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Regime Change

As of this writing (January 2010), the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) is strug-gling to fend off criticism against its president and prime minister, Hatoyama Yukio, and its secretary general, Ozawa Ichiro, over their political funding scandals. The DPJ's sweeping victory in the 2009 lower house election seems as if it happened a long time ago, yet it was a truly historic event in Japanese poli-tics when the DPJ came into power after almost 54 years of unbreakable rule by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). This issue of *SSJ* focuses on Japan's govern-ment change and features four researchers who have tackled this topic.

Iio Jun points out that Japan's 2009 government change was quite significant because it indicated that voters had rejected the methods of the traditional political system and ruling coalition. Iio emphasizes the importance of this elec-toral result and suggests the possibility of further changes to the political struc-ture and social order in the future. Using opinion polling data from 2005 and afterwards, Maeda Yukio details the DPJ's road to victory. He argues that the groundwork for the DPJ' s recent victory was in fact completed in the summer of 2007, when the LDP lost the House of Councillors election for the second time in a row, which also made it extremely difficult for the LDP coalition to control the agenda in the lower house. Uekami Takayoshi examines DPJ and LDP electoral manifestos and describes the differences between the two. He finds overall that differences between the manifestos of the two parties have been shrinking over the past six years, but suggests that the DPJ has (so far) been successful in distinguishing itself from the LDP in policy areas such as administrative reform and welfare. Finally, Hamamoto Shunsuke takes a look at the relationship between political parties and interest groups before and after the 2009 election. He finds that before the election most interest groups contact-ed both major parties despite the LDP's dominance and suggests that interest groups may continue to show this tendency even after the change of govern-ment. It is hard to tell how the future will unfold, but the DPJ's victory has defi-nitely left a major mark on the history of this society.

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Regime Change

What will the change of government bring to Japanese politics?

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In the lower house general election held on August 30, 2009, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) won 308 of 480 seats and secured a significant majority. With this victory, the Liberal Democratic Party-Komeito coalition government crumbled and the DPJ-led Hatoyama Yukio cabinet was inaugurated on September 16. The LDP yielded its long-held reins of power to its opponents.

The significance of the DPJ's victory lies in the fact that it was essentially the first time in the history of Japanese party politics that a "true change in government" was achieved through an election. Under the current Japanese constitution, the Katayama Tetsu cabinet of 1947 and the Hosokawa Morihiro cabinet of 1993 were also formed as the result of seat changes after general elections. So, in this sense, the Hatoyama cabinet is not the first change in government resulting from a general election; but both the Katayama and Hosokawa cabinets were formed by negotiating coalitions after general elections, and those administration changes may not have taken place if the coalitions' negotiations had played out dif-

ferently. In contrast, the recent change in government occurred due to a fierce two-party competition for power which resulted in a dramatic shift in the majority in the lower house, and from this point of view it can be considered a "true change in government."

If we examine this further, we can see that the DPJ did not accidentally come into power but that conditions paved the way for a change in government. Signs of changes to come were indicated by the fact that in many opinion polls the approval ratings of the DPJ had outstripped those of the LDP for quite some time—which was an unprecedented phenomenon—and since the election followed on this heels of this trend, most voters, including supporters of the ousted LDP, accepted the outcome. What's more, the DPJ had secured the position of leading party in the 2004 and 2007 upper house elections, so this is not the first time they have become the leading party in a national election.

In other words, the DPJ not only had a secure foundation to work from in the lower house, which serves as the constitutional backbone for the cabinet, but since it was only a few seats shy of a single-party majority in the upper house, it cooperated with the Social Democratic Party and the People's New Party—with which it formed a coalition—to secure a majority in the upper house and maintain a solid basis for passing legislation. In light of these earlier achievements, the foundation for the DPJ government is firm and there is sufficient potential for the party to retain power as long as the lower house is not dissolved midway through its four-year term.

Furthermore, in the general election of 2009 the lower house electoral system, which combines single-seat districts and proportional-seat representation, provided important clues indicating the potential for changes in government due to massive seat fluctuations. In the previous lower house general election held in 2005, the LDP

secured a major victory with 296 seats, and its coalition partner Komeito won 31 seats while the DPJ suffered a major loss by only winning 113 seats. In 2009, the election results shifted 180 degrees with the LDP and Komeito only holding on to 119 and 21 seats respectively and the DPJ sweeping to victory with 308 seats. The sudden reversal was possible because a mere handful of Japan's 300 electoral districts are "safe districts" that reliably vote for a particular party. This means that large-scale seat turnovers such as what we have just witnessed will remain possible in the future. Looking at the two most recent general elections, one can safely say that party politics in which administration changes are possible are starting to take root in Japan.

While the DPJ was able to effect a change in government, the predominant view is that the election was less a victory for the DPJ than a loss for the LDP, which is the correct assessment. However, one must take care not to infer that a change in government simply means that the ruling party has fallen out of favor. In Japan, where changes in government through elections have not been the norm, the LDP was not simply the leading political party, it had secured a symbolic presence as the ruling elite that also held the reins of government. In this sense, the fact that the LDP lost means that Japan's conventional political systems and ruling bloc have been rejected by the voters. Additionally, the DPJ is carrying a banner for "ending dependence on bureaucrats" and emphasizing the "elimination of government waste" precisely because of these kinds of voter trends. Seen in this light, the 2009 change in government has the potential to alter government structures and transform the social order. Given this potential, what effects will the establishment of a DPJ-led cabinet via a change in government have?

First, the DPJ seeks to change how decisions are made within the government and has been steadily achieving reforms since coming to power. The DPJ has presented a clear policy of politician-led government and has begun to develop systems in which ministers and other high-ranking officials make their own decisions rather than rely on the bureaucrats under them as they used to. The ministers together with the already installed vice-ministers and ministerial aides constitute the top three official posts, and the administration has established that these top officials will make decisions in their respective ministries and agencies. In the past some matters used to only be reported to ministers and agency heads without requests for decisions, but with the top three officials now working in unison, the number of cases being decided by the ministers and agency heads is rising. Cabinet-level decision making, too, has been reformed. Cabinet meetings in which bureaucrats used to coordinate and fix issues in advance are giving way to a system of several cabinet committees in which cabinet ministers coordinate policy together, and this system is gradually starting to kick into gear. These reforms have served to remedy the disparity between nominal power and actual power so that those individuals who possess official authority will now make substantive decisions.

In this context, the standard practice in Japan of keeping the government and the governing party separate and not having Diet members serve in government positions has been overhauled such that members of the ruling party now play major roles in government decision-making; the rule of "a uniform cabinet stance on policy" has been put into effect. These reforms will likely serve to gradually streamline the decision-making process of the Japanese government.

However, since the government is in a transition phase and coordination among ministers remains inadequate, disparate remarks by ministers on foreign policy and other issues are starting to make the administration's stance appear shaky, but as the ministers and other top officials familiarize themselves with the ins and outs of running a government, these problems will most likely sort themselves out.

Second, a major transformation in the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats is imminent. As I have already mentioned, the DPJ-led cabinet has reformed government decision-making systems to phase out the old practice of behind-closed-doors fixing by bureaucrats, and because of this, the roles of bureaucrats are undergoing drastic changes. At present, politicians tend to object to consulting with bureaucrats on policy in order preserve their autonomy.

As a result, the overall capacity for governance has declined somewhat. In any case, the administration is moving from the old system in which politicians and bureaucrats teamed up to make decisions to a new division of roles for each camp based on the assumption that politicians' and bureaucrats' areas of responsibility should be separated from each other. However, a climate in which changes of government are possible means that the opposing LDP could once again regain its grip on power, so the DPJ has decided that it must switch to a separate functional relationship between politicians and bureaucrats, instead of maintaining the heretofore unchallenged symbiotic relationship.

Third, these kinds of changes mean that altering Diet management will be unavoidable. Until now maneuvering surrounding the agenda-setting of the ruling and opposing parties was the primary work undertaken by Japan's Diet. This practice was based on the assumption that the relationship between the two parties was unchanging; however, with role-switching now possible, this tendency towards inefficiency and disregard for real debate is increasingly becoming a target for reform. For example, one tactic that was often used to set agendas was to request the minister of foreign affairs or another minister to attend the Diet, forcing him or her to cancel overseas business trips in order to have remain in attendance even if the opposition parties have no intention of asking the minister questions, but criticism of this kind of senseless behavior will probably increase.

Fourth, shifts in party structures will progress. In addition to the single-seat electoral system, discipline by party officials is starting to take effect on the structure of Japan's political parties. This trend is especially strong in the DPJ which is promoting the unification of the government and the ruling party. For this reason, political parties are expected to evolve from groups of lawmakers to more organized entities.

Fifth, relationships between the state and interest groups will have to change. For instance, as the roles of politicians and bureaucrats are separated, the government and ruling party unify, and political parties become more organized, the number of access points to the government and ruling party, which used to be countless, may be confined into routes of expressed social interest. Against this backdrop, the heretofore amalgamated state-society relationship will most likely move slowly towards a relative decoupling.

Sixth, one can expect a shift in public awareness stemming from a sense of release. The change in ruling systems by way of the change in government is giving people who were not involved in politics in the past a sense of new possibilities. This may raise people's interest in politics, or it may provide an escape from an administrative straitjacket. Increased activity in a heretofore weak area will boost social mobility, and that in and of itself could hold a certain measure of political meaning.

At this point in time, many of these predictions remain mere possibilities, but we must focus attention on the prospect that the impact of the change in government could be greater than expected.

The change of government and public opinion: September 2005 to August 2009

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The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) achieved a historic victory in the 45th general election on August 30, 2009. No one could have expected such a landslide election result four years ago. In the 44th general election on September 11, 2005, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) won 296 seats while the DPJ secured only 113 seats. With Komeito's 31 seats, the LDP-led governing coalition held a two-thirds majority in the House of Representatives, which enabled the government to override decisions by the House of Councillors. However, the legislative balance of power in the Diet is now completely reversed, as the DPJ has won 308 seats and the LDP only 119 seats. The purpose of this essay is to examine the tide of public opinion that brought the first change of government through an election in Japanese history.

