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*Kakusa* - Economic Inequality

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Hirashima Kenji  
Yamazaki Yukiko

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**All inquiries to:**

*Social Science Japan*  
Institute of Social Science  
University of Tokyo  
Hongo 7-3-1, Bunkyo-ku  
Tokyo 113-0033 JAPAN  
Tel +81 3 5841 4931  
Fax +81 3 5841 4905  
Electronic mail:  
[ssjinfo@iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp](mailto:ssjinfo@iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp)

**Cover Photo**

Scene of Tokyo - Shibuya and Shinjuku seen from the Ebisu Garden Place. Photo by ©Tomo.Yun ([www.yunphoto.net/en/](http://www.yunphoto.net/en/)).

**Editorial Notes**

*Personal Names*

All personal names are given in the customary order in the native language of the person unless otherwise requested. Hence in Japanese names, the family name is given first, e.g. Toyotomi Hideyoshi, and in Western names the family name is given second, e.g. George Bush.

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In September of 2006, the Koizumi Administration completed just over 5 years in office. As it left office, the government was confident that the current expansion of the Japanese economy would surpass the 57 month (1965-1970) Izanagi Boom, hitherto the longest period of sustained growth in Japan's post-war era. But there was plenty of rain on retiring Koizumi's parade, with his inaction in the face of growing inequality being perhaps the major source of criticism. Among other indicators, the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare's 2004 survey on the redistribution of income suggests that Japan's Gini coefficient has increased since 1984. The public's concern over income, regional and other variants of economic inequality - or *kakusa*, in Japanese - is stronger than ever. Even Abe Shinzo, Koizumi's heir for Liberal Democratic Party President (and thus Prime Minister), has acknowledged that it is necessary to do something about growing economic inequality.

This edition of *Social Science Japan* therefore takes up the important issue of inequality. Three papers explore youth employment, intergenerational social mobility, and diversification in the forms of employment. Professor Honda points out that the impending retirement of the baby-boom generation might not bring a labor-market nirvana for Japanese youth because of profound changes in the structure of the domestic economy. Professor Ishida also suggests that the ready stereotype of Japan's post-war equalization of society is misleading and that it is especially important to recognize intergenerational immobility. Finally, Professor Sato calls for a careful examination of diversification in the forms of employment as a major cause of economic inequality.

These reports show us that the problem of economic inequality is not a new phenomenon. They also highlight the fact that inequality is not amenable to easy solutions and quick fixes.

We should also like to note that the SSJ editorial committee has changed as of April, 2006, and the Newsletter is now published twice a year. Moreover, beginning with this issue we include research reports by ISS faculty members as well as interviews with researchers visiting ISS. And, as ever, we sincerely hope for your continued support for SSJ.

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# The Transformation of the Youth Labor Market and the Reemergence of the Issue of Educational Credentials

Honda Yuki



**Honda Yuki is an Associate Professor of Sociology of Education at the Institute of Social Science, the University of Tokyo**

Institute of Social Science  
University of Tokyo  
Hongo 7-3-1  
Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113-0033  
yuki@iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp

## The Youth Labor Market: Current Conditions and Future Prospects

For more than the past ten years, corporate recruitment and hiring of new graduates has been remarkably curtailed, and harsh conditions have prevailed in the Japanese youth labor market. However, halfway into the first decade of the new millennium, there are signs that the demand for recruitment of new graduates is finally on the rise due to the recovery of the Japanese economy and the imminent advent of the so-called "2007 problem;" namely, the large-scale retirement of the first baby boomers. For example, in the case of high school graduates, while employment offers to new high school graduates declined from over 1,670,000 offers to March graduates in 1992 to 210,000 (approximately one-eighth of the former figure) in March 2003, thereafter numbers began to rise again, such that there were 290,000 employment offers to March graduates in 2006. Together with this rise, the percentage of March graduates seeking work that in fact managed to secure employment by the end of March rose from a

low of 89.7% in 2002 to 95.8% in 2006 (data available at <http://www.mhlw.go.jp/houdou/2006/05/h0512-2.html>). Similar trends can be observed for university graduates and graduates of vocational colleges (data available at <http://www.mhlw.go.jp/houdou/2006/05/h0512-3.html>).

However, we must beware of jumping to premature conclusions about the bright prospects for the youth labor market based merely on these recent trends. The following factors advise a certain degree of caution in this regard. First, both the economic upturn of recent years and the "2007 problem" are temporary phenomena. Amidst the ongoing globalization of the worldwide economy, the economic welfare of any one country is increasingly vulnerable to the influence of a variety of circumstances abroad, being exposed to competition in terms of quality and cost from a large number of countries. Since the extent to which the economic policies of a particular country can function to maintain a robust economy is limited in such circumstances, economic instability is more pronounced than previously. Further, since the "2007 problem" exists in the context of a distortion of Japan's demographic structure, it is clear that this is an even shorter-term phenomenon than the economic climate. Accordingly, the demand for young workers to make up for the labor scarcity accompanying the retirement of the first baby boomers is not something that can or will continue long-term. Obviously, the continuing decrease in the younger population caused by the declining birthrate and aging population will certainly have a positive influence on the youth labor market. However, the decrease in numbers of the younger population or, in other words, in the supply of young people to the labor market, will not necessarily engender a situation where all young people will have excellent employment opportunities. This is because, in terms of the quality of labor demand, a new situation is beginning to emerge.

This point is directly related to the second reason why we cannot automatically predict bright prospects for the youth labor market. That is, it is likely that irreversible structural changes in indus-

try, and demand for human resources, will hereafter prove to be an ongoing and serious cause of instability in the entire youth labor market, particularly in certain parts thereof. The development of the new economy is, on the one hand, giving birth to complex and sophisticated jobs involving the management of dispersed networks linking factories, businesses and the like, and the planning and development of new products. As many commentators have already pointed out, however, the new economy is also generating unstable types of employment, particularly in human service sectors such as the retail and restaurant industries (Reich 1991, Ball et al. 2000, Bynner 2005, Miyajima 2006). While the former kind of work has brought about an increase in demand for recruits having high-level cognitive and non-cognitive skills, the latter kind of work is linked to an increase in demand for a "disposable" labor force without any specific requirements in terms of skills or qualifications. In the midst of this polarization of demand for human resources, the probability that young people with a comparatively low level of education and training (that is, middle and high school graduates, and high school dropouts) will only be offered opportunities for "disposable" work, is rising. Of course, even among young people with comparatively high levels of education and training (university and graduate school graduates), those deemed not to meet more specialized skill requirements and stricter corporate recruitment standards will not be afforded stable employment opportunities either. Particularly since the 1990s, as the university entrance ratio has risen together with the relaxation of competition for places, there are greater disparities in capabilities than before among university graduates. Accordingly, while graduation from university is a prerequisite to securing favorable employment opportunities, this in itself does not suffice. On the other hand, however, the disadvantages concomitant to not having received higher education have, in the meantime, greatly increased, meaning that labor market prospects for young people in this situation are not promising in the slightest.

### **The Problems Faced by Young People without Higher Education**

We will now consider how those without higher education have faced changes in the labor market over the past 15 years, focusing mainly on high school graduates. According to the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology's *Basic Schools Survey*, while the number of new high

school graduates securing employment in 1990 was over 600,000, by 2005 this had decreased to approximately one-third of the number, at just over 200,000. These figures partially reflect the decrease in the younger population, with the overall number of new high school graduates declining by more than 500,000 from 1,760,000 in 1990 to approximately 1,200,000 in 2005. However, the rate of decline of new high school graduates finding employment is clearly significantly higher than that of overall numbers of new high school graduates, as evidenced by the fact that the proportion of new high school graduates securing employment decreased from 35% in 1990 to 17% in 2005. Over the same fifteen year period, the number of new university graduates increased from 400,000 to 550,000 while the number of those securing employment decreased from 320,000 to 300,000, showing a significant increase in the number of those graduating from university without having found jobs. However, it is important to note that while the decline in numbers of university graduates finding employment is relatively small, for high school graduates the labor market contracted to a remarkable degree.

The breakdown by job-type for new high school graduates recruited as regular employees is shown according to gender in Figs. 1(i) and (ii) respectively. The Tables illustrate, for example, that the decrease in numbers of those recruited is more marked for women than for men; that the job-types available to male high school graduates are predominantly limited to blue-collar jobs; that where previously clerical jobs constituted approximately half of the employment opportunities secured by female high school graduates, there has been a marked decrease in the number of female high school graduates recruited for such positions; and that at present employment opportunities for female high school graduates are spread over a wider variety of job-types.

However, these charts do not reveal the whole story regarding the current state of the labor market for new high school graduates. More detailed data in this regard can be found in the results of a survey of about 500 high schools carried out jointly in March 2006 by the Japan Senior High School Teachers and Staff Union and the National Federation of Independent School Teachers and Staff Unions (*Japan Education Newspaper*, May 22, 2006, p. 19). According to the survey results, while there had been a slight increase in the ratio of new high school graduates seeking employment securing full-time positions,

nearly forty percent of the schools responded to the effect that there had been a rise in job offers for unstable employment, such as part-time work and (temporary) contract employment.

図1-① 職種別 新規高卒就職者数の推移 (男子)




Fig. 1(i) Changes in Numbers of New High School Graduates Securing Employment by Employment Type (Male)

図1-② 職種別 新規高卒就職者数の推移 (女子)




Fig. 1(ii) Changes in Numbers of New High School Graduates Securing Employment by Employment Type (Female)

Data Source: Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology's "Basic Schools Survey"

- その他 Other
- サービス職業従事者 Service industry
- 生産工程・労務作業 Manufacturing and labor
- 販売従事者 Retail
- 事務従事者 Clerical

Further, in the same survey, various responses were obtained from high schools to the effect that, for example, employment offers that were described as regular employment but were in fact offers for positions as dispatched workers had increased; that for many job offers neither social insurance nor regular wage increases would be provided; that jobs with a daily or monthly wage system numbered roughly half of all positions secured; or that positions in the

retail and services sectors tended heavily toward part-time work, with no increase in regular employment in these sectors.

In addition, from the results of interviews conducted with young people who had found work either as regular employees or as "freeters" [job-hoppers] after graduating from high school, it became clear that nearly all of them had no choice but to work under poor employment conditions, such as low wages and long and irregular hours, or in positions where it was difficult to take holidays (Kidoguchi, 2006). In particular, even in the case of regular employees, income levels amounted to no more than around 150,000 yen per month after tax and, moreover, being regular employees, they often had no choice but to commit to "free overtime" without compensation. What is more, with numbers of regular employees in decline, a new employee might find his or herself being thrust into a position of responsibility from early on, and, having few colleagues of the same age, unable to talk to anyone about interpersonal problems or difficulties on the job. It has not been uncommon for those in such positions to give up and leave their jobs without having resolved their problems (*ibid.*). Thus, among the jobs available to new high school graduates, whether regular employees or freeters, the proportion of jobs with a heavy burden in terms of job description or working hours, or with inferior benefits and a poor working environment, is increasing.

