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Cover Photo

Okada Katsuya, Secretary General
of the Democratic Party of Japan,
answering reporters at dawn on the
day after the 2004 Upper House
election (July 12, 2004, Chiyoda
Ward). Courtesy of the Mainichi
Shimbun.

Back Cover Photo

Prime Minister Koizumi Jun'ichirō
and Liberal Democratic Party
Secretary General Abe Shinzō, with
stern expressions during the 2004
Upper House election (July 11,
2004, Chiyoda Ward). Courtesy of
the Mainichi Shimbun.

Editorial Notes*Personal Names*

All personal names are given in
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unless otherwise requested.
Hence in Japanese names, the
family name is given first, e.g.
Toyotomi Hideyoshi, and in
Western names the family
name is given second, e.g.
George Bush.

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Although it would be difficult to claim that the July, 2004 House of Councillors (Upper House) election was a total defeat for the LDP, as the Koizumi Cabinet was able to remain in power, the results clearly enhanced the DPJ's position as an established, viable alternative, and gave further evidence that the Japanese government is headed towards a two-party system. In addition to describing the results of the July election in detail, the authors in this issue of *Social Science Japan* explore the reasons for the somewhat ambiguous outcome, and consider the potential ramifications that this election may hold for Japanese elections in the future. Packed with informative data and insightful analyses, and discussing subjects such as party alliances and strategies, the popularity of Prime Minister Koizumi, policy issues, and shifting voter preferences, these articles offer readers a comprehensive overview of the July 2004 House of Councillors election, and a valuable primer on electoral politics in Japan.

We are proud to say that we will celebrate the 10th Anniversary of *Social Science Japan* with our upcoming issue (No. 30) on Nationalism. If you have a subscription, please look forward to it arriving in your mailbox sometime this winter. If you are not a current subscriber, but would like to receive *Social Science Japan*, please email us at ssjinfo@iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp for a free subscription (please type "SSJ subscription" in the subject box).

Thomas Blackwood
Managing Editor

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Changes in Japanese Electoral Politics, 2003-2004: The Impact of Pension Reform or the Koizumi Effect?

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Introduction

The results of the House of Councillors (Upper House) election held on July 11, 2004 appeared to repeat the trend towards a two-party system marked by the House of Representatives (Lower House) election held on November 9, 2003, but it was clearly exaggerated in the Upper House election. Whereas the number of seats gained by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) did not exceed the combined number of seats gained by the Liberal Democratic Party

(LDP) and the Clean Government Party (CGP, or Kōmei) in either election, the DPJ did increase its seats dramatically (see Table 1). Consequently, the Japanese party system is being transformed into a two-party (or semi-two-party) system.

What was the reason for this change? Was it simply due to the decline of Prime Minister Koizumi's popularity? Was it due to the pension reform bill? To changes in the structure of the electorate? Or to a combination of all of these things? In this essay, I will examine some of the available evidence to help speculate on the reasons for the advancement of the DPJ.

Structural Changes in the Electorate

At the Lower House elections, the electoral strength of the LDP has been declining, as clearly shown in Figure 1. In Figure 1, we can see that the number of votes the LDP won decreased from about 23 million votes in 1993, to about 22 million in 1996. Furthermore, although the LDP increased its votes to about 25 million in 2000 and about 26 million in 2003, this was because the CGP cooperated with the LDP in these elections, and if we subtract the estimated CGP votes, the estimated votes gained by the LDP alone would be about 21 million in 2000 and about 22 million in 2003.¹

Thus, according to Figure 1, the LDP's electoral power has been consistently weakening year by year, and the LDP has been trying to maintain its strength by creating a coalition with, and receiving help from, the CGP in each election from 2000 on.

Table 1. Seats Won by Each Party, 2000 to 2004

Parties	Lower House Election 2000	Lower House Election 2003	Upper House Election 2001	Upper House Election 2004
LDP	233	237	65	49
DPJ	127	177	32	50
CGP	31	34	13	11
JCP	20	9	5	4
SDPJ	19	6	3	2
Conservative	7	4	1	--
Liberal	22	--	6	--
Other	21	13	3	5

(LDP = Liberal Democratic Party; DPJ = Democratic Party of Japan; CGP = Clean Government Party; JCP = Japan Communist Party; SDPJ = Social Democratic Party of Japan)




Figure 1. Structure of Votes Cast, 1979-2003

This suggests that the LDP has successfully resisted the gradual erosion of its electoral strength, in part, by cooperating with the CGP in electoral strategy. But another factor has also helped the LDP resist the gradual erosion of its electoral force: the popularity of Prime Minister Koizumi.

The Popularity of Mr. Koizumi

To see how the popularity of Prime Minister Koizumi has also aided the electoral success of the LDP, we can take a look at the relationship between the cabinet approval rate and votes for the LDP. According to our data (the nation-wide public opinion survey, JSS-GLOPE 2003 and 2004),² Mr. Koizumi's popularity clearly helped the LDP gain votes, as shown in Table 2, which demonstrates a strong relationship between approval for the Koizumi Cabinet and vot-

ing for the LDP in both in the 2003 Lower House election and the 2004 Upper House election in 2004. In both 2003 and 2004, it is very clear that those who supported the Koizumi Cabinet were more likely to vote for the LDP. This pattern suggests that Mr. Koizumi's popularity helped the LDP maintain its seats in national elections.

However, Mr. Koizumi's popularity has declined from 63.5% in October 2003 to 52.9% in June 2004. As the correlation between Koizumi's popularity and voting for the LDP is quite clear (the Tau-C correlation coefficients are .475 for 2003, and .593 for 2004), the decline of his popularity has weakened the LDP's electoral strength. This is a partial explanation for why the LDP had a harder time, and the DPJ dramatically increased its seats, at the Upper House election in 2004.

Table 2. Cabinet Support and Voting Behavior in 2003 and 2004

Voted For	2003 Lower House Election Cabinet Support/Approval			2004 Upper House Election Cabinet Support/Approval		
	Support Cabinet	Do Not Support	Total	Support Cabinet	Do Not Support	Total
LDP	56.2%	13.9%	41.6%	51.9%	6.9%	30.6%
CGP	15.3%	7.1%	12.5%	18.8%	6.2%	12.9%
Opposition Parties	28.4%	79.0%	45.9%	29.3%	86.9%	56.5%
Column Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Correlation:

Tau-C = .475

Tau-C = .593

Data: JSS-GLOPE2003, JSS-GLOPE2004

The Negative Impact of the Pension Reform

In addition to the decline of Mr. Koizumi’s popularity, it is conceivable that the unpopular pension reform bill also might have hurt the LDP’s electoral strength. According to our public opinion data (JSS-GLOPE 2003 and 2004), however, the effects of voters’ evaluation of government performance in handling the pension system reform did not have strong effects on the election outcome. As Table 3A shows, those who thought “the government has been doing well in handling the pension system” were more likely to vote for the LDP in 2003, but this relationship was rather weak (the Tau-C correlation coefficient was .177), when the pension reform bill had not yet been introduced to the Diet. However, in the Spring of 2004 the pension reform bill was introduced to the Diet, and it became a hot issue on the political agenda before the July Upper House election. As Table 3B shows, the degree of voters’ trust in the pension system had moderate but clear effects on voting for the LDP in 2004 (Tau-C correlation coefficient was .252).