1. Cabinet approval and politics

All national newspapers and nationwide TV networks regularly conduct opinion polls to report how people respond to the most pressing public concerns of the day. For this paper, I mainly rely on the numbers provided by the Jiji Press which maintains the longest time series, dating back to June 1960. However, as the Jiji opinion polls cover only levels of cabinet approval and party support, I supplement them with polling results published by the other newspapers. Figure 1 shows cabinet approval and party support ratings between September 2005 and August 2009. Below I will briefly describe the changes in approval ratings for each cabinet.

The third Koizumi cabinet started with an approval rating of 53.5%. Koizumi did not experience a large setback during his final year, but his popularity declined 7% from January 2005 to February 2006 due to a few events that placed his cabinet on the defensive. Chief among these events was the arrest of Horie Takafumi, who campaigned as an independent "assassin" candidate, which seemed to have hurt the image of the Koizumi cabinet and its structural reform policies. However, the cabinet's popularity did not decline further due to a blunder by the opposition. The DPJ disgraced itself by mishandling an e-mail, which was later proven to be falsified, that indicated an inappropriate financial relationship between Horie and the LDP secretary general, Takebe Tsutomu. The last approval rating for Koizumi was 43.2 %, which was unusually high for a prime minister about to resign.

In contrast, the three successive LDP cabinets experienced steep declines in their approval ratings in very short time periods. Among them, the year of the Abe cabinet was most eventful. After the enthusiasm of the LDP presidential election, Abe Shinzo, the youngest prime minister in Japanese postwar history, was very popular with an approval rating of 51.3% in October. However, his approval suddenly went down to 41.9% in December, because LDP headquarters permitted Diet members who were expelled from the LDP

for voting against postal reform to rejoin the party. The Abe cabinet's approval levels ran further downhill and seemed to hit bottom at 34.7% in March 2007.

After passing the budget bill for FY 2007 in March, Abe aggressively pursued a conservative policy agenda including the National Referendum Act for the Revision of the Constitution and civil service reform, which kept Abe's popularity afloat around 40%. According to the public opinion poll conducted by the *Asahi Shimbun* on May 12 and 13, 28% of those interviewed indicated that they would vote for the LDP for their proportional representation (PR) district, while 21% said they would vote for the DPJ (*Asahi Shimbun*, May 16, 2007). After reading a few polling results published by news organizations, the LDP leadership gained confidence in the coming House of Councillors election (*Yomiuri Shimbun*, May 22, 2007).

On the same day that the *Yomiuri Shimbun* reported on the optimism in the LDP, the Committee on Health, Labor and Welfare in the House of Representatives heard testimony on missing pension records, which seemed to deal a serious blow to the Abe cabinet (Kakizaki and Hisae 2007:203-207). Furthermore, about a week after the hear-

ings, Matsuoka Katsutoshi, the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, committed suicide, which obviously aggravated the situation. All news organizations reported that people's cabinet evaluations deteriorated abruptly. The cabinet approval ratings reported by Jiji dropped from 39.4% in May to 28.8% in June.

Unfortunately, Abe further suffered from careless remarks and strange behavior by a few other cabinet members. Boxed into a corner, Abe tried to change the course of public opinion and the election campaign by gambling on the argument that the House of Councillors election was a choice between Abe and the DPJ president, Ozawa Ichiro, for the premiership. Notwithstanding Abe's gamble, the LDP lost by a landslide.

Late in August, after nearly a month-long political vacuum, Abe reshuffled his cabinet only to suffer from the resignation of another cabinet member. After a few days, Abe suddenly announced his own resignation due to health problems.

After Abe stepped down, Fukuda Yasuo won the LDP presidential election and organized his cabinet exactly one year after the Abe cabinet was

Figure 1 Cabinet Approval and Party Support 2005.9-2009.8 Jiji Monthly Poll

Source: Jiji monthly public opinion report

installed. Fukuda's approval ratings began at 44.1%, which was 7.2% lower than Abe's initial score. Fukuda at first tried to form a grand coalition government between the LDP and the DPJ, but failed because of opposition within the DPJ. While this incident itself had little impact on Fukuda's popularity, he suffered from several rounds of legislative gridlock with the DPJ which had adopted an uncompromising strategy after the failed attempt to form a grand coalition. Fukuda's approval ratings steadily declined as he was criticized for one issue after another when the Diet was in session. Those issues included the extension of legislation authorizing the Maritime Self Defense Force's deployment in the Indian Ocean, the appointment of the governor of the Bank of Japan, whether to extend the temporary higher rate for the gasoline tax, etc. Fukuda's approval rating went up slightly after the G8 summit meeting in Tōyako, Hokkaido in July, and again after he reshuffled his cabinet early in August. However, he suddenly announced his resignation, which resulted in the third LPD presidential election without an incumbent in a little more than two years.

Aso Taro won the LDP presidency. The initial approval rating of the Aso cabinet was 38.6%, which was 5.5% lower than Fukuda's initial score. This "ordinary" low number was unexpected since Aso was believed to be popular among the voters (similar reasoning was reported in *Mainichi Shimbun*, September 26, 2008). It should be also noted that each prime minister's initial approval score was lower than his predecessor's, dropping further each time the LDP selected a new prime minister, which indicated that people were dismayed by the frequent turnover in the highest public office.

Furthermore, Aso's popularity dropped suddenly from 38.8% in November to 16.7% in December. This is the record for the sharpest decline in the history of the Jiji monthly poll. One can only speculate on the reasons for this unprecedented decline but it is highly likely that Aso himself was responsible for three reasons. First, he postponed the submission of the second extra budget for FY 2008, which appeared contradictory as he had repeatedly argued that the economy was more important than the election. Second, Aso's limited

ability to lead was revealed by his maladroit handling of a proposal to include cash payments to families in the economic stimulus package. Finally, Aso made several inappropriate remarks and mispronounced words, which undermined his integrity and dignity.

Later in the spring of 2009, his popularity recovered somewhat and reached around 25%, but this was caused by reports of a financial scandal involving the DPJ president, Ozawa. After Hatoyama Yukio replaced Ozawa as the DPJ president, Aso's popularity started to flounder again, and was just 16.7% before the 45th general election.

2. Opinion toward political parties

For party support, only the ratings for the LDP, the DPJ, and nonpartisans are shown in Figure 1. In contrast to cabinet approval ratings, which are sensitive to ongoing political events, party support ratings change gradually. Over a period of four years, the LDP's support slowly went down from its highest point of 31.9% in September 2005 and bottomed out at 15.1% in July 2009. Public support for the ruling LDP was naturally linked to cabinet approval ratings. The correlation coefficients, calculated separately for each cabinet, are roughly between 0.8 and 0.9.

The DPJ's support, on the other hand, started at 14.8% after the 2005 general election. It initially went up and down around 10% before the 2007 House of Councillors election, but jumped up to 19% in a poll taken a week after the election. Afterwards, it stayed around 15%. Different from the LDP's support, the DPJ's support is not necessarily correlated to cabinet approval levels. In fact, DPJ support is positively, though weakly, correlated to both the Koizumi and Fukuda cabinet approval ratings (around 0.20). However, DPJ support is negatively and strongly correlated to the cabinet approval ratings of the Abe (-0.69) and the Aso (-0.46) cabinets, both of which had a national election during their tenures. It seems that (dis)approval of the cabinet does not necessarily lead to support for the major opposition party. Rather, dissatisfaction with the incumbent government is translated into opposition support only when an election is in the foreseeable time

horizon.

There is another technical reason that may explain the tenuous relationship between dissatisfaction with the cabinet and support for the opposition party. As the question for party support allows respondents to choose "no party to support," people can simply sidestep the choice between the parties. To see the impact of day-to-day national political affairs clearly, I employ another question from the *Mainichi Shimbun* opinion poll that forces people to choose between the LDP and the DPJ (Figure 2). It asked respondents, "Do you want the LDP to win the next House of Councillors (House of Representatives) election or do you want the DPJ to win?" This question was first asked when Abe's popularity recorded its first large decline in December 2006.

Initially, public opinion was evenly divided between the LDP and the DPJ. The DPJ first overtook the LDP in the poll taken in May 2007 just after the testimony on missing pension records. From then on, the gap between the DPJ and the LDP increased until the 2007 House of Councillors election. The parties once came close to a tie in September 2007, presumably because of the LDP presidential election and the installation of the Fukuda cabinet. However, the difference between the two parties resurged and registered a gap of 26% in May 2008 when the DPJ strongly criticized the government for the temporary gasoline tax and the health insurance system for elderly people over 75. Before the general election in 2009, the LDP got ahead of the DPJ only once in October 2008, immediately after the LDP presidential election and the installation of the Aso cabinet.

To corroborate the analysis above, another question from Kyodo News regarding the desired partisan composition of the cabinet is visually displayed in Figure 3. It asked respondents, "Do you want to keep the LDP in power or do you want to see the DPJ in power?" The LDP had a lead of 18% when the question was first asked in September 2006, and maintained its advantage over the DPJ until early in May 2007. However, again after May, the gap between the LDP and the DPJ disappeared, and the public was evenly divided regarding which party they would like to see in power. Finally, the DPJ surpassed the LDP in December 2007 when Fukuda's popularity dropped sharply for being unable to meet the deadline for matching missing pension records. After that, the LDP recorded a higher score than

Figure 2 The party voters want to win in the next Diet election   Mainichi Poll

Original question: 次の参院選（衆院選）で自民と民主のどちらに勝って欲しいですか？
Source: *Mainichi Shimbun* (compiled by the author)

the DPJ only twice. From December 2007 to March 2008, the gap gradually narrowed, probably because people feared the several rounds of legislative brinkmanship by the DPJ in the House of Councillors. The second and the last time the LDP recorded a tie with the DPJ was in early September 2008 when Fukuda announced his resignation, generating hopes that the LDP could regain momentum through the next round of the presidential election. However, Aso himself utterly spoiled the LDP's chance to recover .

