

Newsletter of the Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo
ISSN 1340-7155

Social Science

Japan

33

December 2005



Marriage

Published by:
The Information Center for Social
Science Research on Japan
Institute of Social Science
University of Tokyo

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Cover Photo
Kuroda Sayako, the former Princess
Norinomiya, nodding in agreement
as her husband Kuroda Yoshiki
talks about his ambitions for the
future at their wedding reception
party, November 15, 2005
(courtesy of the Mainichi Shimbun).

Back Cover Photo
The wedding of Daiei movie star
Sanjo Miki and former film actor
Shiosaka Ken'ichi, at the Meiji
Kinenkan, February 3, 1949
(courtesy of the Mainichi Shimbun).

Editorial Notes

Personal Names

All personal names are given in
the customary order in the
native language of the person
unless otherwise requested.
Hence in Japanese names, the
family name is given first, e.g.
Toyotomi Hideyoshi, and in
Western names the family
name is given second, e.g.
George Bush.

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When the former Princess Norinomiya (now, Kuroda Sayako) married Kuroda Yoshiki last month at the age of 36, an article in *The Japan Times* pointed out that she was "the first woman in the modern history of the world's oldest royal line to marry in her 30s" (*The Japan Times*, November 15, 2005, p. 2). She is not alone, however; the average age of marriage in Japan has been rising, and continues to rise. In this issue of *Social Science Japan*, we take a closer look at marriage in Japan. Matsuda Shigeki examines the marriage intentions of Japanese young people, and considers the ramifications for the declining birth rate. Nagai Akiko discusses the importance that Japanese society continues to place on weddings, while pointing out that Japanese society is not particularly supportive of a rich family life. Miwa Satoshi applies a longitudinal and cross-national perspective to examine educational homogamy in Japan, and shows that educational homogamy is both declining, and is less common in Japan than in many other countries. Nakamura Mayumi examines Japanese women's educational and career paths, and suggests that, rather than simply being a result of gender-socialization, some Japanese women may choose a "feminine" education or career out of the "rational" belief that it will help them marry high-status men. In this issue of SSJ, we also introduce two of Shaken's current institute-wide research projects: Nakamura Tamio introduces the Comparative Regionalism Project (CREP), and Genda Yuji introduces the Hopology Project. We end with a Research Report by Michael Shapiro, a visiting researcher here at the Institute of Social Science.

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Thomas Blackwood
Managing Editor

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Japanese Young People's Marriage Intentions and the Growth in the Trend of Remaining Single

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The Trend of Remaining Single.

Currently, the trend of remaining single in Japan is rapidly growing. In this paper, I will discuss the marriage intentions of younger Japanese as the background to this trend. The percentage of unmarried young people in Japan has been increasing annually, so that, as of the year 2000, 69.3% of Japanese males and 54% of Japanese females aged 25 to 29 were unmarried; for those aged 30 to 34, 42% of Japanese males and 26.6% of Japanese females were unmarried (National Census). Furthermore, as Japan's total fertility rate continues to drop (it was down to 1.29 in 2004), the trend of remaining single, which is one of the causes for the drop in fertility rate, has become a target of social concern.

Single People's Marriage Intentions

In 1991 and 2001, the Post-Adolescence Research Group (*Posuto Seinenki Kenkyū Kai*), which I participated in under the leadership of Professor Iwakami

Mami of the University of the Sacred Heart, conducted surveys among singles in their 20s regarding work, marriage, and other subjects in Fuchū City, Tokyo, and Matsumoto City, Nagano Prefecture (Iwakami Mami, 2005). Here I would like to introduce the results of the survey conducted in Fuchū City. The investigation was conducted by dropping off surveys at the residences of a random sample of single male and female respondents, which were then collected on subsequent days. The surveys were distributed to 900 people in 1991, with a response rate of 37%, and to 1,500 people in 2001, with a response rate of 41.3%.

Regarding marriage intentions, very few respondents, male or female, replied "I have no intention to marry" in either 1991 or 2001 (Table 1). At the same time, however, the percentage of respondents not giving a concrete age at which they would like to be married by increased over the ten year period, and the number of people who replied "I have not thought about when I will marry" also increased. While most people intend to get married sooner or later, the number of people who wish to marry earlier clearly is decreasing.

Table 1 Desired Age at Marriage

		N	By 25	By 28	By 30	By 35	◇◇◇	XXX
1991 Survey			%	%	%	%	%	%
20-24	Male	94	8.5	14.9	39.4	3.2	33.0	1.1
	Female	114	34.2	34.2	13.2	0.9	16.7	0.9
	Total	208	22.6	25.5	25	1.9	24	1
25-29	Male	39	2.6	10.3	35.9	10.3	35.9	5.1
	Female	74	1.4	33.8	28.4	6.8	24.3	5.4
	Total	113	1.8	25.7	31	8	28.3	5.3
2001 Survey								
20-24	Male	164	9.1	18.9	28	7.9	29.9	6.1
	Female	156	20.5	26.9	25	1.3	23.7	2.6
	Total	320	14.7	22.8	26.6	4.7	26.9	4.4
25-29	Male	153		5.9	26.1	16.3	41.2	10.5
	Female	137	1.5	11.7	40.1	12.4	30.7	3.6
	Total	290	0.7	8.6	32.8	14.5	36.2	7.2

◇◇◇=No Particular Desired Age of Marriage
XXX=No Intention to Marry

Factors Regulating the Intended Age of Marriage

The marriage intentions of individuals are influenced by a variety of social-structural factors. Some of the main hypotheses regarding an individual's choice to remain single focus on factors such as occupational stability, education, a woman's life

course perspective, and whether or not the individual resides with his or her parents (Oppenheimer 1988; Yashiro 1993; Yamada 1999). For example, when employment is unstable, it is hypothesized that the intended age of marriage will rise. Moreover, women with higher educational attainments tend to marry less, and men with less education tend to have difficulty finding willing marriage partners. Also, women who wish to continue working may consider the opportunity cost of having to leave their jobs temporarily at marriage or childbirth too great, and lose their desire to marry. Finally, singles who live with their parents and receive substantial economic assistance from them (so-called "parasite singles") may wish to avoid the drop in living standards which would occur if they married.

The results of an analysis of these hypotheses can be seen in Table 2. Regarding occupational stability, among men in both the 20 to 24 year old and the 25 to 29 year old age groups, we found that men with stable employment and high salaries do in fact express an intention to marry earlier. On the other hand, this correlation is not as clear with women. Also, both male and female college graduates in the 20 to 24 age group, and male college graduates in the 25 to 29 age group, express an intention to marry earlier than non-college graduates. However, among the 25 to 29 year olds who consider a woman's "ideal life course" to include continuously working at a career regardless of marriage or childbirth (women consider this ideal for themselves, and men, for their marriage partners), the number who express no intent to marry by age 35 is relatively high. Regard-