These changes, from Autumn 2003 to Summer 2004 in the Japanese electoral arena, suggest that the voters were not very interested in pension reform in Autumn 2003, but this issue became quite important and attracted the attention of the voters in 2004. We can speculate from these data that the performance of the government (or the LDP) in administrating the pension system has not been satisfactory to Japanese voters. In 2003, when the pension reform was not yet a salient issue, the LDP and the Koizumi Cabinet could manage to secure more seats than the DPJ in the Lower House Election. However, when it became a salient issue in 2004, neither the LDP nor Mr. Koizumi could keep more seats than the DPJ.

Concluding Remarks

Thus, the LDP’s electoral strength has been weaken-

ing election after election. However, while Mr. Koizumi’s popularity resisted the above trend, especially from 2001 to 2003, his mishandling of pension reform bill punished the LDP and hurt its electoral strategy in 2004.

END NOTES

¹ I estimated that the number of votes provided by the CGP to the LDP in 2000 was approximately 3.8 million, according to the following logical inference: the CGP had consistently received more than five million votes over the last two decades, but the CGP (by itself) received only 1.2 million votes in 2000. This sudden decline is inexplicable, unless we hypothesize that the CGP asked about four million of its supporters to vote for the LDP. To estimate the number of votes the LDP received from CGP supporters in 2000, I subtracted the number of votes gained by the CGP in 2000 (1,231,753) from the number of votes gained by the CGP in 1993 (5,114,351), the last year for which CGP voting data are available (in 1996, the CGP was a part of the New Frontier Party [NFP], and therefore data on votes gained by the CGP do not exist for that year). By this calculation, I determined that the CGP gave approximately 3,882,598 votes (= 5,114,351 [1993 votes] - 1,231,753 [2000 votes]) to the LDP in 2000, which means that votes gained solely by the LDP at the 2000 House of Representatives Election were approximately 21,063,208 (24,945,806 - 3,882,598).

I used the same formula for the 2004 election, in which the CGP itself gained only 880,000 votes. Subtracting this number from 5 million CGP votes, I estimated that the CGP gave approximately 4.1 million votes to the LDP in 2004. Subtracting 4.1 million from 26 million, the estimated number of votes received by the LDP alone would be approximately 21.9 million.

² JSS-GLOPE (Japanese Social Security and Global Political Economy) Study is a nation-wide public opinion survey conducted by the joint effort of Waseda University (The 21st-Century Center of Excellence project, GLOPE) and the University of Tokyo (The Japanese Social Security project under the Grant-in-Research by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology). The JSS-GLOPE survey was first conducted in October- November 2003, before and after the November 9th Lower House General Election. The second study was conducted in June and July 2004, before and after the July 11th Upper House Election.

Table 3. Pension System Reform and Voting Behavior in 2003 and 2004

Voted For	3A. 2003 Lower House Election Pension System Reform Evaluation			3B. 2004 Upper House Election Pension Reform Bill Evaluation		
	Gov't Doing Well	Not Doing Well	Total	Trust System	Do Not Trust	Total
LDP	48.5%	33.6%	39.2%	36.9%	20.3%	29.1%
CGP	14.8%	11.4%	12.7%	15.5%	10.3%	12.7%
Opposition Parties	36.8%	55.0%	48.2%	44.9%	69.4%	58.3%
Column Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Correlation: Tau-C = .177

Tau-C = .252

Data: JSS-GLOPE2003, JSS-GLOPE2004

The Dismantlement of the Koizumi Coalition and Changes in Voters' Policy Preferences

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Prime Minister Koizumi Jun'ichirō's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was roundly defeated in the Japanese Upper House election of July 2004; the LDP only managed to win 49 of 121 contested seats, while the largest opposition party, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) won 50. This is especially surprising if one considers that in the previous Upper House election, held in 2001 under the same Prime Minister Koizumi, the LDP clinched a big victory, securing 64 seats against only 26 won by the DPJ. This paper seeks to discover what lies behind this change in the political situation by analyzing how voters changed after the 2001 Upper House election, based on data obtained from surveys conducted as part of the Japanese Election Study III (JES III). JES III is an ongoing project that began in 2001.

The JES III project conducts a nationwide panel survey each time a national election is held, but as of this writing the data from the 2004 Upper House

election is not yet available. Therefore, I will track how voters changed by comparing data from the 2001 Upper House election with survey results from the November 2003 Lower House election.¹

The Dismantlement of the Koizumi Coalition

Table 1 is based on a feeling thermometer measuring affect toward Prime Minister Koizumi (with 100 being most favorable, 0 most unfavorable). It shows the average scores obtained when respondents were broken into groups according to demographic characteristics. In the 2001 data, there was very little difference between the average scores for the groups that have traditionally formed the core of LDP support (over 60 years old, living in non-urban areas, lower educational level, engaged in farming, self-employment, or management) and other groups (especially groups that normally exhibit a low degree of support for the LDP, such as young people, residents of major metropolises, holders of advanced educational degrees, and professional or clerical workers). Even when we conduct an ANOVA, not one of the four characteristics (age, city size, educational background, or occupation) is found to have a significant effect. In other words, there was a feeling of support for Koizumi across-the-board. One could say that a broad pro-Koizumi coalition had formed.

However, by autumn of 2003, this Koizumi coalition was already in the process of breaking up. As shown in Table 2, Koizumi's feeling thermometer score for all voters had declined by more than 10 points, from 69 to 58. This difference is statistically significant.² And as indicated in Table 1, this decline occurred in every single demographic category.

However, what is even more interesting is the fact that here we can see differences between the various groups. The results of ANOVA reveal that all of the

¹ In the 2003 Lower House election, the LDP fell short of winning a majority by taking 237 of 480 seats, but it was still far ahead of the DPJ's 177 seats, and maintained its position as the strongest party.

² The values in Table 2 are averages only for those respondents who answered both times.

Table 1. Thermometer ratings for Prime Minister Koizumi

	Age (2001 p=.22, 2003 p=.00)*						City Size (2001 p=.07, 2003 p=.02)*				
	20~29	30~39	40~49	50~59	60~69	70~	Metropol-itan area	Large	Middle	Small	Town and Village
2001	69.4	69.3	68.3	66.6	69.7	68.9	67.1	70.3	67.0	68.8	68.8
2003	54.6	56.1	54.4	54.1	58.2	60.8	55.0	56.6	54.7	59.1	57.9
	Education (2001 p=.64, 2003 p=.00)*				Occupation (2001 p=.99, 2003 p=.01)*						
	Junior high school	High school	Junior college	University	Farmer	Self-employed	Manager	Professional	Office worker	Manual worker	Housewife
2001	69.0	68.7	68.9	67.3	68.0	69.2	69.4	67.7	69.0	68.4	69.1
2003	59.8	56.7	54.6	54.7	61.8	55.6	60.6	53.1	53.5	56.9	57.9

Note: *Significance levels of ANOVA.

