Postwar Japanologists have tended to base their research on the center: the politicians, bureaucrats and corporations in Tokyo. In recent years, more have begun to examine Japan from regional angles, providing us with vastly different perspectives on many aspects of Japan. This special issue is an outgrowth of this trend and shows that from Okinawa, Japan's history, diplomacy, politics and society look very different indeed.

Social Science Japan is also very pleased to include in this issue an interview with the preeminent Japanese stateswoman, KATÔ Shidzùe.

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Okinawa, the Shame of American Imperialism

Chalmers JOHNSON

America’s two major wars against Asian communism—in Korea and Vietnam—could not have been fought without American bases on Japanese territory. These military outposts were critical staging and logistics areas for the projection of American power. They were also secure sanctuaries, invulnerable to attack by North Korean, Chinese, Vietnamese, or Cambodian forces. Large American staffs lived in security and comfort, and American troops enjoyed their so-called R&R (rest and recreation). In 1965, Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp, commander in chief of U.S. forces in the Pacific, said that the United States could not have fought the Vietnam War without the Okinawan bases. However, if the Americans had had to ask for Japanese permission to launch wars from their territory, the Japanese would have turned them down.

But at the time of the Korean and Vietnamese wars, this was not necessary. In 1950, when the Korean war broke out, the American military still occupied all of Japan. And until 1972, American forces occupied and governed Okinawa as their private military colony even though the U.S. had restored sovereignty to the main Japanese islands under the peace treaty of 1952. By 1969, spurred on by the Korean and Vietnamese wars, the Americans had built their complex of some 117 bases, much of it by forcibly seizing land from people who were completely defenseless, without citizenship, legal protection, or rights of any sort from any country. When, at the height of the Vietnam War, Okinawan protests against B-52s, bars, brothels, stores of nerve gas, and GI-committed crimes forced the Americans to give Okinawa back to Japan, nothing changed in terms of the actual American presence—except that now Americans had to try to justify their behavior. This they proceeded to do, ushering in a period from 1972 to the present of truly extraordinary American hypocrisy, mendacity, and greed.

This pattern reached its dishonorable apogee under the administration of Bill Clinton, when the end of the Cold War seemed to signal a possible end to the daily indignities inflicted on the people of Okinawa. Instead, the Americans began to invent new “threats” that required their presence. This effort involved the perpetuation of Japan’s status as a satellite and the glossing over of what these imperial pretensions were doing to both the people the Americans claimed to be protecting and young members of the American armed forces charged with doing the protecting.

Meanwhile, on July 17, 1998, at Rome, by a vote of 120 to 7, the nations of the world established an international court to bring to justice nations that commit atrocities comparable to those of the Nazis during World War II, Pol Pot in Cambodia, and Saddam Hussein in Iraq and neighboring countries. The leading democracies of the world, including Britain, Canada, Holland, France, Japan, and Germany, supported the treaty. Libya, Algeria, China,
Qatar, Yemen, Israel, and the United States voted no. Why? The United States says that with U.S. troops deployed in hot spots around the world, it must protect them from “politically motivated charges.” But the real answer is probably to be found in some of the activities it carries out in Okinawa.

The Indonesian Connection
During the period May 13 to 15, 1998, nearly 1,200 people were killed in Jakarta in rioting that led to the resignation of the American-supported dictator of Indonesia, General Suharto. It was subsequently revealed that during the so-called rioting at least 168 women and girls, most of them of Chinese ancestry, had been raped by “organized groups of up to a dozen men” (The New York Times, July 20, 1998) and that 20 had died during or after the assaults. It was also revealed that groups of men had traveled the city in vehicles inciting the crowds to violence. Many Indonesians accused the army and its clandestine security forces—the elite, 4,800-strong commando regiment KOPASSUS, known as the “red berets”—of committing these acts, particularly after the army publicly acknowledged that members of its special forces had been involved in the “disappearances” of opposition activists in the weeks before the riots.

The Indonesian armed forces, known as ABRI, have long been the chosen instrument of American foreign policy for bolstering its preferred, stoutly anticommunist regime in the world’s fourth largest country. The United States collaborated with ABRI (providing it with lists of suspected communists) in 1965, when General Suharto slaughtered a half-million people in the process of coming to power. It also condoned ABRI’s invasion of East Timor on December 7, 1975, and its subsequent elimination of 200,000 East Timorese through what the State Department in its 1996 Human Rights Report calls “extrajudicial killings.” When the 1997 economic crisis spread to Indonesia and it became apparent that the International Monetary Fund’s bailout policies were likely to end the 76-year-old Suharto’s further usefulness to the United States, American policy remained committed to maintaining control inside Indonesia through backing and strengthening ABRI.

The Okinawan Connection
Indonesia lacks external enemies. Its armed forces are devoted almost entirely to maintaining internal security. For most of the period of the Suharto regime, the United States has actively trained ABRI special forces in a variety of lethal tactics, including advanced sniper operations, close quarters combat, containing street demonstrations, and psychological operations. The CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) have long maintained close ties with ABRI. ABRI has also often been implicated in
cases of torture, state terrorism, and assassination. After November 12, 1991, when ABRI killed 271 people in Dili, the capital of East Timor, Congress cut off financial support for their further ‘training,’ although it did not end arms sales to Indonesia.

Despite the Congressional elimination of public support for training of ABRI as a state police agency, the Pentagon continued and expanded the training anyway under cover of a forgotten military assistance program known as JCET, or Joint Combined Exchange Training (for details, see The Nation, March 30, April 6, June 8, and June 15, 1998). Since 1995, this training has included at least thirty-six exercises with fully armed U.S. combat troops—including Green Berets, Air Force commandos, and Marines—flying from Okinawa into Indonesia.

On May 22, 1998, in a meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Japanese House of Representatives, a Diet member asked Takano Toshiyuki, then director of the North American Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, about the recent new excuse for keeping U.S. troops in Okinawa. He noted that the Japanese government was now invoking instability in Indonesia as a reason why U.S. troops could not return to their own country. He also noted that the training of Indonesia’s armed forces in how to terrorize and suppress its own people in their calls for democracy had been carried out by the U.S. First Special Forces Group based at Torii in Okinawa. Director Takano replied, “The United States is contributing to peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region. It is possible for them (the U.S. forces) to have exchanges with armed forces of various countries.”

From the storing of sarin nerve gas on Okinawa (in denying that nerve gas was used in Laos, the Pentagon conceded that it was nonetheless stockpiled in Okinawa until 1971) to the training of Indonesian special forces who use rape as a terrorist tactic against Chinese women, it would seem that the U.S. has good cause to fear that the new international tribunal for war crimes may one day come after Americans. For the people of Okinawa, with their legacy as the only genuinely pacifist culture in East Asia, it is a source of moral pain that such activities are devised and carried out from their territory. For the Japanese people as a whole, it is a scandal that they should continue to condone it.

The Japan Policy Research Institute is currently making a film for American television about the Okinawan problem. For details, including the scenario of the film, see the JPRI web site at http://www.nmjc.org/jpri/.
In September 1994 during an inspection tour of Okinawa military bases, the head of the defense facilities department, HOSHUYAMA Noboru, stated that “as Okinawa is part of the nation-state (kokumin kokka) that is Japan, it is necessary for the people of Okinawa to co-exist with the military bases for the benefit of Japan.” Many in Okinawa violently opposed this statement and several local government assemblies passed resolutions stating their disgust with Hoshuyama’s opinion.

For Hoshuyama, it was an obvious conclusion to see the “nation-state” in this way. He was not looking to force the bases on Okinawa but rather considered that it was possible to request that the people of Okinawa, as Japanese, accept the bases. Yet Hoshuyama’s stance begs the question: what is a nation-state (kokumin kokka)? Can the Japanese government and Japanese people view the relationship of the nation-state and Japan as obvious?

Inherent in the concept of a nation, there is the “ideal” aspect that a nation is a “political association in which all obey common laws” and the “cultural” aspect which sees the nation as race of people bound by a common culture. In the United States and France, the concept of nation is especially influenced by an “ideal” sense while in Germany, the racial aspect of the nation is particularly strong. For its part, Japan is understood as nation that has a remarkably strong racial element in its sense of nation. Under the Meiji Constitution, the emperor had a patriarchal relationship which his “children”, the subjects of the Japanese empire. Indeed the definition of a divine monarchy presented by Robert FILMER in his seventeenth century work, Patriarcha: or The Natural Power of Kings, aptly describes the basis of the modern Japanese state under the Meiji Constitution. The sole political position of subjects under the Meiji Constitution was expressed in prewar textbooks which stressed that a subject must absolutely obey the emperor. These texts insisted that to die for the emperor is not a personal sacrifice but is actually the most suitable way for the subject to “use” his or her life.1

In the Meiji period, Okinawa was incorporated into a Japanese nation-state that was built on this extreme ideology. Indeed because they had their own language, culture and history, the people of Okinawa had to endure excessive measures as the Japanese government worked to make them “Japanese.” For example in public schools, the use of the Okinawan language was forbidden. A student who spoke even a word of the Okinawan language in class was forced to wear a dialect placard (hôgen fuda) around his or her neck, enduring humiliation until another student made the same mistake and was in turn, forced to assume the role of class dunce. Okinawa prefecture governor OTA Masahide once stated that process of making Okinawans “Japanese” resulted in human alienation. The Okinawa that had been made Japanese was then sacrificed in the defense of the national polity in the Battle of Okinawa in 1945. After the war, Japan allowed American forces to occupy Okinawa and even after Okinawa was returned to Japan, it was forced to bear an excessive burden of military bases. Given Okinawa’s history, one certainly cannot say that “As Okinawa is part of the nation-state that is Japan, it is necessary for the people of Okinawa to co-exist with the bases for the benefit of Japan.”

Hence those who believe that Japan is a nation-state with a strong sense of racial identity want to express a positive sense of nation in the relationship...
with Okinawa. Yet if we accept this strong sense of racial identity in the nation, the relationship between Japan and Okinawa does not appear to embody a nation in the “ideal” sense. In light of growing calls for Okinawan independence, it seems particularly important to consider the question of nation and Okinawa’s place in it.