The harsh nature of the labor market for new high school graduates is, as discussed above, in large part attributable to the fact that companies are demanding a higher level of skills from workers. Tsutsui (2005a and 2005b) has shown how in the small- to medium-sized manufacturing companies that have traditionally employed many new high school graduates, in addition to a marked acceleration in the accumulation and development curve for knowledge and skills expected of employees after entering a company in recent years, new recruits are also expected to have a higher level of cognitive skills to start with than previously. However, Tsutsui also contends that since these companies have not sufficiently communicated their recruitment requirements to high schools, new high school graduates are increasingly failing to meet corporate expectations (*ibid.*).

As we have seen in the foregoing, in terms of quantity, employment opportunities for new high school

graduates are declining, and in terms of quality, instability and harsh conditions are on the rise. However, since it will clearly not become possible at any time in the future for all new high school graduates to go on to higher education, a certain proportion thereof will always inevitably be forced to enter society, that is, the labor market, upon graduation. Accordingly, we need to consider what kind of measures can and need to be taken in order to improve the fortunes of this group.

### Necessary Measures

In the polarized youth labor market, those without higher educational credentials find themselves facing greater obstacles than ever before. Clearly, however, it is not necessarily the case that all in this position will have to content themselves with inferior employment opportunities. According to a 2005 survey conducted by the Japan Institute for Labor Policy and Training, when asked to give their reason for recruiting new high school graduates, while more than sixty percent of companies replied that the work involved was of a level that high school graduates could handle, the next most common response, given by approximately forty percent of companies, was that the work involved required that employees be trained from as young an age as possible. In other words, a significant percentage of companies maintain an interest in hiring new high school graduates and training them within the company. Further, in the same survey, roughly half of the companies that responded indicated that they would increase or revive high school graduate employment if the quality of graduates improved.

In light of this, one necessary measure might conceivably be to ensure that young people intending to discontinue their education after graduating from high school are armed with basic skills that conform to company personnel requirements and that prepare them for skills development within companies. As discussed above, Tsutsui (2005a and 2000b) has indicated that communication between employers and schools regarding skills requirements is, at the moment, not particularly well developed. Nevertheless, it is vital that both parties move beyond this status quo and establish avenues of mutual dialogue and cooperation. This would necessitate a concerted effort to improve the occupational relevance of high school education, which has hitherto been remark-

ably lacking in Japan in comparison to other countries.

Another course of action would be to create opportunities for young people, having once discontinued their education after graduating from high school, to return to higher level educational or training institutes at a later date to acquire knowledge and skills. This would entail making more places available at universities for recurrent university entrants, organizing learning programs that could be completed while continuing to work, lowering fees, and providing more scholarships.

The creation of mechanisms, by means of such measures, to ease the transition from school to work, so that young people without higher educational credentials are not left facing such bleak employment prospects, is a pressing challenge for Japan.

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# The Persistence of Social Inequality in Postwar Japan

## Ishida Hiroshi



**Ishida Hiroshi is a Professor of Sociology at the Institute of Social Science, the University of Tokyo**

Institute of Social Science  
University of Tokyo  
Hongo 7-3-1  
Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113-0033  
ishida@iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp

Both academic and popular discourses on inequality have received renewed attention since the late 1990s. For example, Tachibanaki Toshiaki's *Japan's Economic Inequality* (1998) and Sato Toshiki's *Japan as an Unequal Society* (2000) both became best sellers.<sup>1</sup> The image of an affluent and equal Japanese society has now been replaced by an image of overt economic inequality in people's minds. Popular discussion on inequality often centers on specific segments of society, such as the wealthiest people who live in Roppongi Hills, or the young part-time "freeters" who are more likely to be subject to unstable and unfavorable labor conditions than full-time workers. However, extreme positions are not representative of the entire distribution of society. We need to examine the pattern of mobility and immobility that

is apparent in the society as a whole, and to understand both the changes and stability in the overall mobility pattern.

This paper focuses on one aspect of social inequality: intergenerational social mobility. It examines the amount of intergenerational mobility observed in postwar Japan. It also asks the question of how the father's social class position affects the position of his son in the next generation, and examines whether the extent of the effect of the father's class on the son's class position has changed in postwar Japan. The father's class position constitutes the son's social origin, which is determined prior to the son's own achievement. In other words, the effect of social origin on the attainment of individual position can be used as a measurement of the extent of openness of a society.

### Social Mobility Data

In order to examine the long-term trend in intergenerational mobility, we need data that cover the entire postwar period. The Social Stratification and Social Mobility (SSM) national surveys conducted in Japan every ten years from 1955 to 1995 are ideal for this purpose.<sup>2</sup> Although the 2005 SSM has already been conducted, the data set has not yet been made available for analysis. Therefore, in place of the 2005 SSM, we used the Japanese General Social Surveys (JGSS) conducted in 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003, in order to examine the changes which have taken place after the mid-1990s.<sup>3</sup> The analysis is restricted to men because the SSM surveys conducted from 1955 to 1975 did not include women.

The respondents of these surveys were asked to report their current employment details (employ-

<sup>1</sup> One of the most informed and balanced expositions of the issue of inequality in Japan is Ohtake (2005).

<sup>2</sup> I am grateful to the 2005 SSM Research Committee for allowing me to use the SSM surveys.

<sup>3</sup> I will combine these four JGSS surveys and create one intergenerational table. I am grateful to the SSJ Data Archive, Information Center for Social Science Research on Japan, Institute of Social Sciences, University of Tokyo, for the access to JGSS data sets. The JGSS project was designed and carried out by the Institute of Regional Studies at Osaka University of Commerce in collaboration with the Institute of Social Sciences at the University of Tokyo. The project was supported by the Gakujutsu Frontier Grant from the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology for the 1999-2003 academic years.

ment status, occupation, managerial status, and firm size) and their father's employment characteristics. We will use current employment as class destination of the respondent, and the information of the father's employment as class origin of the respondent. Class positions are represented by the following six categories: (1) professional-managerial, (2) routine non-manual, (3) urban self-employed, (4) farming, (5) skilled manual, and (6) non-skilled manual. By cross-classifying the father's class with the son's class, we could obtain a six-by-six intergenerational class mobility table for each of the six periods. Our analysis is based on examining these six mobility tables.

### Trends in Total Mobility

In our study, we will examine two kinds of intergenerational mobility rates: total mobility and relative mobility. We begin with total mobility. The total mobility rate refers to the proportion of people experiencing a change in class position between two generations; that is, the number of people who are not on the main diagonal of the mobility table, divided by the total number of people in the table. Total mobility rates changed substantially in postwar Japan. In 1955, the rate was 0.490: less than half of the population changed class positions between two generations. The rate jumped from 1955 to 1965, however, reaching 0.639. The total mobility rate continued to increase to 0.682 in 1975, and thereafter reached a plateau of around 0.69-0.70. This means that more than two-thirds of Japanese men experience intergenerational mobility in contemporary Japan. The Japanese rate is relatively, but not exceptionally, high among industrial nations (Ishida 2001).

Total mobility rates are a gross measure of mobility, and influenced by two sources: changes in class structure between generations, and changes in the impact of class origin on class destination. Even if the effect of class origin on class destination (which is measured by relative mobility rates, discussed below) remains constant, if the class structure changes dramatically between two generations, total mobility rates change. This is precisely what happened between 1955 and 1965 in Japan. In 1955, about 40 percent of the male respondents of the survey were engaged in primary production (namely farming), and 57 percent of their fathers were engaged in the same occupations. The dominance

of the farming sector in both generations implied low mobility. In 1965, the respondents who were engaged in primary production shrunk rapidly to 20 percent, while 49 percent of their fathers were still in primary production. The dramatic transformation of the class structure in the late 1950s and the early 1960s meant a massive shift of the population away from farming to urban occupations. Moving out of farming implied mobility out of the father's class. The process of industrialization continued into the 1970s and 1980s, and the proportion of people who were engaged in primary production at the time of survey continued to shrink (14 percent in 1975 and 6 percent in 1985). Correspondingly, the proportion of people who were engaged in both manual and non-manual occupations expanded. Total mobility rates remained high after 1975. In summary, the total mobility rate in postwar Japan showed a dramatic increase from 1955 to 1965, and then a continued (although slower) increase up to 1975, followed by a stable period of relatively high mobility after 1985.

### Trends in Relative Mobility

The second kind of intergenerational mobility is called relative mobility. Relative mobility rates are concerned with identifying the effect of class origin on the chances of mobility and immobility. In other words, they measure the extent of openness and fluidity in the society. The rates are based on a comparison of mobility chances of the sons of different class origins. For example, let us compare the chances of reaching the professional-managerial class between the sons of the professional-managerial class and those of other classes. The chances may be computed by the following formula.

Among the sons of the professional-managerial (P-M) class:

$$\frac{\text{(number of sons of the P-M class who reached the P-M class)}}{\text{(number of sons of the P-M class who did not reach the P-M class)}}$$

Among the sons of other classes:

$$\frac{\text{(number of sons of other classes who reached the P-M class)}}{\text{(number of sons of other classes who did not reach the P-M class)}}$$

If we take the ratio of the two chances and compute



the relative chances, we obtain the measure of relative mobility rates (called the odds ratios). Table 1 reports the log of odds ratios for different chances. The last column of the first row (1.155) indicates that the sons of the professional-managerial class are 3.2 ( $e^{1.155}$ ) times more likely to reach (or in this case inherit) the professional-managerial class than the sons of other classes in the 2000s. The most important finding in Table 1 is that the pattern of class inheritance is stable across six different periods. The farming class has the highest rate, followed by the professional-managerial class and then by the urban self-employed. Class inheritance is persistent throughout the postwar period.


**Table 1** Class Inheritance as Measured by Log-odds Ratios in Postwar Japan

	1955	1965	1975	1985	1995	2000-03
Professional-managerial	2.085	1.580	1.390	1.343	1.295	1.155
Routine non-manual	1.267	0.937	0.913	0.834	0.622	0.857
Self-employed	1.270	1.294	1.055	1.193	0.965	0.990
Farm	2.697	2.340	2.536	2.931	3.236	3.236
Skilled manual	1.760	1.093	1.089	0.781	0.699	0.747
Non-skilled manual	1.791	1.003	0.602	1.360	0.613	0.421

Table 1 reports relative mobility chances pertaining to class inheritance. There are other kinds of relative mobility chances that can be computed from the six by six mobility table. There are altogether 225 log odds-ratios that can be computed from each table. For each log odds-ratio, we could observe trends between adjacent periods. There are three possible patterns of trend, or direction, as shown in Figure 1. The first pattern indicates that the log-odds ratio is moving towards zero, that is, in the direction of more openness and fluidity. The second pattern is the opposite, and the log odds-ratio is moving away from zero, indicating that there is less openness and more barriers to mobility. The third pattern indicates no discernible trend, as the log odds-ratio goes through zero.