Table 2. Changes in voter's policy preferences

	2001	2003	p*
Thermometer ratings for Koizumi (1~100)	68.92	57.56	.00
Contra-cyclical policy (1) —Financial reconstruction (4)	2.32	2.11	.00
Enhanced welfare services (1) —Lower taxes (4)	2.36	2.24	.02
Generous subsidies(1) —Free competition(4)	2.48	2.48	.96
The Constitution should be amended(1) —should not be amended(4)	2.11	2.17	.22
The exercise of the right to collective self-defense should be approved(1) —should not be approved(4)	2.31	2.54	.00
The Prime Minister should pay an official visit to Yasukuni Shrine(1) —should not pay an official visit to Yasukuni Shrine(4)	2.07	2.08	.78

Note: *Significance levels of t-test.

four demographic variables exert significant ($p<.05$) effects. If we look more closely, we see that favorable feeling toward Prime Minister Koizumi were relatively high among older, less educated, rural-dwelling respondents, especially those who work in agriculture or management. In other words, the broad Koizumi coalition that was seen in 2001 had dissolved, and the pattern of LDP support had returned almost completely to its traditional form. If we look from the opposite angle, we can see that the driving force behind the DPJ's big success in the 2004 Upper House election—urban-dwelling, more highly educated, white-collar workers in their 40s and 50s—had already begun to leave the coalition in 2003.

Changes in Voters' Policy Preferences

So, what was the cause of this drop in support for Koizumi—or rather, for this return to how things were before the Koizumi boom? Undoubtedly, one reason was the fact that clouds began to dim the attractiveness of Koizumi's personality and performance. But at the same time, it is necessary to con-

sider the influence of more policy-related causes.

Table 3 shows the results of multiple regression analysis using thermometer ratings for Koizumi as the dependent variable and preferences regarding six policy questions as independent variables. Of the six questions, three (whether or not to amend the constitution, whether or not to approve the exercise of the right to collective self-defense, and whether or not the Prime Minister should pay an official visit to Yasukuni Shrine) are key issues related to the constitution and national security, which have been at the center of Japanese policy debate since the end of World War II. The other three issues (contra-cyclical policy versus financial reconstruction, enhanced welfare services versus lower taxes, and generous subsidies versus free competition) relate to what has become another important policy divide in contemporary Japan: whether to give priority to competitive market forces or to focus on redistribution.

The results show that, both times, the constitution and security issues had greater influence on feelings toward Koizumi; in fact all three of these issues had

Table 3. Effects of policy preferences on thermometer ratings for Koizumi

	2001	2003
Contra-cyclical policy (1) —Financial reconstruction (4)	.08*	.08**
Enhanced welfare services (1) —Lower taxes (4)	.01	-.02
Generous subsidies(1) —Free competition(4)	.06*	.03
The Constitution should be amended(1) —should not be amended(4)	-.09**	-.07*
The exercise of the right to collective self-defense should be approved(1) —should not be approved(4)	-.11**	-.21**
The Prime Minister should pay an official visit to Yasukuni Shrine(1) —should not pay an official visit to Yasukuni Shrine(4)	-.25**	-.17**
Adj R-squared	.12**	.11**

Notes: Entries are standardized OLS regression coefficients.

* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$

significant effects both times. It should be noted that the collective defense question exerted especially great influence in 2003, reflecting the situation in Iraq.³

Meanwhile, regarding the market competition versus redistribution questions, pump-priming/financial reconstruction had a significant effect both times, while subsidies/free competition was significant only in 2001, and welfare/lower taxes did not have a significant effect in either case. The direction of the effect was as expected in every case: the more strongly a respondent agreed with revising the constitution and exercising the right to collective defense, and the more importance they placed on financial reconstruction and competitive markets, the greater was their positive feeling toward Koizumi.

Let's go back to Table 2 and look at how voters' policy preferences changed between the two surveys. There were significant changes in the responses to three issues. Specifically, voters' preferences shifted in favor of pump-priming over financial reconstruction,

their preferences shifted in favor of enhancing welfare measures rather than lowering taxes, and they leaned away from approving of exercising the right to collective defense. If we consider this together with the results from Table 3, we see that preferences regarding two of the issues that had a significant effect on support for Koizumi in 2003 showed significant change during the two-year interval: pump-priming/financial reconstruction and collective defense. We also see that preferences regarding both of these issues moved in a direction unfavorable to Koizumi.⁴

This article examined how support for Prime Minister Koizumi changed between 2001 and 2003, by looking at the disbanding of the Koizumi coalition and changes in voters' policy preferences, particularly the trend toward valuing pump-priming measures and the growing antipathy toward exercising the right to collective defense. I expect that we will see even clearer changes in these same directions in the JES survey results from the 2004 Upper House election.

³ The unstandardized coefficient for 2001 was 1.72, whereas it was more than twice as large in 2003, at 3.59.

⁴ This could be one explanation for the fact that the group that most strongly favors pump-priming measures—the self-employed—indicated less support for Koizumi in 2003 than farmers and business managers.

What Did Voters Hope to Achieve through the 2004 Upper House Election?

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The 2004 Upper House election ended indecisively, with the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) suffering a loss, and the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) enjoying a surge, but not enough to make a major breakthrough. The number of seats the LDP won was two fewer than it held before the election — yet this was too small a loss to force the Koizumi cabinet to resign. However, Koizumi could not claim to have the support of the voters, as his party lagged behind the DPJ in share of votes both in the prefectural constituencies and the proportional representation (PR) blocks. Thus, the goddess of elections provided complicated results, as she did in the 2003 Lower House election.

In this essay, I examine the hopes that voters entrusted to each party in the 2004 Upper House election. First, what was the support rate for the Koizumi cabinet before the last Upper House election? Once as high as 76 percent,* the support rate for the Koizumi cabinet went down to 56 percent at the time of the 2003 Lower House election, and further dropped to 45 percent at the time of the Upper House election. Especially among independents, the

figure plummeted from 70 percent to 29 percent. Why did so many voters not support the Koizumi cabinet? Of those who answered “not supporting” the cabinet, the greatest number of respondents mentioned the passage of the pension reform bill as their reason for disapproval, followed by participation of the Self Defense Forces (SDF) in the multinational coalition army in Iraq and the management of the economy.

To the question asking about the passage of the pension reform bill, 79 percent of all voters said they did not approve the passage. The figure for disapproval was even greater among independents, of whom about 90 percent said “do not approve.” In my view, the main reason for the lack of approval was the process, in which the governing coalition forced passage by suddenly closing the deliberation in the Diet, rather than the contents of the bill. Moreover, the decision to send the SDF to the multinational coalition army was unpopular. 58 percent of all voters and 76 percent of independents said they did not support it. Here again, independents had a more critical view. Prime Minister Koizumi promised the SDF’s participation to President Bush before the issue was considered in the Diet. He should have limited himself to promising further deliberation, and then made the decision after adequate discussion in the Diet, after returning to Japan. Under these conditions, the figures cited above seem to show that many people became disappointed with Koizumi, whom they once regarded as on their side. They came to see him as no different from past prime ministers. In sum, voters had a stern attitude towards the Koizumi cabinet regarding pension reform and the participation in the multinational coalition army, leading to the sudden drop of support for the cabinet just before the election.