The group that has advocated reform of the constitution is the same group that in that past espoused the need for a return to traditional Japanese values in government. This group used to also hold that the emperor was saved from persecution by the imposition of the current constitution, a document which, however, was forced upon Japan by the American occupation authorities. This reform group now insists that the current constitution is a “foreign” and therefore invalid. Consequently, they seek to restore the political system that existed under the Meiji Constitution. Given these views, it seems that patriotism and the constitution are always in opposition. However both this group that advocates a revision of the constitution and yet another group that seeks to safeguard it have overlooked the fact that the postwar constitution was not imposed upon Okinawa. Even after the main Japanese islands had their independence restored, Okinawa remained under American occupation. The military style rule that is forbidden in the postwar constitution continued on Okinawa. For that reason, the movement to restore Okinawa to Japanese rule took the form of a constitutional movement which championed sovereignty, human rights and peace.

So how should we evaluate this movement to restore Okinawa to Japan from the perspective of constitutionalism? If we look at Okinawa through the constitutional patriotism definition of Jurgen HABERMAS, after the terrible experiences of the Rape of Nanking and the Battle of Okinawa (in particular the mass suicides of non-combatants), it is clear that Japanese citizens cannot be expected to look for a sense of identity in the “unbroken imperial line” or “the beautiful Japanese language” with are in the end, nothing more that ideas developed by the government. The identity of the Japanese people can only be found in the model of a Japanese citizen defined in the postwar Japanese constitution. If we consider the problem in this way, perhaps we can judge the movement to return Okinawa to Japan as embodying “constitutional patriotism.”

Certainly the “constitutional illusions” of the restoration movement must be called into question given that even after the restoration of Okinawa to Japan, the peace and human rights of the Okinawan people have not been protected. However, it is very important that Okinawa people once again ask the meaning of the Japanese constitution, especially when a mindless constitutional reform movement, which is based on a shallow understanding of “globalism,” has recently sprouted in Japanese society. The movement by Okinawans to rid the prefecture of bases was motivated by a desire to protect their own human rights. Okinawans are asking the Japanese of the main islands if Japan has the intention to treat Okinawa as part of the nation in the “ideal” sense. The people of Okinawa are now trying to restore the “ideal” sense of nation in Japan while at the same time, facing the prevalent view among Japanese that “Japan exists as a nation of one race.” Without question, reconsidering the idea of nation-state from the view of Okinawa is an important task for the field of constitutional studies in Japan.

Notes

In recent years perhaps no other local politician in Japan has received as much attention, and has occasioned such controversy, as the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture, OTA Masahide. Widespread public outrage over the rape of a 12-year-old schoolgirl by US servicemen in the fall of 1995 prompted Ota to publicly confront Japan’s political leaders over their handling of the US bases. Ota’s efforts to change the national government’s policy priorities are unprecedented in postwar politics, but today, after three years of negotiations between the prefectural government and Tokyo, the “Okinawa base problem” remains unresolved. While Ota played a leading role in the events that unfolded, it was the citizens of Okinawa that initiated this political drama, and it was local residents of Nago City that rejected Tokyo’s proposal to build a new heliport off their coast. In fact, local politicians in Okinawa have been hard pressed to devise policies that will satisfy their constituents and conform to Tokyo’s policy priorities.

National Policy and the Okinawa Base Protest
Without a doubt, the protest in Okinawa against the US military bases strikes at the heart of the national government’s policy priorities. The US-Japan alliance remains central to Japan’s security and foreign policy goals, and the continued presence of US military forces in Japan is seen as indispensable to bilateral security cooperation. But citizen protest against the US bases is not new, and civic activism has been particularly strong in postwar Okinawa. The forcible expropriation of land by the US military during the 1950s gave rise to broad Okinawan protest. The oldest organized group protesting the bases is the anti-war landowners (hansen jinushi). Although anti-war landowners today represent only about 10% of the base landowners, their political trump card was the rather tenuous legal basis by which the Japanese government claimed use of their land. In fact, it was an administrative loophole that provided the opportunity for Governor Ota to challenge national policy in 1995. His refusal to expropriate land for the US resulted in Tokyo’s initiation of legal action against him.

But it was the protest by a wide array of Okinawan citizens in the wake of the rape that powerfully reinforced the Governor’s position. In the second “island-wide protest” organized in postwar Okinawa, more than 80,000 Okinawans gathered in October 1995 to call for a change in the way Tokyo administered the bases. Political organizations associated with the left in Japanese politics, such as labor unions and teachers associations, stood alongside local community leaders, PTA members and other citizen groups. While protest seemed to lessen in the year after the rape incident, citizens continued to make their voices heard. New organizations reached out to international networks of protest against US bases in other countries. Moreover, local politicians were pressed by residents to ensure that their communities would not be subject to attempts by the Japanese government to relocate US forces. Most widely covered in the press, of course, was the organization of a new citizens movement in Nago City in response to the Tokyo government’s attempt to build a new base for the Marines in that community.
The national government responded to Okinawa’s protest in two ways. First, it sought to negotiate with the US government a reduction of the area the US military utilized in Okinawa. In April 1997, Prime Minister Hashimoto and US Ambassador to Japan, Walter MONDALE, announced that one of the most problematic bases on the island, Futenma Marine Air Station, would be returned. But Hashimoto accepted the US condition that alternative facilities be found for the Marines, and in doing so, he mistakenly assumed that he could rely on the cooperation of local political leaders in Okinawa to gain public support for a new base. Second, in addressing the legal challenge posed by Okinawan landowners and Governor Ota, the Japanese Diet passed new legislation that would give Tokyo physical control over contested base land. In effect, this law, applicable only to the US bases in Okinawa, weakened the authority of the prefectural Land Expropriation Committee, and neutralized the political clout of the hansen jinushi movement.2

Local Politicians and Representation of Citizen Interests
The Okinawa base protest has highlighted the role played by local politicians in the implementation of national policy. City, town and village governments have long complained of the administrative difficulties that arise as a result of having a foreign military in their community, but they have been given little opportunity to shape the policies that they are asked to carry out.

Governor Ota’s argument that his primary responsibility as an elected official was to the citizens of Okinawa won him national attention, but the Japanese courts did not grant him the right to put prefectural interests above those of the nation. Therefore, one year into his confrontation with Tokyo, Ota announced he would sign the procedures required to expropriate contested land in Okinawa. His role as an administrator of national policy confirmed, the Governor began to negotiate with the Prime Minister on what policies would satisfy the Okinawan people while accomplishing Tokyo’s goal of maintaining US bases in Okinawa. The base issue crystallized into efforts to accomplish the return of Futenma, and Tokyo officials sought to find a new home for the Marines.

Like Ota, Mayor HIGA Tetsuya of Nago City faced the dilemma of satisfying his constituents while fulfilling his obligations as national policy administrator. In July 1996, after local media reports noted the possibility of relocating the Marines from Futenma to the northern part of Okinawa, 4,000 residents of Nago City gathered in a Citizens Assembly. Tokyo continued to explore the Nago option, however, and in November, the head of the Japanese Defense Agency publicly confirmed that Nago was an attractive candidate for a sea-based facility. In response, Nago residents convened a second Citizens Assembly, and adopted another resolution against the building of a new facility in Nago. Despite this, the US and Japanese governments announced their agreement to return Futenma and to construct a sea-based facility on the eastern shore of Okinawa.

Notes
1 For example, the Okinawa Women against Military Violence not only attended the 1995 Beijing Women’s Conference, but also organized Peace Caravans across the United States, meeting with numerous American civic organizations.
2 A resounding 90% of the Japanese Diet’s Lower House approved this new law, signally an overwhelming lack of support within the national legislature for Governor’s appeals. Only the Japan Communist Party and the Social Democrats were willing to defend Okinawan landowners.
3 In October, the Nago City Assembly had adopted an amended version, and the Citizens Referendum Promotion Committee reorganized itself as the Committee against the Heliport Base. Meanwhile, a second citizen group had organized the Nago City Economic Promotion Committee. It advocated acceptance of the new heliport on the condition that funds for local economic development accompany the decision.
4 Governor Ota argued that his government refrained from intervening in this conversation with Nago City because the administrative procedures for determining whether or not residents would accept the relocation proposal required local acquiescence before he was called to make any policy decision. Mayor Higa openly challenged the Governor for his lack of engagement in the City’s dialogue with Tokyo.
Higa was finally confronted with Tokyo’s policy choice in January 1997 when the Director of the Naha Office of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency (DFAA) visited Nago and asked for the Mayor’s cooperation in a “preliminary survey” of the coastal area. Higa refused and requested the presence of prefectural officials in any meetings between the DFAA and Nago City. But by April, as the prefectural sat on the sidelines, he announced that he would permit a survey, with the proviso that this did not signify his acquiescence to Tokyo’s policy. It was a temporizing step, and without the political support of the Governor, he undoubtedly found it increasingly difficult to refuse. Moreover, officials in Tokyo hinted at considerable economic benefits to be had if the residents of Nago cooperated with the effort to build a heliport in their community.

The Governor had to be consulted, however. Once the preliminary survey was completed, the DFAA was required to request permission from the prefectural government to conduct offshore boring tests. Naha announced in August that it would handle this request as a procedural manner, and would refrain at that time from making a policy judgement. Meanwhile, fearing that political leaders in Nago and Naha were succumbing to Tokyo’s pressure, local residents had organized a Citizens Referendum Promotion Committee. By the end of the summer, they had collected enough signatures for a referendum.3

The Nago referendum was scheduled for December 21, and throughout November, members of the Hashimoto Cabinet visited Nago in an attempt to build local support for the new base. In early December, Tokyo announced a program of economic assistance for the entire northern region. DFAA officials held public meetings, and reportedly made house calls on Nago residents. What had begun as a conversation between the Governor and the Prime Minister on the need to reduce the US military presence in Okinawa had evolved into a campaign to gain Nago’s acceptance of a new military base.

Both Governor Ota and Mayor Higa found it necessary—and perhaps even expedient—to comply with established administrative procedures at the same time that they denied their acceptance of the policy option advanced by Tokyo.4 As it turned out, the December 1997 Nago City referendum produced a majority (52%) against construction of the heliport. Higa then announced that, while he would formally accept the Tokyo proposal, he would also resign as Mayor of Nago City. The Governor, meanwhile, remained silent. But on February 7, 1998, two days before the mayoral election in Nago, he announced that he would reject any plan that involved relocating existing US military facilities within Okinawa prefecture. The newly elected Mayor of Nago, KISHIMOTO Takeo announced immediately that he would abide by Ota’s decision. Thus, the debate within Okinawa over Tokyo’s policy option ended.

Who will Represent the Interests of Okinawa?

Until 1995, the task of managing the US military presence in Okinawa was primarily administrative, subject to quiet negotiations between local politicians and national bureaucrats. Governor Ota broke with this pattern of articulating local interests, and he openly challenged the national government’s neglect of Okinawa. Moreover, Tokyo’s efforts to find a policy solution have repeatedly been punctuated by local community protest.

