on different paths by looking into the policy debates and unions' attitudes concerning female labor during the years of rapid economic expansion in the postwar period. Although this new research is historical in its orientation, my goal is to highlight the importance of political decisions at critical junctures, and also to show

that those decisions produce unintended consequences as well. For example, countries that failed to create good part-time jobs or provide the flexibility that allows women to move back and forth between part-time and full-time work during their life course are experiencing sharper fertility declines today.

In addition, I am also collecting historical data on women's educational investments, fertility patterns and marriage behavior to compare how the behaviors and identity of women might or might not have changed in the aforementioned five countries.

**Q.** What do you like about Shaken?

First and foremost, I like the people in Shaken. Although trained as a political scientist, I've always been interested in labor market and social policy issues. The mix of people in Shaken very much fits my intellectual orientation. So I am enjoying meeting new Shaken colleagues as well as continuing conversations with those Shaken colleagues I have known for a while. Second, I like the area. I've fallen in love with the Hongo neighborhood. I've explored small alleyways to find a little bit of old Tokyo. I also like the location of the Shaken building. Right in front of it is a small traditional Japanese house. That's the house for the Tokyo University Kyujitsu Club. I've seen female students attired in Japanese hakama practicing kyujitsu. I sometimes hear Todai Kyujitsu-bu women's voices during their evening practice. When I'm working in my Shaken office, their voices remind me that I am in Hongo! Lastly, but most importantly, I would like to thank Director Suehiro, Professors Osawa, Hiwatari and Noble for making my visit possible and extremely pleasant.



## ISS Contemporary Japan Group at the Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo

ISS Contemporary Japan Group seminar series provides English-speaking residents of the Tokyo area with an opportunity to hear cutting-edge research in social science and related policy issues, as well as a venue for researchers and professionals in or visiting Tokyo to present and receive knowledgeable feedback on their latest research projects. Seminars are open to everyone. Admission is free and advance registration is not required. For inquiries, please contact the seminar organizers: Professor Hiroshi Ishida ([ishida@iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp](mailto:ishida@iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp)), Professor Gregory W. Noble ([noble@iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp](mailto:noble@iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp)), or the coordinator, Satsuki Takahashi ([tsatsuki@iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp](mailto:tsatsuki@iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp)).  
Photo by Takahashi Satsuki (ISS)



### Colin Smith

*Assistant Professor at the Department of Sociology, the University of Hong Kong*

*Freeters into Precariat: Alienation and Counterculture in Postindustrial Tokyo*

*October 21, 2010*

#### Abstract:

Since the collapse of Japan's bubble economy in 1990, the ranks of young part-time and temporary workers known as "freeters" have swelled. Growing frustration among young people with the lack of good jobs has materialized

in recent years in the form of a new social movement and scene composed largely of these irregular workers. In alliance with anti-globalization movements in other countries, they use the politically charged term "precariat" (precarious + proletariat) to describe themselves. Since 2003 this movement has staged a number of unusual public protests called "sound demos"--unusual because they incorporate rave music, dancing, costumes, and floats, elements that are associated more with carnival and spectacle than with serious political protest--in the heart of Tokyo and other cities. Members have also organized or been involved in protests against the war in Iraq, security surveillance and police checks in Tokyo, and the privatization of Shibuya's Miyashita Park, among other issues.

My research on this topic is a work-in-progress, and in this talk I present the questions I am trying to answer and examine how this social movement and its associated social network have developed through the production of public spectacles and alternative spaces such as "underground" cafes, bookstores, recycle shops, used clothing stores, art spaces, and communal living spaces in various parts of Tokyo. It is based on participant-observation fieldwork I conducted in Tokyo in the spring and summer of 2009, and the summer of 2010.

### William W. Kelly


*Professor of Anthropology and Sumitomo Professor of Japanese Studies at Yale University*

*The World of the Hanshin Tigers: An Anthropology of Contemporary Sport*

*January 27, 2011*


#### Abstract:

In the last three decades of the twentieth century, the Hanshin Tigers were the heart and soul of Kansai professional sports and emblematic of a sport that was central to the development of transportation, media, and leisure in that region. To an anthropologist, the Hanshin Tigers represent an intriguing lifeworld centered on the production and presentation of what was arguably the most important sport in twentieth-century Japan. In this talk, I first outline the key elements of the Hanshin Tigers sports world: the stadium, the team, the management, the fans, and the media. I then introduce five themes embodied in this sports world: the uncanny mimicry of Bushido baseball, Japanese baseball as "edu-tainment," Osaka's second-city complex, Hanshin Tigers baseball as an example of the nobility of failure, and Tigers baseball as workplace melodrama.