3. Discussion

In this essay, I described changes in public opinion over the four years. It may appear that idiosyncratic factors in politics, such as ongoing political events and remarks by cabinet members, have a strong influence on people's perceptions and opinions. However, there also seems to be a few structural elements that shape, if not determine, the course of public opinion, which I summarize below.

First, Diet sessions provide turning points for the direction of public opinion. While cabinet members can be criticized at any time, they can be forced to respond only in the deliberations of the Diet. The opposition parties exploit this opportu-

nity to attack the government. Thus, it is not a coincidence that the cabinets with the greatest drops in approval ratings also experienced the longest Diet sessions. The Fukuda cabinet is a case in point. Fukuda assumed the premiership on September 26, but the 168th extraordinary session had started on September 10 under the Abe cabinet, and concluded on January 15. Then, just three days later, the 169th regular session started on January 18 and lasted until June 21. In other words, the Fukuda cabinet was incessantly criticized by the DPJ on one issue after another for nine straight months. Unfortunately for Fukuda, the expiration of the temporary higher rate for the gasoline tax in April and its re-legislation in May constrained him from pursuing his own agenda, as the tax was indispensable to implementing some of the policies planned for FY 2008. That is why the line for Fukuda's popularity in Figure 1 declined monotonically until June. In contrast, Abe had the luxury of pursuing his own agenda after passing the budget for FY 2007, which contributed to the recovery of his popularity in April and May.

The Diet was in session for 192 days for the third Koizumi cabinet and 253 days in total for Abe before he announced his resignation. It was in session for 268 days for Fukuda, and finally 291

Figure 3: The desired partisan composition of the cabinet   Kyodo Poll

Original question: あなたは、自民党が中心になる政権が続くのがよいと思いますか。それとも民主党が中心となる政権に代わるのがよいと思いますが。
Source: *Tokyo Shimbun* (compiled by the author)

days for the Aso cabinet. The accumulation of political events and missteps obviously affected the cabinets' approval ratings, but the timing and length of Diet sessions give a rhythm, if not a direction, to the flow of public opinion.

Second, the presence of the political party in the Diet translates into support rates in the opinion polls. The support for the DPJ grew higher after the 2007 House of Councillors election and did not return to prior levels . Reading the trajectories of three questions that tap into different aspects of partisan evaluation, shown in Figure 1-3, it seems that the critical period is between May and July in 2007. During this time, the testimony on missing pension records impressed the scale and the seriousness of the problem upon the public. The DPJ capitalized on the window of opportunity created by this political situation in the nick of time. Many people, disgusted by the Abe cabinet, cast their ballots for the DPJ in the House of Councillors election.

During the long history of the LDP's reign, people occasionally registered their dissatisfaction through House of Councillors elections, the outcomes of which did not directly influence the status of the cabinet. However, as the DPJ was also successful in the 2004 House of Councillors election, the DPJ became the largest party in the upper house, and, in cooperation with the small parties, could effectively stall nearly every bill submitted by the government. The DPJ effectively employed this legislative advantage to demonstrate their ability and importance to a wide audience by attacking the Fukuda cabinet. The political clout of the DPJ, elevated through its near-majority status in the House of Councillors, seems to be responsible for a roughly 5% increase in support rates after the election.

Finally, people came back to the LDP when its importance was highlighted by presidential elections. Media reports on debates among candidates during campaigns gave a temporal boost to the LDP and narrowed its gap with the DPJ, but, once the legislative advantage was in the hands of the DPJ, LDP support soon went back to lower levels. During its final years as a governing party, the LDP could sustain its energy and support among the voters only by changing its president. While the 2009 general election was a final nail in the coffin, the fate of the LDP seems to have been already set in the summer of 2007. The missing pension records provided a crucial springboard for the DPJ to acquire a critical weapon in the House of Councillors to break into the decision-making process and undermine the LDP government.

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Electoral Manifestos of the Democratic Party of Japan

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For the first time in sixteen years a change in government took place in Japan as a result of the lower house general elections in September 2009. The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) secured a landslide victory and the Hatoyama Yukio cabinet was inaugurated. The Hatoyama administration has made the implementation of its campaign manifesto its top priority and is attempting to enact various new policies. In this article I discuss the importance and the characteristics of the DPJ manifesto, a document which has garnered unprecedented attention.

The manifesto is having a massive impact on Japanese politics, but the history of such documents is relatively recent. While they may be called by several names, manifestos are typically announced by political parties during national elections. The first national election in which manifestos were unveiled was the 2003 general election. At that time, the then governor of Mie Prefecture Kitagawa Masayasu emphasized the implementation of his "Local Manifesto," after which the use of manifestos in regional elections—primarily gubernatorial elections—began to spread. The DPJ kicked off this movement by stressing the adoption of British-style elections and governance.

The image below is the cover of the DPJ's first manifesto from the 2003 general election, and the image next to it is the cover of Great Britain's Labour Party manifesto from the 2001 general election.

The layout of DPJ manifesto uses a full-cover shot of then-DPJ president Kan Naoto, and the similarities with the manifesto of the Tony Blair-led Labour Party are striking. The slogan on the cover of the DPJ manifesto "Building a strong Japan,"[1] also resembles the slogan on the Labour Party manifesto, "Ambitions for Britain." Allow me to address two questions: How do manifestos in Japan differ from the campaign promises of the past, and is their format merely copied from British manifestos?

In the past, Japan's political parties announced campaign promises at the outset of national elections. It is generally understood that manifestos differ from typical campaign promises in that manifestos must clearly indicate numerical targets, deadlines and financial resources. In this sense, one can measure the extent to which manifestos are fulfilled. The fact that manifestos provide details on how policies will be funded differentiates them from conventional campaign promises which were never more than wish lists.

According to manifesto proponents, it is important to establish a "manifesto cycle" in which voters cast ballots based on a party's promises, the

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[1] Subsequent slogans include "Directly and Single-mindedly" (2004), "Don't Give up on Japan" (2005), "Putting Peoples' Lives First" (2007), and "Change in Government" (2009).

[Manifestos of the DPJ (2003, left) and Great Britain's Labour Party (2001, right)]

Source: The Democratic Party of Japan

Source: The Labour Party (UK)

administration strives to fulfill those promises and the voters reassess the administration based on its performance. With the change in government due to the DPJ's general election victory in 2009, the current cycle has entered the second stage.

What kinds of policies comprise the DPJ manifesto? Are they different from those of the once-

dominant Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)? The table below classifies DPJ and LDP manifestos from 2003, 2005 and 2009 into policy areas divided along the jurisdictions of the old ministries and agencies. Please refer to Shinada (2006) for details on how this data was compiled and tabulated.

At a glance, one can see that the LDP and the DPJ

Table 1 Content Analysis of Policy Area Component Ratios in Manifestos

	2003		2005		2009	
	LDP	DPJ	LDP	DPJ	LDP	DPJ
Cabinet	20.3%	14.6%	12.8%	21.9%	14.0%	15.9%
Local government	11.7%	9.9%	9.8%	6.0%	6.1%	5.2%
Security and foreign affairs	6.4%	11.2%	9.7%	10.8%	7.5%	7.0%
Finance	11.5%	8.4%	5.4%	6.6%	3.9%	9.9%
Education, science and technology	9.8%	4.7%	10.9%	8.5%	10.4%	4.7%
Health and welfare	8.8%	11.5%	12.9%	14.3%	14.5%	20.9%
Labor	5.5%	6.8%	3.7%	4.5%	8.6%	7.2%
Agriculture and fisheries	2.1%	3.2%	5.2%	4.7%	8.5%	4.3%
Structural reforms	0.7%	0.0%	0.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Trade and industry	11.5%	6.5%	7.2%	5.1%	5.3%	4.4%
Transportation	0.9%	0.6%	3.1%	0.8%	1.5%	0.7%
Posts and telecommunications	1.2%	1.9%	1.8%	3.2%	1.7%	1.6%
Construction	3.1%	6.5%	6.5%	3.9%	3.6%	4.4%
Environment	3.3%	2.9%	4.4%	3.4%	4.5%	4.0%
Politics	0.5%	5.7%	1.6%	4.3%	6.0%	6.0%
Other	2.8%	5.4%	4.4%	2.0%	4.0%	4.0%

focus on different policy areas and that systematic changes have occurred within each party over time. All of the manifestos used for this analysis mention the policy area of "the cabinet" the most. While it is not included in the table for the sake of space, the breakdown for the cabinet category reveals frequent references to governmental, administrative and fiscal reforms. The policy area with the second most mentions is "health and welfare." The breakdown for this category shows high percentages for medicine, pensions, and welfare services. Third and fourth places are held by "security and foreign affairs" and "education, science and technology" respectively. Regarding the latter category, there is a high percentage of mentions for [improving] educational infrastructure. "Local government" ranks fifth; there are frequent mentions of decentralization, local government finance and crime prevention.

In the 2003 and 2005 manifestos, the biggest difference in references between the LDP and the DPJ is also in the cabinet policy area. In the 2003 manifestos, the LDP mentions government reform and administrative and fiscal reform more frequently than the DPJ, but this trend reversed in 2005 and 2009. In the 2009 manifestos, the overall differences in the cabinet category diminished, but the LDP made more mentions than the DPJ regarding economic measures in this area, offsetting the scarcity of remarks the LDP made pertaining to government reform.

The policy area where the parties differ the most in the 2009 manifestos is health and welfare as the DPJ mentioned medicine, pensions, and welfare services much more often than the LDP.

As we can see, what each party says in its manifestos differs, but broadly speaking those differences are lessening year after year. By taking the absolute value of the differences in mention rates per policy area for each party and totaling them for each year, the parties' convergence becomes evident: 44% in 2003, 35.5% in 2005 and 30.2% in 2009.