The demand for greater representation of citizen interests is at the heart of the events that have unfolded since 1995 in Okinawa. More than simply a policy dialogue about the US-Japan alliance, the Okinawa base protest reveals new expectations of elected officials. First the Governor, and later the Mayor of Nago City, faced the dilemma of balancing their administrative and representative roles in negotiating with Tokyo. In the end, Mayor Higa felt compelled to fulfill his role as administrator of national government policies. Yet, he also felt compelled to resign from office. The ultimate rejection by Ota and Kishimoto of Tokyo’s policy choice reveals the impact of citizen activism in Okinawa. It also suggests that Japan’s local politicians can no longer simply act as mediators between the national government and their constituents. They are being asked to be advocates of citizen interests.
The Creation of “Okinawans” and the Formation of the Japanese Nation State

MASHIKO Hidenori

In *Imagined Communities*, Benedict ANDERSON makes a particularly egregious mistake in his description of Japan. He concludes that because of the relatively high rate of linguistic similarity of dialects in the Japanese archipelago, major problems did not arise during the linguistic and political integration of Japanese during the formation of Japan as a nation state. Anderson suggests that pride in the imperial house and its unique antiquity, coupled with the widespread use of Chinese characters throughout the Japanese islands helped bring about cultural integration. Anderson’s modernization model in itself is not incorrect. However his reiteration of the popular conception that the Japanese archipelago was exceptionally fortunate to have a high degree of ethnic homogeneity is quite mistaken.

Without question, the idea of an “imagined community” based on the “discovery of tradition” has become quite prevalent, creating historical complications in postwar Japan. If we suppose that like the Korean peninsula, Japan has a unique, homogenous culture, then this uniqueness in itself could only have equated to success in the nation building process. In his description of Japan in *Imagined Communities*, Anderson demonstrates his misunderstanding of the Japanese situation in his positioning of the Ryukyu Kingdom in the process of the development of the Japanese state.

Linguists have concluded that Ryukyu dialects are clearly related to dialects of the main Japanese islands. Yet in the mid-nineteenth century people from Ryukyu and the main Japanese islands could not communicate without the assistance of a translator. In the Edo period (1600–1868), the Ryukyu Kingdom was defined as a foreign state but controlled and governed by the Satsuma domain (present day Kagoshima prefecture). At the same time, it remained in the orbit of the Chinese World Order, dispatching biennial missions of tribute to the Chinese capital. Hence until only relatively recently, Ryukyu had a considerably different culture from the main Japanese islands and its inhabitants were not regarded as “completely Japanese.”

Numerous Japanese forgot that the inhabitants of the Ryukyu Kingdom had been forced to become speakers of Japanese. After WWII as well, Japanese inundated Okinawans with naive and cruel questions such as “Is the Ryukyu language a dialect of Chinese?” or “You are good at speaking English!” Okinawans who believed themselves to be “Japanese” were at once discouraged and enraged. Successive generations of Okinawans remembered these experiences, but unfortunately in recent years the acts of discrimination against the people of Okinawa are slipping from the common memory. Sarcastically speaking, until the Sino-Japanese War (1894–5), there...
was no widespread self-consciousness of being a “Japanese citizen” or a “standard Japanese” in existence in Japan. Even without a substantive “common language” in existence, the people of Okinawa were forced to “become Japanese” and to speak the “Japanese language.” The inhabitants of the islands were rushed into this mirage of nationhood, forced to become “speakers of Japanese” as if they were immigrants to a new country.

In three ways, this effort assumed a deeper paradoxical meaning in 1895 when Taiwan became a Japanese colony. First, a unified society of Japanese citizens had just been developed. Second, although a large number of Japanese could not yet speak and read “standard Japanese,” soon after the takeover of Taiwan, the inhabitants of the island were forced to learn Japanese and it was used in government proceedings. Thirdly, Ryukyu born policemen and teachers became the advance guard of colonial control in an empire based upon assimilation. The people of Okinawa who had been taught the incomplete “standard Japanese” at the most only a few decades before, were now in the position of teaching “Japanese culture” as representatives of Japan. Quickly and artificially the “Japanese language” had been standardized while at the same time, numerous types of creole Japanese had been created in each region. Moreover a form of pidgin Japanese spread, exported throughout Asia and to the islands of the South Pacific, leading to a two-fold reproduction of “tradition.”

Even when Japan lost its colonies with its defeat in WWII, the “tradition of Japanese” (kokugo) was not demythicized and numerous forms of creole Japanese continued to exist. While the use of traditional Ryukyu dialects quickly declined, a heterogeneous linguistic culture survived in the form of “Okinawan standard Japanese” and other new dialects. In numerous ways, however, it is not appropriate to consider the Ainu in the north and the people of the Ryukyu Islands in the south as exceptions in the Japanese nation state. Above all, the experiences of these peoples symbolize the great social changes that have taken place in the Japanese archipelago since the nineteenth century. Indeed one example clearly demonstrates the difficulties experienced by the Ainu and the inhabitants of Ryukyu. On islands that were once part of the Ryukyu Kingdom but are now incorporated in Kagoshima prefecture, there are postwar examples of punishment of people for the use of dialects (a widespread practice in prewar Okinawa).

For their part, Japanese researchers have sinned by idealizing the formation of the Japanese nation in science texts and school textbooks and by bolstering the theory of Japanese uniqueness (nipponjin-ron). In a sense, they have become apparatuses for “national ideology.” What is worse, these researchers also led Anderson and other Westerns to describe Japan in these ideological terms.
At any rate, the invented tradition came to include a national history and history of the national language. Ryukyu was made a part of both these Japanese histories. Taiwan and the Korean peninsula were also assigned a national history which had an origin in the foundation legend of the Yamato state. Specifically, they were made parts of the five provinces and seven districts of ancient Japan, giving Ryukyu and Korea the image of being part of Japanese history. According to the logic of this effort, the merging of Ryukyu’s history to Japanese history was not exceptional in a “relatively homogenous Japan.” In inverse proportion, this practice strengthened the consciousness of Okinawans while forcing a quick decline in class and regional discrimination.

The establishment of Okinawa prefecture in 1879 equated to the complete demise of the Ryukyu Kingdom and in a way, created a sense of brotherhood among the people of Okinawa who now felt part of the Japanese Empire. Yet discrimination continued in the quarter of a century that included the Battle of Okinawa and the period of governance by the US military. Indeed it did not fade in the decades after the return of administrative power to Japan that has been marked by the continued presence of U.S. bases on Okinawa. This discrimination strengthened the demand for the right to be treated as one part of “Japan” but also proved to be somewhat contrary to the movement for independence. In general, the people of Okinawa regard the area that includes the main island of Okinawa and the islands south of it as one entity. The formation of the Japanese nation state led to the absorption of the Ryukyu Islands and precluded the possibility of their separation from Japan. Yet at the same time the process also cultivated an “imagined community” that embodies a sense of Okinawa as “one body,” something that the region lacked in pre-modern times.

Bibliography

In December 1997, a plebiscite in Nago City, Okinawa Prefecture, saw more than 52% of participating voters reject the proposed construction of an offshore heliport. The rejection can be considered along with the subsequent impasse between the central and prefectural governments as the second stage of the current Okinawa problem, which first ignited in September 1995 with the abduction and rape of a local 12-year-old school girl by three American servicemen.

During the year following that tragic rape incident, Okinawans expressed their anger at the rape and other base-related problems in the huge October 1995 “Prefectural People’s Rally” which demonstrated the high level of public support for anti-base Governor OTA Masahide’s confrontational stance vis-à-vis the Japanese central government over land-lease arrangements for U.S. military facilities, and in the first-ever prefecture-wide referendum held in September 1996. Although an overwhelming 89% of the participating voters came out in favor of the reduction and consolidation of U.S. bases and a review of the 1960 U.S.-Japan Status of Forces Agreement, the prefectural referendum also had the twin effects of exposing fractures in Okinawan public opinion and complicating already delicate relations between the prefecture and central government.

Recognizing, belatedly, the need to address the “Okinawa Problem,” the U.S. and Japanese governments established a bilateral Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) in November 1995 to “reduce the burden on the people of Okinawa and thereby strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance.” However a fundamental dilemma exists, namely how to reduce the impact of U.S. bases while fully maintaining the operational capability and readiness of U.S. forces in the region. Nowhere has this dilemma been more visible than in the problem of the return of the U.S. Marine Futenma Air Station and the planned relocation of its military functions to Nago City, the proposed site of an offshore heliport facility.

It is here that the second stage of the current Okinawa problem begins. The April 1996 bilateral decision to return Futenma Air Station (which was a former high ranking Defense Department official called a “time bomb waiting to explode” because it is located in crowded and urbanized Ginowan City) was well-received throughout Japan. However, the fine print of SACO’s “Interim Report” stating, among other things, that “the relocation of facilities... [would] require construction of a heliport on other U.S. facilities and areas in Okinawa,” was unwelcome. Indeed, many Okinawans were angry about this relocation within the prefecture. Governor Ota and his anti-war supporters considered the relocation as no more than a reshifting of the burden back on to the Okinawan people. Local assemblies in Kadena, which hosts Kadena Air Force Base, and Nago City, which hosts Camp Schwab,
(both initially named as possible relocation sites) passed unanimous resolutions against the construction of the heliport in or near their communities.

In the week following the prefectural referendum, HASHIMOTO Ryutarō made his first visit to Okinawa as prime minister. In a September 17 speech, he revealed the U.S.-proposed idea of a floating, offshore heliport as a compromise solution to the impasse with the prefecture (and U.S. government) over the relocation site for a land-based heliport. Hashimoto believed that in building the facility offshore, which would greatly reduce noise pollution and the risks of military-related accidents, the central government could gain the understanding of the people of the prefecture. He also attempted to sell the offshore plan by explaining that the heliport would be constructed with great care for the environment and that stringent safety measures would be applied concerning its use. Likewise, Hashimoto stated that when the heliport was no longer needed it could be removed, thus suggesting that the heliport would not be a permanent structure.