Table 2

Age 20-24											(%)
		N	Men			χ^2	N	Women			χ^2
			By28	By30	Not wish to be married by 30			By28	By30	Not wish to be married by 30	
Occupation	Full-Time Workers	31	48.4	29.0	M	**	58	58.6	19.0	22.4	NS
	Part-Time Workers	19	5.3	21.1	73.7		19	47.4	15.8	36.8	
	Students	104	26.0	28.8	45.2		74	39.2	32.4	28.4	
Education	Junior College and Less	36	33.3	13.9	52.8	**	44	54.5	9.1	36.4	*
	College and Higher	23	30.4	47.8	21.7		38	55.3	28.9	15.8	
Ideal Life Course for Women	Continuous Career	58	24.1	25.9	50.0	NS	64	40.6	29.7	29.7	NS
	Interrupted Career	63	34.9	28.6	36.5		68	55.9	23.5	20.6	
	Full-Time Homemaker	26	38.5	38.5	23.1		15	60.0	20.0	20.0	
Residence	Not Living with Parents	67	34.3	37.3	28.4	**	50	50.0	28.0	22.0	NS
	Living with Parents	96	24.0	20.8	55.2		106	46.2	23.6	30.2	
Age 25-29											(%)
		N	Men			χ^2	N	Women			χ^2
			By30	By35	Not wish to be married by 35			By30	By35	Not wish to be married by 35	
Occupation	Full-Time Workers (high wage)	68	38.2	23.5	38.2	NS	53	50.9	20.8	28.3	+
	Full-time Workers (low wage)	39	35.9	10.3	53.8		51	56.9	7.8	35.3	
	Part-Time Workers	18	22.2	16.7	61.1		16	43.8	—	56.3	
Education	Junior College and Less	62	25.8	27.4	46.8	**	73	54.8	8.2	37.0	NS
	College and Higher	90	36.7	8.9	54.4		63	50.8	17.5	31.7	
Ideal Life Course for Women	Continuous Career	46	19.6	13.0	67.4	*	61	41.0	18.0	41.0	*
	Interrupted Career	61	44.3	21.3	34.4		53	69.8	5.7	24.5	
	Full-Time Homemaker	29	44.8	17.2	37.9		19	57.9	15.8	26.3	
Residence	Not Living with Parents	66	34.8	18.2	47.0	NS	45	51.1	17.8	31.1	NS
	Living with Parents	87	29.9	14.9	55.2		92	54.3	9.8	35.9	

**: $p < 0.01$, *: $p < 0.05$, +: $P < 0.1$, NS: No statistically significant difference
 For female respondents, the "Ideal Life Course for Women" refers to the type of life course they desire for themselves. For male respondents, this refers to the life course desired for their future spouses.
 The 20-24 year olds who were still in school were excluded from the "Education" row.
 "Full-Time Workers" include Tenured, Contracted, and Temporary Workers.
 "High wage" Full-Time workers earn more than 3,000,000 yen/year.
 "Low wage" full-time workers earn less than 3,000,000 yen/year

ing the relationship between living with one's parents and intended age of marriage, there seems to be little direct influence. However, it is important to remember that one assumption of the "parasite single" hypothesis is that they must be economically dependent on parents, and not simply living in the same household.

What We Can See from the Marriage Intentions of Singles

Among the results of the analysis, the degree of employment stability attracts the most attention. Under the current economic slump, companies have curbed their hiring of full-time employees, and instead have opted to increase their reliance on part-time workers. However, people who are employed only part-time have difficulty making concrete plans for family formation. Thus, the so-called "diversification of the employment system" has caused younger people to put off marriage longer, and created class-based differences in family formation.

Moreover, it is important to remember that while the desired age of marriage for males is strongly influenced by occupational stability, this tendency is not seen as clearly among women. Under the popular belief in the traditional division of family labor, which places men in the workplace and women in the household, men are expected to be the "breadwinners." Even today many Japanese men and women expect this to be true, and for these people, especially, it becomes difficult to find suitable marriage partners in a situation where males' employ-

ment environment has deteriorated. On the other hand, however, it was also discovered that women who wish to work without interruption also intend to marry at a later age. This is because, even today, it is difficult in Japan for women to be married and still have a successful career.

Thus, our data suggest that the increasing trend of remaining single in Japan is due to the postponement of marriage both by those who still believe in the traditional gender norms as well as those who no longer believe in those norms.

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Marriage for Social Recognition and Subsequent Married Life

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In Japan, the way people approach marriage has changed greatly over the past 60 years. In the past, arranged marriages were the most common way of meeting marriage partners, but in the 1960s marriages for love surpassed arranged marriages, and currently arranged marriages compose only about 10% of all marriages. This also means that the involvement of parents and other relatives in choosing marriage partners has declined. However, the traditional emphasis on respecting legal marriage, as well as the exhibition of the deep relationship between parents and children that one sees at weddings, and the continued use of go-betweens remain strong.

One might go so far as to say that married life after the wedding ceremony is a process of gradually increasing the distance between husbands who work long hours and the other family members. While legal marriage and the wedding ceremony continue to be emphasized and warrant social recognition, Japanese society simply gives men no time

for forming a family.

Marriage for Social Recognition

While the proportion of contemporary young people that have experienced unmarried cohabitation with a member of the opposite sex is steadily increasing, the percentage of people who have cohabited prior to marriage remains low in Japan when compared to other countries. According to the National Institute of Population and Social Security Research's 2002 survey of birth trends, approximately 10 percent of Japanese men and women in their late twenties had experienced cohabitation.

The well-known term "*dekichatta-kon*" (or "shotgun marriage," used to describe cases where a pregnancy occurs before marriage) is nuanced to suggest shame implicit in the act of causing a pregnancy by having sexual relations before being legally wedded. With the principle of legitimate birth remaining strong in Japanese society, the percentage of children born out of wedlock in Japan in 2003 was low at 1.9 percent; however, conversely, the proportion of first children born under "*dekichatta-kon*" circumstances is rising. With shotgun marriages on the increase, the negative image associated with the term "*dekichatta-kon*" has somewhat diminished, but legal marriage nonetheless remains fundamental to social recognition for both couples and children.

In terms of social recognition for couples, in addition to legal marriage, the wedding ceremony itself is important. The wedding ceremony includes the marriage rites, the reception banquet and the reception party. Marriage rites have, of course, been performed by a variety of people from long ago, and it is still common for the ceremony in which a couple pledges marriage to take the shape of a religious ceremony based on, for example, Shintoism, Buddhism or Christianity. After World War Two, it became common to hold a separate reception banquet or a reception party after a marriage ceremony. Today, the prevailing trend is for a reception banquet to be held after a marriage ceremony and for a reception

party to be held after the reception banquet (Kumagai, 2005). Relatives and a few close friends are invited to the marriage ceremony, and these are joined by employers and professional colleagues at the reception banquet. Reception parties tend to be informal affairs held chiefly for the bride and groom's respective friends. Put another way, whereas the reception banquet has a public aspect and involves many people from the workplace, the reception party is held for one's private acquaintances.


While wedding ceremonies have changed with the times, the major role played in the marriage ceremony and the reception banquet by the go-between has hardly changed at all. The go-between escorts the bridal couple, introduces them to the guests and also supports the newly wedded couple in their married life afterwards. In the era when agriculture, forestry, fishing, and other family-run businesses were predominant, the go-between was a relative; however, today the go-between is often a company superior, usually from the husband's workplace. While wedding ceremonies not involving a go-between are gradually increasing, approximately 90 percent of people who were married in the first half of the 1990s employed a go-between (Kumagai, 2005).

While the cost of a wedding varies among couples, the deep involvement of parents in wedding ceremonies tends to bring the overall costs rather high. According to the Institute for Research on Household Economics' "JPSC: Panel Survey on Consumers," from data on approximately 2,800 young women, the total cost of a wedding, including engagement commemorative gifts, the marriage ceremony, reception banquet and party, payment of the go-between, the honeymoon trip, furniture and appliances for the new residence, clothing and accessories, and other costs involved with moving into the new home, was in the region of 6,000,000 yen before 1994. Further, both sets of parents of the bridal couple put up more money for these various costs than the couple themselves contributed from their respective savings. Data from the same survey for young women in the years from 1995 to 2004 shows that the average cost of a wedding dropped to 5,200,000 yen, and the amount of money contributed by the parents was roughly equivalent to that contributed by the couple.

Married Life

With the wedding and the honeymoon trip over, most couples have an extremely satisfactory life as husband and wife during the honeymoon period of their marriage. However, experiencing the reality of married life gradually takes the shine off their dreams. Changes in the wife's degree of satisfaction with the marriage in relation to the number of years of marriage that have elapsed since the wedding show that satisfaction with the marital relationship starts decreasing during the first six years of marriage (Table 1). While this kind of trend in the early stages of marriage is evident in other countries due to the honeymoon effect, the specific factors affecting the degree of satisfaction with the marital relationship thereafter may be different in Japan compared to other countries.