Finally, I examine policies of the Hatoyama administration that have garnered particular public attention, see when they were incorporated into the DPJ's manifestos and check if the party's stance on those policies has been consistent. At the same time I will also examine the manifestos from the upper house elections.

In a nationwide telephone survey conducted by the *Yomiuri Shimbun* in October 2009, respondents were asked if they agreed or disagreed with several major policies of the Hatoyama administration. Of these, I traced the timeline of DPJ manifesto content for three major domestic issues: child allowances, highways and the Yamba Dam. Please refer to Jimbo (2009) for details on each of these policies.

Disbursement of child allowances. The 2009 DPJ manifesto states, "We will pay a child allowance of 312,000 yen per annum (26,000 yen per month) for all children until they finish junior high school." A characteristic of this policy is that it is paired with the "elimination of tax deductions that benefit earners of relatively high incomes." According to the *Yomiuri* survey, 57% of respondents agreed with this policy while 39%—an unexpectedly high percentage—disagreed.

These child allowances first appeared in the manifesto issued for the 2004 House of Councillors election. The amounts were not clearly indicated, and the allowance payments were paired with the elimination of the spouse tax deduction and the spouse special tax deduction. An amount (16,000 yen) was first listed in the manifesto for the 2005 general election which paired allowances with the elimination of the dependents tax deduction in addition to the spouse tax deduction and the spouse special tax deduction. By the time of the 2007 upper house election, the allowance amount had been upped to the current level of 26,000 yen. In the manifesto for the 2009 general election, the amount did not change but the types of tax deductions slated for elimination now included the dependents tax deduction in addition to the spouse tax deduction. As shown here, the amounts of allowances and types of tax deductions slated for elimination have not been consistent.

Elimination of highway tolls. This policy goal has been consistently listed in DPJ manifestos since 2003. The 2009 manifesto states: "With the exception of certain major urban areas, all highway

tolls will be eliminated…to revitalize local communities and reduce distribution costs." Not all highway tolls would be eliminated at once. The proposed policy offers to "implement a stepwise expansion of toll discounts, and assess their social impact." However, this proposal fared poorly as only 26% of the public were in agreement compared to 69% in opposition.

Discontinuation of construction on the Yamba Dam. The number of people in favor of suspending construction (44%) is roughly equal to the number opposed (36%). The 2003 and 2004 manifestos listed the Kawabegawa dam, the Yoshinogawa movable dam and the Tokuyama dam as candidates for discontinuation. The DPJ declared, "We will do away with public works that waste taxpayers' money and damage the environment, hastening the changeover to new types of public works that will restore the environment" (2003 Manifesto).

The 2005 manifesto listed the Kawabegawa dam, the Yoshinogawa movable dam and—for the first time—the Yamba dam, and the 2009 manifesto followed suit in listing the Kawabegawa dam and the Yamba dam. The discontinuation of the Yamba dam project was not included in the 2007 manifesto because a member of the lower house who was committed to the issue lost his seat in the 2005 general election (*Yomiuri Shimbun*, September 22, 2009).

The scope and details of these major policies have not been entirely consistent over time, but all of them have been part of the DPJ's platform since early time, and this recurrence can be seen as an indication of the existence of a political commitment by the DPJ. By analyzing the aggregate data I have found that the DPJ has successfully distinguished itself from the LDP with regard to its government reform and welfare policies. Can the DPJ continue to win over voters by differentiating its policies from those of the LDP? How will the party handle fiscal restrictions? Are there any problems associated with a political technique often referred to as "manifesto tyranny"? These are some of the many challenges that the Hatoyama administration faces and whether or not this new style of governance that the DPJ has introduced will take hold in Japan depends on its ability to solve these problems.

Acknowledgments

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Changes among Interest Groups toward the Two-Party System

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1. Introduction

The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) scored a historic victory in the 2009 election, bringing an end to more than fifty years of almost unbroken rule by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). This election marked the first time that power has shifted between the two largest parties in postwar Japan, a watershed event that has influenced the bureaucracy and interest groups. The purpose of this article is to make inferences regarding the relationships between political parties and interest groups based on the results of the Japan Interest Group Survey (JIGS) for the period 2006-2007.

JIGS is a nationwide survey that was conducted by Tsujinaka Yutaka[1]. The survey was sent to all 91,101 non-profit organizations that were listed in the NTT (Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation) telephone directory. 15,791 organizations responded to the survey (a response rate of 17.3%), all of which submitted valid responses.

One of the advantages of a nationwide survey is that it can demonstrate the effects of the party system on interest groups at the local level since the party system itself varies from prefecture to prefecture. An analysis based on a nationwide survey offers a key to understanding interest groups' interactions with the two-party system and allows us to estimate the effect of the power shift on the interest groups themselves.

2. Contact and Endorsement

Several studies have focused on the relationship between political parties and interest groups in Japan. These studies have verified that labor groups supported only the opposition party and that other groups (agricultural, economic, etc.) were in contact with and supported only the LDP. The relationship between the political parties and interest groups has been a divided one (Muramatsu, Ito and Tsujinaka 1986).

What groups are in contact with or endorse the LDP or the DPJ? There are two relevant questions regarding this point in JIGS:
1) When your organization makes a request to a political party, which party does it approach and how often does it make requests?
2) Did your organization endorse any political parties in the 2004 or 2005 general elections?

For question 1, respondents indicated their frequency of contact with the LDP, DPJ, Komeito, Social Democratic Party, Communist Party, regional parties and others on a 5-point scale: (5) very frequently, (4) frequently, (3) sometimes, (2) rarely, (1) not at all. For question 2, the respondents chose the parties that their organization endorsed during the 2004 and 2005 elections. Table 1 presents the percentage of organizations that contacted and endorsed the LDP and the DPJ and includes all groups reporting they contacted

parties at least "sometimes."

Table 1 indicates three important points. First, the proportion of interest groups that were in contact with the LDP was twice as high as those in touch with the DPJ. The percentage of groups reaching out to the LDP was 31.3%, whereas that for the DPJ was 14.2%. This is a key difference between the two parties. Second, labor organizations behaved differently in comparison to other kinds of organizations. Of all the labor organizations, 53.2% were in contact with the DPJ, whereas only 13.4% were in contact with the LDP. Third, the number of groups that endorsed the LDP for the 2004 upper house election was four times greater than those that endorsed the DPJ. The percentage endorsing the LDP was 31.4% whereas that for the DPJ was 8.8%. Agricultural, economic, professional, labor, and political organizations are all observed to be active during election campaigns. As a consequence, the gap between the two parties continues to widen even further.

Do similar patterns exist at the prefectural level? Table 2 summarizes the patterns of party contact and endorsement by prefecture, and ranks the prefectures by their level of support for the LDP. Interest groups with a pattern of contacting the LDP and other parties (except for the DPJ) are in the "LDP" column. Groups that reported contacting both the LDP and the DPJ are in the "LDP+DPJ" column and those that contacted the

DPJ and other parties (except for the LDP) are placed in the "DPJ" column.

Table 2 indicates three additional points. First, the percentage of groups contacting the LDP varies from 79.6% (Ehime Prefecture) to 35.9% (Mie Prefecture). It has been reported in studies of interest groups that the LDP is dominant, but when viewed across every prefecture, the pattern of contacting political parties varies. Second, the average percentage of groups contacting the DPJ is 13.7% and, at maximum, reaches only 22.1% (Hokkaido). We can conclude that a decrease in the proportion of groups contacting the LDP does not necessarily result in an increase in DPJ contacts.

Third, interest groups tend to contact both the LDP and the DPJ. The percentage of groups that contacted only the DPJ is 13.7%, whereas that for both the LDP and the DPJ is 21.8%. Furthermore, the latter exceeds the LDP's percentage in three prefectures (Mie, Iwate, and Fukushima). For instance, in Mie the percentage of groups that contacted only the LDP is 35.9%, whereas 43.5% contacted both main parties.

3. Influence of Party Competition

How do interest groups decide whether to contact and endorse political parties? It is important to verify the effects of competition within the party

Table 1 The Relationship between Interest Groups and the LDP and the DPJ

Interest group category	Party Contacted			Party Endorsed*		
	LDP (%)	DPJ (%)	No. of responses	LDP (%)	DPJ (%)	No. of responses
Agriculture/Fisheries	43.7	9.2	2574	57.4	5.2	2777
Economic	40.0	9.2	3745	44.5	6.3	4000
Labor	13.4	53.2	1127	5.9	48.2	1184
Education	24.0	11.6	509	9.8	3.2	570
Administration	17.6	5.1	767	15.1	2.4	845
Welfare	20.4	12.7	1067	11.3	3.7	1175
Professional	42.1	15.2	795	50.8	10.5	857
Political	50.0	33.1	320	43.3	26.4	337
Citizen	24.7	20.5	649	7.2	4.1	704
Science/Culture	13.8	5.9	522	9.8	1.0	592
Leisure	20.1	7.4	417	12.6	3.3	460
Religion	14.0	7.4	121	19.9	7.4	136
Others	24.0	11.4	1747	18.3	4.1	1985
Total			14360			15622
Weighted Average	31.3	14.2		31.4	8.8	