Following this, and later indications by the central government that it in fact intended to build the heliport in the waters to the east of Nago City, anti-heliport groups in Henoko village, nearest the proposed construction site, formed the “Council Against the Construction of a Heliport/Society for the Protection of Life” in January 1997. When the mayor of Nago, HIGA Tetsuya, accepted the central government’s request to go ahead with a feasibility study in April (after the prefectural government had continued to refuse to get involved), the above council joined with other Nago citizens’ groups to denounce Higa’s action as undemocratic. It and some 21 other local organizations subsequently formed the “Council for the Promotion of Nago City Plebiscite on the Construction of the Heliport Base” on June 6.4

Eventually more than 50% of the signatures of Nago’s voters were gathered, far exceeding the 2% required to establish an ordinance. In September these signatures were submitted to Higa and the plebiscite bill was voted on by the city assembly in early October. Although the contents of the plebiscite were changed, both the pro and anti-heliport groups mobilized in great numbers for the December vote. As cited at the beginning of this article, the anti-heliport forces eventually emerged victorious. However when Mayor Higa decided to accept construction of the heliport because of the economic benefits that would come to the traditionally ignored and less-developed northern part of Okinawa.5

As he had anticipated, the public did not support his decision and he chose to resign. After consulting with his own supporters, Governor Ota found it necessary to announce at a February 1998 press conference that he would not

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1 In actual figures, 31,477 (82.45%) out of a total 38,176 eligible voters participated in the vote. 16,639 voters were against the plan. Rather than a simple “yes” or “no” vote, the plebiscite offered voters the opportunity to support or reject the planned construction outright, or to approve or disapprove the plan because of economic and environmental effects.


accept the heliport either. With Ota not cooperating, the central government and ruling Liberal Democratic Party temporarily stopped discussions on economic packages for the prefecture, hoping to employ “carrot and stick” approach to the problem.

Despite his initial promises to “cooperate” with the central government when the Futenma reversion agreement was announced in 1996, Ota’s official rejection of the construction of the heliport has added a new and complicated dimension to the stand-off between local residents and the central government. As a result, the implementation of the heliport relocation plan remains frozen (at the time of writing), although the U.S. and Japanese governments appear determined to see it through. Because the Hashimoto and Obuchi governments have been overwhelmed with economic problems, and the fact that the central government was angered by Governor Ota’s “reversal,” little attention has been paid to Okinawa. The local, prefectural, central, and U.S. governments have seemingly resigned themselves to wait for the results of the November gubernatorial election to see how the voters in the prefecture feel before their next move.

As this quick survey has shown, the Nago heliport problem is a complex one. It is first a bilateral political and military issue between the U.S. and Japanese governments. Secondly, it is also a domestic political problem relating to Okinawa’s position within Japan, a problem which Governor Ota and the people of Okinawa felt necessary to bring attention to by conducting the 1996 prefectoral referendum. Thirdly, the Nago problem is an intra-prefecture, socio-economic problem between the poorer north and the richer central and southern parts of Okinawa. Fourthly, it is an east-west problem between the residents of Henoko, which already hosts a military base and would be most affected by a new heliport, and the rest of the city of Nago, which financially benefits by the presence of the bases, without being exposed to their nuisances. And finally, it is a problem within Henoko, where residents are divided over the question of whether or not to accept the heliport. In light of the complexity of the issue and the necessity for further discussions with all the parties concerned, the final implementation of the return of Futenma and designation of a relocation site and facility seems to be far off.

Further Information
For local coverage of the issue, readers can consult two Japanese language newspapers published in Okinawa.

The Ryukyu Shinpō (http://www.ryukyushimpo.co.jp) and the Okinawa Taimusu (http://www.okinawatimes.co.jp).
Believing it necessary to reestablish government functions that had been lost in the wake of the Battle of Okinawa, the U.S. military government established on August 15, 1945 the Advisory Council of Okinawa (ACO), composed of fifteen Okinawan representatives chosen in conjunction by Okinawans and the Americans authorities. Until the Okinawan civil government was established eight months later, the ACO functioned as a transitional central governmental body. Heretofore, the ACO has usually been seen as a group that was handpicked by the U.S. military government and therefore, no more than a support organization for the occupation government. Indeed on the surface, it does appear that the ACO supported most policies of the U.S. military government.

However, when one reads carefully the records of its meetings, it is clear that the ACO went beyond merely debating the implementation of administrative policies. Namely, it fought to act as a self-government as the civil-military relationship was defined in the first months of American military rule of Okinawa. Records of ACO meetings repeatedly show that from the first days of the occupation, the U.S. military government clearly felt that the people of Okinawa had little ability for self-government and hence chose to limit paths to self-rule. The Americans believed that the people of Okinawa had no experience of living in a democracy and therefore needed some form of authority in their lives. As a result, they regarded the prewar political system with its strict controls from above as the most appropriate form of government for Okinawa. However, above all, the U.S. sought to use Okinawa as a primary U.S. military base. U.S. military leaders looked to develop a governing structure that would facilitate “exclusive rule” by the U.S and thereby make possible the unfettered military development of the archipelago.

The activities of the ACO can be divided into three stages. The first stage from August 15, 1945 to early October 1945 witnessed a period where “self government” was lively debated. In its dealings with the ACO, the U.S. military government stressed that it was important to reestablish the systems of government in order to secure public peace. The Americans also asserted that clearly “democratic” institutions needed to be developed. Moreover as a move intended to show a change from Japanese rule, the U.S. military government excluded former leaders of Imperial Rule Assistance Association (taisetsyokusankai) when the ACO was established. If there was a period with potential for “reform under the occupation,” it was probably during these weeks. During this time, the ACO presented for discussion plans for a separation of police powers and a request for war reparations from the Japanese government. It also called for a gubernatorial election, the establishment of a legislative body and proposed a constitution for Okinawa. However, before significant movement on these issues could take place, the U.S. military government suddenly changed its stance in early October 1945, disregarding plans to establish democratic institutions in Okinawa.

This change marked the beginning of a second stage (October to December) in the process of developing a civilian government and came despite the fact that there was no significant anti-American movement in Okinawa. It saw increased controls on the people with limitations placed on free speech. In addition, meetings of the ACO were no longer open to the public and the system of passing orders down from the military government was
Occupation and “Self Government” 1945–1946 continued

strengthened. Later, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) approved a document (JCS 570/40) that aimed to make Okinawa a “primary base.” While on September 27 the JCS examined the possibility of “exclusive rule,” (namely governing Okinawa as it did the former Japanese mandated territories of Micronesia), it did not label Okinawa as a “primary base” at that time. However, on October 10, Okinawa was defined as a “primary base” (JCS 570/37) and on the 23rd day of the same month, this classification was approved (JCS 570/40). As part of its overall plan for postwar East Asia, the U.S. declared that it would build a democratic and demilitarized Japan. Yet with the classification of Okinawa as a “primary base,” moves to build democratic institutions in the archipelago came to a crashing halt.

In the third stage, from early 1946 to April of that year, the Okinawa civil administration was established. In this process, a democratic structure was ignored, police power was entrusted to the American military police and limits on freedom of speech were increased. Moreover ignoring the desires of Okinawa residents to return to their original villages, the American authorities promoted the takeover of land for use as military bases. In the area of government administration, plans for a gubernatorial election were abandoned and to simplify governance for the Americans, the ACO was made the civil government of Okinawa. In response to this action, one group within the ACO claimed that the American move amounted to “despotism” and insisted that all members should resign in protest. However many in the ACO realized that Okinawa was also receiving benefits under U.S. rule and in the end, the ACO announced that “the Nimitz Proclamation would serve as a constitution,” thereby upholding the premise that the U.S. military government had absolute authority in Okinawa.2

While we can say that the Okinawa civil government was built within the rubric of occupation rule, these institutions were not the start of self-government. Rather during the process of building the governing apparatus of occupation rule, calls for self-government began to be heard. The late 1940s were a period marked by the confiscation of Okinawan land by the U.S. military, population growth, and urbanization. There were also changes in the structure of labor relations and rapid social changes were brought about by the presence of American bases. In this period, new political and social relationships were born. After 1950, the peace treaty between the U.S. and Japan and the question of returning Okinawa to Japan served as focal points for a new wave of political activity. Throughout the 1950s, the connections established in these movements laid the groundwork for “the people vs. the U.S. military” seen in battles over land in Okinawa. “Self-government” came to encompass social reform that called for the elimination of “foreign rule.” Democracy and human rights and in the end, moves for self-reliance also began to be incorporated into movements for self-government.

Notes

1 In ACO records, jichi is the term used for “self government.” In the records of the US military government, “self govern- ment” and “self administration” are both used as an equivalent term for jichi. Yet in the study of political thought, the word jichi is not limited to institutions or structures of government. In many ways, its meaning is closer to “autonomy.” In the context of the history of modern Okinawa, it has also come to hold the meanings of “self reliance” and “self determination.”

2 The “Nimitz Proclamation” was actually a series of proclama- tions issued by the U.S. Navy when U.S. forces landed on Okinawa in April 1945. U.S. forces proclaimed that they had seized political and administrative authority over the Nansei Shoto Islands south of the 30 degree latitude. The proclamation included regulations on the judiciary, police activities, finance and public health.

Further Reading

Historiographical Institute of Okinawa Prefecture, ed. Okinawa-ken shiryô sengo 1 Okinawa Shijun-kai kiroku. Okinawa: Okinawa-ken kyôiku iinkai, 1986. This is part of a four-volume set of ACO records.


Robert HELLYER

In 1839, MIZUNO Tadakuni, the de facto leader of the Tokugawa bakufu (shogunate), took an unprecedented step. He executed an order (announced two years earlier) that banned the sale of “Ryukyu products” in the bakufu-controlled port of Nagasaki for a ten-year period.1 As the imported goods (chiefly medicines and textiles) fetched high prices on the Japanese domestic market, their sale provided a valuable source of income for the Satsuma domain (today’s Kagoshima prefecture) which had controlled the Ryukyu Kingdom since 1609. The overall regulation of trade by a central government is today a foregone conclusion but during the Edo period (1600-1868), the central authority, the bakufu, did not assert such power. The reigning Tokugawa house directly controlled only trade with Chinese and Dutch merchants at Nagasaki. As part of the network of trade and diplomacy with East Asia, the shogunate allowed Satsuma to earn profits by selling at Nagasaki merchandise produced in Ryukyu and Chinese commodities obtained during Ryukyu’s biennial embassies to China, the so-called “Ryukyu products.”

Traditionally the history of Japanese foreign relations in the nineteenth century has been explained almost exclusively on the basis of the diplomatic interplay between Western envoys and leaders of the bakufu. Certainly the arrival in 1853 of Commodore Matthew Perry near the bakufu capital at Edo deserves attention as a key event in modern Japanese history. Yet friction between the bakufu and the Satsuma domain over trade and Western pressure on Ryukyu also had an important impact. In the 1830s and 1840s, the leaders of the bakufu and the Satsuma domain jockeyed over how trade, diplomacy, and defense would be conducted in Ryukyu, events that influenced larger changes in Japanese foreign relations during the nineteenth century.