Table 1 Degree of Marital Satisfaction (Fixed Effect Model)



The amount of time the husband spends at work on a weekday is one of the factors that lowers a wife's degree of satisfaction with a marital relationship up until the sixth year of marriage, with a long time spent at work by the husband lowering the wife's satisfaction with the marriage (Nagai, 2000). However, from the seventh to the eleventh year of marriage the amount of time a husband spends doing housework and with the kids on days off appears as a factor in marital satisfaction, with a short time spent by the husband on such activities lowering the wife's degree of satisfaction in the marital relationship. After the twelfth year there are no major factors other than socioeconomic variables.

For example, in Tokyo the majority of husbands return home after 8 p.m., so that the whole family is only able to dine together about twice a week. In other words, on weekdays the family dines without

the husband/father, who comes home after the family has finished dining (Institute for Research on Household Economics, 2000). While this kind of work-oriented lifestyle on behalf of the husband may cause the wife some dissatisfaction in the early stages of marriage, after several years the wife tends to give up hope of the husband participating in family life during the week, and instead hopes that he will help with the housework and look after the children on his days off. When yet more time has passed, the wife even gives up on the husband's behavior on the weekends. In Japanese society, no time for family-building is allotted to men.

Having a partner in Japanese society usually means being legally married and having held a wedding ceremony. Despite the fact that marriage is an extremely "high threshold" affair, society does not allow the time for relationship and family building. The proportion of Japanese young people with partners is low compared to other countries. For young Japanese today, perhaps the costs and rewards of having a partner do not present a balanced equation.

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Educational Homogamy in Contemporary Japan

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What is Educational Homogamy?

Status homogamy is one of many themes that have traditionally been researched to gauge the openness or exclusiveness of social stratification systems. In societies in which most men and women marry people of similar class standing, this is taken as indicating a tendency toward mutual reinforcement of the status group from within, and such societies can be interpreted as having clear boundaries between groups or, in other words, as being closed societies.

Among the various kinds of status homogamy, one that has hitherto been extensively researched is that of marriage between partners with similar educational credentials (hereafter referred to as "educational homogamy"). There are a number of possible reasons for this. First, theoretically speaking, in contemporary society educational credentials are closely linked to other status and values. That is to say, since (for example), a person's employment and future income tend to be decided on the basis of their educational qualifications, and differences in knowledge and cultural preference based on differ-

ences in educational background do actually exist, educational background is taken to be a key variable for indicating an individual's status. In addition, the fact that educational background is a more significant factor in homogamy than other indicators of social status, such as origin or occupation, can be empirically observed (Kalmijn, 1998).

Predictions and Methods

Intuitively, it might be expected that educational homogamy is extremely prevalent in Japanese society. This is because for women the value of higher education is frequently emphasized not in terms of investment in human capital but, rather, as working to one's advantage in the marriage market. Moreover, the fact that education is widely publicized as being highly prized by society lends further weight to the function of education as an indicator of status, and may in turn conceivably serve to create spheres of social interaction based on educational background.

Broadly speaking, two methods can be employed in order to ascertain the characteristics of educational homogamy in Japan today. The first is trend analysis; that is, by longitudinal comparison with data from previous decades. This method can shed light on how the prevalence of educational homogamy in Japan has varied between the past and the present. The other method is comparative analysis; that is, by cross-sectional comparison with other countries. By this method it is possible to determine whether, in relative terms, the level of educational homogamy in Japan is striking, or unremarkable.

This paper briefly reviews existing research findings and attempts a statistical analysis based on micro-level survey datasets¹. For both the trend analysis and the comparative analysis, odds ratios are used in order to gauge the extent of educational homogamy. The educational credentials of a husband and a wife are respectively converted into a dichotomous variable showing whether or not they received higher education, and odds ratios are calcu-

lated based on two-by-two cross-tabs compiled from these variables.

Longitudinal Perspective

Regarding trends in educational homogamy, competing hypotheses related to industrialization have been proposed (Smits, 2003). First, the status attainment hypothesis predicts the further strengthening of educational homogamy as industrialization progresses. Second, the general openness hypothesis contends that associations between all variables of status, including educational background, will weaken, predicting that the tendency toward educational homogamy will weaken with industrialization. A third hypothesis postulates an inverted U-shape curve, with educational homogamy increasing in the initial stages of industrialization and falling off in the latter stages. Finally, the saturation hypothesis maintains that while educational homogamy will gradually become less frequent, when a society attains a high level of openness this trend of reduced frequency comes to an end and educational homogamy remains at a fixed level thereafter.

Shida et al. (2000), analyzing trends in educational homogamy in Japan, assert that the extent of educational homogamy in Japan has not changed in the postwar period. These results would appear to support the saturation hypothesis; however, since the sample used in their analysis was comparatively small and questions remain concerning their analytical methods, their results are not necessarily reliable.

The results of a re-examination of trends in educational homogamy using a simple statistic are shown in Figure 1. While the percentage of in-marriage was approximately 90 percent in the 1950s, in the youngest marriage cohort this has fallen to about 70 percent. Odds ratios also show that the level of educational homogamy has declined. In particular, a marked reduction can be seen between the 1960s

and the 1980s. Contrary to the prior research, therefore, it can be concluded that the frequency of educational homogamy has decreased over time.




Figure 1. Trends in Educational Homogamy in Japan

Comparative Perspective

Cross-national comparative research on educational homogamy is an area that has been actively addressed, particularly since the 1990s. Such research has been of two types: the first has involved detailed scrutiny of similarities and differences in patterns of educational homogamy in a relatively small number of countries (e.g. Halpin and Chan, 2003), while the other has used data from a large number of countries for macro level modeling involving explanatory variables (e.g. Smits, 2003).

From the findings of the latter kind of research, Japan, along with South Korea and some other countries, has been described as a society with one of the highest levels of educational homogamy (Smits et al., 1998). However, this result is based on data obtained in the 1970s and needs to be updated in order to determine Japan's current international standing as regards educational homogamy. Therefore, I have attempted a comparative analysis using data from the 1990s. Further, in order to avoid bias, only couples in their first five years of marriage at the time of the survey have been included in the analysis (Mare, 1991).

1 I analyzed the following Japanese datasets: the 1965, 1985 and 1995 Social Stratification and Social Mobility Surveys, and the 2000-2003 Japanese General Social Surveys. I am grateful to the 2005 SSM Research Committee for permission to use the SSM datasets. The data for this secondary analysis, the Japanese General Social Survey datasets (depositor: Institute of Regional Studies, Osaka University of Commerce and Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo [ISS]), was provided by the Social Science Japan Data Archive, Information Center for Social Science Research on Japan, ISS. I also obtained the U.S. datasets (General Social Survey) from the ICPSR through the Information Center for Social Science Research on Japan, and Korean datasets (Korea Labor and Income Panel Study) from the Korea Labor Institute. The statistics for Ireland and U.K. were calculated from Table AI in Halpin and Chan's article (Halpin and Chan, 2003).




Figure 2. Cross-national Comparison of Educational Homogamy in the 1990s

Figure 2 shows the results of a comparison of the prevalence of educational homogamy in the United Kingdom, Ireland, Japan, South Korea and the United States of America. In terms of the percentage of in-marriage, there is a somewhat noticeable difference between a lower level group, consisting of Japan and the U.S.A. at approximately 70 percent, and a higher level group, consisting of the U.K., Ireland, and South Korea at about 80 percent. The odds ratios show that the level of educational homogamy is extremely high in South Korea. While the U.K. is somewhat high, the remaining three countries can be considered to be at roughly the same level. Since, as seen above, the level of educational homogamy in Japan has dropped during the postwar period, it cannot be said that the level of educational homogamy in Japan today is particularly high compared to other countries

Reassessment of Educational Homogamy in Japan

In conclusion, the results of the re-examination described in this paper do not support the findings of previous research. In other words, a clear declining trend is evident, and it is further clear that Japan today is not a country with a significantly high level of educational homogamy among industrial soci-


eties. On the other hand, a particularly high level of educational homogamy is evident in South Korea, which, together with Japan, is known as an education-obsessed society. Have Japan and South Korea now begun to diverge in this area, despite the fact that both countries previously had a strong tendency toward educational homogamy? This point may prove to be an important issue for international comparative research on the countries of East Asia that have been promoting rapid development in recent years.