*Endorsements for the 2004 Upper house election

Table 2 Patterns of Party Contact and Endorsement by Prefecture

		Parties contacted by interest groups (%)						Parties endorsed by interest groups (%)*			
Ranking	Prefecture	LDP	LDP+DPJ	DPJ	Others	Ranking	Prefecture	LDP	LDP+DPJ	DPJ	Others
1	Ehime	79.6	7.1	6.2	7.1	1	Tokushima	92.1	0.0	5.3	2.6
2	Shimane	75.9	6.9	10.3	6.9	2	Miyazaki	88.5	1.8	4.4	5.3
3	Tokushima	74.1	10.3	10.3	5.2	3	Toyama	88.0	2.4	4.8	4.8
4	Oita	72.3	9.6	12.8	5.3	4	Ehime	86.7	3.0	5.2	5.2
5	Kagoshima	72.3	11.5	9.2	6.9	5	Fukui	84.5	8.2	6.2	1.0
6	Fukui	72.1	14.7	8.8	4.4	6	Tottori	84.0	4.0	12.0	0.0
7	Kumamoto	72.0	13.1	10.3	4.7	7	Wakayama	83.9	5.4	8.9	1.8
8	Wakayama	70.6	13.7	9.8	5.9	8	Oita	82.7	0.9	10.9	5.5
9	Tochigi	68.7	19.1	10.4	1.7	9	Saga	82.2	8.2	4.1	5.5
10	Miyazaki	67.9	13.6	12.3	6.2	10	Akita	81.3	4.5	8.9	5.4
:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
38	Miyagi	49.5	26.6	14.7	9.2	38	Hyogo	67.1	7.3	20.1	5.5
39	Aichi	48.6	25.7	15.3	10.4	39	Shiga	64.7	15.7	19.6	0.0
40	Nagano	48.1	29.4	13.4	9.1	40	Hokkaido	64.4	7.9	23.6	4.1
41	Hokkaido	46.2	25.9	22.1	5.8	41	Fukushima	63.5	22.2	11.9	2.4
42	Kyoto	43.3	21.6	13.4	21.6	42	Kyoto	60.2	13.3	14.3	12.2
43	Kanagawa	43.2	30.1	19.3	7.4	43	Yamagata	59.8	15.7	13.7	10.8
44	Osaka	39.8	24.5	19.9	15.8	44	Nagano	55.7	24.3	11.7	8.3
45	Fukushima	37.4	43.9	14.0	4.7	45	Osaka	53.8	12.7	23.9	9.6
46	Iwate	36.0	38.7	13.5	11.7	46	Kanagawa	52.7	16.2	22.3	8.8
47	Mie	35.9	43.5	16.3	4.3	47	Iwate	46.3	30.6	13.2	9.9
Average		56.1	21.8	13.7	8.3	Average		71.4	9.3	13.3	5.9

*Endorsements for the 2004 Upper house election

system on interest group activity. The degree of competition within the party system varies in every prefecture. Interest groups in an area where the DPJ holds many seats have less incentive to contact and endorse only the LDP, assuming that their goal is to gain access. In this section, I discuss the DPJ's seat ratio after the 2003 general election in every prefecture.

The importance of organizational structure, resources, ideology, position (whether a governing or opposition party) and so on has been recognized (Franz 2008; Naoi and Krauss 2009). Organizational structure refers to whether the organization has branches (branch = 1, no branch = 0). Organizational "resources" refers to membership. The distance between the stance of the political party and the organization on policy issues is also important in understanding contact and endorsement. Interest groups find it difficult to endorse a candidate who asserts policies they are not in agreement with and may therefore endorse a rival candidate. Although the JIGS survey does not ask about the distance between the preferences of political parties and interest groups, there are two sets of questions regarding interest group leaders' ideology (7-point scale) and trust in legislators and political parties (5-point scale).

The last variable involves the granting of commissions and subsidies. The government party has access to many resources. Organizations that receive commissions and subsidies will tend to contact and endorse the party in power more often than not. In view of the effect of these variables, I analyze the effect of competition in the party system in relation to the activities of interest groups.

The results of a logistic regression analysis appear in Table 3. The DPJ's seat ratio in every prefecture is statistically significant in all models. Interest groups tend not to contact and endorse just the LDP. Instead, as the DPJ's seat ratio increases, they tend to contact and endorse both parties. Competition in the party system influences the relationship between the political parties and interest groups.

Interest groups that received commissions or subsidies are inclined to contact the LDP and to refrain from endorsing the DPJ. This result is consistent with previous studies. Ideology also plays a significant role. The interest groups led by individuals possessing a conservative ideology tended to contact and endorse the LDP. Organizational structure, membership, and trust in legislators and parties are also significant factors in all mod-

Table 3 Logistic Estimates of Contact and Endorsement

	LDP		DPJ		LDP+DPJ	
	Contact	Endorsement	Contact	Endorsement	Contact	Endorsement
DPJ's seat ratio	-0.002 ***	-0.006 ***	0.005 ***	0.006 ***	0.007 ***	0.008 ***
	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.002
Commissions	0.223 ***	0.241 ***	-0.148	-0.198 *	-0.009	-0.017
	0.066	0.068	0.092	0.119	0.099	0.141
Subsidies	0.186 ***	-0.034	-0.056	-0.354 ***	0.061	-0.145
	0.058	0.060	0.080	0.101	0.088	0.125
Ideology	0.268 ***	0.397 ***	-0.130 ***	-0.038	-0.037	0.063
	0.021	0.022	0.026	0.031	0.029	0.043
Organizational Structure	0.332 ***	0.279 ***	0.240 ***	0.276 ***	0.308 ***	0.341 ***
	0.056	0.057	0.076	0.094	0.086	0.120
Menbership	0.042 ***	0.046 ***	0.044 **	0.064 ***	0.048 **	0.090 **
	0.014	0.014	0.018	0.022	0.020	0.029
Trust in Legislators and Party	0.667 ***	0.319 ***	0.612 ***	0.310 ***	0.539 ***	0.133 ***
	0.031	0.031	0.039	0.046	0.044	0.061
Agriculture/Fisheries	0.660 ***	1.784 ***	-0.366 ***	0.130	-0.168	0.466
	0.077	0.079	0.112	0.140	0.120	0.166
Economic	0.652 ***	1.311 ***	-0.453 ***	0.248 **	-0.214 **	0.726 **
	0.063	0.064	0.091	0.110	0.097	0.132
Labor	-0.912 ***	-1.209 ***	1.617 ***	2.486 ***	-0.303 *	-0.176 *
	0.142	0.189	0.112	0.122	0.163	0.279
Constant	-4.075 ***	-3.792 ***	-3.413 ***	-3.889 ***	-4.196 ***	-4.898 ***
	0.154	0.155	0.189	0.230	0.218	0.309
-2Log Likelihood	8086.160	7750.104	5315.973	3961.785	4466.867	2640.940
Cox & Snell R^2	0.152	0.213	0.111	0.098	0.032	0.010
Nagelkerke R^2	0.209	0.290	0.192	0.204	0.066	0.033
N	7107	7193	7107	7193	7107	7193

***<0.01 **<0.05 *<0.1

els. Organizations that have branches, large memberships, and strong mutual trust tend to contact and endorse political parties.

4. Peak Associations after the Power Shift

How have peak associations responded to the power shift? Many groups have changed their relationships with the LDP. For example, the Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives and the Japan Medical Association, which in the past supported only the LDP, have declared their neutrality. Table 4 shows trends in endorsements by major peak associations after the power shift.

After the power shift, some peak associations did not endorse the LDP in special elections or for the 2010 general election. For instance, agricultural and contractors' associations that had endorsed LDP candidates did not support the LDP in special elections in Kanagawa and Shizuoka. The Japan Dental Federation, which had supported the LDP since 1955, withdrew its support from an LDP candidate to endorse a new LDP candidate for the next general election. Some peak associations have maintained their endorsement of LDP candidates, whereas others are starting to keep their distance.

On the contrary, the DPJ has announced plans to disband the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy, in which only business interests participated, and has created the "Government Revitalization Unit" (GRU). Kusano Tadayoshi, secretary-gener-

Table 4 Peak Associations after the Power Shift

	Reported votes in the 2007 General Election[a]	2010 General Election[b]	Special Elections after Power Shift[c]	
			Kanagawa	Shizuoka
Japan Medical Association	186616	Endorsement (LDP Incumbent)	LDP	No Endorsement
Japan Dental Association	228167	LDP endorsement withdrawn	LDP・DPJ	LDP・DPJ
Japan Pharmaceutical Association	168187	Endorsement (LDP Candidate)	No Endorsement	No Endorsement
Japanese Nursing Association	167594	Endorsement (LDP Candidate)	LDP	LDP
Japan War-Bereaved Families Association	230303	Endorsement (LDP Incumbent)	LDP	LDP
Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives	449183	Under consideration	No Endorsement	No Endorsement
National Federation of Land Improvement Association	128199	LDP endorsement withdrawn	No Endorsement	LDP
The Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry	161279		LDP・DPJ	No Endorsement
Building Contractors Society	227123	Endorsement (LDP Incumbent)	No Endorsement	No Endorsement

[a]Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications
[b]Yomiuri Shinbun (10/2/2009), Mainichi Shinbun (11/12/2009)
[c]Jiji Press (10/17/2009)

al of the Japanese Trade Union Confederation (JTUC), is a participant in GRU. In addition, the prime minister is meeting regularly with JTUC. At the regional level, all prefectural DPJ branches are actively developing ties with local interest groups and inviting them to roundtable conferences.

5. Conclusion

The results of the JIGS survey reveal the extent of interest groups' party contacts and endorsements and show that their involvement with parties varied across prefectures when the LDP was the dominant party. The survey also shows that interest groups tended to contact both major parties. Furthermore, various dimensions of the relationships between interest groups and the political parties were affected by the DPJ's strength in every prefecture, its control over government resources, and its ideology.

It is likely that the LDP's share of interest groups' contacts and endorsements will decrease since the party has lost many seats and its access to government resources has diminished as a result of the power shift in 2009. The results of other surveys by media organizations on trends in endorsements by peak associations after the power shift confirm this point. However, it is likely that the power shift will result not in the DPJ's dominance, but rather in a situation where interest groups will tend to be in contact with both the LDP and the DPJ but withdraw from the electoral process.

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The Soviet Union, Russia and Poland:
A Retrospective of My Research

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1. I began my research in 1970 as a graduate student majoring in Soviet law. I chose to research Soviet law because I had, so to speak, a "positive interest" in socialism as an idea and a societal system. I say "positive" in the sense that I wanted to find some suggestions for seeking potential alternatives to the society in which we lived. However, this does not mean that I positively assessed the Soviet system and other examples of "real existing socialism;" in fact the opposite was true. Based on the premise that "real existing socialism" harbored myriad problems, I tried to explain why a system so full of shortcomings was developed and probed where the potential for its reform may have lain.