The bottom part of Figure 1 shows the distribution of the patterns of log odds-ratios. From 1955 to 1965, of the 225 log odds-ratios, 54 percent are classified as fitting the first pattern, 31 percent the second pattern, and the remaining 15 percent the third pattern. The dominant pattern is that of greater openness and fluidity. From 1965 to 1975, the modal pattern is the trend towards greater openness, but the log odds-ratios comprise less than the majority (44%) and the share is close to that of the opposite pattern (41%). From 1975 to 1985, the trend is reversed, and the modal pattern is the trend towards less openness (45%). Once again, however, the

**Figure 1** Three Patterns of the Trend in Log Odds Ratios



Distribution of the Patterns of Log Odds Ratios for Adjacent Periods

	1955-65	1965-75	1975-85	1985-95	1995-2000/03
[First Pattern]	54%	44%	34%	49%	37%
[Second Pattern]	31%	41%	45%	35%	45%
[Third Pattern]	15%	15%	21%	16%	18%
parameter	-0.106	-0.004	0.114	-0.137	0.002
st. error	(0.065)	(0.069)	(0.072)	(0.080)	(0.078)

modal pattern does not constitute the majority. From 1985 to 1995, the trend is reversed again, and the modal pattern is back in the direction of greater openness. From 1995 to the 2000s, the trend is reversed yet again. The modal pattern is the trend towards less openness. Although this trend echoes recent public perception, the modal pattern is hardly a dominant one. There is no consistent trend across these five periods; in fact, if anything, we can see only a trendless fluctuation. The statistical tests of the trends between adjacent periods reported at the bottom of Figure 1 indicate that there is no significant change between the pairs of adjacent periods. As is consistent with the findings from Table 1, the relative mobility chances appear to be very stable in postwar Japan. The advantages and disadvantages associated with class origin are persistent, despite the rapidly changing nature of the class structure in postwar Japan.

## Conclusions

People's perception of inequality is influenced by absolute mobility rates, such as total mobility. Due to rapid industrialization and urbanization, we

heard success stories about the sons of poor farming families being educated in universities and becoming managers in large corporations. It is, therefore, not surprising to find that the notions of the "new middle mass" (Murakami, 1984) and the "mass education society" (Kariya, 1995) were popularized in the 1970s. In contrast, relative mobility rates are not easily observed. Despite the increased number of men of farming class origin going to universities and becoming managers, the relative chances of the sons of farmer becoming managers compared to the sons of the professional-managerial class have not substantially changed throughout the postwar period in Japan. These relative chances can only be computed by compiling data of the kind we discussed above.

Similarly, the prolonged recession beginning in the 1990s seems to have affected people's perception about social inequality. Arguments about an increased economic gap in the 1990s have attracted attention, and there is even a tendency to idealize the past, suggesting that there was fair competition and a much greater chance of mobility during the high economic growth period in Japan. Our results, however, do not support such claims. There has been persistent social inequality, at least in the form of barriers to intergenerational mobility, throughout the postwar period. Japanese society has always been characterized by differential relative mobility chances by class origin.

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# Diversification in Forms of Employment and Widening Disparities

Sato Hiroki



**Sato Hiroki is a Professor of Human Resource Management at the Institute of Social Science, the University of Tokyo**

Institute of Social Science  
University of Tokyo  
Hongo 7-3-1  
Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113-0033  
hiroki@iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp

## 1. Introduction

In recent years, a lively debate has been ongoing in Japan regarding the widening of disparities, with the debate extending beyond the domain of academics and policymakers into the mass media.<sup>1</sup> The debate itself has ranged over a variety of topics such as the veracity of the allegedly widening disparities and the causal factors behind them, and, if they do indeed exist, whether or not the size of the disparities is within acceptable limits. The kinds of disparities covered by the debate have not been limited to economic disparities such as earnings (stock) and income (flow), but have included qualitative issues such as stability of employment opportunities, future career prospects, and even opportunities for skill development.

One factor that has frequently been singled out in the debate as a causal factor in widening disparities is the diversification in forms of employment. A decrease in typical employment opportunities based on long-term employment (where full-time staff and employees are typical employees) and, on the other hand, an increase in non-typical employment opportunities (irregular employees) has been identified as causing a variety of gaps to open up, such as disparities in earnings or income, stability of job opportunities, future career prospects and opportunities for skill development.<sup>2</sup>

In the case of young people in particular, the fact that the ratio of those securing typical employment after graduating from school has decreased, while the number of those finding work as non-typical employees has increased, has been identified as a factor behind widening disparities among young people.<sup>3</sup> Further, widespread concern regarding the fact that the kind of employment secured by young people significantly constrains their career prospects thereafter has even led to policy initiatives aimed at reducing this kind of disparity.

I do not deny that diversification in forms of employment is one factor that has contributed to a number of growing disparities. However, it is also worth considering that placing too much emphasis on the disparities caused by differences in forms of employment, such as disparities in opportunities for skill development, may in itself cause significant detrimental effects, by, for example, unintentionally restricting the possibilities of movement between the forms of employment. In fact, when opportunities for skill development for typical employees and non-typical employees are compared, there is often a sizeable degree of overlap. There are even places of employment where some typical employees are at a

<sup>1</sup> Recent research includes Miyajima Hiroshi and the Research Institute for the Advancement of Living Standards, eds, *Nihon no shotoku haibun to kakusa* (Tokyo Keizai Shinposha, 2002), *Nihon no fukintô: kakusa shakai no gensô to mirai* (Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha, 2005), Shirahase Sawako, ed., *Henka suru shakai no fukintô: shoji kôreika ni hisomu kakusa* (Tokyo University Press, 2006).

<sup>2</sup> See, for example, the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare's 2006 Labor Economics White Paper.

<sup>3</sup> See, for example, Sakai Tadashi and Iwamatsu Shougo, "Furi-ta-izen to furi-ta-ikô" in Higuchi Yoshio and Keio University and Keisho joint 21st Century COE, eds., *Nihon no kakei kôdô no dainamizumu*, Keio University Press, 2005.

disadvantage to non-typical employees in terms of opportunities for skill development, as well as places of employment where certain non-typical employees have more enhanced opportunities for skill development than typical employees. Thus, it is evident that disparities between forms of employment are on a continuum, such that the respective types of employee are not separated by an unbridgeable chasm. In fact, stressing the disparities between forms of employment irrespective of the actual reality thereof can easily result in the creation of barriers to non-typical employees later being recruited as typical employees. This is due to the kind of social labeling that automatically assumes that the kind of work done by non-typical employees affords meager opportunities for skill development, even if the non-typical employee has previously worked and augmented his or her occupational skills in a working environment well-equipped for skill development.

In addition, if the various disparities among forms of employment are only considered in terms of stereotypes, it is quite possible that policies to resolve the disparities will only stress reducing non-typical employment as much as possible while increasing opportunities for typical employment, thereby ignoring the fact that there is a certain rationality in the use of non-typical employees in the context of corporate human resource management.

In the following study, the circumstances of skill development for typical and non-typical employees are compared for young people at the start of their working careers, an important period in terms of skill acquirement. The survey used in the analysis was carried out between August 25 and September 20, 2005 and was distributed to 8,000 individuals nationwide, male and female, between the ages of 20 and 65. The survey had an effective response rate of 61.7% (4,939 responses), and the data used in this analysis are taken from employed respondents between the ages of 20 and 34.<sup>4</sup>

## 2. A Comparison of Levels of Skill Development for Typical and Non-typical Employees

### *Indices for Levels of Skill Development*

The results of the survey clearly illustrate that compared to non-typical employees, there are more typical employees who, recognizing the necessity of improving their professional skills and knowledge, and having a keen desire to do so, actually make an effort to upgrade their qualifications and expertise. In other words, more typical employees than non-typical employees fulfill the conditions for a high level of skill development.

However, there also exist many non-typical employees who are aware of the need to improve their professional skills and knowledge, who are keen to do so, and who thus make an effort to upgrade their qualifications and expertise. Further, the survey results also revealed typical employees who see little need to improve their professional skills, who have little desire to do so, and who do little to actively upgrade their qualifications and expertise. Accordingly, when looking at levels of skill development, it is clear that there is a significant amount of variation among non-typical employees as well as among typical employees.

In the following analysis, therefore, I have attempted a comparison of levels of skill development in the workplace for both typical and non-typical employees.<sup>5</sup> I have determined indices for levels of skill development by taking into account: (1) the necessity of upgrading professional skills; (2) an individual's ambitions to upgrade their own professional skills in view of this necessity; and (3) their actual efforts to do so. Types fulfilling all three of these conditions have been designated "high level skill development types" while types not fulfilling any one of the conditions have been designated "low level skill development types." Table 1 shows the proportions of the respective types for typical employees and for non-typical employees.

It is clear from the table that the proportion of "high

<sup>4</sup> For an outline of the survey method and results, please refer to *Shūgyō keitai no tayō no naka de no nihonjin no hatarakikata: nihonjin no hatarakikata chōsa (dai ikkai)* (JILPT Survey Series No. 15, The Japan Institute for Labor Policy and Training, 2006), and for intermediate analysis, please refer to *Nihonjin no hatarakikata to se-futinetto ni kansuru kenkyū: yobiteki bunseki* (JILPT Document Series No. 14, The Japan Institute for Labor Policy and Training, 2006). The author participated in the study group as chairman.

<sup>5</sup> The indices related to adequacy of skill development are as defined in Sano's paper in *Nihonjin no hatarakikata to se-futinetto ni kansuru kenkyū: yobiteki bunseki*, op. cit.

Table 1 Sufficiency of Skill Development (%)

	High level skill development types	Low level skill development types	Total	Number of respondents
Typical Workers	52.6	47.4	100.0	456
Non-typical Workers	32.7	67.3	100.0	214
Total	46.3	53.7	100.0	670

Note (1): "High level skill development types" fulfill all of the following conditions (1)-(3). (1) Regarding the necessity of acquiring new skills and knowledge while continuing in the same job, this was either "a constant necessity," "a frequent necessity" or "an occasional necessity." (2) In response to the question "Do you wish to enhance your professional skills and knowledge?" the response was either "Yes" or "To a certain extent." (3) In response to the question "Are you usually engaged in some kind of activity to acquire skills and knowledge useful to your job?" the response was "Yes." Further, those who did not fulfill any one of these conditions were designated "low level skill development types." The same applies below.

Note (2): Cases where responses were not received regarding the above three conditions were not included in the analysis.

Table 2 Evaluation of Skill Level by Level of Skill Development (%)

		Less than 1 month	1 month to less than 6 months	6 months to less than 1 year	1 year to less than 2 years	2 years to less than 3 years	3 years to less than 5 years	5 years to less than 10 years	10 years or more	Un-known	No response	Total	Number of respondents
Typical employees	High level skill development types	3.3	21.7	25.0	16.3	13.8	9.2	3.3	2.1	5.4	0.0	100.0	240
	Low level skill development types	8.3	30.6	26.4	12.0	7.4	5.6	1.9	0.9	6.9	0.0	100.0	216
	Overall	5.7	25.7	25.5	14.2	10.7	7.6	2.8	1.5	6.1	0.2	100.0	459
Non-typical Employees	High level skill development types	11.4	32.9	24.3	12.9	5.7	1.4	1.4	0.0	10.0	0.0	100.0	70
	Low level skill development types	32.6	41.0	10.4	9.7	0.7	0.0	1.4	0.0	3.5	0.7	100.0	144
	Overall	25.5	38.4	14.8	10.6	2.3	1.4	0.5	0.0	5.6	0.9	100.0	216

Note (1): The question used was "How long do you think it would take for a new employee to be trained to be proficient at your job?"

