Social Science *Japan*

30

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Nationalism

Cover Photo
Japanese children dedicating the warplane, the "Patriotic Child," at its dedication ceremony. December 2, 1932. Courtesy of the Mainichi Shinbun.

Back Cover Photo
Japanese supporters unfurling a large Japanese flag at the Asian World Cup (Soccer) Qualifying game at the Jamsil Olympic Stadium in Seoul. November 1, 1997. Courtesy of the Mainichi Shinbun.

Editorial Notes
Personal Names
All personal names are given in the customary order in the native language of the person unless otherwise requested. Hence in Japanese names, the family name is given first, e.g. Toyotomi Hideyoshi, and in Western names the family name is given second, e.g. George Bush.

The thematic focus of this issue of *Social Science Japan* is Nationalism. From Jason Karlin's reconsideration of the culpability of Japanese women in wartime Japan, to Oguma Eiji's examination of contemporary right-wing groups pushing for history textbook reform, these articles remind us that nationalism is neither something limited to men, nor something only of the past. Hiraishi Naoaki critically analyzes the writings of one of Japan's foremost intellectuals of the 20th Century, Maruyama Masao, to explain how his democratic impulses merged nicely with his nationalistic tendencies. Looking internationally, Sakamoto Hiroko examines the various ways Chinese nationalism has been understood in modern Chinese history, especially by Japanese scholars, and Rwei-Ren Wu offers a fascinating Hegelian interpretation of the nationalism of Taiwan.

Finally, as many of our loyal readers are aware, this issue of *Social Science Japan* marks our Tenth Anniversary. We thus begin the issue with an essay by the current director of the Institute of Social Science, Nitta Michio, who offers a short institutional history of the newsletter and its relationship with the Information Center for Social Science Research on Japan.

As always, if you are not a current subscriber, but would like to receive *Social Science Japan*, please email us at ssjinfo@iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp, with the words "SSJ subscription" in the subject box, for a free subscription.

Thomas Blackwood
Managing Editor

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Celebrating the Tenth Anniversary of *Social Science Japan*

Nitta Michio

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Ten years have passed since the Institute of Social Science published the first issue of our English language newsletter, *Social Science Japan*, and issue Number 30 marks this special anniversary. This is truly an event to celebrate. Since its beginning, we have been able to produce three issues almost every year. I am grateful to the five managing editors we have had, as well as the current and past members of the editorial board, and all of our contributors, from inside and outside of the Institute.

Not only have we been able to produce a substantial number of issues, both our content and design are deemed outstanding for an English language newsletter published by a Japanese university or research institute, and we are extremely proud of the praise we have received both domestically and abroad. When considering how we have achieved such a high quality publication, we must first recognize the hard work and self-sacrifice of our managing editors, who have been directly involved with translating and editing the articles. The contribution

of the founding managing editor, Jonathan Lewis, was especially significant in establishing the style of the newsletter. After Mr. Lewis, we have been fortunate to secure such talented people as David Leheny, Jim Hellyer, Ian Martin, and Tom Blackwood as managing editors.

In retrospect, the SSJ newsletter had its starting point in 1993, when the then director of the ISS, Professor Yamazaki Hiroaki, proposed that the Institute employ a research associate to be in charge of an English language newsletter, and he obtained approval at the monthly faculty meeting. This was at the time when the ISS was requesting the Ministry of Education's (currently the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology) approval to establish an Information Center for Social Science Research on Japan (ICSSRJ), and producing an English newsletter was one of the activities we hoped would increase our chances of gaining MOE's approval. By advancing communication in English, our main intention was to distribute information concerning social scientific research on Japan to Japanologists and social scientists interested in Japan around the world. Among all of the candidates who applied for the managing editor job, Mr. Jonathan Lewis (currently Associate Professor at the Institute for the Study of Global Issues, Graduate School of Social Sciences, Hitotsubashi University) was chosen as our first managing editor. In fact, according to Professor Kudo Akira who was the chair of the ICSSRJ Preparation Committee at the time, Mr. Lewis was the second choice of the selection committee. But, since our first choice declined, Mr. Lewis was hired. Considering Mr. Lewis' subsequent activity, however, this small setback turned out to be very fortunate for the SSJ newsletter and the Institute.

According to an ISS oral tradition, Professor Banno Junji, the Director of ISS when SSJ first came out, snatched the first issue hot off the press and brought it straight to the Ministry of Education. "Surely, an institute that can produce such a high-quality English language newsletter," he asserted, "should be

able to establish an Information Center for Social Science Research on Japan, as an international center for research on Japanese society." This, it is said, led to success at the budgetary request meeting the following year, and was the first step towards the inauguration of the ICSSRJ in 1996. Mr. Lewis, together with visiting researcher Mr. Andrew DeWit (currently an Associate Professor of Economics at Rikkyo University), was also responsible for starting up our English language electronic discussion list, SSJ Forum, in May of 1995. The activity of the SSJ Forum was another important task in preparing for the establishment of the ICSSRJ. I have many fond memories of Mr. Lewis operating the SSJ Forum, and introducing it to visitors from university administration and from the Ministry of Education.

Even after the ICSSRJ was established in 1996, SSJ continued to be published 3 times a year, occasionally putting out special issues on thematic topics. In addition to paper copies, SSJ was also available online from very early on, and issues could be downloaded from a web site. In keeping up with technological changes, a shift to CAD-based editing was also carried out. At the same time they were coping with such technical challenges, the managing editors had to continue to translate Japanese manuscripts and edit them, giving them extra difficulties. Since I myself served as the Chair of the Center Management Committee from 1996 to 2000, I have also been involved with the selection and hiring of managing editors. Although all of the job candidates who make it to the interview stage are given Japanese-to-English translation exams, we thought that since much of the translating will be of articles written by ISS faculty members, we decided to chose selections from publications written by ISS faculty for candidates to translate in the exams. However, the first time we did this, I'm afraid we chose a very difficult Japanese passage, and made the candidates suffer quite a bit. Upon reflection, I realized that even if we intend to have our writing translated into English, we must try to write clear Japanese that can be easily understood.

Finally, I will discuss the role of visiting scholars in the SSJ newsletter. When looking over past issues of the newsletter, we can see many articles written by researchers visiting ISS at the time. Every year ISS welcomes more than 30 visiting researchers for either long or short stays, and many of them have published short pieces about their research in SSJ. Furthermore, many former visiting researchers have published pieces in SSJ after returning to their home institutions. The fact that SSJ functions as a place for such bidirectional communication, and not only to publicize the research of ISS faculty, is one of the unique features of SSJ when compared to similar publications. This is one sign that our institute operates as a hub for an international network of social scientific research on Japan, and our international activities have worked to greatly enrich this network.

Gender, Nationalism, and the Problem of Ideology in Women's History

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More shocking than the photographs of torture and sexual humiliation that emerged from Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq was the centrality of women as the "perpetrators." While Barbara Ehrenreich, Susan Sontag, and Naomi Wolf among other feminists expressed a sense of disillusion with the idealized view of women as the gentler and less aggressive sex, others defended the women as "victims" of an ideology of nationalism, racism, and patriarchy. Why did these women do what they did?