# Recent Publications by ISS and ISS Staff

菅原郁夫・山本和彦・佐藤岩夫（編）  
『利用者が求める民事訴訟の実践：  
民事訴訟はどのように評価されているか』  
（日本評論社）2010年8月



中村尚史（著）  
『地方からの産業革命：  
日本における企業勃興の原動力』  
（名古屋大学出版会）2010年9月



大沢真理（著）  
『いまこそ考えたい生活保障のしくみ：  
岩波ブックレット No.790』  
（岩波書店）2010年9月



佐々木聡・中林真幸（編著）  
『講座・日本経営史3  
組織と戦略の時代：1914～1937』  
（ミネルヴァ書房）2010年9月



玄田有史（著）  
『希望のつくり方』  
（岩波新書）2010年10月

## Recent Publications by ISS and ISS Staff

\*For more publications, please visit the ISS Homepage (<http://jwww.iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp/>, <http://www.iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp/>).

宇野重規（編著）

『政治の発見 第4巻』

つながる：社会的紐帯と政治学』

（風行社）2010年10月



佐藤博樹・永井暁子・三輪哲（編著）

『結婚の壁：非婚・晩婚の構造』

（勁草書房）2010年10月



五百旗頭薫（著）

『条約改正史：法権回復への  
展望とナショナリズム』

（有斐閣）2010年12月



佐藤博樹・武石恵美子（著）

『職場のワーク・ライフ・バランス』

（日経文庫）2010年11月



中林真幸・石黒真吾（編）

『比較制度分析・入門』

（有斐閣）2010年12月

# Focus on ISS

Starting with this issue, we will showcase a variety of ongoing activities at ISS in the SSJ Newsletter. For our first feature, Dr. Kana Takamatsu, ISS Research Associate/Global COE Fellow, gives a brief overview of the Global COE Program, "Gender Equality and Multicultural Conviviality in the Age of Globalization."

The Institute of Social Science has been an active partner in Tohoku University's GCOE Program, "Gender Equality and Multicultural Conviviality in the Age of Globalization," since FY2008. The aim of this program is to promote interdisciplinary collaboration among the major fields of the social sciences in order to establish global education and research networks. At the same time, program members are working to use research outcomes to be utilized in the society by helping to formulate effective public policy for contemporary social issues such as social exclusion due to poverty and disparity, population aging and deep-rooted gender inequality.



The 22<sup>nd</sup> UT-ISS International Symposium: "Faces of Social Exclusion from a Gender Perspectives" February 28, 2009

To date, ISS has cooperated with the program's home institution, Tohoku University, to hold joint seminars and symposia, conduct research projects and accept exchange PhD students. ISS has also been implementing its own activities. We organized several research meetings in FY2010. In the past several months we co-sponsored an international forum entitled "The Hague Convention on Child Abduction and Domestic Violence – Practices and Challenges in American Society" (July 22nd), we held a research presentation session funded with GCOE Specially Promoted Research Funds to support our young researchers (August 31st), and we held a luncheon seminar entitled "Issues with Child Abuse Prevention in Japan" (September 30th). We will also hold a variety of events going forward. In addition to these seminars and symposia, we have been holding small-scale gender study groups at the ISS Branch of the GCOE Program. We will continue striving to become a focal point for gender-related research at ISS.

第22回 東京大学社会科学研究所国際シンポジウム  
The 22nd UT-ISS International Symposium

**『社会的排除とジェンダー：日独型レジームと北欧型レジーム』**  
"Faces of Social Exclusion from a Gender Perspective"

日時：2009年2月28日(土) 10:30~16:30  
会場：東京大学本郷キャンパス内 講義ホール  
Date: February 28 (Sat), 2009, 10:30-16:30  
Venue: Fukutake Learning Theater, University of Tokyo

○ 協力 ○  
東北大学GCOEプログラム「グローバル時代の男女共同参画と多文化共生」(実行リーダー：辻村みよ子)  
科学研究費補助金 基盤(A)「生活文化学」の比較・ジェンダー分析」(研究代表者：大沢真理)  
科学研究費補助金 基盤(A)「日独型レジーム」の比較政治分析」(研究代表者：高木太郎)

