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Japanese Views on the Socialist Economies in Transition

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Japanese Views on the Socialist Economies in Transition

MOST issues of *Social Science Japan* have dealt specifically with Japan. Although this remains a top priority for the newsletter as well as the Information Center for Social Science Research on Japan, one of our other goals is to introduce to a global audience the sort of research that Japanese social scientists have pursued for decades, but have published only in Japanese. Language remains a problem. A growing number of foreign scholars are proficient in speaking and reading Japanese, but most of them are Japan specialists. Scholars from other fields or areas have few opportunities to get to know the kind of research that Japanese scholars conduct.

This issue is meant as a step in the direction of alleviating this problem with regard to socialist and post-socialist countries. Anyone with access to an English-language newspaper can learn about how the US and the countries of the EU are treating the socialist countries in transition, but few get to know what Japan is doing except through the lens of American and European scholars and policymakers. In this issue, we offer eight essays specifically on the topic of how Japanese researchers have treated the changing socialist economies. The authors demonstrate how they differ from their European and American counterparts in their approaches to the issues, and provide a glimpse of the intellectual environment within which Japanese policymakers are deciding how to cope with massive change in some of the world's largest countries.

Although *Social Science Japan* will continue to focus primarily on research on Japan, we hope that this issue will allow readers to get to know an area of Japanese scholarship that has traditionally remained unfamiliar to researchers abroad.

Note

Because of software limitations, we have decided to omit temporarily the use of kanji and the Japanese syllabaries, hiragana and katakana, in Social Science Japan. This issue is the first issue to be offered in PDF format through our Web page, meaning that it can be downloaded, read, and printed with the help of Adobe Acrobat. The Acrobat software currently does not support Japanese characters and, having weighed the benefits of accessibility and linguistic authenticity, we have opted to use romanized Japanese texts. We will use kanji once again when software improvements so permit.

State Socialism as a Phenomenon of the Age of World War

WADA Haruki

IT is no secret that Marxism strongly affected postwar social science research in Japan, and it left its imprint on researchers on socialist systems at the Institute of Social Science as well. But there has been a change over time toward broader, more plural perspectives on Marxism itself, as well as a trend toward more historical views on how Marxism and socialism actually played out in practice. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, this trend has, if anything, accelerated.

Research on Socialism at Shaken

Yamanouchi Ichiro, Shaken's first professor of Soviet law, worked during the war years in the research section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and came to Shaken with the conviction that he would lead his life as a loyal follower of Marxism. His student, Fujita Isamu, returned from postwar internment in Siberia to enter the University of Tokyo; as a professor, he established Soviet law as a true academic field. One of Fujita's students, Komorida Akio, is currently a professor at Shaken, where he focuses his research on changes in Soviet and Russian law. Our institute's first professor of the Soviet economy, Udaka Motosuke, who had worked at the wartime *Tôa Kenkyujo* (East Asian Research Institute), is known for his contributions to the Japanese translations of such classics as Marx's *Capital* and Lenin's *Imperialism*.

A number of Shaken's young research associates became professors and leaders in the field of research on the Soviet history. Among these were Taniuchi Yuzuru, Okuda Hiroshi, and Shiokawa Nobuaki. Taniuchi, in part because of the shock of the Khrushchev's "de-Stalinization" program, went to the US where he met and was inspired by E.H. Carr, and returned to write several major monographs on Stalinism, among them his *Starin seiji taisei no seiritsu* (Formation of the Stalinist Political System). Largely influenced by Taniuchi, Okuda wrote and published important works on peasant communes and collectivization based on his research from Russian archives. And Shiokawa has produced substantial research on labor under the first Five-Year Plan. These three have all taught at other departments at the University of Tokyo and continue to teach today.

My Recent Work on Soviet History

I myself began my career at Shaken as a research associate and became a professor, researching Russian economic history from before the revolution; as Udaka's replacement, I have been less committed to orthodox Marxism and my interest has expanded into historical research as well. Needless to say, I have recently devoted a considerable amount of attention to the *perestroika* process. In addition to my work on the Soviet Union, I have also devoted myself to research on socialism in North Korea. The collapse of the Soviet Union forced me to do some hard thinking about how Marxism is going to be appraised historically, and I recently wrote a book entitled *Rekishii to shite no shakaishugi* (Socialism as History), published in 1992 by Iwanami, in



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The Era of World Wars and State Socialism *continued*

which I took up this issue. I present below a short summary in order to provide one example of how Japanese researchers on social science have dealt with these issues.

Socialist utopianism was actually born alongside both capitalism and modern society, and attempted to humanize modern development by providing a philosophical basis for social reform. Marxism, one branch of this school of thought, took an uncharacteristically strident position *vis-a-vis* capitalism and managed to inspire actual conflict among people by helping to engender a new political radicalism as well as genuine conviction on the inevitable outcome of human history. Although the 19th century did not witness the realization of a socialist utopia anywhere, the 20th century, or rather the century's "age of world war," helped to bring socialism to real political life.

By "the age of world war," I refer not only to the First and Second World Wars, but also to the Cold War that dominated the international political landscape for most of the "postwar" 20th century. This was an era that witnessed massive political changes spawned by world war as well as those in opposition to world war, among them the development of warfare into its incarnation as total warfare, the growing depth and breadth of state control, and ethnic movements that have altered the shape of state-society relations. We need to bear in mind that it was in this "age of world war" and all the changes it implied that communist movements and state socialism began their history.

Lenin himself believed that the genesis of world war lay in the contradictions of capitalism, and that therefore a transition to socialism would be necessary to end world war; as a model, he chose Germany's wartime economy, which German scholars were describing as "war socialism" or "state socialism." The kernel of the Russian Revolution lay within this decision. The October Revolution and the one-party dictatorship that emerged from the civil war produced "war communism" policies, and established the foundation for state socialism itself. In other words, Lenin left behind the edifice on which Stalin completed state socialism, and created a "new civilization" quite unlike anything ever previously seen in human history.

This system is most properly seen as the outcome of 19th century socialist utopian ideals mixed with the total militarization of society that developed in the 20th century age of world war. Even compared with ordinary totalitarian systems, it was a more completely unified system.

Transformed by mass repression, the state socialist system soon adopted a secondary structure enforced by terror. In other words, with a one-person dictatorship and the conversion of the family into a public entity, terror became the instrument for the establishment of the private as public concerns and the deepening of a one-person dictatorship into the lives of the people.

The structure left behind by Lenin became the foundation on which Stalin built his own version of state socialism, and created a "new civilization" quite unlike anything ever seen in human history.

After the Soviet Union's early losses to Germany in 1941, a new kind of anti-Stalinism developed somewhat naturally, and terror temporarily ceased to be this secondary structural issue. The new general militarization of the socialist system, however, managed to rebuild terror as a structural feature after the Soviets defeated the Germans in the Second World War. Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin after his death helped to break down terror as a fundamental binding force in Soviet society, as well to usher in a maturing state socialist system. The relaxation of controls on family life further protected the rights of people in their personal lives. As Soviet society further matured, the development of higher education as well as more complex foreign relations necessitated the opening of information resources which, perhaps more than anything else, helped to expose the differences between the official line on how Soviet society worked and how the people actually lived their lives. Ultimately, it was this breach between the ideal of socialist utopia and spreading knowledge about actual conditions in the Soviet Union that underscored stagnation and the country's almost spiritual malaise and crisis.

The crisis of state socialism developed on precisely this foundation. Secretary General Gorbachev's efforts to create a "new thinking on diplomacy" and to end the Cold War, combined with the *glasnost* that helped to produce *perestroika* managed to do the unthinkable: to bring state socialism to an end at the same time that he succeeded in ending the age of world war. It was perhaps at this time that we can mark the beginning of a new era, that of the world economy.

In 1994, Martin Malia's *The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917-1991* (New York: The Free Press) appeared in the US, and to a certain degree, his analysis appears to be similar to mine. Led by his belief that the "revolution from above" characterized the Soviet Union's system as "a permanent, institutionalized version of war communism" (p. 184), Malia finds that "the Party had realized an instrumental program of socialism, but socialism's moral program still remained in the future" (p. 224). He further argues that "there never existed any 'third way' that would lead to integral socialism as noncapitalism and yet would be democratic" (emphasis in original, p. 503).

My disagreement with Malia hinges on how we see the "age of world war." Where I place great emphasis on how the conditions of this era produced the state socialist system by force, or how it essentially gave birth to this utopia through fire, I think it is fair to say that Malia downplays its importance. In particular, if we rely on Malia's argument it becomes difficult to see how state socialism was intimately tied to the vicissitudes of the international communist movements. This means that if we look at the trajectory of state socialism as a phenomenon specifically of this age, we actually develop a vocabulary with which to discuss how the communist movements around the world were largely brought about as responses to the militarism and imperialism that have so characterized our century.



Changing the Frame:

Research on the Planned Economies and Economic Change

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IT is by now common knowledge that the planned economies of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe underwent three waves of economic reforms: in the latter half of the 1950s, again in the middle of the 1960s, and finally in the 1980s, a wave that brought the *coup de grâce* to these regimes. Yugoslavia, which had long since taken a path somewhat different from that of its neighbors, was unable to avoid a similar fate. China, following the same trends as its socialist counterparts in Europe, also took the plunge toward developing a market economy. The reforms, however, provoked reactions everywhere. This contradiction-filled course helped to expose the fundamental confrontation between the problems involved in the introduction of market elements, on the one hand, and entrenched interests aiming at the reconfirmation of the planning principle on the other.

These processes of course inspired harsh debate. For example, when the Soviet Union, at the beginning of the 1960s, faced controversies over the "principle of material interests" and the "introduction of profits," discussions among Japanese specialists of the Soviet economy took it up as if it were a war by proxy; the self-described orthodox scholars criticized those who supported the reforms as "revisionists." Similarly, the Cultural Revolution in China involved Japanese scholars in serious discussion on how to evaluate this phenomenon. Yugoslav "workers' self-management" was introduced and also became a popular subject for Japanese scholars.

For better or worse, we can therefore characterize Japanese studies of planned economies as being "idea-oriented." In other words, there was a pronounced tendency to study planned economies from the perspective of the idea of socialism itself. Investigation of the planned economy institutions and their functioning therefore constituted the mainstream of research, and there was a strong normative approach which included theorizing on optimal planning. Conversely, research on real situations and concrete aspects of the economy, such as industries and agriculture, or econometrical and empirical analyses of economic performance and structures, apart from some excellent and isolated achievements, has generally been relegated to the status of a backwater.

The durability of this idea-oriented approach can be explained by the fact that one of the main motives of the study of the Soviet Union and the socialist countries in Japan was an interest in socialism inspired by reflection on World War II. While in the United States, for example, research was focused on the reality of the Soviet Union as a hypothetical enemy in the Cold War. Japan, compared with the US and Europe, where many Soviet and Eastern European emigrants lived, faced serious problems in getting access to information on the real conditions in these countries. As a result, Japanese research on the socialist economies was conducted mainly through analyses of the self-understanding of those countries' scholars, politicians and bureaucrats. As a result, this made it difficult for Japanese scholars to grasp economic realities obtaining in these countries.