How did voters evaluate the government’s economic management and the privatization of the Japan Highway Public Corporation? First, let’s look at economic management. While the economy has shown some signs of recovery, the reform effort has just started, and the privatization of the Japan Highway

Public Corporation and Japan Post have not yet been implemented. Therefore, voters likely considered the recovery to be a result of painful cost-cutting efforts in the private sector, rather than the government's economic management. Thus, the popular opinion of the government's economic management was low. About 70 percent of all voters and about 80 percent of independents said that they did not support Koizumi's economic policies. The evaluation of reform efforts led by his cabinet was also low. More than half of the voters said they did not approve the Koizumi reforms. The figure reaches about 70 percent among independents. These numbers reflect the gap between the high expectations people had for the reforms three years ago and the actual accomplishments the Koizumi cabinet has made thus far.

As we have seen, voters gave low evaluations of the current state of the Koizumi cabinet. What do they think of its prospects for the future? Asked whether they thought the Koizumi cabinet would fulfill its reform promises, the share of respondents who said "no" has gradually increased, from 58 percent three years ago to 70 percent today. These results suggest that at the time of the last Upper House election, voters judged the cabinet based on "future expectations" — on what reforms they believed the cabinet will implement in the future. By contrast, after three years, the grounds for judgment changed to a "retrospective estimate" — based on what reforms the cabinet has actually accomplished. In other words, the shift in the electorate's perspective on their reasons for supporting Koizumi caused the drop of the support rate, and, combined with Koizumi's disregard of voters, epitomized in the forced passage of the pension reform bill and the decision to take part in the multinational force, ultimately led to the election result.

Next, let's examine the actual voting behavior in the 2004 Upper House election, beginning with affiliated voters. Among those who went to the polls, about 70 percent of LDP supporters and about 80 percent of DPJ supporters voted for their own parties. More than 90 percent of supporters of Kōmeitō voted for Kōmeitō candidates in three districts where the party ticketed candidates — Saitama, Tokyo, and Osaka. In the remaining 44 prefectures, 60 percent of Kōmeitō supporters voted for LDP candidates, and 20 percent for DPJ candidates. Given the fact that Kōmeitō supporters had rarely

voted for DPJ candidates, 20 percent is a significant share.

By contrast, 20 percent of supporters of the Communist Party (CPJ), which filed either official or recommended candidates in all districts, voted for DPJ candidates instead of CPJ ones. Furthermore, nearly 60 percent of supporters of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) voted for DPJ candidates. Even in districts where the SDP filed candidates, a considerable number of SDP supporters voted for DPJ candidates. Such behavior of the supporters of the SDP and the CPJ is apparently based on the rational calculation to make the best use of their votes. When the candidate whom a voter regards as the best is unlikely to win, votes cast for him or her would be wasted. In this case, a rational voter would prefer strategic voting to sincere voting. To get the best out of his/her vote, she/he would choose the better candidate from a set of candidates with some possibility of victory (in most districts, the LDP and the DPJ candidates). Such rational voting led to a concentration of votes for LDP and DPJ candidates in single-member districts.

Second, how did independents, who are regarded as having the deciding vote, actually vote? In this election, more than twice as many independents voted for the DPJ as for the LDP. The gap was even bigger in the proportional representation blocks, where the proportion of independents who voted for the DPJ versus the LDP was 3:1. How have independents voted in the prefectural constituencies? In the 2000 Lower House election, the DPJ won three times the number of independent votes as the LDP. In the 2001 Upper House election, the LDP won a landslide victory by capturing half of the independent vote. Then, in the 2003 Lower House election, the proportion of votes reversed: the DPJ won five independent votes for every three won by the LDP. The tendency intensified in the 2004 Upper House election, as the DPJ won an even greater share of the independent vote.

Judging from these data, independents seem to fluctuate from one party to another in each election. However, their ground for voting remains stable over time. Many independents, lots of whom are relatively young, are concerned about the long-term future of Japan. In the 2000 Lower House election, therefore, they voted for the DPJ, which called for

fiscal consolidation, and in the 2003 Lower House election, they supported Koizumi's LDP, who similarly advocated fiscal reconstruction. Although the DPJ maintained an almost identical position regarding fiscal policy at that time, it is natural for the voters to consider the party in power more credible when two parties advocate similar policies. Yet, as high expectations for Koizumi began to wane, the voters turned back to the DPJ. Of the voters who voted for the LDP in the 2001 Lower House election, only about 60 percent voted again for the party in the 2004 Upper House election. Of the remaining 40 percent, more than 20 percent voted for the DPJ, sharply contrasting with the Koizumi boom three years ago.

As we have seen thus far, the distance between the LDP and the voters is even greater than it seems from the results of past elections. This does not mean, however, that the "anti-LDP" voters have converted to "pro-DPJ." The voters just want to have a party that can counterbalance the LDP. This point is obvious from opinion polls conducted after the Upper House election, which show that more people hope to keep Koizumi as prime minister than hope to replace him. If people preferred to have the DPJ in power instead of the LDP, then more respondents would hope to replace Koizumi. Moreover, when asked which party is more capable of running Japan, more than half answered the LDP, although the percentage has been declining, whereas the number of people who answered the DPJ was only one third of those who said the LDP. If the DPJ incorrectly believes that all voters who cast votes for the party in this election did so because they fully supported the party, the party will replicate the mistake the Socialist Party made after its victory in the

1989 Upper House election. Although many of the candidates in the DPJ's PR list were from organizations such as labor unions, the party needs to field more specialists in monetary and financial issues in future elections. Otherwise, it would be difficult for the party to transform the "anti-LDP" voters into "pro-DPJ."

As I have discussed above, the result of the Upper House election was largely brought about by discontent with the LDP. The DPJ surged as the party received votes from those who had previously supported the LDP. In other words, voters who had expected to find a "blue bird" in Koizumi had now set off in search of a "new bird." This is apparent from the fact that in a recent opinion poll, about 80 percent of voters answered that they were not satisfied with politics, up from 69 percent at the time of the 2001 Upper House election. Moreover, more than half of the respondents said they didn't believe that their votes would change politics. Democracy means that the people's will determines policy decisions. However, recent developments in Japanese politics, in which important decisions are made through forced passage, ox-walk delaying tactics, and promises to the U.S. President rather than through careful deliberation in the Diet, suggest that it would not be an overstatement to say that Japanese citizens are subject to the will of politicians. Will political parties respond to the voice of the voters, or will they concentrate on the power game between the parties and the Diet? The voters will deliver judgment on the behavior of political parties in the next national election.

*This essay is based on data from a public opinion survey conducted by the author during the 2004 Upper House election.

ISS Contemporary Japan Group at the Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo

The ISS Contemporary Japan Group serves as a forum for researchers on Japan to receive critical feedback on their work. Researchers visiting Tokyo are invited to contact one of the persons listed below if they would like to make a presentation. Meetings are open to everyone. Please contact Professor Ishida Hiroshi (ishida@iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp) or Sugihara Masako (suginohara@iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp) for more information.

Flexible Attitude and Results-based Personnel System: A Sociological Approach to Personnel System Reform at Japanese Companies


Imai Jun

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February 19, 2004*



In this presentation, Jun Imai explained the development of the "results-based" evaluation system through its relation to the informal labor contract in Japanese companies. Because of the non-existence of fixed job descriptions in most Japanese firms, workers' assignments are defined by employers' direction and evaluation. Based on a content analysis of personnel evaluation sheets (completed in 1996), Mr. Imai found that workers received positive evaluations when they demonstrated constant effort to acquire new knowledge, and when they could organize co-workers for effective service. Furthermore, it became clear that "making effort" is considered a central part of the informal labor contract in Japanese companies, and thus, effort must be clearly visible in workers' behavior. The emergence of a "results-based" evaluation system in Japanese companies, characterized by "competency" (*konpitenshi*-) management, can only be understood as an extension of this informal labor contract. "Competency" management, thus, measures "results" and achievements according to a detailed list of behaviors, with "making effort" at the top of the list.