The Edo Period Network of Trade and Diplomacy

As it refused to send tribute missions to China, the bakufu had no direct diplomatic contact with the Ming or Ch’ing courts. However because it wanted to maintain indirect commercial and diplomatic ties, it allowed Chinese merchants to trade at Nagasaki and also did not oppose the dispatch of Ryukyuan embassies to China. While the bakufu recognized Satsuma suzerainty over Ryukyu, it still defined Ryukyu as a foreign state and received periodic diplomatic missions from the island kingdom, missions that were mediated by Satsuma. These entourages traveled by ship to Kagoshima where they were placed on a vessel under the control of Satsuma samurai and transported to Osaka. With Satsuma escorts, the missions slowly proceeded overland to Edo, creating the spectacle of foreign dignitaries coming to pay respects to the bakufu.2 The reception of these missions clearly enhanced the bakufu’s claim of sovereignty over all of Japan.3
Moreover, as part of its overall defensive scheme, the bakufu relied on Satsuma to use Ryukyu’s commercial and diplomatic contacts with China (made possible by Ryukyu’s biennial tribute missions to China) to gather intelligence about events in East Asia.\(^4\) For its part, Satsuma needed bakufu approval to sell Ryukyuan and Chinese goods at Nagasaki and thereby be plugged into the bakufu-controlled domestic commercial network.\(^5\) While for a century and a half it had placed annual quotas on Satsuma’s trade, until 1839 the bakufu had never gone so far as to push for a complete ban on the sale of “Ryukyu products.” Previous bakufu leaders had believed that overly strict regulations might weaken Ryukyu economically and disrupt relations with Satsuma. They did not want to lose the benefits that the bakufu gained from indirect contact with China through Ryukyu.

Given the importance of this commercial and diplomatic network to the bakufu, why did Mizuno move in 1839 to change the nature of the relationship with Satsuma? His actions were largely motivated by bakufu concerns about the declining number of Chinese merchant ships arriving in Nagasaki, a trend which had led to a steady drop in the profits the bakufu garnered from trade. Bakufu officials were convinced that Satsuma was illicitly obtaining dried kelp, abalone and sea slugs (used in Chinese cuisine) from northern Japan, goods that were the mainstay of the bakufu export trade to China. Chinese ships would travel to Satsuma instead of Nagasaki to purchase these products and consequently, sell their wares to Satsuma merchants instead of the bakufu. To get the contraband on the domestic market, the bakufu believed that Satsuma would mix the Chinese goods with the permitted “Ryukyu products” and ship them to Nagasaki, where the domain had bakufu approval to sell foreign goods. In making his decision, Mizuno took the advice of bakufu officials in Nagasaki who urged that action be taken against Satsuma to restore lost trade revenue and more importantly, to preserve bakufu prestige and authority.\(^6\)

So should we see Mizuno’s move as the action of a leader of a nascent, modern, central government asserting its authority, moving to take control over “national” diplomacy and commerce? Apparently not, since only seven years later, the bakufu backed down and allowed Satsuma to resume the sale of “Ryukyu products” in Nagasaki.\(^7\) The reversal was directly triggered by the arrival in Ryukyu of a powerful force of French warships in 1846. The Satsuma domain and the bakufu were both extremely concerned that the French might attempt to occupy Ryukyu. ABE Masahiro, who succeeded Mizuno as the de facto leader of the bakufu, realized that Ryukyu was far too weak militarily to fend off a French attack and looked to Satsuma for assistance to quickly bolster the defenses of the island kingdom.\(^8\)

Although the leaders of the Satsuma domain were also concerned about the defense of Ryukyu, they did not miss the opportunity to press the bakufu to repeal the prohibition on the sale of “Ryukyu products” in Nagasaki. The domain asserted that a repeal of the ban would bolster trade, strengthening

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4. Ibid., 110-167.

the economy of Ryukyu and thereby help the kingdom to ward off a Western incursion. Faced with Western military pressure and needing the cooperation of Satsuma, in 1846 the bakufu caved in and once again allowed Satsuma to sell “Ryukyu products” in Nagasaki at levels it had enjoyed before 1839. For the remainder of Tokugawa rule, the bakufu would never again aggressively try to limit Satsuma’s trade in “Ryukyu products.” Indeed in successive decades, Satsuma increasingly sought to expand trade through Ryukyu by developing new trading relationships with Western and Chinese merchants.9

Reflected in these events of the 1830s and 1840s is how trade and diplomacy in nineteenth century Japan took place in a larger context, in other words as part of a network of commercial and diplomatic ties with East Asia, in which Satsuma and Ryukyu played important roles. Certainly the arrival of Perry forced the bakufu to deal directly with representatives of Western states. Moreover, the coming of Perry began a series of events that would eventually lead to the signing of commercial treaties with Western nations and the opening of Japanese ports to Western-style free trade. Yet while the interactions between the bakufu and the West are without question a large part of the story, we must not forget that Japanese diplomacy in the Edo period was not based on the central government dictating policy or negotiations with foreign representatives. Edo period foreign relations emanated from the interdependent network of trade, diplomacy and defense that existed between the bakufu and, in large part, the Satsuma domain. Satsuma’s smuggling activities disrupted the network as the domain began to cut into bakufu trade profits. This led Mizuno to restrict Satsuma’s foreign trade. French pressure brought the situation to a head and led to a bakufu retreat.

In the following two decades as it fought to maintain the Tokugawa hegemony, the bakufu continuously struggled with the question of just how to deal with trade, diplomacy and defense in Ryukyu, and by implication, its relationship with Satsuma. In the 1850s, the U.S., France and Holland signed treaties with Ryukyu.10 When questioned by Western diplomats, the bakufu also had difficulty defining Ryukyu’s place in the Tokugawa regime. What is more, in 1862, Satsuma began to press the bakufu to allow Western style free trade in the kingdom.11

The network of trade and diplomacy with East Asia that had functioned effectively for over two centuries was crumbling, and not simply because of Western pressure. Competition over trade with Satsuma and events in Ryukyu clearly showed that the interdependent relationship was breaking down. In the decades before the Meiji Restoration, internal events, including those on Ryukyu, were moving Japan toward a redefinition of how it conducted foreign relations.

Notes (continued)

8 The documents submitted by bakufu officials describing their suspicions of Satsuma smuggling can be found in YANAI Kenji, ed. Tsukô Ichiran Zokushû , vol. 1 (Osaka: Seibunbô, 1968), 152–186. In 1850, the bakufu ordered the compilation of documents related to foreign relations from 1566 to 1825. After six years of work, Tsukô Ichiran was completed. An additional series, Tsukô Ichiran Zokushû , was compiled a short time later. For more on Tsukô Ichiran, visit the homepage of TSURUTA Kei, http://www.hi.u-tokyo.ac.jp/personal/tsuruta/index.htm.

9 Uehara, 12.


11 Ibid., 410.
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Research Report

Japan’s Welfare State and the Paradox of Equality

WADA Yukako

Welfare state analyses have long addressed the issue of equality via social expenditure. However, social expenditure in itself does not account for welfare outcomes such as equality or standard of living. One of the major aims of the welfare state is to achieve equality, either by redistributing resources horizontally, between rich and poor, or vertically, between young and old or between men and women. If the welfare state is defined in this way, its aim is not simply to expand social expenditure, but to achieve equality and to raise the standard of living by alleviating poverty. Recent literature has criticized the expenditure-centered approach, arguing that there are alternative means of achieving equality and high welfare outcomes.

My research examines the validity of this argument by looking at the case of Japan.

Causes of Japanese Welfare State Development

Theories of welfare state development have primarily focused on the causes behind the growth of the welfare state, rather than its purpose. Extensive use of social expenditure as an indicator for welfare state development could largely be explained by this logic. Social expenditure was not only convenient for comparing large numbers of countries, but also useful for comparing demographic, sociological and political factors. With a few exceptions, this literature has not articulated how or whether an increase in social expenditure has actually contributed to better welfare outcomes. Accordingly, academics evaluating welfare state outcomes in different ways began to question the centrality of social expenditure. Among these post-expenditure centered theorists, some gave up the idea of comparison altogether, and retreated to relativism. According to this group, the goals of welfare states are all qualitatively different and therefore cannot be compared linearly. In contrast, others persisted with these comparisons using standard indicators. However, extensive analysis of the contexts of welfare state development are often omitted in this literature. A few studies by post-social expenditure centered comparativists include contextual analysis in an attempt to explain welfare state development more comprehensively.

What is the implication of all this for Japan? Unfortunately, the analysis of the Japanese welfare state has not been a central issue for most comparative welfare state researchers. The treatment of Japan in the international literature has been limited to the inclusion of Japanese data in quantitative analyses, which often disregards historical and contextual frameworks specific to Japan. The existing theories of welfare state development regard Japan as residual or underdeveloped, mainly due to its low level of social expenditure. In contrast, Japan specialists outside Japan and Japanese social welfare researchers have long conducted contextual analyses of welfare state development in Japan. Some of them adopted the view that low social expenditure in Japan means that the Japanese welfare state is underdeveloped. They did not find particular reasons why alternative explanations of welfare state development were necessary for Japan. On the other hand, those who argue that Japanese welfare outcomes cannot be analyzed by social expenditure alone either emphasized the uniqueness of the Japanese welfare state, or attempted to create new indicators for measuring welfare outcomes.
Is Japan Really Equal?
Recent literature uses a range of indicators other than social expenditure, to compare welfare outcomes in various countries. These include health status, income equality, poverty rate, differences in socio-economic status by gender and corporate size. Some argue that wage differences by corporate size is central to the residuality of the Japanese welfare state. Indeed since the 1970s, the differences in Japan have been relatively larger than in other countries. Wage differences based on gender have been the largest among most advanced capitalist countries since the early seventies. From this evidence it seems that the Japanese welfare state is rather residual. However, the Japanese performance is far from residual when other aspects are examined. For example, the infant mortality rate has been relatively low in post-war Japan and life expectancy is among the highest among OECD countries. Moreover, the percentage of the Japanese population below the poverty line has continued to be relatively low when compared to other countries. In addition, income equality based on Gini coefficient measures is much higher in Japan than in most advanced capitalist countries.