Note (2): Please refer to the notes for Table 1 regarding the types of level of skill development.

level skill development types" is higher for typical employees than for non-typical employees. This is because, overall, sufficient skill development is more common for typical employees than for non-typical employees. However, even for typical employees,

almost half of the respondents were designated "low level skill development types." On the other hand, the proportion of "high level skill development types" was not insignificant for non-typical employees. Accordingly, regarding whether or not levels of

skill development are sufficient, it is clear that being a typical worker as opposed to a non-typical worker is not inherently a decisive factor.

*Adequacy of Opportunities for Skill Development and Skill Levels*

Table 2 examines the relationship between level of skill development and level of skill required for the work concerned. The table indicates that for both typical and non-typical employees there is a trend towards "high level skill development types" requiring a longer period of skill acquisition before they are proficient at their work than "low level skill development types." In other words, in cases where: (1) it is necessary to upgrade one's professional skills; (2) the individual concerned is accordingly keen to upgrade their skills; and (3) they are actively involved in activities to this end, there is a trend for both the typical and non-typical workers concerned to be engaged in work that requires a comparatively high skill level. It might even be said that this results in a higher chance that skill development progresses further.

The distribution of skill acquisition periods for non-typical worker "high level skill development types" roughly corresponds to the distribution for typical worker "high level skill development types." Further, a significant portion also corresponds to typical worker "low level skill development types." Accordingly, it is evident that a significant proportion of

non-typical workers, particularly those with skill levels reflecting a high level of skill development, have skill levels corresponding to those of typical workers.

In addition, the table below offers a comparison of self-evaluations regarding the transferability of skills to a different company. According to Table 3, the proportion of employees that thought their own skills and knowledge would be "useful" ("extremely useful" or "somewhat useful") at a different company was higher for "high level skill development types" in the case of both typical and non-typical employees. Both typical and non-typical employees were more likely to consider the skills they possessed to be transferable to another company, the higher their level of skill development. It is also clear, by the table, that among non-typical workers, a significant number are equally or more confident than typical workers that they could use their skills in a different workplace.

It might be argued that a trend is evident whereby the more adequate the level of skill development, the higher the skill level and the higher the self-confidence regarding the transferability of one's skills to a different workplace. In other words, the more adequate the level of skill development, the easier it becomes for a worker to have confidence about the prospect of changing jobs.

Table 3 Evaluation of Transferability by Level of Skill Development (%)

		Very useful	Somewhat useful	Not very useful	Not useful at all	Unknown	No response	Total	Number of respondents
Typical employees	High level skill development types	17.5	55.4	12.5	2.9	11.7	0.0	100.0	240
	Low level skill development types	5.1	45.8	19.0	6.0	23.6	0.5	100.0	216
	Overall	11.8	50.8	15.5	4.4	17.2	0.4	100.0	459
Non-typical employees	High level skill development types	20.0	57.1	12.9	0.0	10.0	0.0	100.0	70
	Low level skill development types	2.8	38.9	29.2	7.6	21.5	0.0	100.0	144
	Overall	8.3	44.9	23.6	5.1	17.6	0.5	100.0	216

Note (1): The question used was "Do you think your skills and knowledge would be useful at another workplace or business?"

Note (2): Please refer to the notes for Table 1 regarding the types of level of skill development.

### **3. Conclusion**

To summarize the main points of the preceding discussion, there are many different levels of skill development among young people, whether typical or non-typical workers. On average, a discrepancy does exist between typical and non-typical employees in terms of opportunities for skill development. However, there is a significant degree of overlap between the respective groups, and whether one is a typical or non-typical employee does not appear to be a decisive determining factor limiting the adequacy of opportunities for skill development.

Accordingly, in order to enhance the opportunities available to young people for developing their skills, it might be argued that in addition to increasing opportunities for employment as typical workers, it is also important to increase opportunities for skill development within the contexts of both typical employment and non-typical employment, and to implement measures aimed at heightening a worker's ambitions with regard to upgrading their skills, irrespective of whether they are typical or non-typical employees.

## An Overview of Research Accomplished during My Tenure at *Shaken*

### Hiraishi Naoaki



**Hiraishi Naoaki is a Professor of Japanese Intellectual History at the Institute of Social Science, the University of Tokyo**

Institute of Social Science  
University of Tokyo  
Hongo 7-3-1  
Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113-0033  
hiraishi@iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp

As I am due to retire from *Shaken* (the Institute of Social Science) next March, I have taken this opportunity to review and report on the research I have conducted during my time at *Shaken*. My area of specialization is the history of political thought in Japan, and I have viewed my purpose at *Shaken* as being to shed light on Japanese society and attributes of its modernization in comparison with Western Europe and Asia, via my own research in this field and in cooperation with my colleagues.

My research since arriving at *Shaken* in 1984 can be divided into three areas according to the historical periods concerned. The first area relates to the history of political thought in pre-modern Japan. Research on Japan by *Shaken* staff generally focuses

on the modern era, and in my case, too, my interests were originally focused on political thought in modern Japan. However, since Maruyama Masao's work (centered on *Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan*, which deals with political thoughts in early modern times before the Meiji Restoration) holds a dominant position in the field of Japanese intellectual history as a whole, it is not possible to present a new perspective on the modern history of thought without first critically examining his work on early modern times. Accordingly, it was necessary for me to engage in thorough research on political thoughts in *early* modern times.

Research in this area can be further divided into two broad fields. The first project involved developing a new perspective on the history of Tokugawa thought by empirical research on the literature of celebrated thinkers such as Ito Jinsai, Ogyu Sorai and Motoori Norinaga, and identifying historical linkages between them. This project followed my previous research undertaken before joining the faculty of *Shaken* and resulted in the publication of works such as "A Critique of Studies on Ogyu Sorai during the War and Postwar Periods" and "Reconstructing the Confucian Philosophy of Ogyu Sorai."<sup>1</sup> These two papers were based on a critical evaluation of conventional interpretations, presenting a new systematic approach to the philosophy of Ogyu Sorai, and were reviewed on the occasion of my promotion to Professor in 1990.

The second project in this area focused less on individual thinkers than on certain ideas and concepts and, drawing on an extensive array of historical data, traced the origins, development and transformations thereof. Publications on this theme include "Views of Occupation in Early Modern Japan,"

<sup>1</sup> 「戦中・戦後徠論批判」『社会科学研究』39巻1号、1987年8月。「徠学の再構成」『思想』766号、1988年4月。



"Views of Politics in Pre-modern Times: Centered on Japan and China," and *Heaven*.<sup>2</sup> "Views of Occupation in Early Modern Japan" was included as a part of *Shaken's* research project "Contemporary Japanese Society." Among academic circles there has been a tendency to perceive the formation of popular views of occupations in early modern Japan through the filter of Weber's theories, and it has been argued that a counterpart of Protestantism can be found in Ishida Baigan's *Sekimon Shingaku* in the Tokugawa era. On the other hand, as can be seen in the work of legal historians, a theory also exists to the effect that Japan in pre-modern times differed from both the Chinese Empire and Western feudalism in terms of the formation of its social system, and that the difference is evident in the Japanese concept of household occupation (*kashoku*). This term refers to a system whereby each household inherits a particular occupation from their ancestors, as assigned to them by society, and gains social honor by accomplishing their work. In this paper, I examined what was actually the case and drew comparisons, mainly with China, regarding the characteristics of attitudes towards occupation and work ethic. One conclusion reached was that a major transformation occurred during the late Tokugawa period.

Compiling the findings of the above research, I published a work entitled *A History of Political Thought in Japan: Focusing on Early Modern Periods*,<sup>3</sup> in which I presented an overview of the history of Tokugawa thought according to my own unified perspective. I believe that with this work I realized my goals (for the time being) with respect to the first area of research.

The second area of research is related to the history of political thought of modern Japan, and can also be divided into two fields. The first field pertains to research focusing on Fukuzawa Yukichi. It hardly needs to be said that Fukuzawa occupies an extremely important place in modern Japanese intellectual history, and that related research is abundant.

However, there is a surprising lack of rigorous work pursuing the early formation of his thought before and after the Restoration, analyzing the connection between his occasional statements and both the theoretical framework behind them and the circumstances in which the statements were made. My research aimed to approach Fukuzawa from this perspective and to reconstruct a comprehensive overview. In the course of this research I published papers such as "Fukuzawa Yukichi's Strategic Visions,"<sup>4</sup> but the project as a whole is not yet complete.

Like the first area of research described above, this project was concerned with tracing the historical metamorphosis of certain concepts. In relation to this field I published, among other things, a paper analyzing the speeches and addresses of past Presidents of the University of Tokyo, since the Meiji era, and tracing the evolution of the university ethos. I also wrote a paper entitled "Views of the International Order in Modern Japan and 'Pan-Asianism'"<sup>5</sup> as part of *Shaken's* research project "The Twentieth Century Global System." This paper follows the development of Pan-Asianism until the time of the Manchurian Incident, and clarifies the various facets of Pan-Asianism (which has been overwhelmingly viewed as a strain of nationalism) by means of analysis from the perspectives of, for example, hegemony and concepts of regional order.

The third area of research was concerned with the history of political thought in wartime and postwar Japan. This area, too, can be broadly divided into two separate projects. The first project was an attempt to trace the formation of Maruyama Masao's learning and thought and to elucidate the contemporary significance thereof. This line of research yielded such fruit as "Maruyama Masao's Concepts of 'Civil Society'" and "The Formation of Maruyama Masao's Image of Japanese Intellectual History during the War Period."<sup>6</sup> While an enormous amount has been written about Maruyama,

<sup>2</sup> 「近世日本の<職業>観」、東大社研編『現代日本社会4 歴史的前提』所収、東京大学出版会、1991年9月。「前近代の政治観」『思想』792号、1990年6月。「天」三省堂、1996年5月。

<sup>3</sup> 『日本政治思想史—近世を中心に—』、放送大学教育振興会、1997年3月（同改訂版、2001年3月）。

<sup>4</sup> 「福沢諭吉の戦略構想」『社会科学研究』51巻1号、1999年12月。「福沢諭吉の明治維新論」『福沢諭吉年鑑』27、2000年12月。

<sup>5</sup> 「近代日本の国際秩序観と「アジア主義」」、東大社研編『20世紀システム1／構想と形成』所収、東京大学出版会、1998年1月。

<sup>6</sup> 「丸山眞男の「市民社会」論」、小林正弥編『丸山眞男論』所収、東京大学出版会、2003年2月。"The Formation of Maruyama Masao's Image of Japanese Intellectual History during the War Period," *Social Science Japan Journal*, Vol.6, No.2, October, 2003. The upgrade version of the latter paper is contained in 『思想』964号、2004年8月。

few attempts have been made to analyze his discourse with an aim to seek out the possibilities thereof from within. My own questions about this intellectual status quo provided the impetus for this research. Further, connected to my work in this area, in collaboration with three other former students of Maruyama, I reconstructed his lectures on "The History of Political Thought in Japan," based on the notes he had bequeathed, and published these as seven volumes of lecture transcripts.