The shock that many feminists felt at the women of Abu Ghraib precipitated reflection on the dominant narrative of gender difference that placed women outside of the discourses of nationalism, violence, and sexual oppression. In the history of modern Japan, the question of the wartime responsibility of women languished in the postwar period until the early 1990s when the forced sexual slavery of Korean "comfort women" compelled historians to begin to question the complicity of women in the wartime system of colonialism and oppression. However, throughout the postwar years, historians have doggedly invoked the "emperor system" (*tennōsei*) and "good wife, wise mother" (*ryōsai kenbo*) ideologies to explain the victimization of Japanese women by the patriarchal Japanese state.

As a result, the historiography of modern Japan has recycled a narrative of resistance to state authority to explain women's victimization during the twentieth century. Since the subjectivity of women is enunciatively portrayed as victimized by state oppression, historical scholarship can only rescue the subjectivity of women by valorizing their resistance to the state. Such terms as "victim" and "resistance" become part of the standard vocabulary for narrating women's history. Another part of this vocabulary has been the centrality of the emperor, as embodied in the monolithic notion of the emperor system ideology. As the dominant ideological apparatus of the state and the agent of patriarchal authority, the emperor system has functioned to explain the domination and subordination of the Japanese people. In this narrative, the state is explicitly conceived as a repressive apparatus that denies the subjectivity of the Japanese people.

The reexamination of the role of the people in history, from Yoshimi Yoshiaki's *Kusa no Ne no Fashizumu* (1987) to Daniel Goldhagen's *Hitler's Willing Executioners* (1997), is forcing historians to question their emphasis on narratives of resistance to the ideology of the state. Still this narrative of resistance has been central to the historiography of modern Japan, especially the history of women. Some historians seek to rescue the voices of Japan's activist women who challenged the established order. However, these women who rejected the traditional imperatives of the marital institution and who struggled for equality and justice for women often came from the middle-class, and not from the tenant farms of rural Japan. Despite the courage and idealism of these women activists, they often were alienated from the underprivileged members of society who they sought to represent. Sharon L. Sievers' groundbreaking history of the women's movement (1983), for example, is staged as a struggle against an oppres-

sive, patriarchal state. Sievers tells "the stories of many women who refused to be victimized by that oppression, and who struggled against it" (p. xi). Though Sievers importantly reveals the emergence of a feminist consciousness in modern Japan, the failure of the women's movement is seen as a casualty of state nationalism. In these accounts, Japanese women emerge as the victims of government forces whose voices can only be heard in the transcripts of resistance to state authority.

Most historians generally attribute the failure of the women's movement in prewar Japan to the formation of the "good wife, wise mother" ideology which narrowly defined women's roles as nurturer and educator. This ideological apparatus, like the emperor system ideology, has helped to explain the state's success in controlling and manipulating the Japanese people. For example, Kathleen Uno (1993) attributes the production of this ideology to officials in the Ministry of Education who crafted an official ideal of Japanese womanhood. Uno notes that "from the late 1890s until the end of World War II, 'good wife, wise mother' increasingly pervaded the mass media and the higher levels of public and private girls' higher schools" (p. 294). She identifies its production with the state and industrialists who conspired with the mass media to shape female attitudes and behavior. For Uno, this ideology failed to become hegemonic because "despite government repression, the critical voices of educators, leftists, and feminists spread dissonant visions of womanhood through their writings, protests, and alternative institutions." Uno's view of the dissemination of the ideology of "good wife, wise mother" partakes of the New Left critique of the media that reduces its influence to that of manipulation. This approach is exculpatory insofar as the consumers of media are seen as being manipulated by external forces. It conceals the weakness and negligible role of the critical voices of activist women whose influence seldom reached beyond isolated segments of the middle-class, by attributing their failure to the power of the media. Moreover, it posits a pure, unmanipulated truth outside of discourse that is concealed behind the false consciousness of nationalism.

In questioning these historians' interpretation that Japanese women resisted the state, one need not countenance the stereotypical image of the passive Japanese woman bound by "traditional" obligations.

A subject position for women in Japanese history can be defined without romanticizing the actions of individual women in a process of self-identification with noble heroes. In these works, the individual is conceived as the sole agent of causal efficacy in defending the interests of women against the oppressive collectivity. The problem with this approach is suggested in Sievers' definition of her subject as "the lives of ordinary, 'extraordinary' women" (p. xii). What is illustrated in this oxymoronic phrase is a romanticist conceptualization of history, which generalizes across the historical field while defining its subject in terms of particular agents. The result is a romanticized view of Japanese history for which the defiant actions of a few redeem Japanese women as a whole for their complicity in wartime mobilization.

For the women of modern Japan, the ideology of "good wife, wise mother" corresponded to their own understanding of women's difference from men. As a gendered discourse within which women were defined in terms of their closeness to nature and nurturing compassion, its core beliefs were not inevitable and essential qualities of Japanese womanhood, but a multivocal text constructed from ideals, expectations, and policy. These conceptions of women's difference, embodied in notions of lifestyle and community, resonated with women who saw difference not as the basis for their own oppression but as a source of strength and solidarity. Historians, on the other hand, have tended to explain women's belief in their difference from men as a product of the "good wife, wise mother" ideological indoctrination. However, in their search for those women who resisted this dominant ideology, they have defined women by supposed gender-neutral categories, which have in fact a masculinist bias that denies the subjectivity of women's experience.

The recent work of historians such as Sheldon Garon (1998), Nishikawa Yūko (2000), and Okano Yukie (2004) all take a critical view of women's victimization to state ideology.

In her influential work, Carol Gluck (1983) shows that the process of ideological formation was not singular and static, but composed of "an array of ideological formulations which at some points reinforced, and at others contradicted, the official ideological imagination" (p. 30). In Gluck's analysis, the

Meiji oligarchy dominated the ideological process in the late 1880s and early 1890s, but increasingly there were voices outside the government who shaped the ideological field. In this way, Gluck's view of nationalism balances claims of a monolithic state ideology by showing how groups within society contributed to the production of a nationalist consciousness. Gluck shows that the state was successful in persuading the people of the validity of the emperor system ideology because, in Gramscian terms, "force did not greatly exceed consent."

Garon sides with Gluck's definition of ideology in his analysis of why officials and intermediary groups cooperated in programs of social management in prewar Japan. Garon's argument parallels Gluck's assertion that society shared in the creation of ideology by foregrounding the cooperation between civil servants and middle-class activists, such as Hani Tomoko. Because the state was regarded as a progressive force for effecting meaningful change, the bureaucrats and middle-class activists who collaborated in reforming and improving daily life advocated the modernization and Westernization of Japanese society. According to Garon, the shared desire to modernize the rest of society underlies the alliance between the state and societal groups.

For Japanese women, their complicity in wartime mobilization and cooperation with the state was not the result of simple wartime ideological indoctrination, but rather the expression of a shared belief in the nation and its ideals. Nationalist appeals to family and community did not produce false consciousness, but instead responded to the insecurities and anxieties that attended the experience of modernity in Japan. For women's historians, rather than couching historical narratives in terms of the noble struggle of the people against an oppressive state, greater attention must now be paid to describing how democratic impulses engender nationalism, racism, and patriarchy.