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University Education for Marital Status Attainment for Japanese Women

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I. Introduction¹

Why do many Japanese women choose female-dominated educational paths, even though such choices are often believed to lead women into dead ends in their careers? In this article, using data on people's perceptions of what types of education advance women's status attainment through marriage, I argue, first, that female-dominated education is perceived to lead to better economic benefits via status attainment through marriage, and that this may partially account for why many Japanese women have made such a choice; and second, that the perception of the usefulness of such an educational choice varies depending on one's background, specifically with regard to gender relations at home.

II. Data²

In 1999 and 2000 I conducted interviews with 45 college-educated adults in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area. My sample was collected via a snowball sampling, whereby my initial respondents introduced me to other potential respondents, and so on. I presented a list of university characteristics and department names, and asked the respondents to rate, on a five point scale, how useful each item would be for a woman in marrying a "high-status man."

III. Analysis

A. An exploration of the educational dimensions that affect marriage

First, I investigated what educational qualities people perceive affect women's marital status attainments, by using a principal component factor analysis, a technique used to identify some of the underlying dimensions (factors) behind numerous variables.

Table 1 Results of the Factor Analysis on College Characteristics and Departments³

College characteristic	Factors		
	Status-signifying	Female-dominated	Male-dominated
Affiliation-from elementary	0.752	0.343	0.006
Affiliation-from junior-high	0.779	0.063	0.292
Affiliation-from senior-high	0.554	-0.139	0.524
Missionary institution	0.561	0.126	0.290
Small-scale institution	0.472	0.002	0.238
Mild school culture	0.435	0.151	-0.074
Academic selectivity	0.192	0.221	-0.061
High tuition	0.616	0.186	0.023
Old institution	0.112	0.180	-0.226
Private institution	0.503	0.402	-0.274
Founded as a <i>kōtō jūgōgaku</i> (prewar liberal arts school)	0.649	-0.044	-0.006
Women's college	0.676	0.335	-0.234
Academic Departments (Majors)			
English literature	0.611	0.620	0.008
French literature	0.328	0.647	0.161
Chinese literature	0.188	0.404	0.587
Japanese literature	0.356	-0.726	0.025
Home economics	0.593	0.572	-0.007
Economics	0.158	0.028	0.778
Law	0.194	-0.285	0.789
Agriculture	0.079	0.090	0.706
Engineering	0.012	-0.152	0.734
Medicine	0.082	-0.028	0.802
Pharmacy	0.122	0.233	0.711
Nursing and hygiene	-0.033	0.703	0.355
Physical education	0.130	0.364	0.407
Education	-0.014	0.835	0.045
Infant nursing	-0.037	0.821	-0.170
Clothing design	0.095	0.652	0.124
Secretarial studies	-0.049	0.662	-0.064

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization

Cumulative extraction sums of squared loadings: 51.30% N=36

The number of factors was decided on the analysis by the Kaiser-Guttman rule and the scree test.

1 The goal of my research is to show that in Japan's gender-stratified workplace, some women choose to pursue professional careers, and others seek financial stability by marrying well. I am not making a moral judgment about this decision, but if the pattern appears to hold, it is worth investigating the ways in which women choose this latter path.

2 The study presented here is a part of a larger project, and the data shown here come from a pretest conducted to create an index used for the main part of my project. Due to space constraints, I can present only one part of my results in this article. Although there are limitations in the sample size, composition and sampling measures, I believe the data still merit analysis since they show interesting relationships between the variables. The findings here, however, will need to be tested with a larger data set.

The results show three dimensions (factors) in education that are perceived to affect women's marital status attainment.

i.) The status-signifying liberal-arts-related dimension

The first dimension is what I call the "status-signifying liberal-arts-related dimension," which corresponds to the "status-signifying function" of education posited by Amano (1983).⁴ It refers to the function of signaling a woman's wealthy familial status via educational institution (or academic department), so as to help her marry a man of desirable background; historically, this has often been displayed by having a (Western) liberal arts education. Most of the college characteristics (e.g., high tuitions, colleges with an affiliation system⁵) that have heavy factor weights on this dimension signify familial wealth. The departments that have heavy factor weights on this status-signifying dimension are related to liberal-arts fields (e.g., literature), as opposed to practical occupational education (e.g., law, nursing).⁶

ii.) The female-dominated semi-professional dimension

The second dimension represents an education that is related to female-dominated majors and female-dominated semi-professional occupations. The departments that have heavy factor weights on this dimension have a high concentration of females (i.e. literature, education, and nursing). The difference from the "status-signifying dimension" is its relation to female-dominated semi-professional occupations (e.g., education, nursing) in addition to female-dominated majors in general (e.g., literature).

iii.) The male-dominated professional dimension

The third dimension represents a dimension of education that is related to male-dominated professional occupations. The departments that have heavy factor weights on this dimension have a high concentration of men, and most of these departments are also directly related to professional occupations that have a high concentration of men (i.e. law, medicine).

Of these three dimensions, the first two (the status-signifying and the female-dominated semi-profes-

sional) are related to female-dominated paths, and the third (the male-dominated professional) is related to a male-dominated path.

B. Valuation of these educational dimensions

How are each of these dimensions perceived to affect women's marital status attainments? Are female-dominated educational dimensions perceived to advance women's marital status attainments? I tested for the direction and significance of the correlation between the average rating of each variable (college characteristics and department names) and its factor weights. If the correlation between the average rating and the factor weights on a particular dimension is statistically significant and positive, that dimension (factor) is perceived to advance women's marital status attainment. Thus, I expected the two female-dominated dimensions to have a positive correlation, and the male-dominated dimension to have a negative correlation.

Table 2 Correlations between Average Rating and Factor Weights on Each Dimension

Status-Signifying	Female-dominated	Male-dominated
-.055	.535**	-.441*
(.764)	(.002)	(.011)
N=32	N=32	N=32

**p<.01, *p<.05.

i.) The status-signifying liberal-arts-related dimension

Against my prediction, the correlation between the average rating of variables and their factor weights on the status-signifying liberal-arts-related dimension was not statistically significant. Thus, it cannot be concluded that the status-signifying dimension is perceived to advance women's marital status attainment.

ii.) The female-dominated semi-professional dimension

The correlation between the average rating of variables and their factor weights on the female-dominated semi-professional dimension is both positive and significant, which means the female-dominated semi-professional dimension is perceived to advance women's marital status attainment. This finding supports my hypothesis.

3 The college characteristics included in the list is rather poorly balanced (most of them are characteristics related to the status-signifying dimension). Therefore, in order to include a wider variety of educational paths, I included academic departments in the analysis. I selected the college characteristics and department names from my original table.

4 Amano, Ikuo. 1983. "Kyōiku no chō-hyōji-kinō ni tsuite," *Kyōiku Shakaigaku Kenkyū* 38: 44-49.

5 The affiliation system refers to a system in which universities have an affiliation with schools at a lower level (i.e. elementary schools, junior high schools, and high schools). Students who attend affiliation schools are often considered to be wealthy, since they can afford to pay expensive tuition all the way through the educational system.