主催：東北大学グローバルCOE「グローバル時代の男女共同参画と多文化共生」  
GEMC

**国際セミナー2009**  
**多文化共生社会のジェンダー平等**  
グローバリゼーションのジェンダー・多様性・共生  
Gender Equality in Multicultural Societies: Gender, Diversity and Conviviality in the Age of Globalization

2009年8月3日(月)  
13:30~17:30  
会場：東京大学駒場キャンパス  
「多文化共生とジェンダー平等の交錯」

2009年8月4日(火)  
14:30~18:00  
会場：東北大学内南キャンパス  
(文芸学研究所・文学部大会議室)  
「移民の人口・ジェンダー・シフト」  
「経済格差と家族・労働」

東京会場  
仙台会場  
盛岡会場

どなたでも参加できますが、参加ご希望の方はFAXまたはEメールで参加登録をお願いします。

東北大学法学研究科GCOE事務局  
TEL: 022-211-5590 FAX: 022-211-5595  
E-mail: gcoe-contact@law.tohoku.ac.jp http://law.tohoku.ac.jp/gcoe/

국제공동심포지움  
한일 사회의 빈곤, 불평등, 사회정책:  
젠더 관점에서의 비교  
Poverty, Inequality and Social Policy in Korea and Japan from a Gender Perspective  
日韓社会における貧困、不平等、社会政策：ジェンダーの観点からの比較

2010년 3월 6일(토) 9:30~18:00, 서울대학교 국제대학원 소신관 (동서관)

9:30-10:00 제1차 및 축하공연  
• 환영회 (서울대학교 국제대학원 교수, 임명연구소 소장)  
• 오찬회 (오찬회 (오찬회 사회과학연구소 교수)  
• 이해관계 (한일 사회정책 비교연구회) (한일 사회정책 비교연구회)

10:00-12:10 Panel 1  
(사) 한일 사회정책 비교연구회 (한일 사회정책 비교연구회)  
(한) 한일 사회정책 비교연구회 (한일 사회정책 비교연구회)  
(한) 한일 사회정책 비교연구회 (한일 사회정책 비교연구회)  
(한) 한일 사회정책 비교연구회 (한일 사회정책 비교연구회)  
(한) 한일 사회정책 비교연구회 (한일 사회정책 비교연구회)

12:10-13:00 Panel 2  
(한) 한일 사회정책 비교연구회 (한일 사회정책 비교연구회)  
(한) 한일 사회정책 비교연구회 (한일 사회정책 비교연구회)  
(한) 한일 사회정책 비교연구회 (한일 사회정책 비교연구회)  
(한) 한일 사회정책 비교연구회 (한일 사회정책 비교연구회)  
(한) 한일 사회정책 비교연구회 (한일 사회정책 비교연구회)

13:00-14:00 Panel 3  
(한) 한일 사회정책 비교연구회 (한일 사회정책 비교연구회)  
(한) 한일 사회정책 비교연구회 (한일 사회정책 비교연구회)  
(한) 한일 사회정책 비교연구회 (한일 사회정책 비교연구회)  
(한) 한일 사회정책 비교연구회 (한일 사회정책 비교연구회)  
(한) 한일 사회정책 비교연구회 (한일 사회정책 비교연구회)

14:00-16:00 Panel 4  
(한) 한일 사회정책 비교연구회 (한일 사회정책 비교연구회)  
(한) 한일 사회정책 비교연구회 (한일 사회정책 비교연구회)  
(한) 한일 사회정책 비교연구회 (한일 사회정책 비교연구회)  
(한) 한일 사회정책 비교연구회 (한일 사회정책 비교연구회)  
(한) 한일 사회정책 비교연구회 (한일 사회정책 비교연구회)

16:00-17:00 Panel 5  
(한) 한일 사회정책 비교연구회 (한일 사회정책 비교연구회)  
(한) 한일 사회정책 비교연구회 (한일 사회정책 비교연구회)  
(한) 한일 사회정책 비교연구회 (한일 사회정책 비교연구회)  
(한) 한일 사회정책 비교연구회 (한일 사회정책 비교연구회)  
(한) 한일 사회정책 비교연구회 (한일 사회정책 비교연구회)

17:00-18:00 축하공연

주최: 서울대학교, 임명연구소  
주최연구비(보조금) (한일 사회정책 비교연구회) (한일 사회정책 비교연구회) (한일 사회정책 비교연구회) (한일 사회정책 비교연구회) (한일 사회정책 비교연구회)