This field of research also involved a project looking at certain ideas and analyzing the significance and evolution thereof. In "The Modern West as an Ideal,"<sup>7</sup> I clarify the fact that, with regard to the trend toward democratization heteronomously imposed on Japan by the occupying army immediately after WWII, the concept of "the Modern West" was emphasized as a theoretical weapon by Japanese Intellectuals with a view to the proactive development of democratization by the Japanese people. Further, my paper "Nationalisms in Contemporary Japan"<sup>8</sup> was the result of group research focusing on "Transformations in Consciousness in 1990s Japan" and was published as part of Shaken's research project "The Lost Decade? Reappraising 1990s Japan."

As a result of defeat in WWII, Japan was robbed of the unifying power held by the national polity (*kokutai*), leading to a crisis of national identity. While a number of thinkers sought after the creation of a

new national spirit, these never amounted to more than a minority. Thereafter, Japan entrusted its national security to the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and prioritized economic growth. However, the end of the Cold War and then the outbreak of the Gulf War prompted a reconsideration of these arrangements and questions were raised concerning the restructuring of the 1955 system, Japan's international contribution, and revision of the constitution. During the same period, China advanced along the path of reform and liberalization, and democracy took hold in the Republic of Korea against a backdrop of economic globalization. This brought about closer relations among the three East Asian nations and, on the other hand, fuelled trends toward exclusionism. Further, increased exposure to questions of national war responsibility birthed a reactionary view of history aiming at an overall affirmative view of modern Japanese history. In addition, with the postwar development of mass society and, in particular, the bubble economy of the late 1980s and the collapse thereof in the early 1990s, companies and families lost their role as units of social cohesion, and atomization and crises in self-identity became widespread. This paper attempted to elucidate the phenomenon of contemporary Japanese nationalisms from among the above tangle of factors. On a personal level, I am satisfied that I have been able to contribute to an academic investigation into the state of mind of contemporary Japan, a subject in which I have long held an interest.

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<sup>7</sup> 「理念としての近代西洋」、中村政則等編『戦後日本・占領と戦後改革 3 戦後思想と社会意識』、岩波書店、1995年9月。

<sup>8</sup> 「現代日本のナショナリズム」『社会科学研究』58巻1号、2006年9月(forthcoming)。

## The 2005 General Election and Public Opinion

### Maeda Yukio



**Maeda Yukio is an Associate Professor, Interfaculty Initiative in Information Studies and Adjunct Associate Professor, Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo**

Institute of Social Science  
University of Tokyo  
Hongo 7-3-1  
Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113-0033  
ymaeda@iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp

In the 2005 general election, Prime Minister Koizumi achieved an historic victory for the Liberal Democratic Party. Koizumi dissolved the House of Representatives on August 8, immediately after the House of Councillors rejected the postal reform bill. However, very few people expected that the LDP would win nearly three hundred seats, as only a few weeks before the climax of the political battle over postal reform, the public seemed to be in favor of the Democratic Party of Japan. On July 16 and 17, the Mainichi Shimbun conducted a nationwide telephone survey and asked respondents "if a general election were to take place, which party would you want to increase its number of seats?" At that time, 25 percent of the respondents chose the LDP, while 35 percent chose the DPJ. On July 23 and 24, the Asahi Shimbun conducted another public opinion survey by telephone and asked an almost identical

question. This time, 30 percent chose the LDP, while 32 percent chose the DPJ.

Even though the approval rate for the Koizumi Cabinet jumped after the dissolution of the Diet, few people expected such a landslide victory for the LDP. The editorial in the Mainichi Shimbun on August 11 discussed the situation as follows:

"...the opposition parties should not be afraid (of the recent upsurge in the cabinet approval rate), however. In the Mainichi Opinion Poll (of August 8 and 9), nearly 40 percent of the respondents did not support a particular political party, and chose independents. In fact, those independents comprise 'the majority party.' In past elections, the independent voters have held the deciding votes of the election. In our Opinion Poll, the approval and disapproval rates were comparable for the independents. Opposition parties should try to appeal to them"

Yet, the actual election resulted in a miserable defeat for the opposition parties, in particular for the DPJ. In order to understand the cause of the LDP's unexpected victory, one has to closely examine the tide of public opinion.

In recent years, news organizations have repeatedly conducted a series of telephone opinion surveys shortly before elections. For the 2005 election, for example, the Asahi Shimbun carried out nine nationwide telephone surveys between August 8 and September 9, and the Yomiuri conducted five telephone surveys within the same period. Although the total number of interviews is fewer than those conducted by the Asahi, the Yomiuri Poll succeeded in capturing an important change in public opinion by consistently asking the same questions from the beginning. Table 1 shows selected questions from the Yomiuri Opinion Polls.

**Table 1** The Yomiuri Shimbun Opinion Polls

	Immediately after the Diet dissolution	The First Wave	The Second Wave	The Third Wave	The Fourth Wave
	August 8-9	August 17-19	August 24-26	August 31-September 2	September 6-8
<b>Q1 Are you interested in the coming general election?</b>					
Very interested	51.7	53.5	57.0	60.2	63.2
Somewhat interested	24.1	29.1	27.5	27.5	26.4
Not so interested	17.3	12.4	10.8	8.6	6.8
Not at all	6.0	3.9	3.8	2.5	2.5
<b>Q2 In this general election, which party's candidate are you going to vote for in your district?</b>					
The LDP	30.1	39.2	38.0	37.9	42.4
The DPJ	17.7	14.1	16.3	19.2	19.5
All the other parties combined	7.3	6.5	7.2	6.9	6.8
Independent	0.7	0.9	0.8	1.5	1.4
Not decided	37.3	33.8	31.4	28.4	23.3
DK/NA	6.9	5.3	6.5	6.1	6.7
<b>Q3 In this general election, which issue or policy do you want to consider most important in your voting decision?</b>					
Postal privatization	-	30.2	30.9	28.4	30.2
Economy/employment	-	10.7	8.5	10.7	8.8
Fiscal Reform/Tax	-	11.8	10.6	12.4	9.8
Social security	-	39.0	40.4	40.6	43.3
Diplomacy/National Security	-	3.9	4.2	3.9	3.7
Other	-	0.7	1.0	0.9	0.8
No issue	-	1.7	1.7	1.0	1.5
DK	-	2.0	2.9	2.2	2.0
<b>Q4 Do you prefer that the LDP-led government keeps power or a DPJ-led government emerges after this election?</b>					
LDP-led government	43.4	51.9	49.5	47.5	50.6
DPJ-led government	33.3	28.2	28.6	31.9	29.7
Other	4.9	7.7	7.0	7.7	7.9
DK/NA	18.4	12.1	14.9	12.9	11.8
<b>Q5 Are you for or against privatizing the three postal businesses?</b>					
For	-	57.3	61.9	60.4	58.9
Against	-	22.7	20.9	22.6	23.0
Hard to say	-	14.5	13.0	12.3	12.9
DK/NA	-	5.5	4.2	4.8	5.2

Source: Yomiuri Shimbun Various Days

First of all, the level of interest in the election continuously grew as the campaign evolved (Q1). In contrast, voters' intention to vote for the LDP in single member districts did not keep pace with the increase in interest in the election (Q2). Although intention to vote for the LDP did rise between the Diet dissolution (August 8-9) and the First Wave (August 17-19), it stayed at roughly the same level thereafter. Voting intention in proportional representation (PR) districts also behaved in a similar fashion (not shown). Moreover, this was also the case for the question regarding the most desirable form of government (Q4). The largest change occurred between the Diet dissolution and the First Wave. Those responding that they would prefer to have an LDP-led government after the election increased by roughly 8 percent between the two surveys, but it did not show any marked change between the First Wave (August 17-19) and the Fourth Wave (September 6-8). During that same period, clear change was neither observed in what voters considered the most important issue in making their voting decision (Q3), nor for people's opinion towards postal reform (Q5). Thus, it is fair to say that the most important change in public opinion took place between August 8 and August 19. The continuing growth of people's interest in the election after August 19 may have strengthened the already existing mood, but the tide

of public opinion had already undergone its crucial moment. Therefore, the question which thus arises is, what caused such a change?

Reading news items published after August 9, it appears to me that what determined the tide of public opinion by August 19 was the endorsement of "assassinator" (刺客) candidates by Koizumi and the LDP headquarters. On August 9, the Minister of the Environment Koike Yuriko (elected in the PR Kinki district in 2003) was assigned to challenge Kobayashi Koki (Tokyo's 10th district), one of the most vocal anti-postal reform representatives. The Asahi Shimbun used unusually inflammatory language for its subtitle in an August 10 article on Koike's candidacy in the Tokyo 10th district: "The anti-postal reform representatives will be (politically) assassinated" (郵政造反者を抹殺). Checking the Asahi news database, I found this to be the first news item using the word "assassinator" in this way. Furthermore, from August 11, the Yomiuri, the Mainichi, and the Sankei also started to use the word "assassinator." On August 10, Prime Minister Koizumi and LDP Secretary General Takebe agreed to endorse new LDP candidates against the thirty-seven anti-postal reform representatives in single member districts. Subsequently, all of the newspapers relentlessly reported on the selection and endorsement of "assassinator" candidates, as well as the reactions from the anti-postal reform candidates and local LDP organizations.

It seems that the developments in the internal affairs of the LDP overwhelmed news reporters. In fact, the amount of news coverage on the "assassinators" was so large that very little print space was devoted to the DPJ. On August 11, the Asahi Shimbun reported one news item titled "The LDP is in the spotlight: The DPJ looks worried." Thereafter, articles on the LDP's "assassinator" candidates appeared almost daily. To offer a brief list of some of the days when the major "assassinators" were reported in the Asahi Shimbun: on August 12 MOF bureaucrat Katayama Satsuki was reported as running against Kiuchi Minoru in Shizuoka's 7th district; on August 13 MOF bureaucrat Nagasaki Kohtaro was reported running for Yamanashi's 2nd district against Horiuchi Mitsuo; Takaichi Sanae (Nara 2nd) and Nishikawa Kyoko (Fukuoka 10th) were reported on August 14; Fujino Makiko (Aichi 4th) on August 16; Horie Takafumi as an indepen-

dent candidate against Kamei Shizuka (Hiroshima 6th) on August 17; and finally Sato Yukari against Noda Seiko (Gifu 2nd) was reported on August 21. Although a few other celebrities were also rumored as having been recruited by Koizumi or the LDP headquarters, for my data, I only rely on newspapers which report these developments in a relatively sober manner, with occasional black and white photos. Television broadcasts (entertainment programs in particular), tended to be even more dramatic in their reporting than the newspapers. Considering the fact that people's opinions toward important policy issues (Q3) and postal reform (Q5) exhibited little change through the four interviews, it is unmistakable that Koizumi won the 2005 election through his candidate endorsement strategy, rather than due to the substance of postal reform.

The next question, then, is to whom Koizumi appealed by employing this strategy. The Jiji Press monthly opinion poll provides a demographic breakdown for party support and cabinet approval rate. For its August poll, the interviewers were dispatched to the field between August 5 and 8, and for its September poll between September 14 and 19. Since the two cross-section interviews were conducted just before the Diet dissolution and immediately after the general election respectively, it is possible to examine who yielded to Koizumi's "assassinator" candidate strategy.