Even so, I believe that Japanese scholars never lagged behind their counterparts in North America and Western Europe with regard to research

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on economic institutions in the planned economies. With the use of detailed surveys of economic institutions and their functioning, scholars achieved a clearer understanding of the real conditions of economies in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. By the end of the 1980s, these projects, based on thorough analyses of the whole process of economic reforms, enabled scholars to foresee the systemic change from socialism to capitalism. The theoretical assumption was the following: because experience had proved that the grafting of commodity markets into a planned economy could not by itself generate a smoothly functioning market mechanism, and that therefore the development of labor and capital markets would also become inevitable from the viewpoint of both technological innovation and economic efficiency, the economies of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe would be transformed into market economies. In terms of economic systems, this would make them essentially capitalist, limiting socialist elements to the field of economic policy. To be honest, however, although Japanese scholars grasped the essence of the problems facing socialism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, they did not predict the sudden collapse of planned economies in the course of the by now well-known political earthquakes from 1989 to 1991. Additionally, detailed socio-economic studies by historians dealing with the period from before World War II to the years immediately following it are worthy of mention here, as they provided valuable objective and critical analyses.

The majority of economists, however, regarded the existing socialist economies as developing continuously and eternally. Their general inclination was to patch up the flaws in the practice of socialism by referring to its ideals, a tendency that further led many of them to defend socialist ideals by separating them from the failing reality of planned economies. A number of specialists on the Soviet economy went so far as to make the anachronistic mistake of discussing the "stage" that these countries had reached, with reference to the ultimate completeness of socialism. Characterized by a hodgepodge of science and ideology, this harmful idea-oriented approach was further bedevilled with an unfortunate emphasis on judging the socialist economies through the experience of the Soviet Union, rather than through the more suggestive and illuminating experiences of Eastern Europe.

There is a nomenclatural dispute among Japanese economists that symbolizes the confrontation between these two trends in research on socialist economics. Hitherto, the academic association of specialists of socialist economies was called "the Association of the Study of Socialist Economies," but in 1991, a group of scholars, who had foreseen the coming systemic changes and predicted correctly how anachronistic that name would soon be, proposed changing it to "the Association for Comparative Economic Studies." Strong opposition prevented immediate acceptance of the change, however, and the name remained until 1993, by which time systemic changes had made the association's name an obvious anachronism.



Japanese research on the economies in transition, which began with the collapse of the socialist economies, has a number of specific features. First, former specialists of the socialist economies entered the stage again as area specialists on each country. Making use of their accumulated knowledge, they became the core of this academic field. The newly favorable environment for inquiry has encouraged more empirical research, including field studies. This has been accompanied by a dilution of the research's ideological aspects, and more importance has been attached to comparative analyses of different countries.

Second, in connection with the worldwide intellectual support for transition toward the market economies, newcomers from various fields have joined the study of the economies in these areas. This has produced a number of interesting new tendencies. For instance, specialists of the Japanese economy and developmental economics, bankers, and economic bureaucrats, in cooperation with specialists of the former socialist economies, are tackling the issue of economic transition. Their intention has been to offer intellectual support for the transition of the former socialist countries to a market economy, referring to the postwar Japanese experience in economic management, in which Japan had to come to grips with the twin problems of catching up with its fully industrialized counterparts in Western Europe and North America and transition from the wartime controlled-economy to a free market economy. They have also drawn on the experiences in economic development of Asian and other countries. This approach means combining the study of the given countries with the study of the Japanese economy, and at the same time enables scholars to re-evaluate Japanese experiences in light of those of other countries.

Third, the new name of the organization "the Association for Comparative Economic Studies" implies an understanding that experiences of the planned economies must be noted as significant experiences even in analyses of market economies, and that in the framework of the market economy, various kinds of economic systems can function, making comparative analysis of these systems an important task.

In sum, these trends together suggest that Japanese scholars researching the economies in transition avoid the assumption that the Anglo-Saxon type of economic development is the best type, and that only neoclassical economic theories are reliable. Instead, they recognize that there are many roads to economic development, and each road must find for itself an adequate economic theory. Japanese scholars are thus trying to rethink the fundamental problems regarding the relationship between the state and the market or the differences between the plan and the market as the basis of an economy.



Recent Developments and Rising Hopes for Japanese Research in Soviet History

UCHIDA Kenji

JUST like their counterparts in Europe and North America, and also in Russia itself, since 1991 Japanese scholars of Soviet history have borne witness to and participated in two important changes in the field. The first of these is the opportunity that the disintegration of the Soviet Union has given for a fundamental rethinking of the country's history. Of similar importance is the second major development, the new and improved access to archival documents and the opportunity to deepen research and to explore new fields on the basis of this new wealth of information. In the following essay, I survey the new Japanese research in Soviet history, focusing on my particular area of academic inquiry, the Stalin period.

The rethinking of Soviet history in the wake of the shocking disintegration of the Soviet Union is led by the goal of explaining scientifically the whole process from the creation of Soviet socialism to its ultimate collapse with a single coherent logic. A conspicuous feature of this reinterpretation in North America and Europe is that it is connected with the "rehabilitation of totalitarianism," as proposed by Martin Malia.¹ Similarly in Russia, though in a vulgarized form, there has been a strong tendency to explain Soviet history in the framework of totalitarianism has appeared, as is shown in the books of the late Dmitrii A. Volkogonov and Edvard Radzinsky.²

In Japan, Wada Haruki and Ishii Norie each present a new interpretation.³ The core of their studies is the effort to understand Soviet history as the realization and subsequent breakdown of a utopia. In this respect, their approaches are similar to Malia's, but they differ from him in emphasizing the global 20th century conditions that affected and imposed restraints on Soviet socialism. As they see it, Soviet history is closely related to such universal tendencies as the rise of mass society, the total militarization of social life through the two World Wars, heavy and high-tech industrialization and the like.

As a result, as compared with the "totalitarian" theory that tends to find a direct causal relationship between the intentions of the leaders and the actual results, Wada and Ishii pay considerably more attention to how the original ideas of the leaders were "distorted" under the pressure of these international factors. They have thus succeeded in establishing a historical interpretation that differentiates between the intentions and the results of Soviet socialism. The arguments of both authors, however, are for the time being limited to offering a frame of analysis, or a large sketch map of Soviet history. The task of testing their hypotheses and supporting them with historical documents still remains.

The opening of the archives has not only provided the opportunity for such senior Russian historians as N.A. Ivnitskii and V.P. Danilov to deepen their previous works, but also for historians of the younger generation, like O.V. Khlevniuk, to develop new areas of historical inquiry.⁴ Needless to say, this development has been a great inspiration to Japanese historians.



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Japanese Research on Soviet History *continued*

Notes

¹Martin Malia, *The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917-1991*. New York: The Free Press, 1994.

²D. A. Volkogonov, *Lenin: politicheskii portret, v dvukh knigakh*, M., 1994; E. Radzinsky, *Stalin: The First In-Depth Biography based on Explosive New Documents from Russia's Secret Archives* (trans. H.T. Willets). New York: Doubleday, 1996.

³Wada Haruki, *Rekishi to shite shakaishugi* (Socialism as History). Tokyo: Iwanami, 1992; Ishii Norie, *Bunmei to shite no soren — shoki gendai no shūen* (The Soviet Union as a Civilization: The End of Early Modernity). Tokyo: Yamakawa, 1995.

⁴See, for example, N. Ivnitskii, *Kollektivizatsia i raskulachivanie (nachalo 30-khgodov)*, M., 1994; O. Khlevniuk, *1937-i.: Stalin, NKVD i sovetsoke obschestvo*, M., 1992.

⁵Arata H. "Politics and the Economy in the Soviet Union to the 1930s," in *Historical Studies in Japan* (VII) 1983-1987 (National Committee of Japanese Historians, ed.). Tokyo: Yamakawa, 1990, pp. 325-326.

⁶Taniuchi Yuzuru, "Sobieto shi ni okeru dentō to kindai" (Modernity and Tradition in Soviet History), *Shiso* 4, April 1996.

⁷Okuda Hiroshi, *Voruga no kakumei — Stalin tochika no noson* (Revolution on the Volga: The Society Countryside under Stalinist Rule, 1929-1934). Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1996.

The study of Soviet history in Japan has been quite deeply affected by earlier works by Taniuchi Yuzuru. As Arata Hiroshi has pointed out, many of the Japanese scholars in Soviet history have followed Taniuchi's lead not only in terms of their analytical framework, but also in their empirical methods.⁵ Compared with their colleagues in North America and Europe, Japanese historians have showed a clearer interest in problems of the peasantry and of rural communes. This research characteristic partly reflects Japan's special circumstances, in that its modernization process was affected by rural communes in a variety of ways. Taniuchi's work, which revealed the decisive importance of political processes in the rural districts for the Soviet regime, further strengthened this rural bias.

In particular, Taniuchi's contribution lies in his explanation of the emergence of the Stalinist regime at the beginning of the 1930s in the context of contradictions between central authority, on the one hand, and the peasants and rural communes on the other. According to Taniuchi, the introduction of the so-called "Ural-Siberian method," a new method of grain collections, was the most important turning point in the emergence of the Stalinist regime.

Because of the scarcity of available materials, however, much remained unresolved in the study of the Ural-Siberian method. Taniuchi's new article, based on new archival materials, fills the gap in our knowledge by tracing the decision-making process at the top of the Communist Party.⁶ The article restates even more convincingly his view — articulated in earlier works — that through the "Revolution from Above" at the beginning of the 1930s, a new type of political regime, which differed crucially from its predecessor of the 1920s, was established, though the two political systems appeared similar to each other in terms of the one-party dictatorship.

The greatest achievement yet produced by the opening of the archives is the recent book by Okuda Hiroshi.⁷ Okuda is the first scholar, even including those from North America and Europe, to have written a full-scale regional history based not only on the central archival documents in Moscow, but also on regional archival documents. In this book he vividly describes confrontations between the peasantry and the central authorities, which took place in the rural districts in the middle reaches of Volga, and focused on the issues of grain collections and the collectivization of agriculture.

Okuda's success not only in making clear the reality of life in the rural districts under the Stalin regime with regard to various issues, such as famines and the role of religion, but also in analyzing the dynamic relationship between the central government and the provinces in terms of decision-making and policy implementation, also bears special emphasis here. In accomplishing both of these, Okuda has greatly contributed to

Continued on page 13 ⇨

Priority Research Report: Existence and Coexistence in the Slavic-Eurasian Region

MINAGAWA Shugo

UNDER a grant from the Japanese Ministry of Education, in April 1995 a group of Japanese scholars began a priority research project under the main theme "Changes in the Slavic-Eurasian World: Conditions for Existence and Coexistence," which is scheduled to run for three years. The central purpose of this project is to create, within the fixed period of study, a comprehensive and concentrated study of the region's historical development and current problems that would represent a major advance for the field. There are currently more than 100 scholars involved in this project.

Put simply, the scholars in this project want to rebuild a Slavic-Eurasian studies program that recognizes the existence of value systems regarding independent existence and coexistence in this historically turbulent region. The study of the Slavic-Eurasian region, which has played a critical role in civilizational history, is important not only to nearby Japan, but also to the other countries of the world, and is at the forefront of the current drive toward a new era.