6 "Home economics" also has a heavy factor weight on this dimension, since it performs a similar function as the liberal arts (as a marriage preparation path), and is not related to practical occupational education.

iii.) The male-dominated professional dimension

The correlation between the average rating of variables and their factor weights on the male-dominated professional dimension is negative and significant, which means that people perceive that attainment of this 'male-dominated educational dimension' works negatively for women's status attainment through marriage. Thus, my hypothesis is supported here, as well.

C. The relationship between individual background and perception

Does background affect perception regarding what kind of education is useful for women's marital status attainment? To test for this hypothesis, I used multivariate regression analysis, with factor scores on each dimension as dependent variables and with background variables as independent variables, to examine the relationship between patterns of evaluation of each dimension and respondents' backgrounds. In particular, I hypothesized that gender relations at home (represented by mother's occupational status and education) will affect the perception of status-signifying education and male-dominated education (with those from traditional families, with full-time homemaker mothers with less education rating the former as higher while those from egalitarian families with full-time working mothers with more education rating the latter more highly).

As was expected, those from traditional families tended to rate the usefulness of the status-signifying dimension more highly. The respondents whose mothers are full-time homemakers with fewer years of education are likely to evaluate this dimension more highly than those whose mothers work full-time and have more education. Regarding the male-dominated dimension however, neither the mother's education nor her occupational status was significantly related to the respondent's evaluation.⁷

Table 3 Correlation between background and perception

Dependent Variables	Model 1		Model2		Model3	
	Status-signifying		Female-Dominated(i)		Male-Dominated	
Independent Variables	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.
(Constant)	0.769	2.819	-5.282	3.176	7.073†	3.386
Birth year	-0.026	0.031	0.068	0.039	-0.043	0.038
Sex (♀=1, ♂=0)	0.893*	0.393	1.671**	0.462	-0.694	0.472
Selectivity	0.030	0.030	0.003	0.035	0.091*	0.036
Junior college (2yr=1, 4yr=0)	-0.669	0.510	-0.235	0.578	1.710*	0.612
Father's education	0.039	0.192	0.119	0.167	-0.676*	0.230
Father's status (executive/professional=1, other=0)	0.558	0.803	-	-	1.927†	0.965
Mother's education	-0.263*	0.117	-0.183	0.147	-0.045	0.141
Mother's work status						
Full-time	-0.984†	0.484	0.278	0.599	0.312	0.581
Part-time	0.003	0.587	-0.116	0.704	0.004	0.706
Not employed (base)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Adjusted R square	0.539		0.268		0.331	
	3.986	sig=.010	2.101	sig=.098	2.267	sig=.082

Dependent Variable: Factor scores on each dimension separately regressed on individual characteristics of the respondents.

**p<.01, *p<.05, † p <.10.

IV. Conclusion


Overall, my findings support my hypothesis, and suggest that female-dominated education is perceived to lead to more benefits through marital status attainment for women than does male-dominated education. Moreover, as expected, the evaluation of the usefulness of a certain type of education for women's marital status attainment did vary depending on one's background.⁸ These findings suggest the possibility that (at least some) Japanese women may chose female-dominated educational paths out of a rational calculation of the economic returns (rather than by simply being swayed by gender-role socialization). Their rationality, however, seems to entail limitations. Even when women try to be rational decision makers, and invest in a type of education that they believe will lead to maximum economic returns through marriage, the perception of what type of education leads to maximum benefits through marriage is bounded by their background and socialization.

7 Further, in addition to these findings, I also found that women are likely to evaluate the two female-dominated dimensions more highly than men, that highly educated people tend to rate the "male-dominated dimension" more highly, and that father's education and occupational status affect the evaluation of the male-dominated dimension. Women were likely to rate the two female-dominated dimensions more highly than men, probably because they are the ones who make their own strategies for marital status attainment, and therefore are more aware of their impact. Highly educated people tend to evaluate the male-dominated dimension more highly, probably because they have more liberal attitudes. This may be also attributed to differences in what the respondents had on their minds when they were interviewed. Findings from my other research suggests that the negative impact of the male-dominated paths on women's marital status attainment can be offset if they are highly selective paths (Nakamura, Mayumi, 2006, *Feminine Capital: Educational and Occupational Investment for Gender Specific Status Attainment and Its Consequences*, Doctoral Dissertation to be submitted to the University of Chicago). When asked about male-dominated majors, respondents who had attended selective colleges themselves likely had male-dominated majors at those colleges (which have a less negative impact on women's marriages) on their minds, and therefore rated them higher. Regarding the effect of father's education and status, the direction of influence is contradictory and hard to interpret (while education affects the evaluation of this dimension negatively, status does so positively).

8 Although one of the female-dominated dimensions (the status-signifying dimension) was not significantly positively related with marital status attainment, this does not necessarily suggest that it is not perceived as useful for women's status attainment through marriage at all. Rather, appreciation of this type of education is limited to a certain type of people (i.e. those from traditional families).

The Comparative Regionalism Project (CREP) at the Institute of Social Science

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CREP (the Comparative Regionalism Project) is an innovative, interdisciplinary project which aims to compare and analyze regionalism in Asia, Europe, and the Americas. This is the first scholarly, systematic attempt to analyze regionalism in Asia from a comparative perspective. Researchers in Law, Political Science, and Economics will conduct research on a set of common topics, using discipline-specific methodologies, to identify and assess how the regionalisms in the three areas are similar, as well as how they differ.

Background

"Regionalism" as distinguished from "regionalisation" means a deliberate attempt to create a larger regional unit beyond national boundaries in order to promote economic prosperity and political stability in the regional areas concerned.

Such regionalism is gaining popularity as a form of governance in major geographical regions of the present world. European countries have developed

the European Union (EU) over 50 years. North and South American countries are preparing for the establishment of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). Successful conclusion of the agreement would merge NAFTA and Mercosur regimes into one larger arrangement. In East Asia, particularly ASEAN countries, China, Korea and Japan have been negotiating bilateral and/or regionally multi-lateral free trade agreements (FTAs) and economic partnership agreements (EPAs) since the late 1990s.

When Japan concluded EPAs that included FTAs with Singapore and Mexico in the early 2000s, I sensed a fundamental change in Japanese economic diplomacy towards neighboring East Asian states. Until the mid-90s, Japan showed little interest in bilateral agreements such as EPAs/FTAs; rather, Japan showed a strong policy commitment to the WTO legal framework based on multilateralism. I wanted to know why the fundamental policy preference for multilateralism changed to bilateralism in the early 2000s. Some scholars have argued that the inability of the existing framework, i.e. the WTO and APEC, to appropriately respond to the 1997 Asian financial crisis caused Japan's policy shift. Indeed, multilateralism, as represented in such organizations as the WTO, has some drawbacks. Its members are world-wide and large in number, resulting in slow decision-making. Furthermore, while the WTO's policy instruments are mostly legal measures, APEC's instruments are completely non-legal, broad political understandings. Since legal instruments necessitate lengthy negotiations, and non-legal instruments are followed by non-compliance, joint responses to new economic issues tend to be slow or ineffective in either forum.

However, such problems do not fully explain why Japan changed its diplomacy after 1997. Clearly the WTO framework is not designed to respond to such problems as the Asian financial crisis. Similarly, APEC is not a venue to agree on specific governmental actions to respond to such crises either. I suspect that there was a change of opinion within the Japanese government regarding diplomatic strate-

gies toward East Asia. I imagine that the Japanese government wanted to develop new political relations by strengthening bilateral economic partnerships with neighboring Asian states. The Japanese government, however, has not disclosed any specific objectives behind this economic partnership diplomacy. While the present government has mentioned the importance of building an East Asian "community," it is important to note that the "community" they refer to begins with a small "c," not a large one. Furthermore, at the same time, the Japanese government stresses the importance of maintaining the close economic and political ties it has with the U.S. as well.