I was part of a generation that turned out a comparatively large number of researchers who strived to study socialism. One could say that these researchers, for the most part, shared the aforementioned stance on "real existing socialism." This interest was not accidental as my generation shouldered the weight of living through the late 1960s, symbolized by the "year 1968," a time of protest movements—student riots, anti-Vietnam war protests, and opposition to the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and Korea, which more or less concluded the history of colonial rule between Japan and only one-half of the divided Korean peninsula.

2. There are many possible ways to approach socialism as a societal (socio-economic) system. My approach was to consider "real existing socialism" from the perspective of workers' self-management of production. However, the 1970s, which later came to be called the Age of Stagnation, was a time when outward signs of change were far and few between. There was no real substance worth researching from the perspective of workers' self-management, and the signs of reform were scarce, especially at the beginning of the decade. So I tried to retrace the history of the formation of the Soviet-style management of state-owned enterprises where the element of workers' self-management was minimized, recreating a wealth of disputes and trial-and-error experimentation. My first research topic was the transformation of legal structures in state-owned enterprise management from the point of view of workers' rights in the period from the October Revolution, through War Communism, to the New Economic Policy (NEP). In the late 1970s, when I finished my historical research, even the Soviet Union experienced a revival of interest in workers' participation in production management and collective labor relations—issues long forgotten in the USSR. This renewed interest opened up the possibility of linking my afore-

mentioned historical research with an analysis of the current state of affairs. Of course I pursued these trends with great care.

Meanwhile—in addition to my historical research—my original objective was to choose another socialist country and compare it to the Soviet Union in order to relativize the socio-economic system of the latter. What I had in mind was not Yugoslavia, which had gained attention for its own self-management system, but Poland, which had a rich tradition of sociological research that would, I supposed, make empirical study possible. An opportunity arose for me to take the first step toward achieving my goal in 1981. I was going to study in the Soviet Union for ten months starting in the fall of 1980, so I decided to spend forty days in Poland in August and September in 1981, after my stay in the Soviet Union. As luck would have it, this was the peak of the Solidarity movement. In relation to my field of interest, the drafts of the new labor union law and the employees' self-management law were subject to vigorous debate. The Solidarity movement was temporarily derailed by martial law, but despite this, the movement managed to have an impact on the Soviet Union as shown by the USSR's promulgation of the Work Collective Act, which included an element of a Soviet version of employees' self-management.

By the latter half of the 1980s, in light of experiences in the Soviet Union, Poland and Yugoslavia, my research progressed to the point where I could provide a theoretical explanation for the potential coexistence of two types of labor organizations—the trade union and the workers' council—and the division of roles between them. It seemed to me that this framework laid out a policy direction for reforming "real existing socialism." However, I must confess that "real existing socialism" in both the Soviet Union and Poland at that time was exceeding my expectations: the socialist system itself had begun to advance along the road to systemic transformation at a rapid rate.

3. This transformation reached a turning point in 1988, around the time that I moved from Hokkaido University to ISS of the University of Tokyo. For the next few years, I followed the perestroika movement in the Soviet Union and the process of

negotiated transition in Poland and took a multi-faceted approach to the many legal issues that arose therefrom. I spent all my time producing many short articles in an effort to ponder the meaning of these issues. Please allow me to raise one example each from Polish law and Soviet law which I remember for the difficulties involved in writing them.

Regarding Polish law, I wrote an article analyzing the partially free parliamentary elections held in June 1989. After tracing the process from the creation of a "social contract" with the founding of the Solidarity union in 1980 to the rebirth of this derailed social contract with the April 1989 Round Table Agreement, I analyzed the institutional framework and results of the election. Having secured on short notice back issues of *Gazeta Wyborcza*, a Solidarity newspaper whose publication was specially approved for the 1989 election, I wrote a paper in early August just before the inauguration of the Mazowiecki administration. While this election holds great significance as the turning point in Poland's transition, my analysis of subsequent multiparty election systems and election results comprise one part of my research into Polish law.

As for Soviet law, let me mention an article I wrote immediately after I witnessed the attempted coup d'état in August 1991 and the subsequent demise of the Soviet Union. I wrote this article as part of the ISS institute-wide "Contemporary Japan Studies" project. Based on my understanding of the so-called "collapse of the Soviet Union," I demonstrated how three different aspects of the breakup—political democratization (de-Sovietization), transition of the socio-economic system (giving up of socialism) and transformation of national statehood (disintegration of the Union)—were intertwined with each other in the actual political process and illustrated the kinds of problems that would remain for post-Soviet Russia. The perspectives and problems I outlined in this paper have served as my guidelines for analyzing systemic transitions in post-Soviet nations including Poland.

4. The awareness of issues that formed the basis of my interest in socialism as a socio-economic system in all its various permutations still contin-

ues to the present day in a slightly modified way as shown, for example, by my recent research—primarily on Poland—on the selection of privatization models for state-owned enterprises and the restructuring of livelihood security systems during the transition to capitalism.

At the same time, I have undertaken research on another set of issues, that is, judicial systems, broadly defined. This line of inquiry originated from the awakening to law in action and the sociological study of law I experienced when I stayed in the Soviet Union in 1981. At that time I witnessed a series of criminal and civil trials at Moscow courtrooms as a member of the public and drew up my own judicial statistics for one courthouse over a fixed period of time (so to speak, mini-statistics) since actual judicial statistics were not published at that time. In Poland, where the judicial system was receptive to the overall Soviet-style institutional framework, I saw judges, public prosecutors and attorneys stick doggedly to tradition, unlike in the USSR. I learned the important lesson that legal traditions can be perpetuated despite transformations of societal system through the practices of legal elites, that is, legal practitioners and scholars. From the late 1980s, both Russia and Poland began to implement large-scale judicial reforms concurrently with the transformation of their socio-economic systems, and these reforms are ongoing today. While their reform agendas have a lot in common, their actual system designs often differ and these differences are especially apparent at the law-in-action level. One of my current research topics is to explore why and how these designs have diverged, keeping in mind the similar judicial reform issues that Japan faces now because it, like Russia, underwent historical changes after beginning to develop a modern judicial system in the latter half of the 19th century.

5. Since ISS was founded in 1946, the Soviet Union, along with China, was a focal point of ISS research. For many years there were three Russian/Soviet specialists on the ISS roster who studied respectively Russian/Soviet history and contemporary politics, Soviet law, and the Soviet economy. But when I retire in March 2010, there will no longer be any Soviet Union/Russia specialists at ISS. Although this is connected with the major transformations in defining the objectives of research and the changes in the social meanings of social science research on this region of the world, I am keenly aware of both my lack of ability and responsibilities. It is my sincere hope that someday ISS will once again conduct research on Russia, our significant neighbor in every aspect, and on Poland and the other East European countries, which underwent two major systemic transformations in the 20th century alone, and are now bringing something new to the European Union as its youngest members.

Japanese National Identities and Perceptions of Foreign Countries

Tanabe Shunsuke

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1. Japan amidst Globalization

To date I have researched ordinary people's sense of national identities and perceptions of foreign countries. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, many people thought that the world would "become one" through globalization, but the world, in fact, split into many more "nation states" as witnessed by the breakup of the former Yugoslavia. In Europe, where it seemed as if integration had been accomplished with the supranational framework of the European Union, extreme right-wing parties grew more powerful through appeals to nationalism and anti-immigration sentiment. These circumstances led me to ask what is meant by the word "nation" and how people perceive foreign nations; these questions served as the springboard for my research.

In Japan as well, it is said that nationalism has grown stronger under the influence of globalization. For example, Takahara (2006) argues that rapid job mobility concurrent with globalization has directly affected young adults. Job insecurity engenders a sense of isolation and economic vulnerability and those emotions are transforming into nationalism. Takahara calls this kind of nationalism "personal anxiety-based nationalism." In relation to this rising nationalism, some scholars point out worsening perceptions of foreign counties typified by phrases such as "Ken-Kan" (anti-Korean sentiment) and "Ken-Chu" (anti-Chinese sentiment). In fact, one can find numerous postings on internet bulletin boards which express strong anti-Korean and anti-Chinese attitudes.

Debates on these issues are vigorous. Surprisingly, however, the volume of empirical research grounded in tangible data remains miniscule, especially for the case of Japan. Some works are little more than impressionistic criticisms based on the authors' overgeneralization of a handful of examples, while others are conceptually elaborated theories with no supporting data. Therefore, I have conducted various empirical studies by statistically analyzing survey data both on national identities and perceptions of foreign countries.

2. Japanese National Identities

Almost everyone assumes an identity as a member of the nation-state to which he or she belongs and is affected by that identity to one degree or another. I have been conducting secondary analyses of International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) data on national identities (Tanabe 2001, 2008a, 2010). My findings show that people in Japan, a typical ethnic nation, do not often distinguish between ascription and achievement as

conditions for deciding who is "truly Japanese." Unlike civic nations such as the United States or Australia, in Japan the concept of "citizen" (the civic element) is not distinguished from the concept of "Japanese ethnicity" (the ethnic element). I also confirmed the tendency for strong political national pride to correlate closely with national particularism and exclusionism. These findings suggest that statements of liberal nationalism such as "I love my country so I want to open it to foreigners" do not gain approval in Japan without difficulty.

However, the types of national identity in Japan differ greatly across generations. The elderly overwhelmingly displayed what could be called "nationalistic" types of national identity. Meanwhile, many young people have wide parameters for defining "truly Japanese." They either exhibit non-exclusionary national identities or national identities of strong cultural pride with weak exclusionary tendencies; few young people exhibit the exclusionism or self-particularism that is prevalent among the elderly.