The Slavic-Eurasian region spreads from the eastern part of Europe all the way through parts of the Asian mainland in areas where the Slavic peoples are dominant. Since before the Middle Ages, this area has contained a large number of different peoples, and has a complex economic, political, and cultural background based on the migration of different groups as well as the establishment of a multiethnic empire. Because of the Russian Revolution and its expansion, much of the region shares a history of socialist regimes. Since the collapse of the Soviet system, many of the countries in the region have undergone not only political and economic upheavals, but also disintegration of a social order through ethnic conflict, as well as efforts at cultural restoration. As the region is currently undergoing a series of difficult changes, most of them are taking another look at the difficulties involved in democracy and the establishment of market economies at the same time that they are struggling through problems of social disintegration, reorganization and unification. A central theme in the research project therefore is how the region has changed as a result of these major political and social transformations, and therefore to think about what kinds of conditions will affect the possibilities for independent existence or coexistence of the different societies, states, and ethnic groups in the region. In order to get a firmer grasp on the complex issues involved in these transformations, this project aims at establishing a new comprehensive approach to Slavic-Eurasian studies, one which brings together different academic fields and theoretical traditions into an organic whole. As current changes in the region reflect important elements in global history, we absolutely must study them interdisciplinarily and comprehensively. This is particularly important as calls come from both inside and outside the academy for more accurate Japanese studies of the Slavic-Eurasian region.

The momentous changes in the international system, typified by the transformation of the Slavic region, represent a wonderful opportunity for



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Continuity and Change in Slavic Eurasia *continued*

NOTE

For more information about the "Existence and Coexistence in the Slavic-Eurasian Region" Priority Research Report, please see the special box item on page 14.

scholars by creating a path that is, in principle, open for field research, and improving the quantity and quality of information available. This research environment benefits scholars from a broad range of disciplines, including not only traditional ones like political science, economics, history, anthropology, and literature, but also geography, population studies, sociology, religious studies, education studies, and the like, by giving them new chances for innovative empirical research. Accordingly, scholars have to take advantage of this new environment by moving beyond a narrow focus on states, and instead move on to examinations of ethnic groups, religions, sub-regions of Slavic Eurasia, etc. In order to establish this comprehensive approach to Slavic-Eurasian studies, we need to reconsider the frame of western modernity that has affected previous studies.

The descriptive phrase in our title — "Existence and Coexistence" — refers to our efforts to discern the particularistic value systems that emphasize the independent existence of political, ethnic, or religious units, and the universalistic value systems that derive from general issues facing all these units and affecting their coexistence. There is a great variety of relationships among coexisting units, in terms of international, intraregional, and interethnic relations. We need therefore to determine the universalistic value systems and issues that will affect the region as a whole.

The goals of this research go far beyond the narrow walls of the academy. We hope that by spelling out some of the implications of these momentous changes, we will produce conclusions useful to people around the world, and will help to establish Japan as a major center of research on the Slavic-Eurasian region.

Our project has three main features in its examination of these transformations.

A) Transformation in Political Systems and Inter-regional Relations

Particularistic elements would include the traditional value systems associated with the states, regions, and ethnic groups in the area; for example, in Russia, these might include factors like traditional Russian thought, religion, and even art, as well as traditional Russian social norms. In examining the universalistic features of states, regions, and peoples, we will look at such universalistic ideals and systems as socialism, democracy, capitalism, and the rule of law. The issues here will be continuity, discontinuity, fragmentation and combination of universalism and particularism. Our object will be to uncover the importance of regime structure, regional political culture, regime patterns, elite behavior, and regional-ethnic interstate patterns of coexistence in the process of change.

B) Economic System Orientation and the Formation of New Economic Spheres

This feature will examine the dual processes of change in the transition from planned economies to market economies, and toward unification with the global economy. We will use both empirical studies to provide multilayered views of the current problems involved in creating new economic spheres and changing their basic orientation, and theoretical analyses developed from the comparative study of economic systems. In so doing, this project will determine which problems devolve from the individual characteristics of each country, and which appear to be endemic to the post-socialist economies. It will thus provide a deeper understanding not only of the possibility of applying the modern economic development model to these countries, but also of the historical meaning and role of the socialist system itself.

C) Social Change and Self-Awareness

The collapse of the "socialist society" identity that acted as an axis for the unification of different peoples and cultures under one roof has left a social-psychological void in which people are groping for new principles of social organization and combination. In addition to analyzing surface-level phenomena in the process of change, we will research such factors as ethnic self-consciousness, peoples' understandings of history, as well as forms of artistic self-expression. This project thus includes in the scope of inquiry both these more obvious socio-cultural factors — ethnic characteristics, environments, traditions, and historical processes — as well as the many transitory and historically contingent elements that have combined to create the current self-awareness of these societies.



Japanese Research on Soviet History *continued*

drawing a whole picture of the Stalinist regime, and has certainly opened up new pages in the study of Soviet history.

The reconstruction of Soviet history based on the use of recently opened archival documents has only just begun. Even so, the works noted above provide at least some evidence of the fertile possibilities in this new research environment. The burden for us historians, therefore, is to ensure that our work takes full advantage of this new wealth of information.



Existence and Coexistence in the Slavic-Eurasian Region: The Program

Area-wide Planned Research Topics and Team Leaders:

- *Political Reforms and the Process of Institutionalization* (S. Minagawa, Hokkaido University)
- *Systems of Regional Governance and Political Culture* (I. Ieda, Hokkaido University)
- *Evolution of Interregional and International Cooperation* (T. Hayashi, Hokkaido University)
- *Empirical Analysis of Enterprises in the Period of Economic Transition* (R. Yamamura, Hokkaido University)
- *Empirical Analysis of Structural Changes in the Economy and its Circular Flow* (S. Tabata, Hokkaido University)
- *Problems and Prospects of Interregional Economic Cooperation* (A. Nishimura, Hitotsubashi University)
- *Ethnic Problems and Conditions for Ethnic Coexistence* (K. Inoue, Hokkaido University)
- *Historical Perception of Regions and their Unification* (T. Hara, Hokkaido University)
- *Social Identity in Russian Literature* (T. Mochizuki, Hokkaido University)

Specialized Topics and Team Leaders:

- *Social Changes and Regional Politics in the Russian Far East During the Transition Period* (W. Fujimoto, Osaka University)
- *Cooperation of the Peripheral States of European-Russia* (H. Momose, Tsuda University)
- *Changes in Economic Structure and Problems of Foreign Workers in the Russian Far East* (S. Aramata, Hokkaido University)
- *Case Studies of Privatization of Workers' Self-Management Enterprises in the Former Yugoslavia* (H. Fujimura, Shiga University)
- *Transformation of the Economic System and the Environment in the Russian Far East* (Y. Genga, Okayama University)
- *Transformation of Ownership and Management in Rural Areas of the Former Soviet Union, Particularly Russia* (S. Okada, Kochi University)
- *Potentialities of Economic Development in the Russian Far East and the Role of Japan* (K. Miyamoto, Osaka Prefectural University)
- *The Market Economy and Industrial Relations Under the New Management System in Poland* (K. Kasahara/Rikkyo University)
- *The Russian School System and Its Curriculum in Transition* (S. Tokoro, Hokkaido University)
- *Ethnic Problems in the Caucasus in Historical Perspective* (S. Kitagawa, Hirosaki University)

Structural Change in China:

A New Research Program

MÔRI Kazuko

CHINA has once again leapt to the world's attention. Between rapid economic growth, domestic social and political upheavals, concerns about the post-Deng Xiaoping era, menacing gestures toward Taiwan, and new tension in its relationship with the US, China has become such a fixture on the front pages of the world's newspapers that file cabinets can no longer handle the daily loads of clippings. This growing importance, of course, means that many people, not just those who actually conduct research on China, pay considerably more attention to China's transitions than they had previously.

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Since April 1994, the Japanese Ministry of Education has been funding a cooperative research program entitled "Structural Change in Contemporary China — Interdisciplinary Research on the Present Stage and Prospects Toward the 21st Century," currently scheduled to run for three years. In the first year, there are more than eighty affiliated researchers, including those in the eight planned research groups as well as those contacted through public calls for research.

Since the 1980s, China's reform and open-door policies have brought about not only rapid economic growth, but also changes unprecedented in Chinese history in basic governmental structure, economic and social structures, China's place in the world system and the Asian-Pacific region in particular, and popular consciousness. Moreover, with Deng Xiaoping and the other remaining members of the "first generation of the revolution" certain to disappear from the political stage in the near future, we can expect to witness accelerated changes as a generational shift of leadership takes place.

With the 21st century just around the corner, theoretical analysis at both the micro- and macro-levels of the structural changes in contemporary China has become a pressing problem for researchers on China and the region for a number of reasons. One is that, with China's gigantic population of 1.2 billion, questions about what political and social structures or what economic structure China will adopt in the future, what kind of society it will build, and what kind of international ties it will forge in the Asia-Pacific region and elsewhere, are of immense importance to Japan and other neighbors of China, as well as to the world as a whole. These will necessarily affect how China relates to Southeast Asia, to Japan, and to the other countries of the region. In addition, there have been a number of forecasts of change in the nature of the Chinese state itself. For example, there is speculation that Chinese leaders will be pressured into modifying their goal of trying to construct a "nation state" — with a unified market, a homogenous population, and a centralized political system — and will instead seek to erect a new kind of system that represents a new model of the state. In other words, instead of adapting blindly to the existing international system based on the "nation-state," China will opt to become



Structural Change in China *continued*

an important player in the building of a new international system for the Asia-Pacific region.

As a result of modernization policies over the last 15 years, China now faces various problems. Among these are (1) tension between central power and the regions; (2) the twin but oppositional attractions of consolidation into a national market and of creating regional economic zones; (3) a weakening of ideology and the development of a free market economy, leading to an increase in social autonomy and change in the state-society relationship; (4) contradictions between "economic development" and human welfare, resulting from a one-track focus on economic growth that leads to environmental pollution, the weakening of educational conditions, and the like; (5) conflict between modernity and tradition; (6) the development of new kinds of tension between center (the authorities in Beijing) and periphery, particularly with border regions inhabited by ethnic minorities, and the "heresies" (Hong Kong and Taiwan); and (7) rivalry and tension in politics, military affairs, culture, and other arenas, regarding a new, ideal order in China's relations with its neighbor states.

This collaborative research project will start with the identification of these seven themes for multifaceted analysis through the use of three methods for approaching the issues at hand. These are (1) interdisciplinary research involving the cross-linkage of politics, economics, sociology, cultural anthropology, history, and international relations; (2) "vertical comparative analysis" involving China's own traditions, as well as modern and contemporary trends; and (3) "horizontal comparative analysis" with several countries in Southeast Asia that share common historical conditions and problems with China and that are achieving success in economic development and the creation of a "nation-state" (modernization). Comparison with Russia and other countries making the transition from socialism will also be important in this context.

It is, of course, easy to say things like "multifaceted approach," "comparative analysis," and "interdisciplinary research," but there are few cases of real success in the field. For many years, Japanese research on China has been among the best in the world, but in the field of cooperative, organized, and comparative research, there is still much that we can and must learn from our colleagues in the US and elsewhere.

We are eager to begin and to succeed in this three-pronged approach to studying China's transformation. The project brings together not only seasoned China hands as well as some of the most energetic and flexible thinkers in the younger generation of China scholars, but also scholars in the broader field of Asian area studies. We expect that cooperative research — based on a common understanding of the problems and hypotheses requiring attention — will bring us closer to the above-mentioned goal and also enable us to establish new viewpoints in the research on China.