Think Global, Fear Local: Sex, Violence, and International Norms in Contemporary Japan

David Leheny

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June 3, 2004*

Theories of international norms posit that policies align around globally accepted principles for proper state behavior, or around standard practices for dealing with technical problems. But for norms to matter, they have to be interpreted by political actors, who draw them into larger and continuing moral and social debates. In his current manuscript, Professor Leheny examines how transnational norms of criminal justice become components of larger debates over the proper role of the state in Japanese society, and how those norms can help to legitimize political decisions that would otherwise be difficult or unacceptably costly.

In this talk, Professor Leheny laid out his argument with specific reference to two of the major cases he uses in his book: the 1999 child prostitution/child pornography law, and the post-9/11 counterterrorism steps taken by the Japanese government. In both cases, changing international norms dramatically altered the policy outcomes, but, he argued, these should be seen as elements of continuing struggles that suggest only partial alignment with idealized global standards.

China as Mirror: Japanese National Dailies' Portrayals of China and of Japanese-Chinese Relations, 1972-2002

Jing Sun

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June 25, 2004*



In this talk Jing Sun examined factors that have shaped Japan's major national dailies' portrayals of China and of the Japanese-Chinese relations since the two countries normalized diplomatic relations in 1972. He argued that such portrayals are not only about how the Japanese witness and comment on what is really happening to its biggest neighbor, but also about how the Japanese define and redefine their country's position in the world by observing China and Japan's interactions with China. Without denying the important role of the state on deciding what issues are to be put into the reporting agenda, Mr. Sun showed that the media are practicing their autonomy through framing influential opinions, i.e., stressing specific values, facts, or other considerations, and endowing them with greater apparent relevance to the issue than they might appear to have under an alternative frame. Hence, Mr. Sun's research demonstrated the media's autonomy at work, rather than seeing the media as being merely a lapdog for a strong state — be that the home or host state.



College Quality Effects in the Japanese Labor Market

Ono Hiroshi

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September 6, 2004*

The motivations underlying the pursuit of college prestige in Japan presume a labor market that rewards workers according to the quality of the college that they attended. In this seminar, Professor Ono examined how college quality affects labor market outcomes in

Japan by highlighting the findings of various empirical investigations of male college graduates in 1995. The findings suggest that college quality significantly improves earnings even after accounting for the costs. National university graduates have higher rates of return than private university graduates, lending support to the "elite" approach (Becker 1993) under which abler persons have more to gain from investments in their human capital. Professor Ono's findings confirmed that college quality plays a crucial role in shaping incentives and earnings in the Japanese labor market.

Prospects for a Two-Party System in Japan

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Japan's two most recent elections, the November 2003 Lower House (House of Representatives) election, and the July 2004 Upper House (House of Councillors) election resulted in a defeat for the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and major gains for the opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), with the Prime Minister and LDP leader Koizumi Jun'ichirō nonetheless staying in power. Three major political factors were at play in these elections. The first factor is the popularity of Prime Minister Koizumi, which had once been enough to mask the decline of the LDP, but has recently waned. The second is the dependence of the LDP on the support of the Kōmeitō, the other party in the ruling coalition. The third is the increasing prominence of the DPJ, which many predict may eventually share a two-party system with the LDP. By analyzing these three

factors based on the results from the two latest elections, we will consider the likelihood of such a bipartite system heretofore unknown in Japan, and suggest how this may become a reality.

The Koizumi Effect

The LDP scored a major triumph in the July 2001 Upper House election, the first to be held after the maverick Koizumi replaced the unpopular Mori Yoshirō as prime minister. The LDP's biggest gains in 2001 occurred in the cities, where it had traditionally been weakest. Koizumi's image as a proponent of structural reform, seeking to eradicate the system of entrenched benefits provided to outlying regions, restored the LDP's popularity with urban voters. This has come to be known as the *Koizumi effect*.

In November 2003, the Koizumi effect was still strongly felt in the big cities and bastions of the DPJ, where the LDP retained the gains it had made in 2001. In fact, it is estimated that in the absence of the Koizumi effect, the LDP would have come up 14 seats short of its actual gains in single-seat districts (Table 1). In the LDP's traditional strongholds, however, its share of votes declined to around the same level as the pre-Koizumi years. Thus, the Koizumi effect had considerable bearing on the election results, particularly in urban areas, though the effect might not have been as extensive as at the peak of Koizumi's popularity.

The Koizumi effect continued to be evident in the most recent July 2004 Upper House election. Although the results for this election show a decline from the 2001 levels, they are still generally well above pre-2001 levels. Thus, while the decline in Koizumi's popularity has nearly caused the LDP to return to the state in which it would have been without him, the Koizumi effect still does exist, so the

TABLE 1. Size of the Koizumi Effect in Single-Seat Districts in 2003 Election ¹

	Liberal Democratic Party				Democratic Party of Japan			
	Rural	Inter-	Urban	Total	Rural	Inter-	Urban	Total
Actual seats won	79	58	31	168	10	35	60	105
Projection A	75	53	26	154	12	39	65	116
Projection B	74	46	18	138	13	44	72	129

Note: Projection A shows the simulated results in the absence of the Koizumi effect. Projection B shows the outcome if an equivalent positive effect had instead worked in favor of the runner-up non-LDP candidate.

¹ Table 1 taken from Kabashima et al, 2004, p.35.

LDP has no choice but to keep him at its helm.

Dependence on the Kōmeitō

The LDP is heavily reliant on the votes of Kōmeitō supporters and members of the Sōka Gakkai (the lay Buddhist organization backing the Kōmeitō). This tendency appears to have been reinforced in the last two elections. If we suppose that 60% of the proportional-representation votes for the Kōmeitō were cast for an LDP candidate in single-member constituencies, our calculations indicate that 34 LDP candidates escaped defeat thanks to Kōmeitō support in the 2000 election, and that in November 2003 this figure jumped to 53 seats.

Part of the reason that the LDP's reliance on the Kōmeitō actually increased despite having a popular leader is that the DPJ's recent merger with the Liberal Party enabled it to pose a more formidable challenge to LDP candidates, and actually defeat many of them.

The dependence of the LDP on the Kōmeitō's vote-generating machinery was further demonstrated by the July 2004 Upper House election. According to exit polls, more than 60% of the Kōmeitō supporters in most prefectural districts cast ballots for an LDP candidate. Had 60% of the Kōmeitō votes in single-seat districts been subtracted from the total vote of the local LDP candidate, we estimate that the LDP would have captured only 7 of the 27 seats being contested, just half of the 14 that it actually won. The LDP's dependence on the Kōmeitō in single-seat constituencies is a product of the rise in the number of votes being collected by the DPJ in these traditional LDP bastions. As the LDP has become unable to cruise to victory in these constituencies, its reliance on Kōmeitō votes has grown. The better the DPJ does, the more the fate of the LDP hinges on the Kōmeitō.