The above analyses indicate that Japanese welfare state is residual and underdeveloped in some aspects but not in others. The relatively strong performance of Japan in some areas of welfare suggests that the existing theories of welfare state development which focus on social expenditure levels are inadequate for explaining Japan. The argument that Japan is simply residual is no longer tenable in the face of this new evidence. This does not mean, however, that Japan is a highly equitable society. The Japanese welfare state is indeed residual in terms of differences in welfare outcomes by gender and corporate size of employer. In either case, the perception that the Japanese welfare state is residual and that this situation could be explained solely by the level of social expenditure, is not sufficient for explaining the case of Japan. If some aspects of Japanese reality pose a paradox for the social expenditure centered theories of welfare state development, how can the Japanese anomaly be explained? Since the post-expenditure centered theorists have not provided sufficient answers, alternative explanations should be drawn from the actual welfare outcomes. In constructing such a frame of reference, it is necessary to examine the effect of welfare provision in the areas which have not been fully examined in the existing literature.

State, Market and Family in Japanese Welfare Provision
If the existing literature has mainly focused on the role of the state in achieving high welfare outcomes through social expenditure based programs, the analysis of alternative mechanisms should include the role of the family and the market. In addition, the role of the state in welfare provision by means other than by social expenditure based programs also needs to be examined. The dominance of family provision in Japan, which has been described in literature on the history of Japanese social welfare, has generally been explained using “subsidarity,” the principle by which families become the primary provider of welfare. This principle,

Notes
3 MORITA Nariya, Shihon shugi to seisabetsu: jendata teki kosei o mezashite (Tokyo: Aoki shoten, 1997).
5 Ibid., p.91.
7 Ibid.
Japan’s Welfare State and the Paradox of Equality continued

which is at the foundation of the Japanese welfare thought, suggests that the state only provides welfare if family welfare provision is exhausted. The centrality of corporate welfare has also been emphasized by social policy analysts and social security specialists. Most of this literature argues that corporate welfare was designed to maintain the loyalty of employees. In contrast to the social democratic view that labor movements and negotiations between employees and employers result in increases in the welfare entitlements of workers, the conservative welfare view does not encompass the notion of rights. In this view, corporate welfare is provided by employers to employees as a favor, not as an entitlement. The role of the state in redistributing resources, not by social expenditure based programs, but through industrial policy, has been suggested by some political scientists. MIYAMOTO argues that the protection of declining industry had a similar function to income redistribution. Others such as MARUO, WILENSKY and UZUHASHI, point out that constant high employment reduced the necessity of state income transfers. In fact until recently, the unemployment rate in Japan has been low. Furthermore when compared to other countries, the high proportion of public construction funding within the national budget, suggests that jobs were created for those who would otherwise rely on state unemployment benefits or income transfer schemes.

A Japanese Model of Welfare Provision?
The Japanese state has redistributed resources through various measures, but not mainly through welfare programs in the conventional sense. Social security and welfare programs in Japan, as in other countries, have improved dramatically since WWII, but the low level of social expenditure means that they were not the major factors contributing to equality. Instead, the redistribution and equality measures in Japan have relied heavily on the employment structure. A low unemployment rate and high labor market participation rate created less potential needs of welfare provision by the state. This not only suggests that the state spends less on unemployment benefit for mainstream workers, but also that segments of the population which tend to rely on welfare provisions, such as the aged and single mothers, tend to have less economic needs. In Japan, the labor market participation of these two groups is relatively high. Furthermore, as a result of family support by ‘subsidiarity’ mechanisms, the role of the state in alleviating poverty has been reduced. In summary, the Japanese welfare state is different from those of other advanced capitalist countries, not because Japan is in itself unique, but because in comparison to other advanced capitalist countries, Japan used different means to achieve high welfare outcomes. Japanese welfare provision appears to be based on the idea of self-sufficiency, either through work or by family support, and individuals are discouraged to depend on state provision until these two options are exhausted. Analysis of why the Japanese welfare state came to encompass such values, and how these operate in actual welfare provision, is indispensable for overcoming the centrality of social expenditure in comparative welfare state research.
In March 1992, the bôtaihô, law concerning prevention of unjust acts by members of organised crime gangs (bôryokudan) was implemented. What does this legal change signify? Is it a serious attempt to eradicate gangsters and organised crime gangs (yakuza/bôryokudan) from Japanese society, a slap on the wrist, or merely a superficial jump on the post-cold war bandwagon of anti-organised crime rhetoric? What impact has it had on organised crime? As this is still very much a work in progress, this paper aims to set the agenda rather than offer definite answers to these questions.

Under the provisions of the bôtaihô, a local public safety commission is empowered to designate gangsters (yakuza) as an organised crime group bôryokudan. Once designated, bôryokudan are forbidden to make “unfair demands” backed by their organisation’s reputation for violence. Where gangs, or gang members, engage in such activities, and the target of these demands appeals to the authorities, the public safety commission can issue an injunction against the concerned gang. If this injunction is violated, then a fine of up to one million-yen, a prison sentence of up to one year, or a combination of the two may be imposed.

In order to make sense of this change in the law, it is first necessary to look briefly at the historical background to the bôtaihô and the role that yakuza/bôryokudan have played in Japanese society over the last fifty years. Most of the English language literature concerning postwar Japanese organised crime stresses the symbiotic nature of its relationship with the legitimate world; not only individual consumers of illegal goods and services, but businesses, politicians and the law-enforcement community have made use of these groups for their own ends. Although many commentators (not least gang members themselves) see this as an example of Japanese uniqueness, a review of theoretical literature on organised crime (largely generated by American and European sources) shows that one of the crucial considerations of organised crime is that it is not unambiguously dysfunctional to the host society.

Many Japanese police interviewees have conceded that in the past the police have made use of the yakuza/bôryokudan, they stress that since about the mid-1960s, their relationship with these groups has progressively deteriorated. The turning point was the first “summit strategy” in which the police made nation-wide arrests of top-level gang bosses in response to the increasingly public displays of violent conflict during the “gang-war period” that began in the mid-1950s. As a response to the “summit strategy,” there was a significant decline in the number of gang members from the 1963 peak of 184,091 (in 5,216 groups) to 139,089 (3,500 groups) by 1969. There was also a corresponding (if temporary) decline in the number of inter-gang conflicts during this period.

Whilst these figures suggest that the police countermeasures of the “summit strategy” period were successful, in fact they were largely responsible for a number of changes in bôryokudan structure, organisation and fund-raising activities that were not necessarily an improvement on the previous situation. The gangs that disappeared tended to be smaller, traditional
groups with limited resources. Their disappearance left a partial vacuum, which was filled by larger, progressive gangs, which had survived because of their more diversified business portfolios. This encouraged the process of oligopolisation in the following decade by the largest three syndicates, the Yamaguchi-gumi, the Inagawa-kai and the Sumiyoshi-rengô (later known as the Sumiyoshi-kai). The top leadership of these groups was effectively insulated from police countermeasures by the introduction of the quasi-feudal system in which sub-gangs paid money every month to their organisation headquarters. This ensured a high, non-taxable income for syndicate leaders without direct involvement in criminal activity.

Furthermore, police crackdowns on traditional yakuza/bôryokudan activity such as gambling have forced these organisations to diversify into new sectors such as amphetamine trafficking, disruption of company shareholders meetings (sôkaiya activities) and violent intervention in civil disputes (minji kainyu bôryoku). Traditionally the yakuza/bôryokudan had maintained at least an outward appearance of not causing inconvenience to ordinary citizens; the development of fund raising activities that directly targeted ordinary citizens (such as minji kainyu bôryoku) was therefore a major shift in the nature of these groups.

This, in turn, had important implications for the way in which these groups were perceived by the wider society. A crucial determinant of the degree of public toleration of organised crime is the extent to which their activities can be characterised as “victimless crimes.” The increased reliance on violent intervention and similar types of fund-raising operations is considered to be a major factor in creating a climate of opinion that favors a comprehensive legal clampdown on these organisations.

The change in public perception of the yakuza/bôryokudan was also stimulated by a number of high profile gang conflicts: the Yama-ichi conflict, the Okinawa conflict and the Hachioji conflict. Whilst the succession war of the Yamaguchi-gumi following the death of the fourth generation boss was the largest of these battles, in terms of bringing about a sea-change in public opinion it was less significant than the Okinawa war (1990–91). In this conflict between the third generation Kokuryû Kai and the breakaway Okinawa Kokuryû Kai, two policemen and a high school student were amongst the fatalities. In particular, the death of the schoolboy generated widespread anti-gang sentiment.

A number of informants have also suggested that foreign pressure stimulated the formation of the bôtaihô. Whilst this is clearly the case for the draft Organised Crime Countermeasures Bill currently under consideration in the Diet, it is difficult to prove conclusively for the bôtaihô. However, it is clear that with the collapse of the Soviet block and the end of the cold war, organised crime has moved rapidly up the political agenda as a convenient bogeyman. Consequently there has been pressure on countries to prove to the international community that they are “on-side” in the war on transnational organised crime. Police and bureaucrats indignantly deny suggestions that foreign pressure was a factor in the formation of the bôtaihô.
Attempting to evaluate the effects of the bôtaihô is problematic for a number of reasons. Most significant of these is disentangling the effects of extraneous factors such as the collapse of the bubble economy. Informal discussions with gang-members suggest that, of the two, economic changes have far outweighed legal developments in their impact on bôryokudan income and behaviour.

A further obstacle to measuring the effectiveness of the bôtaihô is the possibility of displacement. If the change in the law effectively reduces violent intervention in conflicts only for there to be a corresponding increase in the level of amphetamine or organised robbery related crime, can this be considered an improvement in the overall situation? There is evidence to suggest that there have indeed been increases in both of these categories of crime as low-level gang-members struggle to continue to make payments to their organisation headquarters.

Policy evaluation also assumes that the goal of the authorities has been identified. Considering the widely conflicting interpretations provided by various expert interviewees, this can not be taken as given. Furthermore, the Diet dropped tough provisions for sequestration of gang assets contained in the National Police Agency’s first draft of the bôtaihô. This shows that it is impossible to treat the authorities as a monolithic entity and that a garbage can model of policy formation may be more appropriate.