...a comprehensive yet coherent approach to understanding contemporary China... is, of course, a daunting task.

According to our assumption at the beginning of this project, the core of the problem can be formulated in the following question: will experiments with modernization and the "departure from socialism" in a country like China — a gigantic country and rigid, constraining social and cultural traditions — necessarily trace the course of the Western state model, even in an international system entirely composed of such states? China itself has been pursuing this course since 1949 and continues to do so now, but "departure from the nation-state model" may join "departure from socialism" as a keyword for China in the 21st century.

Another ambitious goal of this project is to reconstruct Japanese studies of China in terms of staff, materials, and organizations, and to pursue an international research network with scholars not only in China, but also in the US, Europe, and Asia. If the research project accomplishes this goal, it will have helped to shift Japan from being a "receiving" country for information and ideas toward one recognized as a "transmitting" country. Of course, this is also a tremendously difficult task. Fortunately, however, the project gathers many young scholars and Chinese scholars. The accumulation of micro-level case studies is becoming more and more important because changes in China itself demand new viewpoints and new methods. Materials are not only to be gathered, but also to be utilized more effectively. Continuous research demands organized efforts to gather, to arrange, and to open information on resources and materials. Seeking to help make Japan a "transmitting" country, we plan to hold international symposia and the like, and also to publish an English language version of our reports. Some scholars have predicted that the 21st century will turn out to be "the Asia era," but it is also possible to believe that it will be the "Century of China." Relations between Japan and Asia, and in particular China, are likely to deepen. Taking a fresh look at the 20th century and making projections about the 21st, we would like to continue our intellectual efforts, seeking a clearer and more accurate portrait of China.



Outline of the "Structural Change in Contemporary China" Project

Research Teams and Leaders

General Team (K. Mori, Yokohama City University)

Structural Change in Chinese Politics Team (S. Amako, Aoyama Gakuin University)

Toward a Free Market Economy Team (K. Nakagane, University of Tokyo)

State-Society Relations Team (M. Nishida, University of Shizuoka)

Environment and Education Team (R. Kojima, Daito Bunka University)

Contemporary China in History Team (S. Nishimura, Osaka University of Foreign Studies)

The Chinese World and Its Environs Team (K. Mori, Yokohama City University)

China and the Asia-Pacific Region Team (K. Tanaka, University of Shizuoka)

Japanese Research on Vietnam

FURUTA Motoo



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It is a little known fact that Japan is the home of the world's largest professional organization in the field of social science and humanities devoted specifically to studies of Vietnam. This is the 100-member Japan Association for Vietnamese Studies (*Nihon betonamu kenkyusha kaigi*). This association was established in 1987 in order to promote research on Vietnam as well as to provide an environment for open scholarly exchange with Vietnam, and was first headed by Yamamoto Tatsuro, a professor emeritus at the University of Tokyo.

The most important reason for the large number of Vietnam researchers and other scholars with a great interest in Vietnam is historical tradition. Japanese research on Asian history has long focused on China and the nearby countries of the region, and Vietnam became the object of Japanese academic attention at a relatively early stage, in part because many of the important materials are written in kanji. Before World War II, a number of Japanese scholars — principally Matsumoto Nobuhiro, Fujiwara Riichiro, and Yamamoto, mentioned above — began to absorb information and studies collected by the *Ecole Francaise d'Extreme-Orient*, and helped to set the cornerstone for future Japanese research on Vietnam.

A second reason for the continuing interest in Vietnam is the existence of excellent Vietnamese language programs in Japan. During the 1960s, Japanese universities developed an organized system for teaching Vietnamese, particularly under the tutelage of Takeuchi Yonosuke of Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, and Kawamoto Kunie, a professor at Keio University. The growing Vietnamese-language proficiency of scholars, combined with increasing interest in this country, connected to the Vietnam War, helped to enlarge the scope of Vietnam studies.

Finally, and perhaps against expectations, Japanese research on Vietnam was not brought to a sudden stop at the end of the Vietnam War, but rather continued to develop through the 1970s. Like elsewhere, a number of new hands joined the field of Vietnam studies in Japan during the war. This meant that when the war ended in 1975, Japan still had a young generation of Vietnam experts at work on the country. In contrast to the US and France, where a great amount of knowledge about Vietnam had accumulated over time, and yet where the studies declined at the end of the war, Japan witnessed rapid development in its examinations of Vietnam. Exchange between Japanese and Vietnamese researchers may not have been extensive, but neither was it severed. Early in the 1980s, about 40 Japanese researchers on Vietnam — many of them young scholars and graduate students — established an annual overnight get-together, at which they were able to share ideas regarding research on Vietnam. As time went on, they began to press for closer intellectual ties with Vietnam, and in 1985 succeeded in opening the door for Japanese graduate students to participate in exchange programs at Hanoi University. They also became the backbone of the Japan Association for Vietnamese Studies, which was established in 1987. In so

Japanese Views on the Socialist Economies in Transition

doing, these young scholars helped to prepare the path for the improvement of ties between the governments of the two countries.

Perhaps the best symbol of this era of intellectual exchange between the two countries was the Hoi An International Symposium, held in March 1990, in Da Nang, in the central region of Vietnam. During the 17th century, Hoi An, being Vietnam's representative international trading port, was the site of a large-scale Japanese village. This beautiful city still manages to maintain the flavor of Southeast Asian port towns. Da Nang was chosen as the site for an international symposium specifically on the area's cultural resources. It was the first large-scale international symposium in the field of social sciences and humanities held in Vietnam since the end of the war. Because of the existence of the old Japanese town, the active participation of Japanese scholars in the symposium was particularly anticipated. The Japan Association for Vietnamese Studies dispatched 14 scholars to participate in the symposium, and also took various steps in Japan to ensure sufficient funding for the conference. The Hoi An International Symposium was successful not only for the rich insights contained in the papers, but also because it symbolized the dawn of a new era of international exchange between Vietnam and Japan.

The content of Japanese studies on Vietnam has begun to broaden in recent years. Due to the background of Japanese research on Vietnam, Japanese scholars had mainly used archaeological and historical approaches, but scholars from fields such as political science, economics, ethnic studies, literature, linguistics, sociology, international relations, and legal studies have now entered the discussion. Among other topics, many scholars are devoting special attention to present conditions under the Doi Moi reforms.

Before the Doi Moi reforms, it was extremely difficult for foreign researchers to get close enough to Vietnamese society to make any sort of coherent or reliable descriptions, explanations, or the like. Currently, however, Vietnam is the most open country in Southeast Asia for research, which enables Japanese scholars to organize field research in cooperation with Vietnamese scholars. As a result, Japanese researchers have begun to work on larger-scale studies of certain aspects of Vietnamese society, or certain regions of the country, for example, a Comprehensive Agriculture Survey in Bach Coc village near Nam Dinh in the northern region of Vietnam, and a Survey on Urban Space in Hoi An.

Japanese research on Vietnam can be evaluated as being one of the most active among the area studies fields in Japan, and academic exchange between the two countries has become quite intensive. Despite this high productivity, the field has not been sufficiently "internationalized." The next task for Japanese research on Vietnam must be to distribute its findings abroad. An international symposium in which scholars on Vietnam all over the world would participate might be a big step in this direction.



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
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
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Civilizations in the World Political Economy

Robert Cox
Professor Emeritus
Faculty of Arts, York University
October 9, 1996

The international system faces more serious upheavals and problems than conventional approaches to interstate relations can explain or delineate. Professor Cox argued that we need to develop a new understanding of social and political interaction that reflects an understanding of the history of the forces involved. He proposed a focus on civilizations, which he defines as patterned interaction based on intersubjective understandings that are linked to market or economic forces. This is not a simple matter of referring to a crude economic base or substructure and its cultural/political superstructure, but rather an effort to determine what kinds of forces are propelling people to behave in radically different ways. Referring to the "End of History" posited by Frances Fukuyama and others touting the victory of Western liberalism as the only surviving form of ideology or legitimate political form, Cox argued that the western market civilization is indeed dominant, but is coming under increasing attack from other forces that should be understood as civilizations in their own rights. Among these, he cited the rise of Islamic movements, environmental movements, and movements for the rights of indigenous peoples, all of which are explicit challenges to the prevailing logic of political and economic interaction that many scholars have today accepted as being natural and permanent.



From Economic Superpower to What Power?

Japanese Foreign Policy in the 1990s

Reinhard Drifte
Director, Newcastle East Asia Centre
Professor, Department of Politics
University of Newcastle Upon Tyne
September 11, 1996

Professor Drifte, discussing his new book, argued that Japanese foreign policy has too often been explained either by conventional theories of international relations that deductively assume a national interest given by system structure or by a thesis of abdication that suggests that Japan simply works for economic gains and not for anything more complicated. His approach, however, suggests that in the post-Cold War world, current Japanese strategies are likely to change, and that we are going to have to start looking for Japanese influence, particularly in the Asian region, in ways typically ignored by IR scholars. Using the distinction between "hard power" and "soft power," Drifte submitted that Japan's economic strategies would, in the long run, start to align the interests of Japan's neighbors with its own interests, or that Japan would build a foreign policy based on persuasion rather than straightforward coercion.

Deconstructing Power:

Explaining the Declining Effectiveness of US Pressure on Japan

Leonard J. Schoppa
Associate Professor
Department of Government and Foreign Affairs
University of Virginia
September 19, 1996

Using his recent research on US-Japan trade conflicts, Professor Schoppa argued that the decline in US control over outcomes in Japanese trade policy cannot be explained either by the weakening of the US position in the international system or by a simple decision by Japan to stand firm. Instead, American problems are linked to developments in how Japan perceived US threats and claims. In other words, factors ranging from Japan's political reforms to the persistence of US budget deficits have altered the social — not the material — context in which negotiations take place. Using the literature on the social construction of the international system, Schoppa suggested that the US and Japan would have to build a new relationship in which issues of respect, affect, and legitimacy would help to shore up America's claims rather than to undermine them. By solving some of its own more discouraging economic problems and pressuring Japan more quietly, the US would likely be in a better position to extract concessions.



The Yuppies and the Fossils:

Three Generations of Japanese Research on Chinese Law

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IN postwar Japan, the Chinese Revolution had a big impact not only on political activity but also on how people view and study socialism. It is regrettable, however, that among the large numbers of China scholars in Japan, there are few who focus explicitly on issues of law and legal construction in China. In the first few years after the Chinese revolution, a "first generation" of scholars grew up and dedicated themselves to understanding the makeup of the Chinese legal system. One of the common characteristics of these scholars, however, was the tendency to view China somewhat sympathetically, throughout such tumultuous periods as the Korean War, the denunciations of Stalin, the China-Soviet disputes, and the Cultural Revolution. Particularly after the death of Mao Tse-Tung and the repudiation of the Cultural Revolution, the relative infrequency of new publications by these scholars suggests that they were slowed down by their years and, perhaps, by a loss of motivation as well.