Table 2 shows party support and cabinet approval for August and September, and changes between the two. Percentages should be read horizontally for each category. For party support, only independents, LDP supporters, and DPJ supporters are shown, and percentages do not add up to 100. One glance is enough to understand who was susceptible to Koizumi's strategy. Relatively speaking, it was women rather than men who enthusiastically supported Koizumi and the LDP in the election. The bottom right of Table 2 indicates that overall, cabinet approval increased by 13.6 percent. However, it increased by 17.1 percent for women but only 10.3 percent for men. The same story holds for party support. Men's support for the LDP increased by 5.8 percent, and their support for the DPJ increased by 4.2 percent. Women's support for the LDP increased by 10 percent, but their support for the DPJ increased only by 5.3 percent.

Table 2 The Jiji Monthly Opinion Poll

	Party Support			Cabinet Approval		
	August 5-8	Independent	LDP	DPJ	Approve	Disapprove
Men	54.6	26.5	13.1	43.3	38.7	17.9
Women	63.8	21.5	7.3	36.4	34.4	29.3
20s	79.5	8.7	5.6	30.4	36.6	32.9
30s	78.0	9.5	7.8	37.5	35.3	27.2
40s	66.6	18.1	9.3	36.3	38.6	25.1
50s	47.3	32.1	14.0	41.7	40.2	18.1
60s or above	47.2	34.1	10.8	44.8	33.6	21.5
Total	59.2	24.1	10.2	39.9	36.6	23.6
September 14-19	Independent	LDP	DPJ	Approve	Disapprove	DK/NA
Men	42.8	32.3	17.3	53.6	33.2	13.2
Women	46.1	31.5	12.6	53.5	26.7	19.8
20s	56.5	25.5	11.0	55.2	23.4	21.4
30s	57.6	24.8	11.6	48.0	29.2	22.8
40s	52.9	23.1	15.5	51.7	33.2	15.1
50s	38.9	30.4	17.2	49.5	35.0	15.5
60s or above	33.0	43.2	15.8	59.6	26.8	13.6
Total	44.5	31.9	14.8	53.5	29.7	16.7
Change	Independent	LDP	DPJ	Approve	Disapprove	DK/NA
Men	-11.8	5.8	4.2	10.3	-5.5	-4.7
Women	-17.7	10.0	5.3	17.1	-7.7	-9.5
20s	-23.0	16.8	5.4	24.8	-13.2	-11.5
30s	-20.4	15.3	3.8	10.5	-6.1	-4.4
40s	-13.7	5.0	6.2	15.4	-5.4	-10.0
50s	-8.4	-1.7	3.2	7.8	-5.2	-2.6
60s or above	-14.2	9.1	5.0	14.8	-6.8	-7.9
Total	-14.7	7.8	4.6	13.6	-6.9	-6.9

Source: Jiji Yoron Chosa Tokuhō

In terms of age, it was those in their 20s and 30s who changed their party support and cabinet approval. The second table indicates that 25.5 percent of respondents in their 20s supported the LDP after the general election. This is a spectacular figure, not only because it increased by 16.8 percent from August, but because, from 1996 to 2005 support for the LDP among people in their 20s was merely 9 percent. The same is true for the cabinet approval rate, which was 55.2 percent after the election. Even though the Koizumi cabinet has enjoyed a high rate of support among voters in their 20s, its average was still only 41.4 percent (by the end of 2005). Thus, it is fair to say that women and young voters, who are known to be relatively politically inactive and uninterested, yielded to Koizumi's "assassinator" candidate strategy.

Finally, it is worthwhile to place the 2005 general election in historical perspective. Although the Jiji Press monthly polls are available since 1960, no other election has recorded such a huge upsurge in the cabinet approval rate since the polls began. The increase from August to September 2005 (13.6%) is the largest recorded increase in cabinet approval, excluding months in which new cabinets were installed. The second largest upsurge (12.8%) occurred from November to December 1960. In terms of the decline in nonpartisan voters, the

largest decline, 20.6 percent, was recorded from November to December 1960. The second largest, 14.7 percent, was recorded last year from August to September 2005. The changes in public opinion in these two months are quite distinct, and it is unusual to observe such huge changes in both party support and cabinet approval at the same time. What, then, happened in November and December 1960? The 1960 general election took place on November 20. There exist only a few culprits that could trigger

such an upsurge in public opinion. One was the assassination of the JSP chairman Asanuma Inejiro on October 12, and the other is the first party leader TV debate on November 12. While it is impossible to ascertain exactly what caused such changes without weekly polls, it seems interesting to find that only a real assassinator could produce a change larger than the change generated by the fake "assassinators."

# Visiting Professor Interview

## Bai Gao



Department of Sociology  
Duke University (U.S.)  
(Visiting Shaken from May 15 to August 14, 2006)  
bagao@soc.duke.edu

**Q.** How did you first come to know about *Shaken*?

**A.** I came to *Shaken* in July of 1990 and stayed here until August of 1991 as a foreign researcher working on my PhD dissertation under a fellowship from the Japan Foundation. I was introduced to Professor Harada Sumitaka by Professor Takemae Eiji of Tokyo Keizai University. One of Professor Takemae's students, Yuasa Hiroshi, now on the editorial board of the Sankei Shinbun, was a Mid-Career Fellow at Princeton University where I was a graduate student. We became friends and he introduced me to Professor Takemae (an expert on the history of the U.S. postwar occupation of Japan).

**Q.** What are your impressions of Japanese society now?

**A.** My impression is that Japan is changing rapidly in a number of dimensions. My last trip to Japan was in the summer of 2003. In three years, Japan appears to have changed a lot. The most significant change this time, in my impression, is the proliferation of discussions on the rise of economic inequality. You can find many books with a title on this theme at bookstores. A recent survey in the Asahi Shimbun indicated that inequality was the number one concern among Japanese people for the post-Koizumi era. One of the biggest challenges for the

next prime minister is to respond to the expectations of the general public, and perhaps shift away from Koizumi's economic policies. The current trend in Japan, just as in many other countries, suggests that we might have entered a period of reflection about globalization.

For example, oil industrialization witnessed a trend toward nationalization in Russia, a number of countries in Latin America and elsewhere. You also see a strong backlash against M&A activities in China and the United States. Many people in Japan also have some serious concerns about the ongoing trend of M&As. Inequality is not just a Japanese phenomenon, it has also become the biggest policy issue in China.

When I came to Japan in the mid 1990s (spending a half-year at Yokohama National University in 1995 and 8 months at Hitotsubashi University in 1996), the most heated debate was on the origins of the Japanese economic system (e.g. the "1940 system," and so on). You no longer see books with such titles these days. There are not many broad inquiries into the Japanese economic system any more. The reason may be that there was a consensus in Japan back in the mid 1990s that Japan really needed a change. At present, in contrast, there is no clear-cut consensus on the future direction of the Japanese economy.

**Q.** Could you tell me about your current projects, and their background?

**A.** I have a strong interest in where Japan is headed in the process of globalization. My project is a historical analysis that has contemporary implications. Originally, this project began as a comparative study of the responses of the United States, Germany and Japan to the downturn in the previous wave of globalization during the Great Depression and World War II. Now, it focuses on the causal mechanisms that determine the fate of convergence movements in the process of globalization. Convergence is generally considered to be the major trend in the process of globalization. The current movement toward convergence, however, is a reversal of the direction of the 1930s. The contemporary trend towards convergence is characterized by a move

towards free market economies in the economic sphere and democracy in the political sphere. In contrast, the trend towards convergence in the 1930s was characterized by a movement towards the associational order represented by cartels and trade associations, and the state began to play a major role in economic governance. Even for the relatively liberal market economies such as the United States, a convergence movement towards the associational order of the economy took place after Congress passed the National Industrial Recovery Act during the first New Deal program. In 1935, however, the Supreme Court ruled that this legislation was unconstitutional. In contrast, this trend exerted a much bigger impact on economic governance in Japan, albeit not to the same degree as seen in Germany. Compared to the period prior to the 1930s, the trend towards the associational order made strong progress in Japan. Even in Germany, the motherland of cartels, the associational order was further strengthened and was directly controlled by the Nazi regime.

What was the reason? My approach starts with the dichotomy between liberal market economies and coordinated market economies borrowed from the "varieties of capitalism" literature. It highlights the importance of the constitutional order of the state. What amazed me is that all countries labeled "liberal market economies" tend to be English-speaking countries and they all share the common law tradition, and all countries labeled "coordinated market economies" tend to be non-English speaking countries and they all share the continental legal tradition. I believe that there must be some causal links between these legal traditions and the patterns of economic governance in these countries. I also think that such legal traditions have impacted the rise of the state in these countries in the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries. In other words, legal traditions shaped the constitutional order of the state, which defines the division of labor among the three branches, including legislative, judicial, and executive. In the common law systems, judges and lawyers were more powerful than their counterparts in the continental legal systems. If we compare the tripartite division of powers in the modern state among the three countries in this study, the United States is notable for its judicial review system and the power of the judicial branch, while Germany and Japan are notable for the power held by the executive branch.

Part of the reason is that in the United States, the legislative branch often drafts the bills by itself, while in Germany and Japan, the executive branch often drafts the bills for the legislative branch. In general, countries that share the continental legal tradition have bestowed a more powerful role to the executive branch than the judicial branch. Despite the fact that the legislative branch is very powerful in America, its legislations are still subject to checks and balances by the judicial branch. Although both Germany and Japan have begun to establish a judicial review mechanism in the postwar period, the power of their executive branches in economic governance is still greater than in the United States.

In this project, the constitutional order of the state provides the political arena to actors whose access to policy making and political resources are defined institutionally. I examine how these institutional factors have influenced the political process, and explain why certain characteristics in the constitutional order of the state tend to yield certain outcomes, through an examination of the political economy of convergence in the process of globalization.

I also feel that if I examine the postwar convergence movements toward free markets, and make a comparison between the prewar and postwar periods, it would make my argument more convincing. However, although I am still considering this possibility, to add the postwar component would triple the amount of time and energy I need to finish the project.

**Q.** What are the features of *Shaken* that you appreciate the most?

**A.** I greatly appreciate *Shaken's* multi-disciplinary orientation. For foreign researchers, it is very useful to have such a wealth of fields and researchers assembled under one roof. The exchanges among different disciplines are always difficult to achieve and the lack of such exchanges seriously limits our exposures to other perspectives. At *Shaken*, however, one has the opportunities to meet researchers in various fields. Since I always like an inter-disciplinary approach for my research, *Shaken* is extremely valuable to me. *Shaken*, being located at the University of Tokyo, also has a cutting edge in international exchanges, providing a venue to meet Japan scholars from various countries.



# Visiting Professor Interview

## Noel Gaston



Professor of Economics, School of Business  
Bond University (Australia)  
(Visiting *Shaken* from May 1 to August 31, 2006)  
ngaston@bond.edu.au

**Q.** How did you first come to know of *Shaken*?

**A.** Professor Sasaki Dan (a professor of *Shaken*) and I have been friends for several years. We are currently working together on developing some interesting ideas. Dan and I met while he was working in Australia, during a previous life! He has visited my university a few times. It was he who invited me to ISS. Of course, I was delighted to accept – the University of Tokyo is very famous. Also, my forthcoming publication on part-time employment in Japan used data collected by Professor Sato Hiroki of ISS. At ISS I gave a presentation on this topic because I appreciated being given access to the data. It was a good opportunity to show people what I have done with the data they collected.