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Recent Trends in Right-Wing Historical Revisionism in Japan

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The "Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform," a right-wing group for historical revisionism, has recently come under great scrutiny in Japan. The Society, a descendent of the "Association for the Advancement of Liberalist [sic] View of History" (AALVH) which was led by Tokyo University School of Education Professor Fujioka Nobukatsu, was formed in 1997.

Japanese historical revisionism has a number of distinctive characteristics. First, unlike Hindi right-wing revisionists in India who battle over ancient historical accounts, it focuses exclusively on issues of modern history. Among those issues, the question of how to situate the so-called "15 Year War," beginning with the 1931 Manchurian Incident, through the 1937 Sino-Japanese War, and up to the 1945 defeat of Japan in the Pacific War, is the most crucial.

At the same time, Japanese historical revisionism is also intimately related to Japan's current political system, which was constructed in the epoch-making year of 1945, following the 15 Year War. Modern Japan is based on a system which was constructed post-1945, from its domestic organization, starting with the Constitution, to its international relations, which are based on its bilateral relationship with the United States. Therefore, at a time when Japan's contemporary national identity is being questioned and altered, Japan's contemporary political system, coming out of the history of the 15 Year War, has arisen as an important point of contention for Japan's self-image. As one might suspect, this aspect closely resembles the characteristics of the historical revisionism of Germany, which is also built on a system fashioned post-1945.

Another characteristic of contemporary Japan's historical revisionism is its emergence after the mid 1990s. This is directly related to the movement opposing the rapid succession of formal objections and lawsuits from war victims from various Asian countries, which came at the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the end of the Pacific War. However, on the other hand, this is also a reflection of the Japanese political system's own deadlock. That is, from the 1990s, as Japan domestically suffered through economic recession, and, on the foreign relations front, faced increasing American requests for the overseas dispatch of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF), there has been a growing sense that the "Postwar System" constructed after 1945 has reached an impasse. At the same time, as this recognition spread, the viewpoint calling for constitutional reform, or a "reevaluation of the system with its origins in 1945," arose side by side with groups calling for a "reevaluation of Japanese history through 1945."

Questions about education can be considered another domestic administrative impasse. As Japan's economic disparities increased due to the recession in the 1990s, issues such as the increase in absenteeism in primary schools or the growth in differences in academic achievement have rapidly gained the attention of all. The Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology's (MEXT) policy responses to these issues have been confused and scattered, and Japanese people have become increas-

ingly uneasy concerning this situation. It is in this setting that the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform began to appeal to the hopes of segments of society which had previously never felt a connection to rightwing ideology or historical revisionism, such as housewives, by implying they would have the power to solve the problems in Japanese education.

The above is the general background within which the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform arose, although it is difficult to explain its ideological characteristics in a single phrase. The "Liberalism" professed by its antecedent, the AALVH, has a unique meaning. The AALVH criticized both "the view of history affirming the 'Greater East Asian War,' " which claimed that the 15 Year War was a war of Asian liberation (the "Greater East Asian War" was the Japanese name for the Pacific War), and "the Tokyo War Crimes Trial view of history,"[1] which unequivocally denounced the 15 Year War as a war of aggression. They argued that the "liberalist view of history" stood in an objective, third position. In this case, "liberalism" means both "anti-communism" and "anti-totalitarianism." Fujioka Nobukatsu, the founder of the AALVH, was a former communist who lost faith in communism at the end of the Cold War.

At its start, the AALVH, with Fujioka at its center, was inaugurated as a research society for educators looking to begin a debate on further developing the methodology of history education. However, the AALVH began a transformation in character as former soldiers and members of right-wing groups, arguing that the Greater East Asian War was a battle for Asian liberation, began to join. As a result, by the time the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform was formed in 1997, members with a strong right-wing leaning had greatly increased in numbers. The trend of young people, especially the popular cartoonist Kobayashi Yoshinori, joining the Society, attracted widespread attention.

However, even though the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform clearly exhibits strong rightwing tendencies, it is difficult to say the Society is ideologically unified. If there are members who argue the Greater East Asian War was a war to fight for Asian liberation, there are also members who contend the Japanese expansion of influence in Asia was, in any case, a strategic mistake which led to a hopeless war with the United States. Furthermore, in the case of contemporary politics, while there are members who express a strong antipathy towards the United States and oppose cooperating with American requests for the overseas deployment of the SDF, there are also members who feel it is in Japan's national interest to follow America's lead. Although all members strongly desire to portray Japan in a positive manner, they do not have a unified opinion on what type of stance Japan should adopt towards the U.S.

Another internal conflict within the Society concerns the Emperor: while older members continue to have strong feelings of allegiance towards him, one can safely say the younger members are indifferent to the Emperor. Although we can split the Society by age into members over 60 and those under 30, when compared to usual right-wing groups, the relatively large number of the latter is another distinctive feature. However, the younger members, who do not feel loyalty to the emperor, have little to offer as a nucleus for Japanese national identity.

Although the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform showed considerable vigor at its founding, these internal conflicts increased in intensity with the completion of their own history textbook in 2001. A considerable number of core members left the Society over a debate concerning the right and wrong of SDF deployment and the American aerial bombardment of Afghanistan. Furthermore, the adoption rate by schools of their new textbook was so low that the Society itself described it as an "utter defeat," and this result crushed the hopes of many fringe and lower-level members. The aforementioned cartoonist Kobayashi Yoshinori left at this time, along with many of these fringe members. As a result, the Society's outreach and expansion efforts among the masses, which began with the young members, have lost their momentum.

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[1] Both terms, "the view of history affirming the Greater East Asian War,'" （大東亜戦争肯定史観）and "the Tokyo War Crimes Trial view of history" （東京裁判史観）were coined by Fujioka Nobukatsu

Currently, the Society has linked up with the Liberal Democratic Party's (LDP) conservative and right-wing groups, and a campaign to popularize their textbook, as a symbol of conservatives, is under way. In a manner of speaking, we can say that the Society is now closer to the customary form of conservative groups. In 2004, the Society's textbook was adopted for new schools in Tokyo, and while these trends cannot be ignored, in all likelihood, the stage where they could have achieved mass popularity has passed.

However, as long as problems such as economic recession, SDF overseas deployment, constitutional reform, education problems, etc. continue to exist in contemporary Japan, it is safe to say that the popular base for the emergence of right-wing historical revisionism in Japan will also continue to exist. Although the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform has temporarily lost its influence, as long as this base exists, the possibility for the emergence of a second or third generation right-wing group is far

Maruyama Masao, National Democrat

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Maruyama Masao, a leading political scientist and intellectual historian, died in 1996 at the age of 82. In the eight years since his death more than twenty books concerning him and his work have appeared both inside and outside Japan, including *Democracy in Postwar Japan* by Rikki Kersten, *Revolution and Subjectivity in Postwar Japan* by Victor Koschmann, and *The Social Sciences in Modern Japan* by Andrew Barshay, not to mention works by Japanese scholars.