The growth of regionalism poses a different set of basic questions in the social sciences. What do these attempts to regionalism have in common, and what are the differences among them? Why have these regional arrangements emerged? Who is promoting the idea of regionalism? Will these regional arrangements result in three regional "blocs," which might undermine the WTO and other current international regimes for global governance? What is the impact of each regional arrangement upon the nation-states in the region? Do these regional arrangements reinforce and/or produce closer political solidarity among the peoples of the region?

Thus, my original question of "why" grew into a bigger question of "whether" and "what sort of" regional cooperation is possible in East Asia. Answering these questions will require interdisciplinary social scientific study, as well as international collaboration with Asian scholars. Moreover, if we can compare our economic, political and legal situation in East Asia with the experiences of the European Union (EU), NAFTA and Mercosur, we may be able to identify some suitable institutional frameworks of cooperation for the states and peoples of East Asia.

Goals

One of the immediate contributions CREP can make is, through its analysis of East Asian regionalism in clearer social scientific terms, and the publication of its results in English, we can augment the knowledge of East Asia in particular, and regionalism in general. The comparative method is useful in this respect. By applying existing analytical frameworks, concepts, and terminology developed in studies on

Europe and the Americas, we can analyze and explain East Asia as much as possible with a common discourse. Having said this, we may find some East Asian peculiarities which are not easily explained with the established terms. In these cases, we will have to develop new analytical frameworks and/or concepts to explain such peculiarities; this is the second anticipated outcome of CREP.

Third, we hope to be able to provide policy recommendations concerning future regionalisms, especially in East Asia. We will need to focus on non-state actors such as local governments, business sectors, and various NGOs, which have not been primary actors in the conventional treaty-making processes. Because the dynamics of regionalization processes include not only state actors but also non-state actors (especially in the case of contemporary East Asia), expected policy recommendations will need to be more inclusive and multi-dimensional than previous policy recommendations.

Therefore, the goals of our project are (a) to identify similarities and differences among the three major regional arrangements in legal, economic and political terms, (b) to clarify their impact upon local, national, regional and global governance, and (c) in relation to East Asia, we would like to discuss possible courses of action in the near future, by building some models of regional arrangements that fit the regional needs.

Features and Merits

Our project has three distinctive features and merits. First, we take up comparative analyses of the three major attempts at regionalism. There are few studies so far that compare all three; many studies compare two of the three, particularly Europe and America, or Europe and Asia. This is mainly because the East Asian regional arrangement is still in the making. Our project is the first international joint research project to include East Asian as well as American and European regionalisms.

Second, in terms of methodology, we carry out cross-disciplinary research in the "trinity" of economics, politics and law. We aim to be synthetic as well as analytical. Thus we set out an analytical framework commonly applicable to those three regionalisms. The framework will consist of the

same set of questions in economics, political science and law, so that our comparison can identify both common and distinctive features among those three regionalisms. In this regard, most prior research on regionalism applies only one or two social science disciplines, such as economics and political science. It is our firm belief that we need both discipline-specific analyses and discipline-transcending syntheses in identifying the features of and in assessing the impact of regionalism on each and every level of governance from local to global.

Third, we will study not only "vertical interactions" at the local, national, regional and global level of actors emerging in those three regions, but also the "horizontal interactions" between those regions. This is because we take particular caution in conceptualizing "one" East Asian regionalism. Although many bilateral agreements have been concluded and are being negotiated between East Asian countries, it is uncertain as to whether those agreements will consolidate into a single regional regime such as the EU and the FTAA.

Points of Research

Since regionalism is based on some deliberate attempts to form regional units of economy and/or policy, it tends to formalize the unit using legal instruments. Thus, our legal analysis will first compare the institutional structures and the role of legal measures in those regional arrangements, and then analyze their relationship with larger (or global) legal arrangements (e.g., WTO, NATO), before assessing their legal impact on the national legal orders in the regions. We will also address some methodological difficulties in analyzing the non-legal arrangements which are prevalent in East Asian regionalism (e.g., ASEAN, APEC).

Similarly, our economic analysis of the mobility of goods, services, capital and persons (labor), before and after the emergence of those formal regional arrangements, will reveal similarities and differences in their economic impact on the local, national,

regional and global economy. We will also compare the impact of each regional arrangement on changes in the market frameworks and the ways firms and businesses operate on the local, national, regional or global scale.

Finally, our political analysis compares the context of forming and developing those regional arrangements, paying attention to the behaviors and the guiding ideas of such actors as governments, political parties, business associations, labor unions and other civic organizations. In assessing the (real or possible) impact of each regional arrangement on politics in various levels including local, national, regional and global, we examine if and to what extent formalizing regionalism has changed (or is changing) the interests and perceptions held by each region's political actors.

Research Schedule

April 2005 – March 2006 (Year One): Stocktaking and Research

- Monthly stocktaking and research workshops will be held at ISS.
- Fund-raising activities (possible sponsors may include the Japan Foundation, the Japan Science Promotion Society, the Murata Foundation and the Heiwa Nakajima Foundation)
- Hold the First International Joint Workshop.

April 2006 – March 2007 (Year Two): Research and Analysis


- A substantive research and theorizing discussion will be conducted based on the research framework agreed upon in Year One.
- An International Joint Workshop will be held to exchange the preliminary research results of the participants.

April 2007 – March 2008 (Year Three): Theory and Application + Publication

- An International Symposium will be held in Tokyo to make public our research results.
- Our research results will be published in books both in English and in Japanese.

The Hopology Project at the Institute of Social Science

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Since 1964, the Institute of Social Science (ISS) has carried out numerous institute-wide research projects involving the majority of the faculty and researchers in residence. In 2005, we started two new institute-wide research projects: the Comparative Regionalism Project (CREP)¹ and a project on the study of hope, or "Hopology."

In the Hopology Project, we intend to study "hope" from a social scientific perspective, and to examine the relationship between hope and society. A fundamental assumption of the conventional social sciences, such as economics, in the analysis of social action is that individuals possess hope and will act in order to realize their hopes. However, in contemporary society, it is no longer the case that the existence of hope can be taken for granted.

Recent increases in unemployment among Japanese youth are not only a result of economic stagnation, but are also due to the fact that Japanese young people cannot identify for themselves any particular

aspirations, on the basis of which they can then formulate their future goals. International comparison, moreover, shows that more Japanese people are pessimistic about the future than people in other countries, and that many Japanese have no hope at all. However, it has been claimed that this phenomenon, the loss of hope, is not unique to Japan, but is spreading among all developed nations. If this is indeed the case, then what social circumstances might explain it?

First, however, recognizing that the word "hope" holds numerous meanings, we need to determine what kind of hope is lacking in contemporary society, and what kind of impact this has not only on individuals, but on society as a whole.

In the past, the concept of hope was commonly regarded as something that belonged to the realm of individual psychology or emotions. In our Hopology Project, however, we wish to emphasize how the hopes held by an individual are influenced by the social environment. Furthermore, we believe that each individual's formation of hope has the possibility to influence the direction of society as a whole, and we wish to investigate how this might happen. Hopology sees hope not only as a part of an individual's personality or emotions, but also as a product of society and, moreover, as a fuel to power society. For this reason, we will conduct our research using a variety of social scientific analytical tools, including the objective analysis of social survey data, and the investigation of historical archived materials, in addition to opening a "Hope Salon," where we will hold discussions about hope with a variety of people based on the findings from our preliminary survey.

Although the concept of hope contains a variety of meanings, we believe that it is possible to categorize these meanings according to a number of different perspectives. For example, the concept of hope includes both hopes that are easily realizable and hopes that are not likely to be realized. Further, some hopes are accompanied by effective action aimed at realization thereof, while some hopes are not accompanied by any concrete action and ulti-

¹ See the previous article in this issue of SSJ for Professor Nakamura Tamio's introduction to CREP - ed.

mately prove to be no more than mere fantasies. Moreover, while some hopes simply provide an individual with an internal sense of fulfillment, sometimes society itself is affected, to a greater or lesser degree, when an individual holds an aspiration and acts towards realizing it. While the Hopology Project recognizes hope as a tangible outlook for the present or the future, we also emphasize that even if an aspiration is difficult to realize, it is when an individual cherishes the aspiration and engages in the trial-and-error process of working towards realizing it, that hope has the potential to affect society in some way.