3. Japanese Views of Foreign Countries

Japanese people's views of foreign counties can be considered the reverse face of their sense of national identity, and I have been analyzing and examining these views with a survey that I conducted. Generally speaking, Japanese people tend to hold the countries of Europe and North America in high regard while thinking less of other countries (Tanabe 2009b). I found that likeability ratings for Western nations are higher than for other nations. I also discovered that the cognitive frame Japanese people employ when considering a foreign country is "Western nations (Japan included) vs. non-Western nations (excluding Japan)" (Tanabe 2004, 2008b). However, I also show that people's classification standards can change. For example, the degree of focus on the "Western vs. non-Western" standard is weakening for Japanese with overseas travel experience and for young people.

Additionally, as I examine perceptions of foreign countries, I use Japanese General Social Surveys data to explore cognitive maps with a limited focus on "Asia" (Tanabe 2009a). My findings show that in likeability ratings, North Korea is especially despised and the average likeability score of China is also low. There are also major divisions between people who liked and disliked China and South Korea. On the other hand, over half of the responses for the nations of Asia are a neutral "0," so the majority of respondents are "indifferent" toward those nations. After analyzing the cognitive structures, I revealed that while China, South Korea and North Korea each exhibit a unique presence, the likeability ratings for the other nations of Asia (Taiwan, Mongolia, the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, and India) are highly correlated. In other words, most Japanese people do not differentiate between these nations by their cultural or geographic proximity but instead treat them as one group. As I have shown above, the public is generally neutral toward most Asian nations while their likeability ratings for the nearby nations of China and South Korea are far from high. In other words, my results indicate that public sentiment for the creation of an "East Asian Community" is not favorable under current conditions.

4. Japan is not in "Globalization" but "Internationalization"

I consider that contemporary Japan is not undergoing "globalization" in the sense that nation-states' boundaries and systems are melting away, but that it exists in a state of "internationalization" in which it remains highly aware of the presence of national boundaries and nation-states, as my analysis of national identities and perceptions of foreign countries has shown. For example, standards for deciding "who is Japanese" are not divided into ascriptive dimensions, such as bloodlines, and subjective dimensions, such as self-identification and respect for national institutions and laws. So it is hard to imagine that Japan's legal criteria for naturalization will be modified or dual citizenship made possible because most Japanese think being "truly Japanese" requires not only being a "Japanese citizen" but also having "Japanese ethnicity." Likewise, Japanese people's perceptions of the countries of the world are organized around the "Western vs. non-Western" standard, so many people see Japan not as one country in Asia, but as a nation closer to the West. Simply put, while the stan-

dards for "Japaneseness" remain solid, the awareness of being a "member of East Asia" is weak and emphasis is placed more on Japan's relationship with the West. For this reason, the government of Japan has not shifted its policy of internationalization based on a strong national awareness very much since the 1980s.

However, one can see the beginnings of change among the younger generation with regard to this state of affairs. Many young people ascribe to non-exclusionary national identities which can be understood as an expression of their intent to make Japan a more open country. Their cognitive maps for foreign countries are also changing, and their "Western orientation" is on the decline. Keeping this in mind, I think that youth who were born in an era in which globalization was the norm have sufficient potential to dramatically change Japanese national identities and perceptions of foreign countries. Research on the mutual relationships between Japanese national identities and the perceptions of foreign countries is still in development. I am currently conducting a survey using a questionnaire that includes both of these elements, and I hope to shed more light on these mutual relationships in my future research.

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Questions and Answers with Visiting Professors

Ha Jongmoon

Professor
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(Visiting *Shaken* from June 15 to August 31, 2009)

Q. How did you come to know about *Shaken*?

I first heard of *Shaken* twenty years ago when I came to Japan in 1987 as a research student at the University of Tokyo Graduate School of Letters. After I enrolled in the master's program, I took economic history seminars—much like Professor Kazutoshi Kase's and Professor Akira Hara's seminars—offered by the Faculty of Economics every year. When I was working on my master's thesis and my doctoral dissertation, I was blessed by the kindness of the *Shaken* library staff who let me access invaluable materials on labor policy, including string-bound volumes. I also learned a wealth of information working on my dissertation under the supervision of Professor Kase. Even after I returned home in 1995, every time I visited Japan I would go to Professor Kase's office to seek his counsel and stop by the *Shaken* library to search for materials. I am very grateful for the opportunity to come back to Japan as a visiting professor, and I would like to thank Professor Kase for his efforts and Director Suehiro and everyone at *Shaken* for their support. *Shaken* will continue to be a valued partner for my research.

Q. What are your research interests?

My research can be divided into four areas: Japanese labor policy during the war; the emperor system; wartime mobilization in colonial Korea; and historical perceptions and history textbooks.

In my dissertation I analyzed Japan's wartime labor mobilization policies and, based on the wartime reorganization of employment agencies, elucidated labor market trends, laws and other systems for control which contributed to the situation. After returning to Korea, I examined changes in labor policy immediately after the war, focusing primarily on the "reorganization" during the transition from wartime to peacetime. I am also attempting to reassess the logic behind wartime labor mobilization. For example, while the principle of an "imperial work ethic" was trumpeted, I am trying to show that the "nationalization" of the workforce and private companies was actually only partially achieved, as seen by the defeat of the Fundamental Labor Law.

I have also been trying to gain an overview of prewar Japan by linking the emperor system to social policy. I examined the process leading up to the promulgation of the Poor Law in 1931 and demonstrated that the redefinition of the emperor as a "compassionate ruler" was pivotal to the government's campaign against democratic reforms during the Taisho era. By continuing to focus on the difference between "subjects" and "citizens," I theoretically elaborated upon the emperor system while exploring the political implications of a system which operated and perpetuated itself along a fixed course, as opposed to advancing towards democracy through regular elections.

Key topics in my research on wartime mobilization in colonial Korea are the Imperial Japanese Army in Korea and "comfort women." It could not have been possible to mobilize "comfort women" and build and operate "comfort stations" without the involvement of the Japanese Army and the Japanese government. I have

shown that the construction of comfort stations was closely tied to military operations and that "comfort women" were identified as "army civilian personnel" or "army subordinates." I am also interested in the close involvement of the Japanese Army stationed on the peninsula in the intricate details of Japan's rule of Korea, such as running the conscription program and "mobilizing resources."

Finally, I am shedding light on the proclivities and backgrounds of Japan's history revisionists—including the Society for History Textbook Reform—and the extent of their movement, while exploring the degree to which Japan, China and Korea can achieve a shared historical perception. I am also keeping a close watch on discussions of nationalism in Korea (i.e., the extent of anti-Japanese and anti-North Korean sentiments and the relationship between the two).

Q. What is the main purpose of your visit?

I came to Japan this time with two research plans. First, keeping in mind the course of development and details of the labor policies planned and implemented immediately after Japan's defeat in WWII, I want to examine the practical application of these policies with a focus on different regions' attitudes towards them. To explore regional attitudes, I will narrow down regions into model cases and look for their respective time-series variations. After verifying whether or not various wartime policies served to fundamentally transform labor policy, I would like to describe how demobilization occurred in regional areas amidst the confusion and shifts in central government policy immediately following the war. Regarding materials, I plan to use relevant wartime and immediate postwar materials, such as the diaries and papers of former Nagano Prefecture official Kitajima Senichi, which are stored at the Saitama Prefectural Museum of Historical Records (*Saitama Kenritsu Shiryōkan*). While I cannot use the *Shaken* Library this time due to earthquake reinforcement work, I intend to make full use of its materials in the future.

Secondly, I will research how Koreans residing on the Japanese mainland during the war were mobilized. While there is already a large volume of research on forced Korean labor, the relationship between the wartime mobilization system and "resident Koreans" who had been living in Japan since before the Sino-Japanese War remains almost completely unexplained. Based on my own research on labor mobilization polices, I would like to zero in on the reality of resident Korean mobilization and delve into the "reorganization" of Korea under Japanese rule during the war.

Q. What do you like about *Shaken*?

I think the most appealing aspect of *Shaken* lies in the integrity of its research which covers every area of the social sciences. Even today, *Shaken's* commitment to the value of integrative social science research makes it a rare kind of institution. Historically speaking, this is because *Shaken* has always offset the shortcomings of empiricism and quantitative approaches in economics by pursuing shared growth instead of adopting a winner-takes-all attitude. When I returned as a visiting professor, I re-read the "Reasons for the Establishment of the Institute of Social Science" which hang above the entrance to *Shaken*. The document proclaims that *Shaken*, in order to rebuild postwar Japan as a "democratic and peace-loving nation," shall reinvent social science to include the systems and situations of the world's nations in its scope. This proclamation could be thought of as the cornerstone of the interdisciplinary research that has become popular at *Shaken* of late. I watched this ideal being realized when I made a presentation at the *Shaken* Staff Seminar. I was caught in a "crossfire"—something I have never experienced in my study of history—and felt a sense of happy perplexity.

Given this, I feel that *Shaken's* openness is the natural progression of things. While I was unable to enter the *Shaken* Library this time, the comfort I have always felt there is perfect example of this welcoming attitude. With its friendly staff and easily accessible materials, I naturally came to make use of the *Shaken* Library. Since I became a visiting professor, I have never once felt isolated. At the beer party in July, before I knew it, I found I had become part of the "*Shaken* Family." I hope my membership never expires.

Questions and Answers with Visiting Professors

Hiroko Takeda

Lecturer
School of East Asian Studies, University of Sheffield
National Institute of Japanese Studies, University
of Sheffield
(Visiting *Shaken* from July 16 to November 15, 2009)

Q. How did you first come to know about *Shaken*?

The School of East Asian Studies (SEAS), University of Sheffield where I completed my PhD and currently hold a position as an academic member of staff has long been collaborating with *Shaken*. Many *Shaken* professors have visited and stayed at SEAS, while *Shaken*, as the heart of social science research in Japan, has in turn been a favoured destination for SEAS staff and research students. In fact, prior to my stay, one of my PhD students, Lisa Nye, spent one year at *Shaken* as a visiting researcher. It is consequently impossible to be a student or academic member of the staff at SEAS without knowing the name '*Shaken*'!