One of the hot topics related to Maruyama in these books is the question of how to assess the historical role of his nationalistic assertions, which he made during World War Two. Maruyama was generally seen as a progressive thinker in postwar Japan, so that, as far as I know, until recently no one tried to criticize him by alleging that he was committed to Japan's war efforts through his propagation of nationalism, and was responsible as an intellectual for supporting the war. Recently, however, some scholars have begun criticizing Maruyama based on these points, insisting that he had actually invented a new theory to mobilize people for the war, albeit in a less fanatic way than the government's official position of the "national polity." In this article, I would like to explore this issue further.

One of Maruyama's main works is *Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan* (1952; an English edition appeared in 1974), which contains three essays written during the war period, and in my view it is crucial to examine the logical relation between the three, and especially between the last two essays, in order to ascertain the covert political implications of Maruyama's works during the war.

In the "Author's Introduction" to the English edition of the book, Maruyama explains that in the first essay he traces, through the historical vicissitudes of Neo–Confucian modes of thought, the disintegration of the "orthodox" world view of Tokugawa Japan, finding in the Sorai and the Norinaga schools early appearances of a modern way of thinking. In the second essay he attempts to "show how the basis for a modern consciousness had emerged as an 'unintended consequence' in the same way as in Part 1 [i.e. the first essay]" (p. xxx), tracing "the transition from the idea of a natural to that of an artificial social order" (p. xxix). With this objective, Maruyama points out in the second essay that the Confucian theory of "invention of the Way" coined by Sorai developed in the middle of the Tokugawa period, but remained stagnant thereafter.

It is easy to see that the first two essays of the book are complimentary in their contents, and Maruyama himself admits that the second essay "was written as a sort of supplement to the first part" (p. xxix). On the other hand, it is not easy to see how the first two essays are related to the third, since in the third he traces the formation of pre-modern nationalism in the late Tokugawa period. In fact, however, there is a close relation between the second essay and the third, and the point is related to an article on the nationalism of Meiji thinker Fukuzawa Yukichi, "Fukuzawa's Perceptions of Order and Man" which Maruyama wrote for the Mita Shimbun, the newspaper of Keio University, during the war period.

In section 3 of chapter 6 in the second essay, Maruyama points out that "the theoretical limit of Sorai's philosophy of invention, the fact that the inventing agent could only be a special personality such as a sage or a Tokugawa shogun," also holds true for the late Tokugawa theorists such as Honda Toshiaki, so that "there is no indication that these theorists were inclining toward the concept that it is the people who make institutions (such as the *social contract theory**)" (p. 300). Maruyama says "So long as the ability to invent is made dependent on a special status, the great majority of the people are denied the right to transform the existing order as autonomous beings. For them the existing social and political order remains in fact a predestined arrangement" (p. 301). Here Maruyama debates what is necessary to create a democratic political system, and his answer is found in the concept of the people's ability to make institutions, democratizing Sorai's theory of "invention of the Way," as a counterpart to Western social contract theory.

On the other hand, Maruyama concludes his third essay as follows. "the fact that the liquidation of the pouvoirs intermédiaires [i.e. the Meiji Restoration] was carried out without the active participation of the popular classes, and, moreover, by the very elements that constituted those intermediate powers [i.e. *samurai* of lesser ranks], had a decisive effect on the character of the Meiji innovations intended to give rise to *a modern nation-state*....[W]hat Fukuzawa Yukichi called 'the implantation of the concept '*nation*' in the minds of the people of the entire country' now became the urgent task of the Meiji thinkers" (p. 267). From his usage of French historical terminology, we can infer that Maruyama had the French Revolution at the end of the 18th century in his mind when he wrote these sentences, and by referring to this model, he indicates that the modern idea of "nation" was not fully developed in Tokugawa Japan, and the task of developing it was left to the hands of later Meiji thinkers, such as Fukuzawa.

The point is, as the case of the French Revolution illustrates, that the appearance of modern nationalism is the flip side of the coin of modern social contract theory. Both are internally related with respect to creating a political community based on the people's consent and initiative, and when a modern nationalistic movement is carried out in full scale, it contains the possibility to abolish the old regime ruled by monarchical and feudalistic elements from below, resulting in the establishment of a new nation-state ruled by the popular classes. In my view, the above-cited sentences in the second and the third essays show that Maruyama was conscious of this internal relationship between modern nationalism and modern social contract theory when he wrote these two essays, and by referring to the French model concerning the relationship, he pointed out the historical backwardness of Tokugawa intellectual history regarding both social contract theory and nationalism.

In the abovementioned newspaper article, Maruyama cites Fukuzawa's dictum "The independence of an individual is the prerequisite for the independence of a nation," emphasizing that Japanese independence cannot be secured if the Confucian dictum of "letting people follow, keeping them uninformed" remains the guiding principle of politics; Maruyama is thereby criticizing the official position on "national polity" propagated by the government. And as I said earlier, some scholars criticize Maruyama on account of this nationalistic assertion, insisting that he had invented a theory to induce people to support the war effort.

But Maruyama stresses in the same article "It is made possible only through the factor of the subjective freedom of an individual that man can transform himself from a person who passively accepts order as predestined to a person who actively takes part in forming order. There is no wonder that [Fukuzawa's] idea of independence and self-respect signifies the individual's initiative."

This is another example of his perception of the relationship between modern nationalism and social contract theory, and if we read these sentences with the sentences in the two above-cited essays, we can see that Maruyama emphasizes the necessity of the intellectual revolution of each citizen, enabling the people to participate in a democratic political reform, so as to create a new nation from below, in place of the "national polity" from above. In other words, Maruyama, in his nationalistic assertion, did in fact tacitly insist that the Japanese old "national polity" first needs a democratic reformation, based on a social contract, so as to be truly nationalistic.

In conclusion, when we try to assess the historical role of Maruyama's nationalistic assertions during the war, we should see how the idea of modern nationalism was closely interrelated with social contract theory in his early thought, and also take into account the revolutionary concepts implicit in his works, especially in the newspaper article on Fukuzawa, although they may at first appear as arguments for mobilizing people for the war.

(*The italics used in quotations of Maruyama throughout the essay are mine.)

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Chinese Nationalism, The Gaze of Japan, and China's National History

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The Gaze of Japan

As nationalism arises accompanying a desire for a national identity vis-à-vis others, it can be seen in many ways, depending on the relationship between the gaze of its observers and the nationalism itself. In other words, the relationship between the nationalism of a people/state and those observing it will affect both the way the nationalism arises, and how it is viewed. The nationalisms of Japan and China offer appropriate examples of this.

Historically speaking, due to its geographic position close to China, Japan experienced a kind of *Chinoiserie* over an extended period of time, incomparable with the brief experience of Western nations. Thus, from the Edo period Japan's national identity was formed through conscious efforts to break away from China, and this was accelerated when Japan defeated China in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. Under these circumstances, in China Studies at the Imperial Universities, only ancient studies, or at the most, studies up to the era known as the Qing Dynasty, were considered worthwhile, and modern China was not considered worth studying (even today, this tendency somehow continues in studies of so-called "Chinese literature" and "Chinese philosophy"). In this way, Japan's attraction towards ancient China changed to contempt for modern China, and Japan rushed into the Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945; after Japan's defeat, its complex towards China unconsciously increased.