Consequently, the "second generation" scholars on Chinese law have taken a more critical position regarding their subject matter, particularly the Cultural Revolution. This does not mean that the second generation of Japanese scholars of Chinese law defines itself politically in opposition to the first generation. Rather, these scholars are trying to jettison the excess ideological baggage of research on China, and to focus their attention more on empirical research. This has in part been facilitated by pro-democratic moves in China, especially those that allow the opening of information to people outside of the government. Consequently, researchers on Chinese law are not abandoning their pursuit of political themes. As the descendants of the first generation of China scholars, they too have a strong interest in Chinese law as socialist law. Law is, moreover, an extremely broad discipline, one in which empirical research can be pursued across a wide range of fields. The second generation of Japanese scholars on Chinese law has therefore focused on such varied topics as political and economic reform; transitions from socialism; single party systems and democratization; long-term historical understandings of human rights; and the dilemmas of tradition and reform. As a result, these cannot be seen as simply empirical studies, but as empirical research aimed at producing deeper theories.

The last decade has seen the emergence of a "third generation" of scholars on Chinese law. The most important characteristic of the new scholars is that they, in marked contrast to their predecessors, have more or less broken entirely from socialism. In practice, this means that they are less concerned with tying their studies into general theories of socialist legal development, and more interested in separating their empirical analyses from the socialist frame that had guided earlier work; it means more studies of individual cases and fields, and fewer of the "Chinese system" as a whole. The fields represented include Chinese criminal law, civil law, and economic law, among others. As recently as 10 years ago, there was barely any research on things as important as "Economic Reform and the Establishment of

. . .the idea of studying Chinese law. . .seems a bit nerdy to many of these younger scholars.

Enterprise Laws," but today, one can find related research on topics as esoteric as "Comparative Legal Studies on Corporate Governance under Chinese Law," and the like.

This probably sounds like an unqualified improvement: from general, ideologically or theoretically driven analyses to narrower, more technical studies on certain aspects of China. In many ways, this does represent progress, but before chalking this up as one more self-congratulatory success story for academia in the 1990s, we ought to think about what we are giving up in these more narrow analyses. The third generation of scholars has grown up with a China more knowable and less foreign than it was for their predecessors. Many studied in China as foreign students, have outstanding language skills, and are part of a broader generation of young Japanese who frequently jet hop between Tokyo and parts of China. As a result, the idea of studying China as a "socialist" country, particularly with reference to Chinese law, rather than as just a familiar developing country, seems a bit nerdy to many of these younger scholars. But as Japan deepens its ties with China, from both official and academic viewpoints, it is probably more important than ever to understand the legal underpinnings of the Chinese socialist system. We should be grateful for specialized knowledge and for a closer understanding of some of the technical issues facing China, but we risk losing as much as we gain if we dissolve the Chinese system into being something knowable on the level of political and economic minutiae, rather than as a fundamentally different system of socialism.

This kind of problem even exists for Chinese students visiting and researching Japan. Originally, when Chinese students came to study law in Japan, they came to study *Japanese* law, which they usually used as an opportunity to do research that reflected their Chinese legal interests. In contrast, these days a number of these students are coming to Japan specifically to study Chinese law. In fact, in the graduate classes I lead on Chinese law, over half of my students are from China. For the most part, these students came to Japan in order to benefit from the high level of specialization in Japanese legal studies. Fuelled by the development of more rich and nuanced legislation in the Chinese system, these students are continuously producing research that reflects the specialization of their training here.

This trend means that a small number of young Japanese specialists on Chinese law probably have a much broader effect than their numbers would suggest, and therefore that there are some real stakes in these academic disputes. To the second generation, the third generation of Japanese experts of Chinese law looks like a bunch of yuppies produced by China's shift to a market economy. And the third generation tends to see the first- and second-generation scholars as a more or less undifferentiated group of fossilized anachronisms. The fossils sit around and discuss the differences between socialist and capitalist law, or opine on simple verbal distinctions between



different kinds of laws. The new generation then asks whether it would be out of the question to investigate real problems that make the earlier arguments seem only academic and trite.

After the legal developments from the 14th Party Congress, it seems that there may be a rapid desertion of many of the legal principles of socialism and a movement toward the creation of a modern citizenship system in China. This development almost certainly favors the yuppies of Japanese research on Chinese laws; it is up to the fossils to figure out whether they have anything to say, or whether they will be left in the dustbin of academic history.



**New Issue: *Shakai Kagaku Kenkyu* (The Journal of Social Science)
Vol. 48, No. 3 (November 1996)**

Articles

- Some Features of Company Groups in Postwar Japan
Takeo KIKKAWA and Hiroyuki KIKUCHI
- A History of Social Science in the United States: J.W. Burgess and His Vision of Political Science
Shinji KARITA
- Japanese Firms in Financial Distress and Main Banks: Analyses of Interest Rate Premia
Juro HASHIMOTO, Shigemi IZUMIDA and Masahiro IZUMIDA
- Enteignungsverfahren und "oeffentliches Interesse"
Narufumi KADOMATSU
- The Russian Machine Building Industry in Transition
Sadayoshi OHTSU

Book Reviews (Book titles are translated from Japanese)

- Akira KUDO, *I.G. Farben's Japan Strategy*
Reviewed by Takeshi ABE
- Takeo KIKKAWA, *The Development of the Japanese Electric Power Industry and Matsunaga Yasuzaemon*
Reviewed by Minoru SAWAI
- A la recherche de (l'histoire) perdue
Compte rendu: MORITA Osamu, *La structure juridique de l'exécution forcée*
Reviewed by Atsushi OMURA
- Mitsuo ISHIDA, Masao INOUE, Yoshihiko KAMII, and Michio NITTA, eds., *Comparative Studies in Industrial Relations: The United States, Europe and Japan*
Reviewed by Susumu HAGIWARA

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An Author's Note:

Structure and Change in Chinese Agriculture

BEFORE the mid-1980s, Chinese agriculture had achieved phenomenal and rapid growth through the deregulation of distribution, the raising of agricultural prices, and the transition from collective farming to family-based farm management after the beginning of economic reforms in 1978. The mid-1980s, however, brought Chinese agriculture into a "wandering" period of relatively slow growth. Since the end of 1993, however, Chinese agriculture has lost its surpluses, and the concomitant rise in prices have helped to produce general inflation. But agricultural exports continue to outperform imports, leaving China considerably in the black in its agricultural trade balance.

If we take a look at a breakdown of agricultural products, we find that the direct consumption has not kept pace with growth in population. Production of other commodities — of grain, including for fodder use — has been increasing. Looking at China's comparative advantage, it is possible that its dependence on imports of wheat and maize will continue to grow.¹ It is important to note, however, that the central problem facing Chinese agriculture is its shift from production shortages toward a structural adjustment for supply dictated by market principles.

Another problem for Chinese agriculture is the size of family farms. According to tradition, family plots are distributed equally among village members. As of 1995, there were 230 million households involved in farming in China, and at the most recent count, July 1996, there were only 130 million hectares of cultivated land.² Even comparing China to some of the other crowded countries in East Asia, the population density of farming areas is a far more serious problem for China than anywhere else, and also puts the disparity in productivity between agriculture and manufacturing into high relief.

Accordingly, structural adjustment in agriculture — particularly as marketization and deregulation proceed — will mean that excess labor will be forced to move off the farms and into other sectors of the Chinese economy.

In order to deal with the issues raised above, this book examines China's agricultural problems by using detailed macro- and micro-level data to demonstrate how its structural problems have evolved, based in part on comparison with the agricultural systems of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. In doing the research for this book, I completed a survey of 600 households across nine counties, and have used the data both to provide an analysis of the current conditions of these farms, as well as to offer clues as to changes they will likely undergo.

Below I present an overview of the work, including detailed summaries of the major findings of each chapter.

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NEW BOOK: *Chûgoku Nôgyô no Kôzô to Hendô*
Structure and Change in Chinese Agriculture

by TAJIMA Toshio (Tokyo: Ochanomizu Press, 1996)

Contents

Chapter 1: *Main Issues*

Chapter 2: *Structure and Change in Chinese Agriculture*

Chapter 3: *Agricultural Development in North China*

Chapter 4: *Agricultural and Rural Structure of Shangdong Province, Wucheng County*

Chapter 5: *Development and Structure of Large Scale Grain Management*

Chapter 1 provides a literature review and a discussion of the issues involved.

Based on macro- and micro-level data, Chapter 2 offers a bird's eye view of structure and change in Chinese agriculture and the agricultural market. Using research from seven different counties across the country, it furthermore clarifies the structure of management and employment in Chinese family farms. Because of the equivalent distribution of arable land among farmers, the resulting small size of plots, and the low rent, structural adjustment in Chinese agriculture often takes the form of multi-item or side-business engagements for farmers outside of grain production. The effort to mitigate risk through diversification of activities thus typifies the transition toward a market-based system.

Japanese Views on the Socialist Economies in Transition

Chapter 3 examines Northern China in more detail, showing the development in productivity from the Republic of China era through the present day. In particular, it traces the introduction of high-yield varieties, the increase of modern inputs, and the expansion of "double-cropping," as well as the development of irrigation/drainage systems in the People's Republic era. The deregulation and reform of Chinese agriculture was therefore realized on the productivity base established in the pre-reform era.

Against the historical background provided in the third chapter, Chapter 4 takes a more detailed look at the current status of Chinese agriculture, using survey data that points out the structure of the agricultural economy at the county, township, village, and even farm levels. Focusing mainly on the development of cotton production, the chapter provides an examination of change in employment practices in villages in which farmers have been able to develop and enter new industries based on agricultural change. Among other current issues, this chapter examines individual management and the collapse of collective means of dealing with infrastructural equipment; the instability of product and livestock markets; the effect of a freer labor market on the structure of the economy of villages; and how the levying of fees and rent on land affects the likelihood of efficient or inefficient use of the land.

Regarding the possibility of the growth of large-scale grain production, Chapter 5 analyzes interviews and production cost data collected from Datong County of Shanxi Province, and Shunyi County of Beijing. This section points directly at a major problem facing grain farms in China. Mechanization, the development of nonagricultural employment opportunities, and moderate land rent fees would seem to encourage a shift toward large-scale farming. Deregulation of the land-use system, however, suggests the possibility of increases in land-use fees, which would essentially break the back of efforts of a shift toward large-scale agricultural projects.

In spite of the diversity of the information and survey data in the book, its implications are clear. One is that the development of an efficient agricultural economy in China is likely to be hampered by such factors as restrictions on labor migration as well as the system of land distribution. The book further suggests that agricultural market imperfections are likely to hinder China's structural adjustment. In addition, delays in China's reorganization of agriculture and the reliance on individual management of small farms, will make it difficult to provide collective goods efficiently. In essence, this book aims to make a unique contribution by taking a different angle from the neoclassical economic liberalization approach to solutions to China's agricultural problems.



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¹Lester R. Brown. *Who Will Feed China* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995). This work examines how China's reliance on food imports is becoming a global problem, but its analysis is hampered by its neglect on the effects of prices on Chinese and global supply-and-demand in foodstuffs.

²*People's Daily*, June 25, 1996.

Japanese Associations for Research on the Socialist and Post-Socialist Countries

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Temporalizations of Space in Japanese Historiography, 1945-55

Sebastian CONRAD

WHEN Ienaga Saburo published his *New History of Japan* in 1947 (one of a host of 'new histories' in the immediate postwar period), he opened the book with a color reproduction of a 17th century world map. In the days of Tokugawa Ieyasu "the eyes of the Japanese people were exposed to the world for the first time," Ienaga explained, and thereby indicated the necessity of resuming that point of view in the postwar present. The prominent location of the geographical map suggests that even the history of Japan could now only be told from a perspective of world history.