Whilst the bôtaihô has led to a certain amount of success in reducing “bôryokudan victimisation” of ordinary members of the public, it has not had a similar effect in areas where legal protection is either unavailable or only partially available. This not only applies to those engaged in illegal enterprises such as amphetamine-trafficking, prostitution or illegal immigration, but to the entertainment industry where the police are reluctant to intervene in minor cases of inebriated customers causing problems. As a consequence one informant, with great experience in both the yakuza and the entertainment business, states that thirty percent of drinking establishments are still paying protection money to designated bôryokudan. Nor has the bôtaihô reduced the level of the other criminal activities engaged in by these groups; indeed there is evidence to suggest that, in certain cases, these activities may have increased. Seen in isolation, the bôtaihô has had only mixed success in mitigating the adverse effects of organised crime groups in Japan. However the bôtaihô should be seen as part of a process where the role of the criminal justice system in bôryokudan countermeasures has increased. This includes not only a more robust application of the existing criminal law, but also the proposed extension of police powers under the Organised Crime Countermeasures Bill. As a consequence of this process, not only are these criminal gangs co-operating less with the authorities, but also there is a noticeable trend of these groups going underground. However, because the full thrust of current organised crime countermeasures in Japan has been handed over to the criminal justice system rather than addressing the aetiological factors giving rise to these groups, it can be expected that these groups will be around for some time to come.

Further Reading


In 1996, 5,180,000 Japanese people visited the United States for business, study, tourism, and other purposes (Prime Minister’s Office Report, 1997). In 1993, 10,746 people entered as exchange visitors, 6,473 of those being spouses and children of exchange visitors. Unlike other nationalities, most Japanese return to Japan (U.S. Department of Justice, 1994, p. 130).

Travel by Japanese Women to the United States
Unlike men who went abroad in the Meiji era and after, Japanese women frequently are not “assigned” a mission of their own. Instead, most married women accompany their husbands, whose assignments are business or study. The living conditions of women and their families in the United States have varied from urban and suburban to rural. (Japanese Ministry of Education, 1989). Some women live in communities with high concentrations of Japanese. Various studies have reported on married women and their families who lived in exclusively Japanese neighborhoods. Some researchers found that these communities are “more Japanese” than those in Japan (FLORY, 1989). The exclusively Japanese communities offer various support systems such as full time schools and supplementary Saturday schools established by the Japanese government and Japanese businesses.

Women who do not live in the exclusively Japanese neighborhoods do not enjoy many of these services and so struggle with a greater diversity of cultural issues. Some cases of difficulties associated with life in a foreign culture have been reported in the press. For example, after a woman was charged with the drowning her new born baby (Detroit Free Press, 11/3/95), her cultural and social isolation was given as the cause of a depression that led her to murder her child. (FETTERS, 1997)

After struggling to adjust to the foreign American culture, most of these women return to Japan where they are obliged to reenter their local communities (WHITE, 1988). KASHIMA (1989) points out that some of these returning women become more active in their local communities than they had been before they went abroad. Kashima concludes that Japanese women who lived in foreign countries may undergo some internal or external changes which are sometimes subtle, sometimes drastic. For her part, White suggests that whether this change is subtle or substantial, real or imaginary, these women had to readjust to their home communities.

Because studies did not consider the women’s reactions to experiences in foreign countries and how they were interpreted when the women returned to Japan, many questions remain unanswered. Did the experience of living in the United States lead Japanese married women to change their perceptions of their activities? What accounts for such changes? Everyone lives under different circumstances, and each individual makes different interpretations of phenomena around him or her. An overriding question, then, is what
kinds of cross-cultural learning occur as a consequence of a foreign experience, and how do these women sojourners retain or revise their conceptions of themselves?

Cross-Cultural Learning
The person who crosses cultural borders has been studied and recognized as part of the cultural adaptation phenomenon. Studies in socio-psychological adaptation have offered many theories and models to predict what happens when a person crosses cultural borders for a prolonged time. These studies fall into two categories: (1) psychological models and (2) learning models.

Psychological Models
A psychological model offers concepts such as cultural shock, the U-Curve process of cultural adaptation or adjustment, and intercultural communication competence. As an outcome of intercultural experiences, HAMMER, GUDYKUNST, and WISEMAN (1978) identified what they termed as the “third cultural perspective.” This exists when a person is “being non-judgmental, being accurate in perceptions of similarities and differences between cultures, and being less exclusive (p. 384).” CHURCH (1982) concluded that those who are acculturated demonstrate a broader worldview, a low level of ethnocentrism, and greater self-awareness and self-esteem. However, ANDERSON (1994) notes that these psychological models do not depict higher level activities such as learning, fulfillment, growth, and development.

Learning Model — Learning in Transition
Various transition theories touch upon psychological reactions and outcomes of transitions, and some of them observe the relationship between life events and learning in adulthood. Life events are the “turning points” or “punctuation marks” that bring changes in self-concept and identity (NEUGARTEN, 1976). How do we learn from a life event? DEWEY (1938) asserts that “what he has learned in the way of knowledge and skill in one situation becomes an instrument of understanding and dealing effectively with the situations which follow.” (p. 44) In Gestalt psychology, “situation” is believed to be subjectively perceived (KOHLER, 1959). Individuals are believed to organize patterns they perceive and make meaning of them. How can meaning be made while individuals attend and reflect on it? For MEZIROW (1991), reflection is “the process of critically assessing the content, process, or premise(s) of our efforts to interpret and give meaning to an experience” (p. 104). These types of reflection make “perspective transformation” possible.

Study Design Overview
My study was conducted in Tokyo in 1998. The participants were Japanese married women, aged 30–50, who lived in not exclusively Japanese neighborhoods in the United States for a year or more during 1992 and 1996 and then returned to Japan. The study consisted of three, one and a half-hour personal interviews with four subjects. Interview questions focused on life concerns before, during, and after the sojourn in the United States.

Tentative results show that these women vividly remember incidents which led them think about culture, race, ethnicity, identity, gender, relationship with in-laws, husbands, and children. Let me present the case of Mrs. Yamamoto (a pseudonym).
Mrs. Yamamoto is married to a college professor who is the eldest son of a rural family. She had worked five years until her marriage and now lives with her husband, her in-laws and her two small children. She believes that marriage and the birth of her children cut her off from social interactions with people outside the family. She wanted to continue to work after the birth of her children but did not want her in-laws to care for her children. She believes that life as a housewife does not allow for personal development. She began to question her self-worth, leading a busy life taking care of her small children and her elderly in-laws. Living with her in-laws was a nerve-wracking experience for her, especially as she knew her mother-in-law did not like the idea of her family going abroad. When she and husband told his parents about their planned sojourn abroad, the next morning the in-laws complained that they had not been able to sleep for worrying about it. Her mother-in-law told her that it was irresponsible as a mother to deprive her children of the opportunity to attend the traditional festivals for children. She was also not pleased that Mrs. Yamamoto’s eldest son would miss the entrance ceremony for Japanese elementary school and accused Mrs. Yamamoto of enticing her husband to go abroad. Her mother-in-law asked, “Who is going to take care of us if something happens while you are in the States?” After various other objections were voiced by her in-laws, Mrs. Yamamoto described counting down in her mind the time until she could go abroad and be away from her in-laws.

Mrs. Yamamoto only felt tense at the beginning of her stay in the United States. After settling in, she studied English in classes sponsored by a local church and learned about American culture and customs at a weekly club. At the club and other venues, she made several presentations about Japanese tea ceremony and “how to wear a kimono.” She enjoyed carving a pumpkin on Halloween, and she took cooking classes. She visited Washington D.C., New York, and Florida. In Japan, a two-night-stay had been her longest trip, but she stayed seven nights in Florida. She attended various parties, took swimming classes and learned how to quilt. Through it all, she did not share her happiness with her mother-in-law in Japan.

Mrs. Yamamoto also reflected on her observations of senior citizens in America.

In Japan, the elderly expect their relatives to take care of them. In the United States, I saw senior citizens walking with the assistance of a cane drive themselves to the supermarket and shop. In Japan, someone has to drive for them. In the U.S., we visited an elderly man who lived alone. I do not believe that would happen in Japan. I realized that as the number of elderly people increases in a society, it becomes more difficult for the elderly to depend on the younger generation. In the past when families usually had many children, when one parent became ill, the children would take turns caring for the parent. Nowadays, with smaller families, there are fewer people to care for infirm parents. Without this social net, they must care for themselves in their old age. I am concerned about when my husband and me become old as we will probably have to look after ourselves.

For three months after she returned to Japan, Mrs. Yamamoto cried frequently. Eventually she learned how to deal with the emotional frustration she felt enduring the criticisms and complaints of her mother-in-law. Before her stay in the U.S., Mrs. Yamamoto was not able to ignore the nagging of her mother-in-law. These days, she relieves her stress by frequently going out with friends she met at PTA gatherings.

Analysis

One possible way to analyze the case of Mrs. Yamamoto is to use the concept of ki, which holds an important place in the Japanese construction of self. Ki is a form of psycho-spiritual energy that occurs within every person. The more ki energy is loosened, the more inner feelings (kimochi) are expressed. A “tightening” of ki energy allows one to have the strength to fulfill group demand responsibilities. (c.f. ROHLEN, 1976)

When Mrs. Yamamoto was in Japan, she would often be at odds with her mother-in-law, tightening her ki. Indeed it seems that others in the family were affected as after hearing arguments between Mrs. Yamamoto and her mother-in-law, Mrs. Yamamoto’s six-year old boy began to wet the bed. As a result of her life in Japan, Mrs. Yamamoto would occasionally “explode,” yelling at her husband. During her stay in the U.S., Mrs. Yamamoto would not communicate with her in-laws, asking her husband to talk to them when they phoned. A sense of “loosened” ki was evident when she presented hundreds of her pictures of her stay in the U.S. Moreover, under this “loosened” ki, Mrs. Yamamoto became more observant of senior citizens in the United States and came to compare their situation with that of her in-laws. She concluded that her in-laws should work harder to support themselves. Yet at the same time, she was concerned about the time when she and her husband would themselves become old and need help in their daily lives.
Mrs. Yamamoto’s sojourn in the U.S. clearly caused her to change her views about care for the elderly. MEZIROW’s theory of perspective transformation is useful in helping us understand the experiences of Mrs. Yamamoto. In a nutshell, perspective transformation is “the process of becoming critically aware of how and why our assumptions have come to constrain the way we perceive, understand, and feel about our world.” It means “changing these structures of habitual expectation to make possible a more inclusive, discriminating, and integrative perspective; and finally, making choices or otherwise acting upon these new understandings.” (1991, p. 167) In this process, various types of reflections are required. Mrs. Yamamoto went through premise reflection which involves “an assessment of the validity of norms, roles, codes, ‘common sense,’ ideologies, language games, paradigms, philosophies, or theories that we have taken for granted (p. 105).” Namely, she questioned Japanese norms for caring for the elderly. This case demonstrates the consequences of living in a foreign land; namely how it can change the way a person handles issues in their primary culture. Mrs. Yamamoto had a stressful life in Japan and was able to enjoy a “cooling-off” period in the United States. She returned to Japan with a new insight on the problems facing her in her daily life in Japan.