At the same time that post-WWII political historians in America were being trained under the influence of John Fairbank et al's research on modern Chinese history, some Japanese specialists of China also began a new era of Chinese studies, based on a critique of prewar days, putting studies of Chinese literature, history, and philosophy within the realm of modern times. People like Nishi Junzō, Shimada Kenji, and, although his style is slightly different, Takeuchi Yoshimi were such researchers, and many young researchers followed them; when I was a student most of my teachers were such people.

I think that it is also no coincidence that Postwar Japan's "New China Studies" resonated with the "New China" born by the Communist Revolution; Chinese Studies in Japan needed to be reformed. In the national history of Post-revolution China, the nationalism that resisted world powers when they began their aggression against modern China is, naturally, highly esteemed. In fact, it was precisely due to the process of fighting against the Japanese imperialist invasion, and resisting Japan, that the Chinese Revolution was able to occur.

Moving Away from National History

However, as China began developing a market economy, and economic development advanced in the 1990s, Chinese intellectuals began to publicly make statements like, "Farewell to the Revolution." In connection with this, the historical view that the nationalism that had arisen in opposition to Japanese imperialism had been preserved throughout the socialist revolution is also beginning to be reexamined.

Even in Japan, a considerable number of researchers are beginning to think that it is necessary to maintain some distance from revolutionary China's national history, which they once cozied up to. My work,[1] which I submitted for publication half a year ago, is this kind of work.

In an ironic twist, the nationalism of modern China has also begun to incorporate social evolution theory, which previously was an important source of intellectual support for the imperialist Japanese invasion against which the Chinese had fought. Moreover, Chinese nationalism has inevitably begun to incorporate elements of racism and eugenics, which are closely connected to social evolution theory. In retrospect, we can see a similar situation in Meiji Japan, where the light of "democracy and science," which were being called for throughout the world, also cast a shadow, consisting of the negative aspects of civilization, including wars of aggression. As is made clear by the current war in Iraq, aggression in Palestine, etc., resolution will only be achieved by confronting the problems head on. Rather than regarding the anti-imperialist, modern Chinese nationalism as something purely positive, we should attempt to convert it into a useful intellectual resource, by pursuing the various aspects of the chain of pros and cons on a more global scale, including Asia, and reflecting upon the different meanings it has in each place.

The Gender Problem in Chinese Nationalism

One research topic that I think is suppressed due to the consecration of modern Chinese nationalism is the problem of gender. By taking up the problem of abolishing foot-binding, in my work I wanted to show how we can view modern China along the axis of gender. After dismantling the Qing Dynasty, it was considered necessary to "nationalize the body" in the process of reorganizing the state. Since women were subsequently incorporated into the nation as "national mothers," or "national reproductive subjects," it was considered necessary to abolish foot-binding, which had been carried out primarily as fashion through the Ming Qing era.

However, even for reform-minded men, in order for men who felt an attachment to foot-bound women to be freed from their attachment, they generally followed a process of first having their nationalistic impulses stimulated by missionaries and doctors from the West who criticized foot-binding as a "barbaric custom of backwards China," before they internalized this view and became critics of foot-binding themselves. Through this process, Chinese women whose feet had been bound became symbols of "backwards China," and were considered a "national shame," and "foot-bound hunts" were subsequently sanctioned. In this way, such women were brought to a state of self-hatred, and they suffered much mental and psychological pain as a result. Furthermore, post-May Fourth Movement "new women," and the subsequent "modern girls," would occasionally refer to women with bound feet as "backward women," to highlight their own "newness" to males. Finally, in emphasizing "quality" over number of children in the drive to improve the race, eugenics went directly against Confucianism, which demanded fertility, and ultimately helped establish feminism in China. We cannot discuss feminism without facing this fact.

How "National" is Chinese Nationalism?

Over the past several years the economic relation between Japan and China has become prosperous; on the political front, however, relations have cooled, and popular sentiment between the two countries has deteriorated. This was especially obvious through various incidents that occurred during the Summer 2004 Asian Cup soccer tournament, when a group of anti-Japanese Chinese spectators caused some disturbances, and various mass media in each country pronounced anti-Japanese or anti-Chinese sentiments.

But as some media emphasized, it would be a serious misunderstanding to believe that the anti-Japanese spectators were part of a larger movement of anti-Japanese nationalism in China. My own experience, when I stopped in Shanghai after attending a symposium in Hunan in late August, affirmed that anti-Japanese nationalism is not a nationwide phenomenon in China. Thus, the question of how "national" modern Chinese nationalism actually is, is a subject that requires further investigation.

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[1] 坂元ひろ子（2004）『中国民族主義の神話－人種・身体・ジェンダー』(The Myth of Nationalism in Modern China: Race, Body and Gender) 岩波書店.

Fragment of/f Empires: The Peripheral Formation of Taiwanese Nationalism

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Modern Taiwanese nationalism is a complicated case of peripheral nationalism that emerged, submerged, and re-emerged as a result of successive yet unfinished state-making and nation-building projects on the island by various imperial centers. Three historical empires present in Northeast Asia deeply shaped the formation and developmental trajectory of Taiwanese nationalism: the Qing Empire from 1683-1895, the Japanese Empire from 1895 to 1945, and the American Empire of the post-WWII era.

Following the classical pattern of state-formation in imperial China, the Qing Empire incorporated Taiwan through military conquest, sinicized a substantial number of *Pingpu* aborigines, and co-opted some of their leaders. By and large, however, the state ruled the island frontier *preventively*, in order not to turn it into a base for rebellion. As a result, Taiwan was for nearly 190 years heavily segregated from the mainland. Still, a society largely made of Han settlers and their offspring gradually took shape. For a long time it was divided by sub-ethnic animosity among Han settlers from different ancestral places, but toward the 1860s signs of integration and indigenization began to manifest themselves. For one thing, the examination system of the Qing state created a class of local gentry. Late born, underdeveloped, and locally contained, the gentry in late imperial Taiwan, while serving the traditional function of linking state and locality politically and ideologically, had a rather strong localistic outlook compared to their counterparts on the mainland. Coming from different origins yet united by common Confucian education, this group of local literati was among the first to rise above ethnic division and articulated the earliest idea of island-wide Taiwanese identity. In a sense they were the pre-national archetype of the Andersonian nationalist bilingual intelligentsia that appeared later in many colonies,[1] only what they helped to forge was more a region than a nation. For another, the rapid growth of trade in tea and camphor during the same period created substantial common interests for—and thus greatly ameliorated the animosity among—Han settlers of various groups.