In May of 2005, the Hopology project conducted a survey of adults in their 20's through 40's over the internet, from which we received around 900 responses. One of the questions on our questionnaire asked the respondents about what they had wanted to be when they grew up when they were elementary and middle school students, and whether or not they subsequently realized their dreams. According to our survey, 71% of the respondents had some kind of specific occupational goal when they were in 6th grade, and 63% of them had concrete goals when they were in their third year of middle school. However, while a majority of young teenagers had concrete ideas about their occupational goals, in most cases, they did not achieve their goals. Only 15% of the respondents actually ended up working at the occupations they had aimed for when they were in middle school, and only 8% of the respondents were working at the jobs that they had expressed interest in when they were in sixth grade.

As it is evidently very difficult for children to realize their goals for the future, it might be considered a waste of time and energy, or perhaps meaningless, to even have goals in the first place. However, it should be noted that the mere possession of a goal in itself had a big influence on future career choices. In the questionnaire mentioned above, we also asked whether the respondents had ever experienced working at a rewarding job. Among the respondents who had had a concrete career goal in elementary school, 86% said they had subsequently experienced working at a rewarding job, while only 77% of those who had not had a concrete career goal in elementary school replied that they had experienced working at a rewarding job. These results suggest that having aspirations regarding one's future occupation may improve one's chances of finding an appropriate job in the future.

The more difficult it is to realize a dream, the more

likely it is that hope will end in disappointment. However, through experiencing disappointment, it is possible that one will recognize one's own capabilities, and reconsidering one's position in society may result in an enhanced sense of satisfaction within society. The more we seek after hope, the more it evades us. However, it is when hope changes to disappointment that individuals can first come to an appropriate understanding of their relationship with society, providing them with a foundation for subsequent action. Chinese novelist Lǚ Xùn once said, "as despair is a falsity, so too is hope." Hope, we expect to show through our research, holds social meaning precisely because hope and despair are, paradoxically, two sides of the same coin.

The Hopology Project also plans to conduct some large-scale surveys in the future. We intend to show, from a variety of angles, how hope is not simply about future goals, but also that hope is important in its function as a catalyst which activates the process of working towards desirable results for individuals and society.

In this year's survey, we conducted a detailed examination of the relationship between "work and hope," and in 2006 we are planning to investigate the relationship between "family and hope." Furthermore, the Hopology Project does not plan merely to conduct surveys; we also stress the importance of dialogue in revealing information, and are conducting interviews and recording oral histories in addition to our surveys. As a part of this, in 2006, we plan to hold a detailed dialogue with the residents of Kamaishi City, Iwate Prefecture, regarding changes in hope in that region.

In July, 2005, the Hopology project held a symposium which was attended by 271 guests, and we are already attracting a great deal of social interest. As we continue our research, we intend to periodically present our findings to the public, and, continuing our dialogue with society, to regularly update and clarify the direction of our research. Currently, we are also planning to conduct comparative international research on the "social distribution of hope," with the cooperation of, among others, Cornell University professor of anthropology Miyazaki Hirokazu, and faculty at the University of Sydney.

Through these measures, the Hopology project hopes to construct a universal lingua franca about hope, and offer hints, based on empirical facts, for individuals to think about hope, and to act. Finally, we will continue our analysis, aiming at producing desirable social policies, keeping hope in mind.

Constructing the Divine Nation: Empire and Providence in the Thought of Ebina Danjo

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In a remote corner of Japan's modern historiography, there is a small but intriguing debate concerning the role of Japanese Protestant missionary activity in colonial Korea. During the years 1911-21, Ebina Danjo's Kumiai Church led, in close cooperation with the Korean Government-general, a proselytization campaign to convert Koreans to a form of Christianity based on loyalty to Japan. What did Kumiai Christians hope to accomplish in Korea? How did they view their relationship with the colonial state? How did they resolve their own minority status as Japanese Christians with their role as agents of cultural assimilation in colonial Korea?

Scholars have often looked to Ebina Danjo's own writings in order to answer these questions. Several studies interpret Ebina's opinions supporting Japan's colonization of Korea as a reflection of Japanese Christianity's broader inability to differentiate itself from the overwhelming trend towards cultural particularism that characterized Japan's modernization. For these authors, the contradictions that beset Japanese Christianity's outsider status in prewar Japan are only brought into greater relief by their projection onto the context of colonial Korea.¹

This conclusion may be worth reexamining. Recent efforts in colonial studies have turned away from debates that treat empire as a by-product of Western modernization and have increasingly seen imperialism as a constituent of modernity itself. More and more, scholars have addressed themselves to the claim, aptly summed up in the words of Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler, that "Europe was made by its imperial projects, as much as colonial encounters were shaped by conflicts occurring within Europe itself" (Cooper and Stoler, 1997, p. 3). It may thus be worthwhile, in addressing the Japanese case, to consider whether certain aspects of Ebina's thought may have been formed through, rather than projected upon, Japan's colonial encounter with Korea.

The Russo-Japanese War and *Shinkoku Kensetsu*

Like so many other Japanese Christians, Ebina Danjo first formed concrete opinions about Korea during the Russo-Japanese War. In an article entitled "The Bible's Position on War" (*Seisho no Sensōshugi*), he justified Japan's participation in this war through the metaphor of a Christian mission to "construct a divine nation" (*shinkoku kensetsu*) (Ebina, 1904, p. 8).

¹ Although I lack the space necessary here to properly discuss the historiography on this subject, a fairly representative sample can be found in Matsuo Takayoshi, "Nihon Kirisuto Kyōkai no Chōsen Dendō" in *Minponshugi to Teikokushugi* (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobo, 1998) 233-65, and Iinuma Jiro and Han Seok Hi, *Nihon Teikokushugika no Chosen Dendo* (Tokyo: Nihon Kirisuto Kyokai Dendokyoku, 1985) Ch.2. For a more recent appraisal of Ebina Danjo's imperialist thought, see Kim Mun Kil, *Kindai Nihon Kirisutokyō to Chōsen: Ebina Danjo no Shisō to Kōdō* (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 1998).

Here "construction" referred to a commitment to actualizing Christian principles in this world based upon a national ethic of self-reliance. Yet how could such a worldly event be imbued with such religious meaning for Ebina? In this essay, I argue that *shinkoku kensetsu*, despite its dogged insistence on self-reliance, ultimately derived its *religious* content from an idea of divine providence that located the source of Japan's salvation outside rather than within the nation. Although this conception is hinted at in Ebina's writings during the Russo-Japanese War, in my view, it is formulated completely only later in his opinions concerning Japan's colonization of Korea.

There are three components that make up Ebina's concept of *shinkoku kensetsu* (at least as he defines it in this article).²

1) Christianity not only tolerates war, *but requires it*. War is absolutely fundamental to Christianity and its spirit of sacrifice.

[Let us consider] not only the soldier who does not hesitate to offer his life to the nation, but also his bereaved family who, in sending a most beloved family member to the battlefield, gives him to the nation. What a beautiful display they make together of the spirit of sacrifice! Ah, this truly is the spirit of the martyrs, a display of spirituality so difficult to realize other than in wartime. Without [first] passing through [war], the nation cannot summon the great spirit (*dai genki*) of its people...Humanity comes at a high price and can only be bought with the blood and tears of those who sacrifice. Those who detest the misery of war and [thus] advocate pacifism still do not comprehend the spirit of Christ (ibid, p. 11).

War is not merely a matter of practical necessity; it makes up the very basis of a nation's spiritual life. For Ebina, war serves as an absolute precondition of faith; for without it the spirit of sacrifice, so essential to Christianity, remains virtually inaccessible to a people.