These were not uncommon ideas in the early days of postwar historiography, heavily influenced by a paradigm of historical materialism. However, invocation of the category of the 'world' implied less the geographical expansion of analytical scope but rather the location of all history within one unified 'world historical time.' In fact, situating Japan within the universal course of historical development was common currency among most Japanese historians in the late 1940s. Only by applying the laws of world history was it deemed possible to make sense of the country's past. This conviction privileged the category of time over space — differences were not due to indigenous developments or an 'unbroken Imperial succession,' but rather attributable to a lag in time. Japan was thus characterized by remnants of feudal or even older days, rather than 'unparalleled in the world' (*banpo muhi*) as had been said during the wartime period. Unlike former attempts to create a "Japan from a world-historical perspective" (associated with the Kyoto School) Japan was now perceived as only backward in time, not the geographical center of an alternative hegemony. Consequently, in Ienaga's map Japan is relegated to the very fringes of the globe, since the Japanese "have learned about the position of Japan in relation to the world." The center of the map, incidentally, is occupied by Western Europe.

The collapse of spatial difference into developments in time is a conspicuous trend in the works of postwar historians; likewise, historians who have dealt with this historiography have largely ignored questions of place and have focused instead on periodization. Historiography is not so much seen as originating in a specific place and reflecting geographical relations of power, but rather as 'progressive' or 'reactionary'. Most accounts of Japanese historiography therefore proclaim the postwar years as the beginning of an entirely new, scientific way of dealing with the past. Toyama Shigeki, author of the only authoritative monograph to date on postwar historiography, is convinced that "after the war both historiography and the historical consciousness of the people drastically changed; it was now stressed that history is a science" (Toyama, 10).

Apart from the fact that there was much more continuity in the writing of history than Toyama would allow for (the late 1940s could even be labelled as an era of recycling of pre-1945 scholarship), this preoccupation with periodization and the search for methodological 'progress' also entails a neglect of the spatial dimension of historiographical endeavors. But



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historians are always embedded in geographical relationships, best epitomized by the American occupation of Japan. In historiographical works, too, space (as well as time) is not a mere category of historical description but is charged with meaning and serves to systematize events within an ideological 'order of things.' Geographical relations of power influenced the writing of history in the decade following the war, while at the same time spatial classifications were used as allegedly disinterested and neutral categories of a timeless and universal nature.

Apart from rigid hierarchies in the university system that tied scientific enunciations to geographical points of origin (i.e. Kyodai versus Todai), in the immediate postwar period it was the American presence that most decisively limited the range of interpretations that could count as historically true. The power to interpret history was sometimes displayed without disguise, as in the case of the GHQ-drafted 'History of the Pacific War' (serialized in the major national newspapers) and the prohibition of the term 'Greater East Asian War' in 1946. And also the Tokyo War Crimes Trial, as well as the total set of postwar reforms, conveyed an American evaluation of the Japanese past that even years later was not easy to overcome. Ienaga Saburo's decision to call his book about the war 'The Pacific War' (a title that focuses on the hostilities begun in 1941) was late (1968) but still palpable proof of these difficulties. What Ienaga in fact described was what he considered the '15-year-war,' but the term '*taiheiyo senso*' was by that time so engrained into public consciousness that it seemed impossible to alter.

In many cases, however, influence was not a matter of will or intention; the 'West' had displayed its superiority (and thereby, it seemed, its universality), and it was deemed inevitable to adopt some of those universal values. Essentially, defeat and subsequent occupation prompted a redefinition of what could count as 'universal' — a universality that derived from space but was expressed in terms of (more or less 'advanced') time. Japanese history, in contrast, was seen as utterly backward — since the Meiji Restoration, but according to some versions since well before that. In Marxist terms, defeat seemed to have verified the *kôzaha*-orthodoxy that Japan had not even made it to a proper bourgeois revolution. Not least therefore was it military defeat and the incorporation into a democratic-capitalist world order that seemed to furnish Japanese history with a telos and entailed the search for prior deviations from that path.

This interpretation stimulated intensive comparative studies that provided the analysis of Japan's development with a historiometrical yardstick. As historians of Europe like Takahashi Kohachiro or Otsuka Hisao explicitly declared, the probing into European modern history was no self-sufficient exercise, but rather served to position Japan's history with respect to a universal norm. To be sure, the geographical index of this norm was covered and turned opaque by a layer of temporal metaphors. Accordingly, studies of Japanese history

...situating Japan within the universal course of historical development was common currency among most Japanese historians in the late 1940s

liturgically referred to the supposedly typical, sound, and advanced development of a (in fact narrowly limited) Western Europe, while Japan's past was depicted as late, deviant, distorted, and backward.

This apotheosis of the cradle of capitalism was not without its counterpart. While notions of inferiority with respect to an idealized 'West' seemed ubiquitous after the war, this measuring of development versus a universal law of history also implied the allotting of positions of even further backwardness to China or Korea. 'Asia' was now equivalent to irrationality, backwardness, and the Asiatic mode of production. Within historical discourse this interpretation entailed the tacit acceptance, if not of the war, then of some of the assumptions that had supported it: namely the conviction that Asian history was characterized by stagnation, and that Japan might have to take the lead in the modernization (however defined) of Asia

Historiography in the decade after World War II was governed by the idea of a linear historical development against which the position of each country could be measured. This concept implied the temporalization of geography, and the differing histories of the respective nations were subsumed into an overarching world history. This unifying principle, however, was often only ritually invoked, and concrete analysis of Japanese history more often than not rested on the premise that it was possible to discern the laws of history in development within the bounds of one single country.

Concurrently, geographical entities were also redefined and spatial relations naturalized, as Naoki Sakai has recently pointed out. In the process, collective identities were constructed that seemed to rely on neutral classifications and defy historicization. These strategies included reevaluations of what could count as the 'West'; the oldest academic journal of the historical profession for example, the *Shigaku Zasshi*, in 1949 abolished its German language resumé and instead began to publish summaries in English. And while this changing, but nonetheless transcendentalized, 'West' was postulated as a model, Japan at the same time reassured its identity versus a self-defined and backward 'East'. This mechanism was not confined to the immediate postwar decade, however. When in 1990 the sinologist Furumaya Tadao analyzed the sphere of trade between Japan and Northeast Asia (*Rekishigaku Kenkyu* 610), he referred to the geographical entities as "*omote Ajia*" and "*ura Nippon*." Japan's Western coast was characterized as the 'backside,' seen from Tokyo and the 'West,' i.e. America. On the other hand, the Eastern coast of Korea and Siberia was elevated to the status of Asian 'frontline,' basking in the now industrialized and advanced sun of Amaterasu.

Therefore, the uses of geographical place in historical narrative betray the concepts and ideologies that are present in any historical interpretation. At the same time, the production of a discourse on history is itself situated in a specific time and place; not only the past that historians relate, but also the historians themselves are embedded in (real and perceived) time/space relationships. In fact, it is the interpretation of that concrete time and place (the position of Japan within the global world order) that determines how the past is situated within the scheme of historical space and time.



The Economic Cure for Political Vulnerability?

ODA Policy Change and Continuity in Germany and Japan

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BECOMING the core state of an emerging regional bloc might be, in many ways, an enviable position. But it also carries with it a series of heavy responsibilities, including an expectation among individual states as well as the international community as a whole that the government will do more to promote regional and economic growth, and to work to stabilize North-South relations. The legacies of World War II left Germany and Japan each in the position of having to perform virtually all of their foreign policy tasks without the use or threat of use of their own armed forces, and international economic links have been of great and obvious significance to both. In particular, Japan's development policy will not only help to determine which of the Asian developing countries will join Singapore and South Korea as industrialized countries, but can help to create political institutions that will deter militarily and territorially aggressive states from becoming destabilizers of the international system. In Europe, German development policy, interacting with the European Union's (EU) regional and extraregional development policy, will surely influence the speed, inclusiveness, and solidarity of the EU's integration process. It is clear, therefore, that the development of both East Asia and Europe (including some of the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union) will be greatly affected by German and Japanese development assistance policy.

In this new context of international relations, the puzzle I want to solve here is why Japan's development cooperation policy has changed drastically since the mid-1970s in accordance with the structural change in the international economy — from mercantilism toward greater support for international cooperation — while Germany, a secondary and civilian power similar to Japan, demonstrated little sensitivity to change in the international system in its aid policy. As is well known, the increase in Japan's share of official development assistance (ODA) among OECD countries, especially after 1975, seems to correspond to American relative decline and to Japan's meteoric rise in the international economy, whereas Germany's share and geographical distribution remained relatively unchanged. I argue that the differences in the foreign policy path of each country resulted primarily from differences in each state's vulnerability to the international system, as well as to the orientation toward the proper use of aid of relevant domestic actors. To say that one needs to examine both domestic and international politics is not particularly new; what I suggest, however, is that changes in aid policy cannot be explained unless we examine the ways in which international position and domestic policy orientation reinforce and shape one another.

The International Positions of Germany and Japan

The international position of a state informs its systemic vulnerability, and is determined by the degree of embeddedness of a state in the international or regional system. Moreover, an international position is more fruitfully defined as being a function of a state's place in an international division of

labor and further shaped by a state's institutional development, rather than in terms of a simple "realist" distribution of capabilities.

The different choices by post-war German and Japanese leaders helped to set the stage for this institutional development. In contrast to Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, who sought to protect Germany through political and military integration into Western Europe, Yoshida separated economics from both political and security matters, and understood international relations as economic competition among nation-states. And it was the so-called Yoshida Doctrine that determined Japan's unique status in the international community by articulating the principles of maintaining the nation's security under the US, avoiding both a high political profile and participation in ideological conflicts, and expanding economic relations to serve national development goals, within the bounds of the first two principles. In so doing, Japan moved closer toward what I would consider a pure international trading state; to a much greater extent than did Germany, it linked its goals to a broad international system rather than to a specific region, though it too has made steps toward promoting a regional order. In being more international and less regional, however, Japan increased its vulnerability to changes in international regimes, particularly those regimes dealing with trade, investment, and capital flows.

Domestic Orientations toward Aid

It is not enough to note, however, that Japan has been more vulnerable internationally, and has had to take into account global responsibilities differently than has had Germany. ODA policies result from more than simple systemic placement. A wealth of recent English language literature on Japan's ODA policy, or *keizai kyôryoku* (economic cooperation), has appeared in recent years, and many of these have correctly noted not only bureaucratic turf fights over aid, but also how aid serves the goals of domestic economic actors. I argue, in brief, that whereas German domestic politics is characterized by the use of political compensation in order to promote adjustment and economic flexibility, in Japan, domestic economic actors work more closely with the state, in the sense that they pursue private economic gains largely in concert with national economic goals.

In Japan, the carefully managed pooling of information among economic actors has been central to national economic development. The government's foreign aid apparatus — divided between ministries and administrative agencies — is linked tightly through ministerial networks to business leaders and other domestic economic interests, and the use of public-private institutions ensures that aid bureaucrats know business plans and, correspondingly, that business leaders understand political initiatives. Japanese ODA in many cases targets countries in which Japanese firms and businesses have an interest, and provides infrastructure-building grants and export credits that then benefit Japanese firms in addition to the host countries. The most important political consequence of the

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synchronization of private and public resources is the high level of economic gains accruing specifically to Asia.