In sum, what we witness in Taiwan under the Qing rule was the belated emerging of a frontier region—a colony-cum-province—loosely if not precariously attached to what Vivienne Shue calls the pre-modern honeycomb polity of Qing Empire.[2] The state from the mainland ruled, not only preventively, but *indirectly*, through the mediation of sometimes unruly local elite, and *incompletely*, with its reach limited to the western part of the territory. Under such clientelistic and partial state-building the settler society grew indigenized while constantly negotiating with the state for its autonomy.

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[1] In his discussion of the origin of colonial nationalism, Benedict Anderson argues that in many colonies the Western-style education offered by the European colonizers inadvertently created a bilingual elite out of natives of various origins that would later become the first nationalists. See Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London, New York: Verso, 1991), Chapter 7.

[2] Vivienne Shue, *The Reach of the State: Sketches of the Chinese Body Politic* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1988), p.89.

With the Japanese takeover of Taiwan in 1895 the island province was detached from the loosely structured clientelistic polity of Qing Empire to be incorporated into the expanding Japanese state. It should be noted that Taiwan was broken off China *before* the latter began its transformation from empire into nation, and from this point on the historical trajectory of the two bifurcated sharply: while the nationalism in China rose after the moribund empire's 1895 defeat to imagine a Chinese nation *without* Taiwan, the nationalism in Taiwan emerged as a reaction to Japan's colonial nation-building to imagine a Taiwan that belonged *only* to the Taiwanese. In short, the bifurcated histories of China and Taiwan since 1895 created two separate political fields that induced in both places movements of nationalism paralleled to—yet separate and different from—each other.

In contradistinction to classical European overseas empires, the Japanese Empire was a *contiguous* empire that expanded into ethnically proximate neighboring areas, and like many contiguous empires in Central and Eastern Europe and Russia, the ultimate goal of Japan's territorial expansion, at least within its formal empire, was to absorb the newly acquired territories—the sovereign colonies of Taiwan, Karafuto, and Korea—into the Japanese nation-state. Indeed Japan's incorporation of these three territories should be regarded as the extension of Meiji state-formation characterized by the continuous expansion of a political core—the Southwestern domains—into outlying peripheries: from Northeast Japan, to Hokkaido and Okinawa, and then to Taiwan, Karafuto, and Korea.[3] This was what Anthony Smith called the "bureaucratic incorporation" path of nation-state formation.[4] Throughout the whole process, however, the Meiji state-builders had followed a consistent logic of *differential incorporation* that sought to incorporate various peripheral territories—hierarchically, not equally—into the Japanese national body. Both an expansionary and constitutive principle of the Meiji state, differential incorporation had its ideological origin in the corpo-ratist discourse of *kazoku kokka*, or family state, which was at the core of pre-war Japanese official nationalism.

Under the system of differential incorporation, the Japanese official nationalists embarked upon projects of colonial nation-building—or nationalizing colonialism—in the peripheries which could be summed up by the principle of *assimilation before integration*. In fact, in putting tremendous efforts into assimilating the colonial subjects, the Japanese stand out among modern empires. The ferocious drive to assimilate its colonized was nonetheless defensive in nature: it was born out of a deep fear of being colonized by the hegemonic West. Hence the Janus-faced Japanese official nationalism/colonialism: it was a Chatterjeean anti-colonial nationalism that sought to resist Western domination and defend its cultural identity by dominating its peripheral subjects and depriving them of their identities.[5] We may well characterize such oxymoronic "anti-colonial colonialism" as an *oriental colonialism*.

Japan's colonial nation-building in Taiwan produced three paradoxical consequences. First, by locking the Taiwanese into a state of institutional liminality where they became "Japanese that were not Japanese," it politicized the regional space of Taiwan, thereby creating the territorial basis for the rise of Taiwanese nationalism. Indeed nationalism did emerge in Taiwan in 1920 as a reaction to differential incorporation. Second, the neo-traditionalistic ideology of Japan's oriental colonialism compelled the Taiwanese nationalists to adopt a modernist and pro-West discursive strategy to critique Japan and construct their own identity. The experience of cultural resistance left an indelible imprint upon the Taiwanese self-understanding ever since—an understanding of themselves as self-determining and passionately aspiring for modernity. This ideological tendency was diametrically opposed to the neo-traditionalistic and centralizing Chinese nationalism on the mainland. Third, over time the aggressive assim-

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[3] For a comprehensive discussion of the nature of Japanese empire and colonialism, including my reconceptualization of the empire as a contiguous empire and thus extended state-formation, and a detailed discussion of the idea of differential incorporation, see Rwei-Ren Wu, "The Formosan Ideology: Oriental Colonialism and the Rise of Taiwanese Nationalism, 1895-1945," (Ph.D. dissertation submitted to the Department of Political Science of the University of Chicago, 2003), Chapter 2.

[4] Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity* (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1991), 54-59.

[5] In his analysis of nationalist ideology in the colonial world, the subaltern studies theorist Partha Chatterjee argues that all anti-colonial nationalism shared an intellectual structure that sought to synthesize *the national* and *the modern.* See Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993).

ilation backed by a strong state began to show signs of success in Japanizing the Taiwanese people and containing their nationalism. In many respects Taiwan toward the end of WWII was on the way to becoming a second Okinawa—vanquished, assimilated, albeit with shreds of residual identity.

And yet the twists and turns of History did not allow the Japanese drama to fully play out—with the defeat of Japan in WWII Taiwan was again transferred unilaterally by the victors, this time to the Chinese Nationalist (KMT) regime. The ruthlessly centralizing state-building by the Nationalists during the interregnum of 1945-1949 to integrate Taiwan to the Chinese nation-state proved less than successful: China's internal colonialism in Taiwan not only triggered fierce native resistance but also revived the once submerged Taiwanese nationalism, now with China as its other. But internal colonialism soon turned into colonialism without metropole: in 1949, a settler state, i.e. the émigré KMT regime, was imposed from without. Still, the émigré KMT state in 1949-50 was nothing but a flickering candle, and it was the American Empire of the Cold War that created a geopolitical space for its continuing existence since 1950. The KMT state on Taiwan after 1950 was a special case of what Charles Tilly describes as "existing states leagued to create new ones,"[6] for although it was a settler state parasitic upon the native society, it nevertheless reigned under the American suzerainty. This dual colonial structure both enabled and constrained the development of Taiwanese nationalism. Domestically, the minority rule of the mainlander elite created a situation highly conducive to ethnic mobilization that could in turn easily escalate into nationalism. Moreover, under minority rule democratization practically means the nativization of the state. This, indeed, is what has happened in the postwar Taiwanese politics: today Taiwanese nationalism has come a long way from heavily suppressed opposition to seize the state power. Externally, however, Taiwanese nationalism has been severely constrained by the changing American national interests: whether to flirt with Taiwanese nationalism or to crack down on it depends on how the US defines its national interest at the time. Thus the dialectics of dual colonialism enabled the domestic growth of a liberal Taiwanese nationalism that ultimately "decolonized" the state from within and below while constraining its further external development.