In the July 2004 election, the LDP candidates in prefectural constituencies did not significantly increase their vote share despite the great deal of support provided by the Kōmeitō. This can only mean that considerable numbers of people who had previously voted for the LDP (especially independents and supporters of the Liberal Party) cast their ballots for DPJ candidates this time around. Thanks in part to the merger between the DPJ and the Liberal Party, the slate of opposition candidates was more consolidated than in past elections. This voter migration may have cancelled out the extra margin the LDP gained from the Kōmeitō's backing.

DPJ Breakthrough

Media reports following the two recent elections claimed that the DPJ took great leaps forward. Is this an accurate interpretation of the results? In November 2003, while the Koizumi effect was keenly felt in the cities, the DPJ managed to secure strong support in all regions, making particularly large inroads in the intermediate districts once dominated by the LDP, and gained a small but significant foothold in rural districts as well. This was a result of its merger with the Liberal Party, which narrowed the field of non-LDP candidates, giving voters a clearer idea of which opposition aspirant had the strongest chance of winning. Protest votes thus naturally flowed to such candidates, yielding 21 additional seats for the DPJ.

In the July 2004 election, the DPJ basically recovered the ground that it had lost earlier in the urban prefectures due to the Koizumi effect. Even in districts traditionally considered LDP strongholds, DPJ candidates took 9 of the 27 seats. When DPJ-backed independents are included, the total rises to 13, almost matching the LDP's 14 seats.

The success of the DPJ in these districts is not only a reflection of its increased support among rural voters, but also of the consolidation of opposition candidates in the prefectural races under the DPJ banner, which clearly identified the DPJ as the prime alternative to the LDP.

Instead of the mixture of cooperation and rivalry among opposition parties seen in previous elections, in July 2004 the mainstream opposition forces were consolidated, with the DPJ leading the battle against the LDP-Kōmeitō coalition. Thus the structure of contests has become clear, making it easier for opposition candidates to benefit from "tactical voting" (voting in favor of an acceptable candidate seen as having a good chance of victory rather than for one's favorite candidate). We call this the *consolidation effect*.

At the time of the 1998 election, the non-Communist opposition parties ranged from the SDP on the left to the Liberal Party on the right, with the DPJ sharing the middle ground with the Kōmeitō, which had yet to join the ruling coalition. This made it difficult for them to join forces, with the result that 10 of the 24 single-seat constituencies had two non-JCP opposition candidates running for election. With the opposition parties competing with each other for votes, they won only 3 of the 10 seats, while the LDP took the remaining 7.

In July 2004, by contrast, each single-seat constituency had just one serious mainstream opposition candidate. This allowed anti-LDP votes to coalesce and secure seats, as demonstrated in Table 2. Even though the Kōmeitō had joined the LDP, the consolidated opposition votes were often sufficient to defeat the LDP candidate.

Finally, our simulation reveals that the DPJ would have surpassed the LDP in the single-seat contests of November 2003 only if they had attracted 70% of the votes that were cast for Japan Communist Party candidates. While some JCP supporters may “strategically” choose a DPJ candidate with the most realistic chance of winning rather than their own party’s candidate with little hope of victory, it is impossible to imagine 70% doing so. As the situation stands, the only route to a decisive DPJ victory over the LDP (and a change of government) entails a decision by the JCP not to field candidates in closely contested single-seat districts.

Conclusions and Implications

First, while Koizumi’s popularity has dropped substantially from its earlier stratospheric levels, it is still boosting the LDP’s vote share in urban areas. If the LDP hopes to maintain its ability to contest these areas, it must retain Koizumi as its leader.

In addition to the Koizumi effect, the LDP would have been incapable of winning anywhere near the number of seats it did in the last two elections without the help of the Kōmeitō. The worst scenario for the LDP would be for Koizumi’s popularity to wane further or for the Kōmeitō to withdraw from the coalition. Particularly in the latter case, a change of government is fully conceivable. The Kōmeitō holds

a strong bargaining position, since neither the LDP nor the DPJ can secure a majority on its own. Its decision on which party to join forces with largely determines which will head the government.

At the same time, though the DPJ has succeeded in making inroads in rural areas in recent elections, that success might weaken its urban-oriented reform course. If the DPJ hopes to seize the reins of power, it must first win back its natural support base in the cities, which has been eroded by Koizumi’s popularity. Having done that, it must then chip away at the LDP’s base.

While the DPJ is not yet a match for the LDP in terms of a simple two-party rivalry, the LDP’s hold on power is not that solid. That said, however, it will not be easy for the DPJ, which is dependent on the fickle support of independents and possesses a weak organization in the provinces, to topple the powerful ruling coalition—the LDP with its intense determination to remain in power and the Kōmeitō with its firm support base—on its own. As long as the Kōmeitō stands by the LDP, the only way for the DPJ to seize power is to join forces with another party, possibly the JCP.

(For further information, as well as the results of the most recent analyses, please visit my website at <http://politics.j.u-tokyo.ac.jp/>.)

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TABLE 2. Mainstream Opposition Slates in Single-Seat and Two-Seat Districts ²

	1998		2001		2004	
	Candi-dates	Seats won	Candi-dates	Seats won	Candi-dates	Seats won
Single-seat districts	33	7	33	2	31	13
DPJ	6	0	14	0	23	9
SDP	8	0	5	0	4	0
Liberal	4	1	2	1	—	—
Independent	15*	6	12	1	4	4
Two-seat districts	33	17	31	14	22	15
DPJ	10	9	16	13	16	14
SDP	7	1	5	0	3	0
Liberal	4	0	7	1	—	—
Independent	12	7	3	0	3	1

Note: The number of single-seat prefectural districts was 24 in the 1998 upper house election and 27 in 2001 and 2004. The number of two-seat districts was 18 in 1998 and 15 in 2001 and 2004.

*This figure includes two independent candidates effectively aligned with the opposition.

² Table 2 taken from Sugawara et al, 2004, p.23.

Analyzing the Results of the 2004 House of Councillors Election: The Same Old Story

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Asked to summarize the results of the 2004 House of Councillors election, I found myself telling journalists, "The LDP managed to hold onto power but the DPJ made significant gains, and it is the DPJ which is looking forward to the next election. The LDP must come up with something new before the next election." The most interesting thing about this analysis is that I had already used it to summarize the results of the 1996 general election, the 1998 House of Councillors election, the 2000 general election, and the 2003 general election. The only recent election which required a different analysis was the 2001 House of Councillors election, in which LDP Prime Minister Koizumi managed to capture the anti-LDP vote. Koizumi was the "something new" that gave the LDP its first real electoral "victory" since 1986. One could also say that the alternative to the LDP has made gains in every election since 1986, including the strange case of 2001, in which the alternative to the LDP was represented by the leader of the LDP.

Two contradictory straight-line predictions can be built based upon these observations. One could easi-

ly argue that the LDP has been losing ground since 1986 so, sooner or later, it must lose to the DPJ. It is just a matter of time. Based on the same data, however, one could make an equally good case that the LDP has always come up with some way or another of holding onto power in the past, so it will continue to do so in the future. They always seem to find a way. The fundamental lesson here is simple: "Never trust straight-line predictions."