**Q.** What was the main purpose of this visit?

**A.** This visit, I have been revising my current project (described below). I also attended the first meeting of a collaborative project (between the ANU and the Japan Institute of Labour) comparing the labor market policies of Japan and Australia. In addition, I am working on a book measuring globalization – with Axel Dreher at ETH-Zürich and Pim Martens at the University of Maastricht – as well as a new paper on the contagion effects of economic freedom with two

other members of ETH-Zürich. I'm also in the process of preparing a working paper on immigration for the World Bank. While here in Japan, I've given several seminars (three at the University of Tokyo, one at Aoyama Gakuin, one at Waseda and one at ICSEAD in Kitakyushu). So I have been, and continue to be, quite busy!

**Q.** What are your current research interests?

**A.** My research interests centre on the analysis of labor markets and international trade, especially the effects of globalization on labor markets. I have in fact been working on the impact of globalization on the labor market for much of my academic career. I'm interested in various aspects of globalization. These aspects include the labor market consequences of trade reforms, foreign investment liberalization, and immigration; the impact of structural adjustments on income distribution; the political economy of labor market policies; structural change and the Japanese firm; and labor market policies in Japan. More recently I have been interested in the impact of globalization on economic and political institutions, especially on how labor market responses in many countries have been affected by those institutions. By institutions, I mean such organizations as unionization, minimum wage laws, labor market regulations, degree of centralization of wage bargaining, and so on. All of these features appear affected by globalization and in turn affect such labor market outcomes as wage levels, rates of unemployment, and the like.

It is quite clear that the average worker is increasingly at the forefront of globalization. Yet economists are often uncomfortable with this fact because most of them are such enthusiastic supporters of freer trade, freer investment and other facets of globalization. It is very difficult for economists to understand the concern felt by the average citizen. But I think that we are seeing substantial changes in the structures of economies and many changes which affect the security of workers. For example, many economies have experienced falling unionization. It is quite clear in some cases that this phenomenon is being driven by more globally mobile capital such

as multinational corporations. That's one good reason that workers are very concerned about outsourcing. In this and other respects, I think that we are increasingly seeing the so-called evidence of the "indirect" effects of globalization. Some of these are institutional effects, and economists have of late become more interested in these effects. Personally, I have become increasingly interested in political economy, particularly the processes of public policy formation in the midst of globalization. In line with that, I have been looking at the responses in different countries. Over the past few years, I have also been fortunate enough to travel to Japan, so some of my research focuses on various aspects of the Japanese economy.

In many respects, Japan has been quite resistant to globalization even though there have been substantial changes in the Japanese labor market. It is difficult to argue that these changes have been brought about by globalization. Most economists regard technological progress as the more significant force affecting the labor markets of most countries. I think that this modal position by economists is a largely correct one; in spite of the average citizen's deep concern about globalization, at least some changes are not due to the "direct" effects of globalization. Some of these changes are occurring due to institutions or structures. Consequently, I am examining what are the most influential forces affecting the various elements of the labor market, and policy. I am not only looking at economic integration – e.g., trade, investment and immigration – but also at political integration. For example, the European Union is a political union, and to a certain extent many of its policy responses are reactions to globalization. With some of my colleagues I am also looking at the elements of social integration and their effects. To give you an example, social integration might be measured by the degree of integration in the media, the number of internet hosts and users, inbound and outbound tourism, the number of Starbucks coffee shops, the number of McDonald's and so on. Another force in social integration is the media, as it can be a vehicle for change, which influences labor markets.

A number of economies have many similarities, but the concern that globalization is homogenizing countries seems exaggerated to me. Even within the politically integrated European Union, we do not

see a great deal of uniformity in social and economic policies. In fact, we see quite the opposite: each country has considerably different social expenditure programs, labor market programs and policies in various sectors. It is clear that greater integration is not inconsistent with diversity in economic and social policies. Fears about globalization, by contrast, stress a "race to the bottom." Globalization skeptics argue that in order to compete, countries have to lower their social safety nets. This was a big concern in Canada during the time of the NAFTA negotiations, for example. I attended a debate between U.S. and Canadian scholars, where the latter's main concern was that their social welfare network would be forced below the American one. I think that there is very little evidence of that happening, and generally speaking, there has been no race to the bottom in environmental, social and economic standards. Thus, popular wisdom is possibly misguided. Unfortunately, very cynical politicians are comfortably exploiting the fears of people and the media is also partly to blame in exaggerating people's concerns about globalization.

In terms of economic efficiency, generating greater income, and so on, I think that most aspects of globalization are a good thing. However, it is quite clear that globalization also entails risks whereby a significant number of people may become losers. So along with fostering freer trade and investment, and freedom of movement of people, there should be policies which compensate people who might be vulnerable to the process of the globalization. I (and many economists) think that a major problem is lack of access to information and communication technologies. When looking at the increased dualism in the labor market in many countries, it is clear that people in the bottom segment of the labor market often have very little access to these technologies. Indeed, that continues to be a problem world-wide. The increased demand for skilled workers means that bifurcation is an international trend. The trend may have been aided by globalization, but it is not solely due to globalization. It is mostly caused by technological change.

Q. What do you like about *Shaken*?

A. I enjoy the interdisciplinary nature of *Shaken*. I spent a significant part of my career in economics departments. But the latter part of my career has

## Visiting Professor Interview

been spent in a business school, which is also interdisciplinary. This interdisciplinary feature is very valuable in my opinion. The longer I'm in the profession, the more I appreciate the inter-connections among things. As I mentioned, one of the areas that I am very interested in is political economy and policy formation. Interdisciplinary environments have taught me that political scientists have been interested in this particular area for many, many years, being keen students of political and economic issues. Political scientists and economists are interested in many of the same issues, albeit from somewhat different perspectives. Indeed, it's not an exaggeration to say that nearly everyone seems interested in the various aspects of globalization, including sociologists, political scientists, economists and legal

scholars. I think that it is very valuable to be in an academic environment in which one is reminded of these other perspectives.

I'd also like to add one more point. I think that the data that Professor Sato collected is a genuine asset. To have data which are internationally accessible is extremely valuable, and not just for scholars working in Japan. Many scholars who are interested in labor market issues are also interested in Japan because it has long been thought to be quite unique. Having access to carefully concorded data is very important for scholars to examine aspects of the Japanese economy in a comparative light. I certainly think that's a major contribution of *Shaken* and its social scientific mission.

## ISS Contemporary Japan Group at the Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo

*The ISS Contemporary Japan Group serves as a forum for researchers on Japan to receive critical feedback on their work. Researchers visiting Tokyo are invited to contact Professor Ishida Hiroshi (ishida@iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp) for more information if they would like to make a presentation. Meetings are open to everyone.*

### Japan Foundation Fellow

**Visiting Researcher, Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo**

**Assistant Professor, International Relations and Political Economy, Michigan State University**

**Mark Elder**

*Environmental Policy, Economic Competitiveness, and the Policymaking Process in Japan  
March 30, 2006*



#### Abstract

The traditional view of the relationship between environmental protection and economic competitiveness is that there is a tradeoff between them. In contrast, the Porter hypothesis argues that stricter environmental regulation can actually promote economic competitiveness by stimulating innovation and advanced demand from consumers. This presentation argues that the Japanese government is trying to realize the latter view and create a virtuous circle, using environmental protection to promote economic competitiveness, and at least to promote environmental considerations in business in an economically beneficial way. Leading the way is the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), with programs promoting recycling businesses, environmental accounting, life cycle design, and environmental management, in addition to environmental technology, new energy, and energy conservation. Promoting environmental business has become a pillar of its industrial policy with connections to other policy areas like the promotion of manufacturing and small business. This may be surprising to environmental groups, who view METI with suspicion, as well as those who will find that reports of METI's demise have been exaggerated. This study also sheds light on long-standing puzzles of industrial policy such as how METI can get business to cooperate voluntarily, how small numbers of generalist bureaucrats can organize specialized complex microeconomic interventions, how METI interacts with other ministries, and what government can accomplish with only small subsidies. Other ministries, like the Ministry of Land Infrastructure and Transport, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, and the Ministry of Education, Sports, Science and Technology, also have environment-related policies, which they use to try to promote their own objectives as well as the institutions under their jurisdiction. Finally, this study will discuss the policy-making process (touching on the substantial role played by other ministries) and contribute to the perennial discussions about the relative roles of bureaucrats, business, and advisory councils.



**Research Fellow, Japan Society for the Promotion of Science**

**Suginozaka Masako**

*Negotiated Openness? US-Japan Financial Talks in a Globalizing World*

April 27, 2006

**Abstract**

In this presentation, I will trace the U.S.-Japan financial talks over the last two decades and examine their impacts on financial openness. Despite the widespread notion that globalization has forced countries to adopt liberal regulatory systems, the global trend toward financial liberalization is not a direct result of market pressure. Rather, it is a result of intergovernmental negotiations and coordination. The changing environment surrounding financial regulators, however, has produced varying outcomes.

A series of U.S.-Japan negotiations over financial openness started in 1983 as the world's first bilateral financial talks. Since then, financial liberalization in Japan has been a subject of bilateral relations, although domestic needs, as well as *gaiatsu*, have played a significant role in the process of liberalization. The globalization of finance, however, led to the politicization of financial matters on the domestic front, and to multilateralization and institutionalization at the international level. These developments made it difficult for financial experts to monopolize the negotiation process and resulted in significant changes in the nature and outcome of negotiations.

**Associate Professor, Department of Political Science,  
University of Wisconsin-Madison**

**David Leheny**

*Japan, America, and the Realities of Liberty City:  
The Politics of Restricting the "Grand Theft Auto" Games*  
May 26, 2006

**Abstract**

This presentation is part of a longer-term project on the politics of Japan's development of its "digital content industries." As the Japanese government seeks to use Japanese pop culture both for economic growth and for the "soft power" dividends expected in the globalization of the nation's entertainment industries, it also confronts new struggles over the actual content of games, film, and other media. In comparing American and Japanese reactions to the extraordinarily popular video game "Grand Theft Auto III" and its sequels, I call attention to the political machinations of specific local and national lawmakers, to the organization of parents' groups and religious organizations, as well as to the interpretations regarding the "reality" of the game itself. I hope to use this project to examine the political economy of moral regulation.



## Matthew R. Augustine



Ph.D. candidate  
History Department  
Columbia University

My dissertation research deals with two inter-related regional migrations: the repatriation and illegal reentry of Koreans and Okinawans in the postwar occupation of Japan. The mass repatriation program coordinated among U.S. occupation personnel in Japan, southern Korea, and the Ryukyu archipelago oversaw the return of approximately 930,000 Koreans and 160,000 Ryukyans (who were no longer referred to as Okinawans by the U.S.) from Japan by January 1947. The official regulation of returnees, however, was a belated effort more effectively orchestrated by the League of Korean Residents and the League of Okinawans established in the aftermath of the Pacific War. Furthermore, the restrictive immigration policy imposed by the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) reveals the nature of occupied Japan's isolation from the rest of the region. By segregating former colonial subjects in a process I call "ethnic dissimulation,"

SCAP and the Japanese Government contributed to the transformation of Japan's multi-ethnic empire into a mono-ethnic nation-state. The Military Government in Okinawa also attempted to divide and isolate the Ryukyus from Japan by repatriating as many Ryukyans from Japan as possible, but American efforts at promoting separatism only drove the Ryukyans to identify more closely with Japan.