The protracted history of Taiwanese nationalism is completely written off by the teleological discourse of Chinese nationalism. From the Chinese point of view, Taiwan symbolizes the unfinished project of Chinese nation-state building: it is the crucial if not last piece to be re-attached to the geo-body of the motherland. Even if its action of freedom is temporarily constrained by the American hegemony, China does not feel any need to justify its irredentist claim over Taiwan. Under Pax Americana, the new imperial structure with a humane face, however, the peripherally formed and democratically empowered Taiwanese nationalism has to daily plead and prove in vain to the cynical world of *Realpolitik* that Taiwanese people do have the moral worth and right to exist merely as a *sub*-nation. Gridlocked in the American Empire's global strategy it must remain forever frustrated and unfinished, hoping against hope that another dire strait might one day open up between the gargantuan US and China, where the tiny fragment of and off many empires, the island of Formosa, could somehow break loose and sail—and sail through. The historical sociology of peripheral nationalism has now turned into a moral drama.

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[6] Charles Tilly, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime," in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol ed., *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p.185.

Do Global Credit Rating Agencies Think Globally? Evidence from Recent Research and Perspectives for East Asia

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There are only three Global Credit Rating Agencies (GCRAs): Moody's, Standard & Poor's (S&P) and Fitch. Though they originated in the U.S., GCRAs have recently come to play a key role in the functioning of international financial markets worldwide. Their ratings are now the main worry of sovereigns, municipal authorities, banks, and corporations around the world, as any downgrading would dent their capitalization and increase their interest burdens. GCRAs' ratings have even been adopted as a cornerstone in financial regulation, e.g. they are included in the regulatory revisions the G-10 countries have recently agreed to adopt by 2006 in terms of minimum capital requirements for banks.

Yet, the reputation of GCRAs has somewhat deteriorated in recent years. On the one hand, even in the US, where they traditionally maintained a good track record in terms of assessing the risk of the default probability of bond issuers, GCRAs failed to forewarn investors of major upcoming bankruptcies at large, well–known, listed companies (e.g. Enron, Worldcom, etc...). These failures called the public's attention to GCRAs, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act mandated the Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) to review the appropriateness of rating industry regulations. On the other hand, the GCRAs' track record has also been poor in emerging countries. A well-known example is the East Asian financial crisis, where GCRAs' ratings lagged behind the markets. Awarding East Asian countries relatively high investment scores until a few months before the crisis, GCRAs suddenly downgraded their ratings to junk levels in countries like Korea and Thailand, countries which then promptly resumed their long-term impressive growth.

The main allegations of the literature criticizing GCRAs hinge on six points:

(i)   they tend to act too late;

(ii)   but, once they act, they are too heavy-handed, thus swinging ratings pro-cyclically;

(iii)   especially in developing countries, private ratings appear excessively linked to sovereign ratings;

(iv)   the information content provided by their ratings seems better in more than in less developed financial markets;

(v)   the highly concentrated market structure of the GCRA industry in the U.S.[1] brings up several issues, regarding possible rent extrac-

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[1] The GCRA industry in the U.S. was largely derived from a regulatory franchise: for almost 30 years no significant new entry was allowed by the SEC in the list of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSRO).

tion vis-à-vis rated entities (a distributional issue), potential underinvestment in the collection and processing of information on rated entities (an efficiency issue), and possible cut-throat behavior to conquer foreign markets (e.g. penalizing unsolicited ratings);

(vi) GCRAs may face conflicts of interest vis-à-vis debt issuers arising from three features of their business, namely: a) that GCRAs' fees are paid for by the debt issuers and increase with the size of the debt issued (so, it is feared that large issuers might exert some influence on the agencies); b) that the presence of undisclosed triggers relating to NRSRO (Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization) ratings may induce the rating agency to be unduly reluctant to downgrade issuers below investment grade;[2] and c) that GCRAs increasingly offer consulting to bond issuers, concurrently to issuing ratings to them.

After recapitulating the available evidence, we can conclude that while some of the allegations may be excessive, others appear fairly grounded. Yet, the ratings are an essential lubricant for financial market development, as they attenuate information asymmetries that investors undergo vis-à-vis issuers. Thus, even though more research is needed, authorities need to consider ways to improve GCRAs' working.

Several policy suggestions have surfaced in the heated debate following the mega-corporate scandals. On the one side, we can distinguish the extreme view calling for the abolition of the NRSRO status, and a full liberalization of the credit rating business. On the other side, more balanced views recognize that, in spite of their recent failures, GCRAs perform a good job on average. These views, which advocate the stiffening of constraints on the GCRAs (which are activated by potential competition and the specter of increased regulatory scrutiny), thus recommend that the SEC permit provisional, location-specific, and industry-specific NRSRO designations. These efforts notwithstanding, with size and age conferring significant advantages, it's not easy for a new rating agency to be established or gain a significant presence in the market. Thus, recognizing that the market may still remain quite concentrated, it is suggested that regulatory reform should also encourage GCRAs to be more responsive to the needs of market participants, for example by raising their accountability through the creation of a public forum in which market participants could comment on GCRAs' performance. Also, periodic certification of GCRAs, verifying that they are operating in accordance with set procedures, might guard against conflicts of interest.

Furthermore, the above scenario describing the weaknesses of the GCRAs raises a vital policy question for various countries/regions of the world wishing to accelerate their financial market development. Can these countries/regions entrust their financial markets exclusively to the GCRAs? Or, rather, should they promote well-functioning National/Regional Credit Rating Agencies (N/RCRAs)?

The answer is not obvious. European and East Asian experiences differ in this respect. While in Europe short-lived national credit rating agencies were eventually acquired by the GCRAs, many Asian countries still have their own national credit rating agencies, even if no truly regional agency exists yet. On the one hand, NCRAs might be less independent (with their judgment subject to domestic influences) and the GCRAs could provide freer and more valuable guidance to markets. On the other hand, though, N/RCRAs could have a relative advantage in understanding local business practices and have a higher commitment to invest more in the rating of local entities. Over all, it seems that a division of labor could be beneficial, with GCRAs specializing in multinationals and N/RCRAs focusing on smaller-sized regional issuers. While Europe has already achieved its Monetary Union and is in a good position to develop its financial market further, it lacks N/RCRAs; East Asia, however, still has its NCRAs, yet has only made preliminary steps towards a regional exchange rate arrangement. Perhaps, in view of the potential benefits to financial market development outlined above, East Asia might wish to keep its NCRAs while trying to nurture one or more truly regional ones.

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[2] If these ratings plunge below investment grade this causes adverse consequences, such as the shortening of debt repayment schedules.

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance and International Politics in Asia, 1902-1903

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Historians studying the early years of the twentieth century have long recognized that the creation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1902 was a significant development in international politics. To a substantial degree this is because the act of alliance marked a practical and a symbolic turning point in the history of both signatories. For Britain, it meant moving away from "splendid isolation;" for Japan, it was the moment when it began to be accepted as a Great Power in its own right. The alliance therefore acts as a symbol of the trajectory that both of these countries would follow in the new century. These national approaches are entirely legitimate, but they do leave open a substantial question, namely, what does the alliance tell us about the evolution of international politics in East Asia?