Germany's corporatist governance system that includes not only economic but also social, religious, and other interests, clearly distinguishes it from Japan, and provides a significantly different domestic policy background for ODA. Corporatist institutions in Germany, which decentralize the policymaking process while centralizing the representation of societal actors, have contributed to the continuity of German policy. For example, although the Ministry of Economic Cooperation (BMZ) retains the last word in most aid disbursements, in practice it relies heavily on guidance from interministerial committees, which serve as parapublic institutions, linking centralized societal organizations with decentralized state actors. These societal actors place consistent pressure on the state to pursue certain goals with development aid, forcing concessions and compensation that, once instituted, become relatively resistant to change. For example, political foundations — traditionally the most centralized of Germany's powerful NGOs — have used their connections with political parties to ensure that their interests are taken into account in BMZ decisions. Similarly, religious organizations have been so important in developing humanitarian grant aid to the third world (German private grants exceed those of Japanese NGOs by a factor of five to seven), and the government in fact subcontracts implementation of its humanitarian aid to German churches. The important factor here is the reliance of the German state on societal actors as well as the impossibility of major policy change without a broad social consensus. Because the type, volume, and purpose of aid is decided by a broad number of actors, German aid policy is somewhat more sensitive to domestic politics than to international change.

Implications

If a country, like Japan, depends on a global-scope international division of labor which includes both developing countries and industrialized economies for natural resources, markets for export goods, and sites of direct investment, it may feel high vulnerability to the collapse of the existing international economic order and thus obliged to favor foreign economic policies in a way commensurate with the profits it derives from the world economy. Using the German case for contrast, this perspective of a loop between international relations and domestic politics throws a wrench into prevailing theories that neatly distinguish between the two, or that create simple, unilinear models of one sphere influencing the other. This case study of aid policy demonstrates the value of this kind of approach, because no static structural analysis can capture the paradox of Japan's international cooperation and its pursuit of national gains. Particularly as international change poses new questions of identity for Japan (the new "Asianism," for example), eclectic theorizing of this type will contribute to a better understanding of the dilemmas faced by Japan as well as its fellow actors on an increasingly complex international stage.



New Book

Junji Banno's *Kindai Nihon no Kokka Kôshô, 1871-1936*
(Ideas of the Political System in Modern Japan, 1871-1936).
Tokyo: Iwanami Press, 1996.

An Excerpt from the Preface

This book describes a sixty-five year conflict between differing concepts of the Japanese political system held by politicians and intellectuals, from the abolition of the han system and establishment of prefectures in 1871 to the attempted coup d'etat on February 26th 1936.

The study confines itself to these sixty-five years because it was during that period that constitutional politics established itself in Japan; in the early days, the argument concentrated on whether a constitution should be introduced at all, but by the latter half of the period the debate had shifted to the question of how to protect what had been achieved. Kido Takayoshi's written statement of 1873, discussed in Chapter 1, gives a representative flavour of the debate in the early phase:

"In civilized countries, even sovereign princes do not change the system for their own ends... public servants respect the commonly agreed national purpose... the people themselves reform unsuitable practices... their elected representatives restrict the freedom of public servants to act as they wish. This is the fundamental virtue of politics." (Kido Ko Denki Hensanjo hen, *Shogiku Kido Ko Den* Vol.2 (Meiji Shoin, 1927) pp. 1564-5.)

The study ends with the 26th February incident for the reason that, under the National Unity cabinet that ruled from the 15 May 1932 assassination of Prime Minister Inukai to the 26 February incident, no direct attacks were made on the parliamentary system.

While emphasizing the tripolar structure of the debate — which featured liberals, moderates, and conservatives — the bulk of this book consists of analysis of moderates. There are two reasons for this. The first is that it is the moderates who have been ignored in accounts focussing on dualistic political conflicts. While the conservatives adopted the German constitution as their model, and the radicals looked to France and Soviet Russia, the moderates with their British model have tended to be overlooked. Although not every page of this book fits the framework exactly, the study's major task is to maintain a focus on the moderates and their British model as a means of examining this 65-year period of political history as a three-way conflict of ideas of the political system.

The second reason to analyze pre-war Japanese politics from the perspective of the moderates is that it offers a means of exploring a question that has been on his mind for ten years: Are moderates simply those who reject both left and right, or can they have their own independent political platform? If there is a distinct moderate platform, then today's moderates need not be too concerned at the collapse of socialism, and indeed should be able to present their own agenda with greater confidence. In fact, however, the last ten years have seen the confidence, and the political power, of Japan's moderates ebb away. My anxiety that if the moderates go the same way as the Socialists, contemporary Japanese politics will be in a sorry state, seems to have intruded on my historical analysis, and caused me to concentrate on the center of the tripolar structure.

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Chapter Two: *Mitsu no Rikken Seitai Kôshô: Igrisu moderu wo chûshin ni*

Chapter Three: *Meiji Kenpô Taisei no Mitsu no Kaishaku*

Chapter Four: *Seitô Seiji no Seiritsu to Hôkai*

Hedgehogs and Foxes:

The Divisive Rational Choice Debate in the Study of Japanese Politics

John C. CAMPBELL

*EDITOR'S NOTE: The following is a piece that Professor Campbell first wrote for the Dead Fukuzawa Society email list, responding to a specific debate over rational choice theory. The dispute between Professor Chalmers Johnson, on the one hand, and Professors Mark Ramseyer and Frances Rosenbluth, on the other, over the benefits or costs of rational choice theory has been highly publicized within the Japan studies community. Because Professor Campbell's piece received a great amount of praise from DFS readers (including one of the scholars involved), I have asked Professor Campbell to allow us to include a slightly re-edited version of the article in the newsletter. In the following piece, "Chal" refers to Chalmers Johnson, and "R&R" to Ramseyer and Rosenbluth, or to their first jointly written book, *Japan's Political Marketplace*. One can subscribe to the DFS mailing list by sending the message "add [one's email address] fukuzawa" to listserv@ucsd.edu.*



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ISAIAH Berlin's celebrated metaphor is that the intellectual world is divided into foxes and hedgehogs (porcupines). Foxes understand a little about everything and see all the subtleties, hedgehogs understand one *big* thing (I didn't look up the original essay but that is more or less it). Foxes tend to admire hedgehogs though they are shy of getting too close; hedgehogs see foxes as rather irrelevant to their lives but hate other hedgehogs. (In the metaphor — probably not in nature).

R&R and Chal are *both* hedgehogs. Chal says the one big thing you need to know about Japanese politics is that the bureaucracy dominates everything, including the politicians. R&R say no, the majority party dominates the bureaucracy, everywhere and always. (Their one big thing is not just that point, it is the chain of principal-agent relationships from voters to rank-and-file Diet members to party leaders to bureaucrats and judges).

So they get mad at each other and seem to have this big fight — actually at quite long range, the only way hedgehogs can fight (this is a wonderful metaphor — one thinks of old Warner Brothers cartoons with porcupines shooting their darts like guided missiles). I do not remember Chal or R&R having a "normal" scholarly dispute where one picks up some specific piece of evidence or story or interpretation used by the other and argues it is wrong or dumb. Rather, they launch these big denunciations at each other.

Do not be misled that the style is so different. True, R&R are a lot more polite on the surface, and in fact call *MITI and the Japanese Miracle* "the finest study of any single Japanese government institution" (p. 100). However, their patronizing characterizations of those who are deluded or old-fashioned enough to believe in bureaucratic power — "Unfortunately, they confuse activism with autonomy" (p. 182) and the like — are almost as off-putting as Chal's attacks on the personal integrity of anybody who sees politicians as good for anything. Neither side is really arguing.

The funny thing is, Chal and R&R are quite similar in other ways too. Both books start out by putting down all those dopes who think "culture" is an important explanation of Japanese politics. What we need to understand is institutions, they both say. Those institutions come out of history — they are "path dependent." And although Chal and R&R define institutions differently, it is striking that they both are fundamentally reacting against the same body of theory — neoclassical economics.

The funny thing is, Chal and R&R are quite similar...

Don't believe me? R&R are in the tradition of the "new institutional economics," for which Robert North got a Nobel Prize and Robert Bates gets a little gasp of respect every time his name is mentioned in a political science department meeting (at Michigan, anyway). The whole point of NIE is that neoclassical economics — freely operating markets etc. — cannot begin to explain a lot of important stuff, including cross-national variation in patterns of economic development.

Still don't believe me? Look at what seems to be the current hot book in third-world political economy, Peter Evans' *Embedded Autonomy*. The main theme of his theory chapters is how neoclassical economics (IMF ideology and so forth) is completely inadequate to explain why some nations succeed and some don't. His exemplars of those who led the way to a much better model are North and Bates and Chalmers Johnson. Not that he claims that they making exactly the same points, but he sees them in the same ballpark without any big disagreement between them.

Another example: Look at R&R, pp. 189-191 — they have no problem with an activist bureaucracy giving important support to big business, including enforcing cartels and so forth; they even imply that this might be an important cause of Japanese economic success. They just see it as explained by the interests of politicians rather than the intelligence of bureaucrats.

And the supreme irony — in a strange sense, it doesn't really matter which side one takes. This kind of rational-choice theory is about "structurally induced equilibrium." The institutional rules drive the bureaucrats and the LDP into each others arms. If they fight with each other both sides would suffer; if they cooperate both sides will prosper. R&R believe that. Chal Johnson believes it too. MITI bureaucrats generally get along quite well with LDP politicians in his book, despite an occasional spat, because (he believes) the politicians will defer on anything important, since they don't really have power. But to the extent we are in equilibrium we can't tell, and it doesn't matter, who has the power (which is the principal and which the agent).

By the way: we can tell, and it matters, when we get out of equilibrium, which is why R&R make a lot out of their argument that Japanese policy is moving from providing private to public goods — because "median voter" strategies now pay off — and that this movement will accelerate with the change in electoral rules. This means that R&R would be incorrect if policy were to remain the same even under different electoral coalitions, a point they seem to accept (I wonder if they then would explain the current equilibrium as bureaucratic principals and party agents?).

So R&R and Chalmers Johnson are much more alike than they are different, and they even agree with each other on the important stuff. There are some genuine disagreements between these two sides, but their hedgehog similarity is much more important.

Hedgehogs really believe in their explanations, in their independent variables. Japan's bureaucracy is x so therefore a, b, c, d, e . . . Japan's electoral



The Divisive Rational Choice Debate Japanese and German ODA Policy *continued continued*

Additional Reading

Chalmers JOHNSON. *MITI and the Japanese Miracle*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1982.

Chalmers JOHNSON and E.B. KEEHN. "A Disaster in the Making: Rational Choice and Asian Studies" (review of Ramseyer and Rosenbluth's *Japan's Political Marketplace*). *National Interest*, Summer 1994.

Mark RAMSEYER and Frances McCall ROSENBLUTH. *Japan's Political Marketplace*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1993.

system is x so therefore a, b, c, d, e, \dots . There is a great big cause, and all the important effects flow from that.

We foxes tend to believe more in the dependent variables: Japanese welfare policy is x ; I wonder why?; could be a, b, c, d, e, \dots . My first explanation might be pure Johnson: smart bureaucrats looking overseas for things they might want to do. But the second one could be straight R&R: when those bureaucrats were drawing up some local programs, they worried a lot about the possible reactions from LDP guys and made sure the regional coverage would be even. Who is running whom? Gee, it depends . . .