2) *Shinkoku kensetsu* also implies a move away from cultural particularism towards universal truth.

Ebina takes great interest in the fact that the Israelite wars of the Old Testament were fought not merely

out of self-defense but also out of aggression. "The Israelites fought out of self-defense, but not only out of self-defense...Clearly adopting the character of an invasion, they defeated their enemies wherever they went..., finally establishing a Jewish kingdom" (ibid, p. 7). This clearly fit well with Ebina's own theory of war as a precondition of nationhood.

These early wars, however, never went beyond the narrow assertion of Jewish identity and so, in Ebina's view, had to be distinguished from the universal task of constructing a divine nation. Israel would learn the value of absolute reliance on God only after defeat in war reduced it to a nation of refugees. This Ebina considered a universal condition: "Peoples who can no longer appeal to combat...end up making their appeals to heaven; this is what history demonstrates" (ibid, p. 8).

3) Finally, *shinkoku kensetsu* does not set itself up in opposition to secular institutions such as the family and the state, but instead seeks to realize itself within them. "The divine nation should not exist merely as an abstract ideal but must be made real within each individual, within the family, within the nation, [and] within the state" (ibid, p. 9). The New Testament, Ebina argued, did not displace the more worldly truths of the Old Testament (such as the necessity of war), but rather built upon them, guiding them towards the divine truth of Christianity. This results in an almost symbiotic relationship between secular institutions and Christianity: "Although the divine nation (*shinkoku*) transcends these [institutions], it also at the same time contains them" (ibid, p. 9). As a consequence, for Ebina, Christianity's spirit of sacrifice must be derived directly from worldly sources.

To sum up, then, *shinkoku kensetsu* posits war as the means by which peoples not only assert themselves as particular, unique entities, but also aspire to the universal (and for Ebina, therefore religious) condition of nationhood. What we should note here is how Ebina, in deriving both the universal and the particular from the same source, that of war, presupposes an absolute identity between them. Such an attitude, because it takes universal meaning directly from the worldly circumstances of the particular, must ultimately emphasize self-reliance to the extent that it affirms so worldly an event as war as the stepping stone towards a national religious transformation. This position, however, must be understood

² I do not mean to suggest that this is the only way in which Ebina used this term.

within the context of Christianity's outsider status in prewar Japan. "How is it possible to be Japanese and a Christian at the same time?" was the question that most vexed, and often tormented, late Meiji Christians. By identifying war absolutely with sacrifice, Ebina was able to imagine a national rebirth that would make it possible to give absolute loyalty both to the state and to one's individual conscience as a Christian.

However, war poses a necessary threshold in a nation's maturity here in another, more contradictory sense as well. A national ethic of self-reliance had to be founded upon total dedication to God. Yet, according to Ebina's own argument, only defeat in war could bring nations to this realization. To this extent, Ebina could not depend entirely on self-reliance to provide the source of Japan's salvation. Let us look next at how Ebina attempted to resolve this contradiction in his writings on Korea's colonization.

Shinkoku Kensetsu and Japan's Colonization of Korea

On a general level, Ebina believed imperialist expansion ought to lead Japan to realize the universal character of its heretofore particularistic beliefs. In his own words, Japan was to "slough off its island nation character" (*shimaguni konjō wo dakkyaku shite*) (Ebina, 1911, p. 3). This recalls his earlier argument that "constructing a divine nation" required moving beyond the narrow confines of cultural particularism, and both arguments were similarly premised on the substitution of a worldly event for a religious one. Here, however, Ebina makes his argument more explicit through the idea of divine providence. "We believe that our nation's establishment *was already the bounty of providence*. When we promote the relationship between our imperial ancestors and the universe, then for the first time we will be able to make our empire a holy [one]" (ibid, p. 2). By arguing for the presence of providence already existing within Japan's past, Ebina justified his own belief in Japan's eventual conversion to Christianity.

What, then, of Ebina's assertion that the experience of defeat in war was necessary to bring nations to rely on this providence? To prescribe such a fate for Japan would have been to deny its capacity to survive the modern world. Ebina could, however, identify a tragic nation in Korea and even see its colonization as a potential source of salvation for Japan. "Certainly, I celebrate the amalgamation of Japan

and Korea on behalf of the Japanese. For it is an opportunity for the Japanese people to become a great nation. Without annexing other countries, a country cannot display its own spirituality or nurture its own capacity for greatness..." (Ebina, 1910, p. 70). Colonization, like war earlier, demonstrated Japan's ability to move beyond its narrow cultural boundaries to take on a task of universal significance. But here Ebina goes further, "Therefore, on the occasion of this grand achievement, the people of the empire must demonstrate their inherent spirituality. Japan's traditional island character must die [so that Japan may] be resurrected into the spirit of a new and rising nation." Ultimately, by substituting Korea's tragedy for its own, Japan would experience a rebirth that would eradicate the rift between its particularistic past and its more recent assimilation into the universal history of nation-states. Here, I would argue, the definition of *shinkoku kensetsu* that Ebina first introduced during the Russo-Japanese War witnesses a sense of completion. By locating the source of Japan's salvation outside of itself, *shinkoku kensetsu* could present the possibility of a much broader cultural transformation neither reducible to metropole nor colony. Thus Ebina could conclude, "I celebrate not only for the Japanese and Korean peoples, I celebrate the progress of the divine nation" (ibid, p. 69).

I have argued above that Ebina's conception of *shinkoku kensetsu* ought to be interpreted as one formed and brought to completion through, rather than projected upon, Japan's colonization of Korea. This suggests that, in the future, interpreting the meaning of Kumiai Church missionary efforts in Korea will require more attention to how their religious beliefs were shaped through their involvement in empire.

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Globalization and University Reforms: A Transnational and Comparative Analysis of the Case of Japan

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How to reform century-old higher education systems in order to remain competitive in the global knowledge economy has become one of the most pressing policy concerns across industrialized countries in the past decade. While the impact of economic globalization on national educational restructuring across both industrialized and industrializing countries has been amply documented by educational researchers in the past two decades, most of this research has focused on reforms in the US, UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Few studies have looked at the policy making process in non Anglo-Saxon countries and, in particular, those with traditionally strong state-controlled educational systems such as Japan and France. Professor Chan-Tiberghien's research offers a transnational and comparative analysis of university governance reforms in two "late" non-Anglo Saxon reformers: Japan and France. Given a similar, centralized higher educational system and common pressures to reform since the late 1980s, how do we explain the divergent reform outcomes in university governance between Japan and France? This presentation focused on the case of Japan and, in particular, the 2004 National Universities Incorporation Law. Professor Chan-Tiberghien analyzed the influence of international norms on university reform agenda-setting in Japan and the impact of the domestic political process on reform meanings and outcome.



Single Mothers, Welfare-to-Work Policies and the Restructuring of Japanese Welfare

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In 2002, the Japanese government implemented major reforms which significantly altered the character of state support for single mothers in Japan. Similar to reforms introduced in the US, Japanese single parent policies have been restructured with the goal of moving single mothers "from welfare to work." The restructuring of lone parent policies and the emphasis on work stands in stark contrast to most contemporary descriptions of Japan's welfare system, which stress women's domestic role as mothers and caretakers of the elderly as a key element of Japanese welfare provision. Is Japan bidding farewell to maternalism and the postwar ideal of the "professional housewife"? In this talk, Professor Ezawa reassessed the gendered character of Japan's welfare regime based on an analysis of Japanese single parent policies. More specifically, she explored the logic of recent reforms, and how policies support single mothers' welfare and the ability to work. Based on life-history interviews with single mothers, Professor Ezawa further highlighted the main problems single mothers face in becoming economically independent through work as envisioned by policy makers. Even though single mothers constitute only a minority of women, their experience provides a window on the gendered character of Japan's welfare regime, as well as women's ability to become economically independent from families, husbands, and the state.