Thinking about this issue can be framed in a number of ways. One might, for example, ask whether the creation of the alliance and its subsequent revisions helped to bring about a measure of international order in the region. In other words, did the British-Japanese axis lead to a new regional balance of power? Conversely, one can ask whether the emergence of the alliance was merely a reflection of the larger forces shaping the region's destiny. Another angle of investigation is to look at the alliance in terms of the role of race as an issue in international politics. After all, this was an alignment that bridged the racial divide at a time when sensitivity to ethnic difference marked both political and intellectual discourse in the West. To what extent then does the alliance provide a comment on the role of race in diplomacy?

In order to understand the relationship between the alliance and the international politics of East Asia, it is necessary to look first at why it came about. The orthodox answer is that Britain and Japan shared a common fear of Russian imperialism in Northeast Asia, which threatened to engulf Manchuria and Korea. The two powers therefore combined primarily to contain the Tsarist regime. One might, however, also speculate that for Britain this balance of power meant not only containing Russia, but also restraining the Japanese government, thus avoiding a potentially destabilizing war or a Russo-Japanese rapprochement that would leave Britain dangerously isolated.

In addition to this, one must also outline the interests that Britain and Japan sought to defend in East Asia. For Britain, China was important because of trade. Ever since the 1840s it had sought to develop the potential of this market through the treaty port system and by encouraging the Qing dynasty to introduce Western-style reforms. However, the Qing proved remarkably obdurate and by the 1890s there

was a possibility that China might be partitioned. The only alternative was a system whereby the Powers would agree to a multilateral semi-colonial regime, known as the "Open Door." Britain's preference was for the latter, but if that failed it was prepared to accept partition if the Yangtse valley fell under its control. Thus, from the British perspective, the Anglo-Japanese alliance, which recognized China's territorial integrity and the right to equal commercial opportunity, can be seen as the culmination of its efforts to prevent the partition of China.

However, whether Japan was intent on maintaining the "Open Door" is a moot point, for its attention was focused on Korea. Largely for security reasons, Japan was determined to prevent Korea from falling under the influence of any other power. Some in Japan were content to suggest that, in exchange for recognition of Japanese predominance in Korea, Russia should have its own sphere of influence in Manchuria. Others felt that this idea of *Man-Kan kōkan* was simply not feasible, for as long as Russia sat on Korea's border the latter would never be safe. It was this latter group therefore that supported the alliance, believing that it might force a Russian retreat or provide a means of preventing French intervention should war become necessary. Japan therefore may have committed itself to upholding the "Open Door" in China, but that was clearly not its priority. While the allies may have shared an enemy, they did not necessarily share a common vision of the region.

The above description might suggest that the alliance was merely a traditional act of diplomacy. However, it is important to see that it was also a revolutionary move, for it was an alliance between a European and an Asian power. This is not a statement induced by political correctness; it was a view that was expressed by a number of contemporary observers. As one Briton working in China noted, by signing this alliance with the "youngest nation, really only half civilised, heathen and of yellow race" the British government had decided to "disregard all social, political and religious prejudices."

It is important then to ask why Britain decided to cross the racial divide in its search for an ally. Of course, power was important, but, in addition, Britain's willingness to treat Japan as a significant entity represented a recognition that the latter's approach to international politics conformed to European practice. In other words, they perceived that a common diplomatic language existed between the two, and that Japan could therefore be trusted. However, Britain did not see Japan as its complete equal, for there was some racial calculation in its thinking. After all, the reason why Britain feared Japan acting as an entirely free agent was due to its concern, as one official put it, that "it is difficult to say what a country and especially an oriental state may do when it finds itself without funds or reliable friends." The alliance therefore represented both a defence of the status quo and a moment of departure for the international politics of East Asia. It was orthodox in that it sought to uphold the "Open Door;" it was revolutionary because Britain for the first time attempted to do this in harness with an Asian power.

In addition, it is important to realise that once signed, the alliance developed its own momentum that led Japan to be treated on a par with the European states. This occurred largely as the result of Japan's sensitivity about diplomatic protocol. Once the alliance was signed, Japan's prickliness about this issue meant that Britain felt it had to treat the former as almost its diplomatic equal, for fear that any offence would lead to awkward political consequences. The result was that on occasions such as Edward VII's coronation in the summer of 1902 the Japanese delegation was treated with greater care and attention than those from other Asian states. Indeed, very quickly the relationship became a self-consciously royal alliance.

The greatest change in Japan's standing after the alliance was, however, due to the war that broke out between Japan and Russia in February 1904. This conflict changed the balance of power in the region by reducing Russia's influence and increasing that of Japan. This development was, in turn, reinforced by the renewal of the alliance in August 1905, which was designed to deter Russia from launching a war of revenge. The new alliance had the desired effect, for in July 1907 a Russo-Japanese pact was signed in which they recognized each other's spheres of influence in Korea and Manchuria. Moreover, France also signed its own pact with Japan in April 1907.

By 1907 then the alliance had become the foundation of the international order in East Asia. In part this was due to the combined power of Britain and Japan, which dwarfed all other countries. In addition, though, the new spirit of co-operation arose due to the fear that opposition to Japan might provoke it into breaking with the West and seeking the leadership of Asia. In this environment, it might be thought that the future of the "Open Door" was assured. However, this period also saw the rise of a new "challenge." Again it was over control of Manchuria, but this time it came from both Russia *and* Japan.

This change in Japanese policy did not immediately bring about the demise of the treaty, for Japan still valued the security provided by the alliance while Britain needed its ally to safeguard East Asian waters while it contained Germany in Europe, but the nature of the alliance did change. The most notable alteration came when the alliance was revised for the second time in 1911, for it now included a clause that implicitly prevented it from being activated in the case of a Japanese-American war. This can be seen in part as an acknowledgement that Britain had more in common, in regard to China, with the United States than with its ally. Thus when the alliance was activated at the start of the Great War it was already in a fragile state. It is therefore no surprise that during that conflict it came under great strain. Japan, freed from the watchful eye of the Europeans, now sought to advance its imperial interests in China and reinvigorated fears

that it might use pan-Asianism as a means of facilitating its drive for continental leadership. The result was that by the end of the war, the alliance had been badly damaged. Not only was Britain now unsure whether it could control its ally, but also, the United States argued that the alliance actually impeded the containment of Japan. The alliance had thus had its day, and the future would instead be dictated by the new co-operative order built at the Washington conference.

The Anglo-Japanese alliance was a reflection of wider forces, but at the same time it acted as a catalyst for change in itself. At a broad level it is possible to say that the alliance was a strategic manifestation of the "Open Door," but this needs to come with the important qualification that the signatories were not equally committed to its perpetuation. The alliance can also be seen as being both representative of Japan's ability to rise above characterization based on race alone, and as a tool that helped it to achieve that goal. Yet here too, despite the effort to elevate the role of court diplomacy in order to finesse the racial divide, mutual suspicion based on racial perception never went away. The monarchical order that brought Japan into a position of equality with the West was therefore as fragile as the "Open door." Perhaps then it is best to characterize the alliance as an alignment that brought order on a temporary basis, but one that in the end demonstrated the difficulty of achieving such a goal in this troubled region of the world.