Because humans are capable of learning, they work very hard to undermine the assumptions underlying any straight-line prediction. It is indeed true that, if the LDP were to continue following the same strategy, it would soon lose. It thus follows that the LDP will change strategies. It does not follow, however, that the LDP's new strategy will necessarily be successful. What we are witnessing, of course, is a competition between the LDP and the DPJ. The question is, "Which party will be the first and best able to adjust to the recently changed parameters of Japanese electoral politics?"

The most fundamental parameter change is the reduced and diminishing effectiveness of the organizational vote, and the increasing numbers of independent and floating voters. The clientelistic ("pork barrel") strategy that the LDP used so effectively from 1974 through 1990 is no longer sufficient to guarantee electoral victories. The other major parameter change is, of course, the new electoral system. What seems to be required (though one can never discount the possibility of some new, currently unimagined, strategy) is a more coherent party with clearer issue positions and stronger leadership. Both the LDP and the DPJ are making some progress in this direction.

Prime Minister Koizumi promised to "change Japan by changing the LDP" and he is having some success in changing the LDP. Most notably, his reform program makes much more sense as a way of changing the LDP than it does as an economic policy or as a populist ploy designed to please voters. For example, privatizing the postal services or reforming the

way highway construction is funded would not rank very high on a list of ways to reform the Japanese economy, nor can either be seen as the optimal way of grabbing public attention, but both would significantly reduce the amount of patronage available to the governing party. Many of Koizumi's "economic" reforms can be best understood as attacks on the clientelistic way of winning elections perfected by Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei in the 1970s. More narrowly, the reforms can also be seen as an attack on the Tanaka (currently Hashimoto) faction. Koizumi has also made moves to strengthen the Prime Ministership, reduce the power of factions in general, and to change the way LDP candidates are recruited and nominated. One may well remain unimpressed by the progress which has been made so far and even doubt whether the project of "changing the LDP" into a more coherent party can ever be achieved, but both the effort and the direction seem clear enough.

The DPJ has the same goal but faces a different set of problems. The party needs to consolidate itself as the only alternative to the LDP, find ways to institutionalize decision-making processes that satisfy the disparate elements that came together to form the party, build an electoral organization from scratch in many areas of the country, and find a sufficient number of reasonably attractive candidates to run in each of the 300 electoral districts. Though the task often seems an impossible dream, some progress is in fact being made on each of these fronts. The DPJ has incorporated the Liberal Party, leaving only the Socialists and Communists as opposition parties outside the fold. Both lost badly in 2004. Since the 2003 general election, the DPJ has become the only

alternative to the LDP. In that same election the party managed to write an election manifesto and get every single candidate to sign it. Though one could hardly call the DPJ a group of like-minded politicians, this feat demonstrated a great deal more policy unity than has ever been displayed by the LDP. Perhaps most importantly, winning begets winning and the DPJ record in 2003 and 2004 will make it easier to attract candidates in the future. Again, one may not be much impressed with the DPJ as a political party at this time, but the direction of change is clearly toward a more coherent party.

The DPJ is currently on track to defeat the LDP and needs only continue along its current path to reach that goal. If there were a general election scheduled for 2005, I would put my money on the DPJ. Unfortunately for the DPJ, the next general election need not be held until 2007. The LDP has three years in which to come up with something new. The Koizumi government might even try enacting some of the reforms it has promised, a strategy that would surely work if tried. So far the pattern has been one of the DPJ winning elections, but then losing ground between elections. The clearest cases of losing between elections are candidates who defeat the LDP then rejoin the LDP. The number of Diet members who defeat the LDP then join the LDP seems to have dropped off recently but we can be certain the LDP will continue to welcome winners into the party without worrying about their past history or policy stances. The challenge for the DPJ is to maintain momentum and unity until the next election. If they can manage that, they must then deal with whatever new strategy the LDP devises.

THE SOCIAL SCIENCE JAPAN DATA ARCHIVE

Achievements Since 1998 and Future Steps

Makita Naoki



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The Social Science Japan Data Archive (SSJDA) collects Japanese social science data (quantitative micro data obtained from social surveys) and provides access to the data to the academic community for secondary analysis. This article gives an overview of the SSJDA and its future plans.

Origin and Staff

Data archives, well established in the United States and most European countries, constitute an integral part of social science research and education. In Japan, however, due to a lack of data archives, large numbers of empirical data sets collected over the years have gradually disappeared after their primary analyses. In the late 1990s the SSJDA was established within the Information Center for Social Sci-

ence Research on Japan, the Institute of Social Science (ISS), with the aim of promoting the effective preservation and use of social science survey data.

The SSJDA encouraged organizations and survey researchers to contribute, and make data acquired in their respective activities available to the academic community (Matsui, 1997). We collected data from organizations and researchers that agreed with our idea and were willing to deposit their data, which otherwise would be difficult to distribute by themselves. The SSJDA began disseminating the data to researchers in April 1998 (Sato et al. 2000).

The SSJDA has been run under an ISS budget, with financial support from a Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research of the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, since 1997.

There are three ISS faculty members primarily in charge of the day-to-day work of the SSJDA: a professor (supervising); an associate professor (archiving and planning the dissemination of data); and a research associate (offering user support). In addition, several part-time staff members process raw data, by changing it into SPSS (a statistical analysis software package)-readable format.

Operation

If you wish to access SSJDA datasets, first you should identify the datasets you want through the search page of data holdings on the SSJDA website (<http://ssjda.iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp/>), where you can find the abstracts and questionnaires for each dataset. Next, submit an application form to the SSJDA via postal mail with a self-addressed-stamped envelope and a blank CD-ROM enclosed. After the data depositor approves the application, the SSJDA sends back the CD-ROM with the requested datasets to the applicant. Datasets are provided, principally, in SPSS (Japanese edition) format; however, upon request, they are available in ASCII format as well. Researchers can use SSJDA datasets free of cost, except for postal fees and the cost of the CD-ROM.

The SSJDA search page covers not only the SSJDA's original holdings, but also the datasets of two other data archives, the *Survey Data Archive on Political and Social Consciousness* by Professor Miyake of Kansai University, and the *Leviathan Data Bank* by LDB Ltd. In addition, the SSJDA website provides hyperlinks to other data archives inside and outside Japan.

The SSJDA is useful for both comparative purposes and Japan studies. While the SSJDA datasets are provided in Japanese only, some of the SSJDA's web pages have been translated into English, to help researchers who do not read Japanese navigate the site. We encourage such researchers to utilize the SSJDA's resources with the help of a Japanese speaker.

Data Holdings and Distribution

As of March, 2004, the SSJDA had released 420 dataset titles, and in the 2003 academic year (April 2003—March 2004), the number of datasets distributed to researchers finally exceeded one thousand (Chart 1). Researchers of 84 universities and research institutes, including 13 universities/institutes overseas, are SSJDA users.

Some of the frequently requested datasets are the "Japanese General Social Surveys" (JGSS) 2000-2002, undertaken by the Institute of Regional Studies at Osaka University of Commerce in cooperation with the ISS; the "National Family Research of Japan" 1998, by the Japan Society of Family Sociology; and the "Working Person Survey" by the Works Institute — Recruit Co., Ltd. Now, survey data from National Life Finance Corporation and Japan Institute of Life Insurance are also popular.