Bibliography


The strength and role of Japanese labor has always been controversial. Normative arguments often overshadow empirical analyses. Moreover, bits and pieces of evidence cited are often somewhat contradictory. Is Japanese labor really weak and completely co-opted? If not, does Japanese labor enjoy a “fair” share of corporate profits? The coexistence of high earnings and a low quality of life continues to provide a mixed picture of Japanese lives.

Ikuo KUME’s recent book, *Disparaged Success*, makes an indispensable contribution to this debate. The book challenges the conventional thesis of weak labor, eloquently stating that “Japanese labor [has] succeeded in gaining important benefits, such as secure employment and participation in the production system, despite its ‘weakness’ characterized by a decentralized enterprise union structure” (p. 6). He attributes the reason for the success to interclass alliances. Specifically, he states that “labor could have substantial power at the micro level and that divided labor could form a cross-class alliance at the national level, if combined. [This] leads us to the conclusion that labor can successfully develop its activity from the micro level to the national level.” (p. 223) Thus, he argues that Japanese labor is not co-opted, and Japan’s private unions have collaborated with employers for their own interests and strategic goals.

This revisionist argument is forceful and fascinating. In the literature of comparative political economy, the resource-centered approach of class politics has been dominant for decades. From this perspective, the power of labor unions depends on their organizational resources—high unionization rates and the high degree of union centralization. Japanese labor has been considered weak due to its organizational fragmentation (i.e., divided national centers and enterprise unions). Hence Japanese labor is not supposed to receive appropriate benefits with respect to wages, working conditions, compensation schemes, and social protection.

The book refutes this thesis and undertakes a systematic examination of labor’s successes. However, measuring labor’s performance and assessing its degree of success is a tricky business. Kume uses (1) wage increases (average hourly wages and wage standardization), (2) employment security (unemployment rates and active labor policies), (3) working hours, and (4) participation in decision-making, as the criteria for the success of Japanese labor. He also includes the formulation of the Equal Opportunity for Male and Female Workers’ Law of 1985 and the Law to Facilitate Employment of Elderly Workers of 1986.

He effectively demonstrates that Japanese workers have done quite well given labor’s weak and divided situation. Yet he tends to overemphasize the gains of labor, assuming that if labor is weak, it will not receive any gains. Japan’s high wage increases, for instance, might have resulted from the fact that Japanese workers had low wages to start with. Even though the spring offensive (*Shuntō*) might have contributed to wage standardization across several sectors, performance payment and personnel evaluations (PRICE, 1997) might have counteracted sectoral wage solidarity. Huge gender gaps still remain uncorrected. Without some sort of normal criterion, such as de-commodification of labor à la ESPING-ANDERSON (1990), each gain is labeled a victory, yet we know little about the relative position of Japanese labor. The book persuasively discredits the weak labor thesis, but a complete map of comparative labor achievement is necessary to evaluate the successes of Japanese labor.
Disparaged Success: Labor Politics in Postwar Japan continued

Given that labor benefited more than expected, what allowed such a situation? Instead of organizational resources, Kume focuses on political coalitions and policy networks that are exogenous to labor, and successfully illustrates the dynamics of alliance formations between accommodationist unions and conservative-yet-progressive elites. According to the recent literature of comparative politics, dependence on trade (a.k.a. globalization) shapes domestic politics such that cleavages between domestic sectors and export-oriented sectors become more politically salient than the classic class cleavage of capital and labor. This book exemplifies a parallel case in Japan. It shows that a cross-class coalition was formed in the export-oriented sectors. Indeed, increasing exposure to the world markets fortified the relationship. Even with the resurgence of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and its neo-liberal reforms, the author argues, private sector unions successfully made themselves important participants in the governmental decision making process. Kume’s demonstration of the linkage between globalization and domestic political change makes the book appealing to a wide range of readers such as students of international political economy and comparative politics. His argument would have been stronger if he explicitly showed how the interclass alliance in the export-oriented sector benefited Japanese workers as he suggests.

In addition to labor’s exogenous power resources, Kume also looks at labor’s endogenous power at the micro level. With the help of recent findings in labor sociology and labor economics, the book argues that managers also depend on workers’ skills. As a result, workers have leverage vis-a-vis employers through their skill formation. As recent works show (cf. NITTA, 1988), Japanese unions indeed have substantial influence in some managerial decisions (e.g., work deployment and employment adjustment). The question is how labor participation at the firm level leads to labor’s macro-level influence and in turn, affects labor performance. If unions are empowered at the firm level, and if these unions can force the government to formulate policies for the sake of labor, we would be able to safely refute the co-opted labor view. By contrast, if the government includes labor in its decision-making processes for its own purposes, regardless of unions’ power and intent, we have co-optation. What then is the situation in Japan?

Kume’s answer is the formation of inter-class coalitions itself. He sees that the micro-level cross-class coalitions achieved wage increases linked with productivity improvement. These alliances laid the foundation for the interclass coalition at the national level because labor’s participation at the company level changed unions’ strategies. Namely, unions came to share views similar to managers as well as desire tax cuts and anti-inflationary policies. His story sounds plausible, yet the concept of cross-class coalitions risks masking the real agent of alliance formation. Managers might treat allied unions as junior partners. Some readers may recall the classic debate of false consciousness and hegemonic discourse. Moreover, some of labor’s gains might not result from the cross-class coalitions at any level. For instance, Japan’s employment security is partly protected by court decisions (SUGENO, 1992), not only by managers’ benevolence. Kume wisely crafted his argument to refute the weak labor/resource-centered views, yet the debate of co-optation will continue to be controversial even with the addition of Kume’s theories.

These criticisms do not detract from Kume’s contribution to the field. His efforts to connect micro-level and macro-level labor politics as well as international dynamics and domestic politics are certainly welcome. Indeed, this book is especially useful as it exposes several different avenues for future research on Japanese labor politics.

References

**A Interview with KATÔ Shidzue**

KATÔ Shidzue is a remarkable figure in modern Japan. Born in 1897, she is the eldest daughter of HIROTA Ritarô, Ph.D. (Engineering) who was among the first students at Tokyo Imperial University, today’s University of Tokyo. After attending the Peer’s Gakushuin High School, she married Baron ISHIMOTO Keikichi in 1915 and moved to the Miki Coal Mining town in Kyushu where her husband had been assigned. Witnessing first hand the harsh conditions endured by especially women employed in the mine, she began working for women’s rights. She later became involved in the birth control movement, inspired by Margaret SANGER, whom she met during a visit to the United States in 1919. After returning to Japan, she worked tirelessly to promote birth control in Japan until the government forced her to desist in 1938. In 1944 she divorced her husband and married KATÔ Kanju, a prominent figure in the Japan Socialist Party (JSP). In 1946, she joined the JSP and was elected as the first female member of the House of Representatives, serving for twenty eight years. Since her retirement from politics in 1974, Katô has continued to be an advocate for women’s rights and other causes, giving speeches and making numerous appearances on radio and television. At 101 years old, she remains active and was kind enough to talk with *Social Science Japan* about her memories of Meiji Japan, women’s rights, and the current domestic political situation.

When asked what she believed might be some of the reasons for the economic and political malaise that currently grips Japan, Katô suggested that today’s Japanese are not individually involved in the nation. She recalled the unity, sense of purpose, and individual motivation in the Japanese war effort of the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905). The men at the front understood the goals of the war and all those at home shared the excitement of Japanese victories against the much larger and more powerful foe as well as the sadness and bereavement of the families who lost loved ones in battle. Katô believes that this was not simply patriotism, but rather a sense of individual involvement for the greater good of the nation, *ichioku isshin*. She also has much praise for the leaders of the period, in particular General NOGI Maresuke (the president of the Peers’ Gakushuin School while Katô was a student there) and Admiral TÔGÔ Heihachirô, both of whom she still respects for their commitment to the country.

Katô contends that in the decades following the Russo-Japanese War, Japan lacked effective leadership and was plagued by a “spineless” diplomatic policy. This led to growing popular disillusionment throughout the nation. This situation worsened after the invasion of Manchuria as Japanese leaders began to embark upon a period of expansion during which the sense of individual purpose in the nation was lost, replaced by militarism. The political leadership failed in not controlling the military and young men died.
at the front without understanding their sacrifice, pathetically crying for their mothers instead of fighting for the glory of the emperor as their predecessors had done in the Russo-Japanese War. Moreover, the people at home also began to feel a great sense of disillusionment with the war, never experiencing the feeling of mutual commitment.

As for the postwar period, she concludes that the question of Japanese war guilt has never been fully resolved because of the weak character of postwar Japanese leaders, many of whom do not understand why Japan was involved in war from 1931 to 1945. She asserted that the Japanese prime minister should follow the lead of West German leaders in the 1960s who made very public displays of regret for the war and Germany’s role in it.

Katô has harsh words for most Japanese men who she sees as spineless and pampered. During her tenure as a member of the Diet, Katô noted that she had little campaign money and so in order to achieve success at the polls, she had to be more diplomatic toward the male sex than she would have preferred. Yet while Japanese men are generally weak, she contends that Japanese women have the potential to do great good on social and political fronts because of their inherent strength that grows from shouldering the majority of household responsibilities. She believes that Japanese women can use their own networks (idobatakai) to find a political voice in today’s Japan.

Overall, the vibrant Katô repeatedly stressed that what is missing in today’s Japan is the sense of individual involvement in the nation that she knew as a child. To rediscover ichioku isshin, Japanese need to more thoroughly study their own history, learning about men like Nogi and Tôgô to understand how Japan became an economic power. Today’s bureaucrats, many of whom are being exposed as corrupt, clearly have little understanding of what it means to have a national sense of purpose. Katô contends that it is a disgrace that national heroes (like Nogi and Tôgô) are virtually ignored in school textbooks, which are regulated by these same bureaucrats. A look to the past will help Japanese people know themselves and in turn build a stronger nation based upon individual involvement.

A prolific writer, Katô has produced numerous books and articles over her lifetime. Among her books is one originally written in English in 1935, Facing Two Ways: The Story of Life. It was republished in paperback by Stanford University Press in 1984. Additionally, there is the biography, A New Woman of Japan—A Political Biography of Katô Shidzû written in English by Helen M. Hopper and published in 1996 by Westview Press.
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Japan in the 1960s

Okinawa