What must be realized is that we foxes are really dependent on the hedgehogs. We go around saying, yeah, it's complicated, sometimes it's this and sometimes it's that and it depends on the other thing, it's sort of pluralist but sort of not, here's an anecdote that contradicts your anecdote. Without the strong explanations those hedgehogs offer us, we would just be doing barefoot history.

In social science, simple strong theories with (in effect) one independent variable will always be much less accurate than complicated theories with lots of independent variables — but when they are decent they are *far* more valuable to most people. However, if you want to know how Japan *really* works, why things are like they are, come ask us foxes.

I really disagree with a lot of both *MITI and the Japanese Miracle* and *Japan's Political Marketplace*. But I depend on both of these books when I teach, and I have personally learned a great deal from them. I admire them both — R&R for insights I had never thought of (such as why the LDP behaved the way it did in budgeting), MITI for its splendid accounts of how bureaucrats work, both for good, pungent, irritating writing and a strong sense of the authors' personalities.

And, finally, for one other thing. Frances, Mark and Chal — unlike a bunch of theorists in both these traditions I could mention — are all very good area studies researchers. They can run with the foxes anytime they want.

I could cite some examples for Mark and Frances of good solid fact-gathering and analysis that doesn't particularly fit into their theories (not so much in the JPM book but elsewhere in their writings), but since they are not even in DFS I will just talk about Chal. The guy who celebrates the developmental state with its coherent, rational policies is also the guy who best describes the vicious fights between ministries. The guy who talks about how bureaucrats manipulate politicians is also the guy who uncovers the creeping tendrils of the Tanaka faction. I am not saying that his arguments are directly contradictory (I'm not *that* gutsy) — he can reconcile them all, I'm sure. But they do head off in different directions, give different impressions, look more like the "rich in ambiguity" arguments foxy types go for.

It is appropriate that my last remark on DFS (for a while anyway) is a compliment to Professor Johnson. And to anyone who got to the end of this, *gokurousamadeshita*.



Modern Games

Andrew Feenberg, *Alternative Modernity: The Technical Turn in Philosophy and Social Theory*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995.

F. Mutlu BINARK

ANDREW Feenberg's constructivist inquiry chooses a fascinating array of cases for examination in his new book *Alternative Modernity*, an investigation into the alternative politics of technology. Using the term the "multicultural politics of technology," Feenberg makes his arguments by reinterpreting various critics, including Herbert Marcuse, Michel Foucault, Jurgen Habermas, Jean-Francois Lyotard, and the Japanese philosopher Nishida Kitaro. In accordance with the thought of these philosophers, Feenberg chooses to discuss the early image of nuclear disaster in science fiction, dystopian themes in the popular spy movies of the 1960s, the impact of AIDS on medical experimentation on human subjects, the experience of Minitel in France, and the Japanese response to modernization as illustrated in Kawabata Yasunari's novel, *The Master of Go*. Feenberg indicates that, along with science and technology, aesthetics, ethics, and culture can also provide alternative modernities, avoiding both positivist universalism and ethnic relativism. Because of his somewhat bizarre patchwork of sources and case studies, the book would at first sight seem unable to produce any unified conclusions. The patchwork approach ultimately surprises, however, in its ability to describe coherently a politics of alternative modernity. In doing so, Feenberg also offers a rather new kind of social criticism, mixing cultural hermeneutics, the sociology of technology, and ethical inquiry.

Feenberg begins his inquiry by questioning the ideology of technological neutrality. Simply put, he finds that there are forms of modernity that might serve as alternatives to the technological determinism that seems to drive much of how scholars, journalists, artists, and citizens think about their lives and how they are likely to change. His reinterpretation of Nishida and his analysis of Kawabata's *The Master of Go* together give us a Japanese response to the traditional Western definition of modernity, as a rationalization of technology and culture. Feenberg's reinterpretation of Japanese philosophy, particularly Nishida's claims, makes clear the distinctions between Japanese thought and the Frankfurt School. He argues that although the Japanese philosophers have shared some philosophical roots with the Frankfurt School, and have even recognized as did Marcuse that technological rationality has become political rationality, they have preferred to emphasize the greater role of national cultural values (p. 34).

Feenberg's reinterpretation of Nishida's philosophy suggests a "return" to Nishida, one that might motivate Japanese intellectuals to take a fresh look at early Japanese postmodern interpretations of the Western conceptualization of modernism. Feenberg mainly focuses on introducing two new concepts related to an understanding of Japanese modernism: an "identity of contradictions" and the "culture of place" (pp. 184 and 215). Nishida's argument here is indeed based on a cultural self-affirmation of Japan against Western imperialism. To Nishida, all modern cultures contribute equally to world culture, because "a true world culture will be formed only by various cultures' preserving their own respective viewpoints, but simultaneously developing themselves through global mediation" (Nishida: 254). Feenberg indicates that the logic of the identity of contradictions enables Japanese culture to be flexible and assimilative with regard to foreign influence, mirroring Nishida's claim that



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Alternative Modernities Review continued

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Marcuse, Herbert. *One-Dimensional Man*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1964.

Kawabata, Yasunari. *The Master of Go*. Trans. E. Seidensticker. New York: Perigree, 1981.

Japanese culture has such a formless structure as to permit the assimilation of non-Japanese cultural features without losing Japanese identity. The formlessness of the culture also helps to harmonize unresolved contradictions in identity. Feenberg claims that this feature of Japanese culture might enable us to think about the possibility of alternative modernity, one not based solely on technological change and the rationalization of politics to technology. He therefore sees Nishida's work as a welcome antidote to the growing power of the new paradigm of technologically-determined modernity.

To explain the Japanese response to modernization, Feenberg analyzes Kawabata's *The Master of Go*, a novel that depicts a turning point in the history of Go, the Japanese strategy game. Kawabata uses this turning point to represent the struggle between modernity and tradition, and the new, modern spirit is dominated by big business and the media (Feenberg, p. 209). Feenberg also uses *The Master of Go* to indicate the role of place in Japanese culture. This "sense of place" means that everyone knows her/his "place" in the system of social relations in which the "self" is constructed (p. 217). Therefore, every move in the game of Go is decided in some deeper sense, such as through the values of "self-realization" and the "sense of aesthetics," in contrast to the Western logic of "fairness" and "winning." Feenberg claims that both of these ways of thinking about self and values are "rational," though one places an emphasis on aspects of play related to "a culture of place," and the other focuses on individual rights (p. 218). The fact that an alternative to western modernity has arisen in Japan suggests that it is possible elsewhere as well. This alternative modernity might emerge not only in minor cultural artifacts like a food culture or an ethnic style, but also as an institution of technology or even administration (p. 219).

Feenberg rejects Kawabata's creation of a dichotomy between modernity and tradition, and between foreign influences and purely Japanese ones, even criticizing Kawabata's "negative mysticism." Using the "identity of contradictions," he argues that Japan has been able to preserve its cultural uniqueness and originality within the modernity project. Feenberg's assumption of an alternative modernity is based on this cultural struggle, which is not simply reactive, but rather reflective.

Although Feenberg's analysis is useful in a number of regards, he is forced to conceptualize a Japanese type of modernity that does not adequately reflect Japanese behavior in the modern era. For example, the emergence of Japanese imperialism — which surely was related at least in form to Japan's interpretation of Western modernity — indicates that Japan did not create a uniquely alternative form of modernity. Even so, Feenberg's work remains pioneering in the way that he uses Japanese postmodern philosophy as a model for thinking about alternative approaches to modernity. In examining the relationship between technology and culture, he also shines a light on a new path to thinking about the logic and relevance of *Nihonjinron*, the theories of Japaneseness that underscore much of the thinking about the differences between Japan and the West.

Transfusion Needed:

Problems for Political Analysis of The Ministry of Health and Welfare in Japan

Stephen ANDERSON

THOUGH theory-building is needed in the analysis of welfare in Japan, your reviewer gave a less than robust overview of the literature in both English and Japanese. In your August 1996 issue, Mikitaka Masuyama (SSJ 7, "The Ministry of Health and Welfare and an Injection of Political Science") missed many leading works that are readily available, particularly in regard to interest groups. The list of sources omitted classics on the Japan Medical Association (JMA) (see William Steslicke) and in the Japanese language. Books from the ministry-related press (*Chûô Hôki Shuppan*) as well as *Jurisuto* among other leading journals were absent, and instead we find the self-promoting autobiography of long-time JMA head, Takemi Taro — but not an English variant of this work published by the JMA themselves.

The review also overlooks Japanese materials that show how doctors are changing. Literature exists in the ISS libraries due to the six-volume work on the welfare state (*Fukushi Kokka*, 1984-1985). Included is a decade-old collection edited by Nakano Minoru that showed long-term decline of JMA influence as its members aged and as younger salaried doctors decided not to join. Furthermore, my book *Welfare Policy & Politics in Japan: Beyond the Developmental State* (New York: Paragon House, 1993) — both in English and in Japanese — was overlooked by a reviewer seemingly focused on English-language books in the annual press catalogs of Cambridge and Princeton.

As a constructive response, my full answer to the review is still available on the Internet (*Editor's note: see box item below*). The review's call for "a theory" about "bureaucrats and politicians within a broader series of links with pressure groups and policy networks" is in the library — or more immediately available as full text on the World Wide Web (<http://www.glocom.ac.jp/Publications/sja/WelfareJapanCon.html>).

This book applies comparative historical perspectives and analyzes the policy coalitions that arose in Japan to build significant welfare policies. From a critical vein, the book also argued that the failures of social democratic parties



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Web Resource

GLOCOM HOME PAGE

The Center for Global Communications (GLOCOM) is a social science institute specializing in the study of information societies and Japan. GLOCOM is affiliated with the International University of Japan, but is independent of government finance or supervision. Its home page (<http://www.glocom.ac.jp/>) offers varied content as well as key materials on the impacts of the Internet.

Health and Welfare Policy Debate *continued*

to win nationwide elections meant that welfare policies were skewed and controlled by such policy coalitions.

In research thus far by Campbell and Masuyama, a more disturbing trend appears in their lack of critical views towards policy recommendations in America. A focus on the good in Japanese National Health Insurance schemes misses the lessons to be learned from errors — perhaps their work should consider applying a “*hanmen kyoshi*” approach. America in particular must learn from mistakes such as when free service led to excess demand and “old people’s salons” in clinic waiting areas. Only the latest example is these researchers’ interest in long-term care insurance — a good idea only if it doesn’t bankrupt Japan’s deficit-ridden public finance.

Though Masuyama aimed to show directions for future research, his review instead calls attention to the problems of theory and policy implications in the on-going research agenda based at Michigan. Such a debate might be purely academic except for the potential impact on the policy debates after November elections in America. In such a policy context, researchers need to be vigilant about the impacts of the “construction of a theory” that bleeds from faulty literature reviews and forgets healthy attention to existing analysis of Japan.

MASUYAMA Mikitaka’s Response

It should be clear that my essay in the last SSJ issue was not meant as a literature review. Rather, given the limited space and the fact that this was a special issue on Japan's bureaucracy, I chose to focus on the Ministry of Health and Welfare of Japan and the 1980s to highlight the changing relationship between bureaucrats and politicians. In the intersection of these subsets, I chose the works by Campbell and Kato to emphasize the importance of theory that explicates how bureaucrats can muster support from politicians successfully. I leave it to SSJ readers to judge my selection.



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