The deportation of illegal immigrants coupled with repatriation was the most convenient way for authorities to expel undesirable minorities from occupied Japan. The irony of SCAP's strict border control policy was that an overwhelming majority of illegal entrants were recent residents of Japan, who had been once repatriated, only to return to Japan for socio-economic reasons. Others were refugees of such violent civil conflicts on the Korean peninsula as the "April 8 Incident" and the subsequent massacre of Cheju Island residents in 1948, and the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. The interrogation of Koreans captured for illegal entry reveals that tens of thousands of Koreans were crossing and re-crossing the Sea of Japan. Borderlands such as Tsushima and Cheju-do served as key staging points for an underground trade of people and goods not only between Japan and Korea but also with the Ryukyus and Taiwan. Among the Ryukyu islands, an active illegal trade network developed out of necessity when U.S. aid barely provided sustenance for war-ravaged Ryukyans. Such bordercrossers were initially detained for their involvement in black-market activities. Their suppression eventually became one of the most urgent security concerns for Japanese and Allied officials, who feared the transnational spread of communism.

## Paul J. Scalise



D.Phil Candidate  
Department of Politics and International Relations  
University of Oxford

Thesis Title: "Agendas and Uncertainty in Japan's Electricity Deregulation"

The Japanese electricity market has entered its third phase of liberalization, marking in 2006 the eleventh year of gradual re-regulatory design and experimentation. With the economy mired in difficulties, burdened by an aging society, tested by deflation and challenged by systemic financial

stress during the 1990s, structural reform of the so-called "old economy" was increasingly heralded by many analysts as the last bullet for sustainable, long-term recovery. My research explores the prospects and problems of such hopes insofar as the electricity sector is concerned. It argues that Japan's average industrial and residential electricity prices per kWh (tariffs), ostensibly the highest among OECD nations, were (and still are) unlikely to fall to the extent and speed experienced in other markets in the near future. At best, the Japanese economic model has introduced tepid competition among private, vertically integrated monopolies without addressing the more serious structural and political barriers to market entry that preclude increased consumer welfare and shareholder value, let alone real competition in Japan. The question is why. Unlike previous political science models that interpret policy change through either a unitary top-down bureaucratic process or, the opposite extreme, a pluralist power struggle among vested interests, my thesis will stress the importance of a bottom-up decision-making process undermined by the weakness of ideas to challenge the (regulatory) status quo using a punctuated equilibrium model.

## Carmen Schmidt



PD Dr. phil. habil.  
University of Osnabrueck (Germany)  
Faculty of Social Sciences  
Senior Lecturer for Political Sociology and Comparative Politics  
Deputy Director Japan Research Center  
(Homepage: <http://www.fsjapan.uni-osnabrueck.de>)

### **Project title: Japan's University Reform**

Focusing on the university reform process, this project shall be embedded in the broader context of wide-ranging structural reforms that are about to take place in all advanced industrialized nations. Historically, education has been a long-standing domain of the nation-state. Nowadays, in all advanced nations, effective and efficient management has become very important within the higher education sector in order to guarantee the quality of education. Quite recently, the Japanese national universities were transformed into independent administrative corporations in order to make them more dynamic and internationally competitive. Management methods of the private sector were introduced into the national universities, and a competitive mechanism utilizing third-party evaluation was adopted. The goals of the reforms were to monitor the allocation of funds by the establishment of a third-party evaluation system, as well as to improve educational and research standards by the enhancement of fluidity among personnel within university teaching and research faculty. Currently, in Germany, the necessity of structural reform is discussed as intensively as in Japan.

The purpose of this project is to study the process and outcome of university reform in Japan and to discuss its applicability for Germany. The project shall answer the following questions:

- Do the reforms improve the quality of education and research?
- Do the reforms secure university autonomy?
- Do the reforms improve university funding?
- What are the achievements of the reforms concerning the establishment of a competitive system among universities?
- What problems remain to be solved?
- What can Germany learn from Japan concerning structural reform of the education system?

Because the reforms were introduced quite recently, the outcomes of the university reform process cannot yet be measured empirically. Instead, therefore, interviews with experts (i.e. persons who took part in the reform processes at former national universities) on the matter shall be conducted. Using qualitative methods, the experts shall be asked about their experiences and their opinions concerning the outcomes of the reform packages, and the actual remaining problems. The interviews shall be complemented by data on budget and financing provided by the universities themselves.

Through our research, we expect to obtain an assessment of the reform package in Japan. Furthermore, we hope to get serious information on the question of which parts of the Japanese reform program could be applicable to Germany, where the need for structural reform as a consequence of globalization, changes in governance structures, and serious problems in public finance, is the focus of interest as well.

### **Major publications** (in German):

- 2005: Japan's Circle of Power: Legitimacy and Integration of a National Elite
- 2003: Dictionary of Contemporary Japanese Politics
- 2001: Social Structure and Political System in Japan: Social Cleavages, Voter Alignment, and Political Representation



# "Current and Future Trajectories of Social Science Research on Japan"

Date: November 17 and 18, 2006

Place: Hongo Campus, University of Tokyo

Language: Japanese

The Information Center for Social Science Research on Japan, housed in the Institute of Social Science (ISS), University of Tokyo, celebrated its 10th anniversary in April 2006. The forthcoming symposium is one of the activities to celebrate this anniversary.

This symposium will assess social science research on Japan. A particular focus will be on identifying the problems and issues faced by researchers and institutions, and discussing future directions of research activities. This symposium will be held in Japanese and is structured as a two-day event. The first day will feature a symposium open to the public in the afternoon, while the rest will be a closed workshop for informal presentation and discussion among the participants.

## Agenda

Friday, November 17, 2006

10:00 Inauguration

10:00-10:05 Opening Remarks  
KOMORIDA Akio (Director, ISS)

10:05-12:30 Workshop I. "The current state of social science research on Japan (1) Reports from the United States and Europe"

Venue: Main Meeting Room, The Institute of Social Science (ISS), University of Tokyo

Chair: KUDO Akira (ISS)

Presentations by:

Patricia Golden STEINHOFF (University of Hawai'i, The United States)

Glenn HOOK (University of Sheffield, The United Kingdom)

Verena K. BLECHINGER-TALCOTT (Free University of Berlin, Germany)

Natacha AVELINE (Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1, France)

Corrado MOLTENI (University of Milan, Italy)

Questions and Answers

12:30-14:00 Lunch Break

14:00-17:00 Open Symposium "Why Study Japan Now?: A Social Science Perspective"

Venue: Koshiba Hall, Faculty of Science Bldg. 1, University of Tokyo

Chair: NAKAMURA Keisuke (ISS)

Opening Remarks: KOMORIDA Akio (ISS)

Presentations by:

John Creighton CAMPBELL (University of Michigan, The United States)

FAN Yongming (Fudan University, People's Republic of China)

Glenn HOOK (University of Sheffield, The United Kingdom)

Franz WALDENBERGER (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, Germany)

KIKKAWA Takeo (ISS)

Discussion

18:00-20:00 Reception

Venue: Sanjo Kaikan, University of Tokyo

Host: SUEHIRO Akira (ISS)

Speeches: SATO Shin'ichi (Vice President, University of Tokyo), HIROWATARI Seigo (ISS), and other guests.

Saturday November 18, 2006

9:30-11:30 Workshop II. "The current state of social science research on Japan (2): Reports from Asia"

Venue: Main Meeting Room, The Institute of Social Science (ISS), University of Tokyo

Chair: TAJIMA Toshio (ISS)

Presentations by:

## Institute of Social Science International Symposium

SUN Xin (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,  
People's Republic of China)

KIM Hosup (Chung-ang University, Republic  
of Korea)

Bachtiar ALAM (University of Indonesia,  
Indonesia)

Pasuk PHONGPAICHIT & Chris BAKER  
(Chulalongkorn University, Thailand)

Questions and Answers

11:30-11:40 Break

11:40-12:30 Introductory Presentation: "Recent  
Research and Activities in the Institute  
of Social Science"

Chair and Speaker: KOMORIDA Akio (Director, ISS)

Venue: Main Meeting Room, The Institute of Social  
Science (ISS), University of Tokyo

12:30-14:00 Lunch Break

14:00-17:00 Workshop III. "Japan in East Asia:  
Visions for the Japanese Studies in  
Social Science"

Venue: Main Meeting Room, The Institute of Social  
Science (ISS), University of Tokyo

Chair: HIRAISHI Naoaki (ISS)

Discussion

Closing address: ISHIDA Hiroshi (ISS)

17:00 Adjournment


Note: The symposium on 17 November (Fri) in the  
afternoon is open to the public. The atten-  
dance of workshops requires permission, and  
requests should be sent to the secretary of the  
Director of the Institute, Ms. Fujiyama at  
<fujiyama@iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp>.

# Recent Publications by ISS and ISS Staff

丸屋豊二郎、丸川知雄、大原盛樹  
『新世界事情3 メイド・イン・シャンハイ  
—— 躍進中国の生産と消費 ——』  
岩波書店(2006年2月)



木棚照一、中川淳司、山根裕子 (共編)  
『プライマリー 国際取引法』  
法律文化社 (2006年2月)



丸川知雄 (編)  
『中国産業ハンドブック2005年—2006年版』  
蒼蒼社 (2006年2月)




本田由紀・内藤朝雄・後藤和智  
『「ニート」って言うな!』  
光文社 (2006年1月)

Junji Nakagawa (Editor)  
*Managing Development: Globalization, Economic Restructuring and Social Policy.*  
Routledge (February, 2006)

中村圭介  
『成果主義の真実』  
東洋経済新報社 (2006年3月)



佐藤岩夫、菅原郁夫、山本和彦 (共編)  
『利用者からみた民事訴訟 司法制度改革審議会  
「民事訴訟利用者調査」の2次分析』  
日本評論社 (2006年3月)




平石直昭、金泰昌 (共編)  
『公共哲学17  
知識人から考える公共性』  
東京大学出版会 (2006年3月)

河合正弘、深作喜一郎（編集/監訳）  
『開発のための政策一貫性  
東アジアの経済発展と先進諸国の役割』  
明石書店（2006年3月）


『社会科学研究』  
第57巻第5・6合併号（2006年3月）



工藤章・橋川武郎・グレン・D.フック（編）  
『グローバル・レビュー 現代日本企業3』  
有斐閣（2006年3月）



末廣昭、星野妙子（共編）  
『ファミリービジネスのトップマネジメント  
—アジアとラテンアメリカにおける企業経営』  
岩波書店（2006年3月）



玄田有史（編著）  
『希望学』  
中央公論新社（2006年4月）

田中素香、小森田秋夫、羽場久美子（共編）  
『ヨーロッパの東方拡大』  
岩波書店（2006年6月）



末廣昭（編）  
『岩波講座 「帝国」日本の学知 第6巻  
地域研究としてのアジア』  
岩波書店（2006年4月）



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