Chart 1: Data Holdings and distribution

Education and Research Activity

To enhance the utilization of the data holdings and secondary analysis, the SSJDA annually holds a Secondary Data Analysis Workshop and Open Seminar. The SSJDA appoints Workshop chair person(s) from the faculty of the ISS (including visiting lecturers) for certain topics (Table 1), and calls for young researchers (graduate students, etc.) who are interested in the topics. The workshop members, around several dozen, present and discuss their analyses of the data throughout the year, and end up publishing the research products.

Table 1: Secondary Data Analysis Workshops

Year	Topic(s)
2000	Secondary Analysis of the Surveys on New Business Startups (Research Institute, National Life Finance Corporation)
2001	Secondary Analysis of the Surveys on Life Insurance (Japan Institute of Life Insurance)
	Secondary Analysis of the Surveys on Student Life (National Federation of University Co-operative Associations)
2002	White Collar Workers' Careers and Promotion, Transfer and Job Change
	Women's Commitment to Working and Parenting — Strategic Actions of Mothers within Social Stratification
2003	Analysis of Diversification in Working Patterns: Firms' Strategies in Human Resources Management and Workers' Careers
	Japanese Employment Relations in Transition: Personnel Management and Employees' Reactions after Restructuring and the Introduction of IT (Information Technology)
2004	Analysis of the Startup and Management of Small Firms in Japan

The Open Seminar is held every fall, inviting lecturers specializing in quantitative/secondary analysis from universities and research institutions (Table 2). The 2003 Open Seminar consisted of a series of reports based on information obtained from the 2002 Secondary Data Analysis Workshop on "Women's commitment to working and parenting," which published a monograph this summer (Honda, 2004).

The SSJDA publishes reports on the data analysis and proceedings of the seminars as a Research Paper Series (RPS). The products of the Secondary Data Analysis Workshops are also part of the RPSs. The list of the RPS titles can be found at the SSJDA web-

site.

Table 2: Open Seminars

Year	Topic(s)
Feb. 1997	Archiving Data for Social Scientists
Oct. 1997	Significance and Potential of Secondary Analysis of Micro Data
1998	The Role of Data Archives in Social Science Research
2000	Research and Education with Public Micro Data
2001	Lecture series on Secondary Data Analysis of Social Surveys
2002	Lecture series on Secondary Data Analysis of Social Surveys II
2003	Research Report by 2002 Secondary Analysis Study Group

Plans and Challenges

The SSJDA currently accepts data access applications only via postal mail, to verify applicants' identities in handwriting, rather than over the Internet (where pseudo-identities are easily created). This procedure is important to maintain the trust of our data depositors, as secondary data analysis has not yet gained widespread public recognition in Japan.

However, the SSJDA is planning to facilitate an online tabulation system for limited datasets in the future, to invite potential SSJDA users to experience the world of secondary analysis.

Aiming to make data archives and secondary analysis more visible to the public, this year the SSJDA launched the "Secondary Analysis Prize Essay Contest," under the auspices of some micro data depositors. It is the first time the SSJDA has held such a contest, and we expect it will further promote secondary analysis both in research and education in Japan.

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
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The Department of Research on the Staffing Industry

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In April, 2004, the Institute of Social Science at the University of Tokyo established the Department of Research on the Staffing Industry, which will remain at the Institute for a three-year term. This department is a privately-sponsored research department, funded by an endowment from Staff Service Holdings Co., Ltd. The purpose of this department is to conduct theoretical and empirical research on the state of affairs and the problems of personnel management in Japanese industry in general, as well as the management strategies, current conditions, and problems of personnel management of the staffing industry in Japan.

Until now, rigorous empirical research on the use of staffing services, or on the management strategies, conditions and problems of personnel management in the staffing industry, has been underdeveloped in Japan. Currently, however, in addition to labor directly hired by companies, the use of external laborers, such as temporary agency workers, contract company workers, etc., is growing in the Japan-

ese workforce. With deregulation in the latter half of the 1990s, the fee-based, private job-placement sector is also expanding. Moreover, due to the aging population, businesses engaged in at-home nursing care are expected to experience stable growth. In light of these circumstances, and understanding the state of human resources management in Japanese companies, it is becoming increasingly important to clarify the current situation and problems of the staffing industry. This new department has been established to help meet the demands of this era.

The Department of Research on the Staffing Industry, with the cooperation of ISS research staff and researchers affiliated with other institutions (both domestic and foreign), is conducting several research projects. The researchers are from various disciplines, including economics, law, and sociology. Based on a variety of analytical perspectives and methodologies, our goal is to obtain a multifaceted picture of the state of affairs and problems of personnel management of the staffing industry, and the companies using such services.

To better explain exactly what this department does, I would now like to introduce some of the research projects we are currently working on.

First, we are conducting research on the activities of external laborers at Japanese manufacturing sites. Since the 1990s, the use of contract company workers by Japanese manufacturers has been rapidly increasing. Moreover, manufacturers can now use temporary agency workers, although this had been illegal until March, 2004. Against this background, we are conducting research on the staffing companies which supply their workforce to the manufacturing industry, as well as on the workers employed by temporary agencies and contract companies who are working at manufacturing sites. Through this research, we hope to clarify the most appropriate use of external labor at manufacturing sites, the business strategies and personnel management of the staffing industry, and the current situation and problems related to skill formation and career for-

mation of contract company workers and temporary agency workers at manufacturing sites.

Second, we are conducting research on the supervision of temporary agency workers in clerical occupations in Japan. The managers of the staffing industry play important roles in improving the motivation of temporary agency workers. In this project, we are studying the managers of temporary agencies supplying clerical workers, and the temporary clerical workers themselves. Accordingly, we hope to clarify the roles that staffing industry managers play in improving temporary agency workers' motivation, as well as the most effective ways to supervise temporary agency workers.

Third, we are conducting research on the at-home nursing care business in Japan. Due to the aging population, at-home care services are becoming increasingly important in Japan. To further develop these services, it is important that the at-home nursing care industry continues to train high quality caregivers, and to maintain stable growth. Therefore, in this research project, we are investigating at-home nursing care business owners, and caregivers, to learn the most effective ways to supervise caregivers, to best develop their skills.

Fourth, we are carrying out an international comparison of the use of atypical workers, including part-timers, temporary agency workers, and contract company workers, in Japanese, American, and British industries. Through analyzing the American

National Organizations Survey and the British Workplace Employee Relations Survey, and comparing them to Japanese data, we will be able to compare the three countries in terms of their employment practices of atypical work, and the factors regulating the practices. Also, through conducting interviews in companies in each of the three countries, we plan to compare how they respectively combine typical full-time regular workers and various forms of atypical workers in the same workplace.

We are actively having graduate students and young researchers join these research projects. The department is offering technical and financial support to the young researchers, and having them conduct surveys and interviews for the projects. For these researchers, participation in these projects is a valuable opportunity to gain research skills through on the job training (OJT). By having young researchers participate in these projects, we will aid in the development of talented researchers, capable of conducting empirical research on personnel management and the staffing industry. This is another important mission of this department.

As we complete each project, we plan to publish the results as research papers. Furthermore, interested readers can check the progress of our activities at the department's web page: (<http://jww.iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp/jinzai/index.html>). Please expect more activity from the University of Tokyo's Department of Research on Staffing Industry in the future.



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