Having said this, I first came across the name of *Shaken* when I was a student in Japan, reading books and articles written by *Shaken* professors for my studies. One of the first *Shaken* publications that I read in the early 1990s was a series of journal articles on gender and social policy written by Professor Osawa Mari, who, also kindly hosted my stay at the ISS this time round. Around that time, studying gender-related topics was not very easy in Tokyo and, having read Professor Osawa's articles, I once or twice snuck into her postgraduate seminar with the help of my friends. So, years later, when Professor Osawa told me about this opportunity to spend time at the ISS as a 'visiting professor', I of course jumped at the chance.

Q. What is the main purpose of this visit?

On an individual level, the main purpose of this visit is to develop ideas to compile a research monograph on the 'governing of everyday risk' in postwar Japan. Inspired by the governmentality discussion, I have long been interested in examining and analyzing, in a concrete manner, ways in which the notion of risk operates to govern individuals. It seems to me that a multitude of discourses regarding various risks in everyday life - ageing, misfortune and accidents at home and work, the death of family members (particularly breadwinners), food shortages, food safety, neighbourhood safety, unemployment, personal financial crises, and divorce/separation to name a few - provide a privileged lens to understand how direct/indirect links between the state and individuals are formed, how they function, and, most importantly, how these links are now being recalibrated in response to changing global and domestic politico-economic conditions. At one level, everyday risks are experienced by the individual as a personal matter. Simultaneously however, to different degrees in different historical times, governments also implement a multitude of measures to mediate these risks, as is exemplified by state social security systems. In this sense, everyday risks are the dynamic interface between individuals' lives and government policy measures.

In many industrially advanced countries, including Japan, the reorganization of state governing and policymaking systems in response to globalization and economic restructuring is an ongoing process at the heart of which we can observe negotiations that draw/redraw the boundaries of individual and state responsibilities to deal with various everyday risks. This is a particularly pertinent issue in the case of the Japanese state, given that the structural reforms of the Koizumi gov-

ernment (2001-6) overtly pursued a reduction of state functions, while emphasizing the notion of self-responsibility. In light of this, I hope that the scholarly contributions my planned monograph will make will be twofold. First, the book will give concrete accounts of recent political and social changes with reference to the handling of various everyday risks. Second, it will also provide theoretical insights into discussions over the individual-state relationship as well as those over 'governmentality'.

There is also an institutional dimension to my visit. Sheffield has just started a joint PhD programme in cooperation with a Global COE programme on Gender Equality and Multicultural Conviviality in which *Shaken* collaborates along with the University of Tohoku. Two of my PhD students (Paola Cavalier and Kamila Szczepanska), along with a third Sheffield student, are participating in this scheme and are now staying in Sendai. *Shaken* has kindly offered these joint PhD programme students institutional affiliations and a research room. Support such as this from *Shaken* has proved very useful for students conducting fieldwork in Tokyo and is crucial to many for the completion of their PhDs. During my stay at *Shaken*, I visited the University of Tohoku with *Shaken* scholars and had the opportunity to converse with my students' supervisors at the University of Tohoku, while both of my students were able to visit me at *Shaken*. The felicitous timing of my visit can therefore be said to have ensured a smooth start to the joint PhD degree programme for Sheffield students.

Q. What are your current research interests?

As mentioned earlier, I am currently working on a project that examines the ways in which the notion of 'risk' functions in the process of governing the everyday lives of individuals in Japan through exploiting the sense of security/insecurity among its people. Since Ulrich Beck's book *Risk Society* was published and translated into English, risk has become one of the most oft-mentioned topics in the social sciences. As Australian sociologist Deborah Lupton has noted, several approaches have been taken in social scientific research on risk. My approach is mainly informed by the 'governmentality' school, especially the

work of scholars such as Nikolas Rose, Mitchell Dean, and Pat O'Malley.

The term 'governmentality' is rooted in Michel Foucault's lectures that are now published and widely available (Foucault 2007). Studies of governmentality are concerned with how a governing system that exercises 'disciplinary power' and 'biopower', both of which target the national population, operates and functions. These studies try to analyze and diagnose how people are being governed by mobilizing different techniques and sets of knowledge. I first came across Foucault's lecture on governmentality when I was a postgraduate student, and since then, governmentality has been the main source of academic inspiration for my research activities. This project on risk is my latest attempt to approach governmentality in the Japanese context.

I also have a long-term interest in gender and family issues, and in fact teach gender issues in Japan and other East Asian countries at Sheffield. My ambition is to add a gender dimension to the discussion on governmentality by exploring links between national policies and everyday conduct at home, be it household finance management, meal preparation or consumption. More concretely, I am working on several papers that examine shifts in the family model appearing in government documents and changes in Japan's food governance system including the *Shokuiku* campaign.

Q. What do you like about *Shaken*?

Needless to say, *Shaken* has a large body of staff specializing in many different disciplines, and very consciously pursues a multi-disciplinary approach. This makes *Shaken* an excellent destination for researchers who work in the anglophone environment of area studies, which is generally multi-disciplinary. By coming to *Shaken*, we are able to meet and receive advice from scholars who are at the forefront of their disciplines, and garner insight on how they utilize their expertise to create multi-disciplinary research fora.

In closing, I would really like to express my gratitude to *Shaken*'s flexible, 'adventurous' spirit and its decision/willingness to accept someone like

myself (being at a relatively early stage of my academic career) as a 'foreign visiting professor'. This opportunity has enabled me, for the first time since I started work as a university lecturer in 2001, to stay a good length of time in Japan, refresh my knowledge, conduct interviews and fieldwork, and last but not least, give presentations in Japanese. Thus, the benefits I have received from *Shaken*'s visiting professor scheme have been phenomenal, especially considering that opportunities of this kind are normally very rare for younger researchers. I am indeed truly grateful to *Shaken*, and at the same time, I am sure my case will encourage many other younger researchers in the field!

ISS Contemporary Japan Group at the Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo

David Leheny

Henry Wendt III '55 Professor of East Asian Studies at Princeton University

The Short, Strange Life of Japan's Values Diplomacy

July 22, 2009

Abstract:
As domestic debate raged about whether Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro's foreign policy had tipped too far toward the United States, and whether it needed to be more "autonomous" or even "pro-Asian," two of his successors had already started to make the case for a diplomatic approach that would embrace and promote free markets, liberal democracy, and the rule of law. Although both Abe Shinzo's "Values Diplomacy" and Aso Taro's "Arc of Freedom and Prosperity" were implicitly targeted at aligning Japan with the United States, Australia, and India against a rising China, these visions displayed the tensions inherent in any articulation of a country's putative values or international stance. This paper examines how these depictions of Japan's diplomacy were exploited both by American analysts arguing for the universalism of American values as well as by Japanese actors aiming to re-define their country's role in an Asia that had, in some alarmist views, started to ignore Tokyo. I trace discourses of culture and development, relating them to contemporary diplomatic themes, particularly that of "soft power," a term associated most frequently with Harvard political scientist Joseph Nye, once thought to be the Obama administration's choice as ambassador to Japan.

Paul J. Scalise

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The Politics of Restructuring: Agendas and Uncertainty in Japan's Electricity Deregulation

November 25, 2009

Abstract:

The 1995 revision of the Electric Power Industry Law (*Denki jigyō-hō*) was the first comprehensive revision of the law governing Japan's electric power industry since 1964. Two further revisions would be made to the Law in 1999 and 2003. Despite little change in real electricity prices since 1995 (the revised law's primary objective), restructuring the industry had fallen off the national agenda by 2007. Indeed, what started as an effort to inject competition into the electric power industry through deregulation ended with an almost equally adamant decision to halt the reform process altogether. How and why did a diffuse public interest like electric power deregulation initially prevail by getting on the national agenda in the early 1990s, only then to face a highly unusual degree of skepticism and resistance fifteen years later? This presentation discusses the politics behind the puzzle. The conventional wisdom among social scientists regarding the failures of diffuse consumer-oriented policy change points to powerful career bureaucrats, self-interested politicians or vested interests "buying up" regulations. In this presentation, I analyze the fine balance between two conflicting images of Japan's energy policy subsystem ("security" versus "efficiency") that are actors engaged in structural reform. Unlike previous research using power-dependence models, I use heretofore-unexamined archival documents, microeconomic data, and qualitative interviews with key actors to test another possible cause of policy change: the infiltration of foreign ideas. Periods of stasis (controlled by negative feedback) in rhetoric, imagery, government-business cooperation, and economic ideas are occasionally known to be offset by bouts of frenetic institutional change. Variations in deliberation timetables, shifting voting patterns in committees, sporadic law promulgations, increasingly negative public opinion polls, and fluctuating media attention cycles (the dependent variables) are analyzed by using the ubiquity, consistency, and strength of foreign economic ideas and events (the independent variables) to explain the transformation of both formal (regulatory/legislative) and informal (normative) institutions in Japan.

Gavin H. Whitelaw

Associate Professor of Sociocultural Anthropology at the International Christian University

Shoptalk: Lives and Livelihood from the Epicenter of Convenience Culture

*January 28, 2010*

Abstract:

Small shops and family enterprises are topics of ongoing interest in studies of Japan. Over the last several decades, however, the profile of such businesses has changed significantly, particularly within the retail sector where convenience store franchises, or *konbini*, now dominate. In certain respects, konbini have re-invented the neighborhood corner shop, turning it into a competitive commercial force with global ties and mass appeal. In 2008, konbini sales in Japan topped 7.8 trillion yen, surpassing department store sales for the first time in history. The story behind these numbers is complex. Statistics alone fail to address how changing practices and notions of store ownership may be contributing to the expansion of this business sector. In this presentation I draw on recent ethnographic research to examine the meanings of konbini ownership in contemporary society. While earlier studies of small shop culture emphasize the ways that merchants actively craft themselves and create traditionalism in urban neighborhood contexts (Kondo 1990, Bestor 1990), I discuss how konbini proprietors are forging a different kind of identity through their negotiations of the very consumption practices and standardization processes embodied by the convenience store model.

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
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
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浅川達人・佐藤香・祐成保志・
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（PHP研究所）2009年11月

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