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Cover Photo
Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai
welcomes Japanese Prime Minister
Tanaka Kakuei to Beijing as he
arrives to negotiate Sino-Japanese
diplomatic normalisation,
September 25, 1972. Courtesy of
the Mainichi Shimbun.

Back Cover Photo
Former United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees and
current Co-chair of the Commission
on Human Security Ogata Sadako
speaks at the U.N. Conference for
Disarmament in Kyoto, August 7,
2002. Courtesy of the Mainichi
Shimbun.

Editorial Notes
Personal Names
All personal names are given in
the customary order in the
native language of the person
unless otherwise requested.
Hence in Japanese names, the
family name is given first, e.g.
Toyotomi Hideyoshi, and in
Western names the family
name is given second, e.g.
George Bush.

Romanization
Due to software limitations
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The articles in this edition of *Social Science Japan* largely explore Japan's active role in the post-war world and the changing nature of the international system itself. While Western academics and international relations specialists have tended to overlook the active role that Japan has played in shaping its own future and at times the international system as a whole, most of the papers in this edition help pave new ground in understanding Japan's position in international society. Some of the articles illustrate the way Japan has been a responsive participant in international regime change, while others look at its active role in these changes, as with the case of fisheries or post-war planning. New challenges exist in international society as a result of some rather fundamental alterations to the Westphalian system, namely the recently christened doctrine of justified pre-emptive attack. Several papers look at the principles binding international society as a whole, from the nature of leadership to perceptions of security and functionality of diplomacy.

This is the final issue of *Social Science Japan* under the leadership of Ian Martin, who leaves the Institute of Social Science for a foray into the private sector. As his successor we welcome aboard Thomas Blackwood (Ph.D. Candidate, University of Michigan). Best of luck, Tom!

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Prelude to Partnership: The Post-Pearl Harbor Report of Admiral Nomura Kichisaburo

Peter Mauch

The post-World War II world has been witness to Japan's remarkable re-emergence as an international force - economically, politically, culturally, and, some might add, militarily. Underlying Japan's meteoric postwar rise has been its alliance relationship with its wartime enemy, the United States. The origins of this relationship have for decades attracted the attention of historians, political scientists, and scholarly commentators of every political persuasion. The net effect has been its elevation to a position of landmark significance in the annals of postwar world history. Even so, these origins remain an imprecisely understood field of inquiry. Through its examination of the post-Pearl Harbor report of Japan's former Ambassador to the United States, Admiral Nomura Kichisaburo, this essay seeks to clarify and illuminate the Japanese side of the intellectual origins of this partnership. In particular, it examines Nomura's belief in the certainty of Japan's ultimate defeat at the hands of the United States, and his notion that Japan's postwar interests were not necessarily inimical to those of the U.S.

When Nomura returned to Tokyo in August 1942, some nine months after Japanese carrier-based torpedo bombers had laid waste to the American naval base at Pearl Harbor, his colleagues in the Japanese government confronted a war situation that diverged widely from their pre-Pearl Harbor strategic planning. Cognisant of their nation's inability to defeat the United States in a prolonged conflict, and yet labouring under the fatalistic notion that war between the two nations was "historically inevitable," Japanese policy-makers had opened the war in the confident expectation that a lightning military campaign in Southeast Asia, the collapse of Chiang Kai-Shek's regime in Chungking, Germany's subjugation of the Soviet Union, and Britain's military defeat - all within months of Pearl Harbor - would force an isolated and dispirited United States to the negotiating table.¹

In the months that followed Pearl Harbor, even as Japanese forces imposed themselves across Southeast Asia, the myopia that characterised this vision revealed itself with startling clarity. On February 25, 1942, the Imperial Headquarters-Cabinet Liaison Conference frankly admitted that, "in view of our national strength and the situation [in China and the Soviet Union], it is not only that under the present circumstances we cannot expect to force Great Britain's surrender or to force America to lose its will to fight, but it cannot be expected that they will compromise their efforts to pursue Japan's surrender to the bitter end."² The strategy upon which policy-makers agreed in the face of such a damning assessment was as typical as it was unrealistic: "We shall continue



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Notes

¹ The notion that war between Japan and the United States was "historically inevitable" is quoted in "Teikoku Kokusaku Suikō Yōryō ni Kansuru Gozen Kaigi ni Okeru Shitsugi-ōtō Shiryō," 6 September 1941, in *Sugiyama Memo: Daihon'e-Seifu Renraku Kaigi Nado Hikki* [Sugiyama Memos: Records of the Headquarters-Government Liaison Conferences], Sanbo Honbu, ed., (Tokyo: Harashobo, 1967), p. 321. The most thorough pre-Pearl Harbor strategic planning conducted by the Japanese Government, which recounts all the above objectives, is to be found in "Tai-Bei-Ei-Ran-Shō Sensōmatsu Sokushin ni Kansuru Fukuan," 15 November 1941, *ibid.*, pp. 523-25.

² "Sumiyaka ni Ei o Kuppuku seshinu Bei no Sen'i o Hōki seshimuru tame Kitei Keiryō no Suikō nomi o motte Jūbun to subekiya" 25 February 1942, *Shūsen Shiroyaku* [Historical Documents on Ending the War], Gaimusho, ed., (Tokyo: Asahi Gekkansha, 1952), p. 8. The membership of the Liaison Conference included the vice chiefs of the Army General Staff and the Navy General Staff, the prime minister, and the foreign, army, and navy ministers. In addition, the chief cabinet secretary and the chiefs of the Military Affairs and Naval Affairs bureaus of the Army and Navy ministries served as secretaries for the conference. For details, see Hattori Takushirō, *Dai Tōa Sensō Zenshi* [A Complete History of the Greater East Asian War], (Tokyo: Masu Shobō, 1956), vol. I, p. 246.

expanding from the areas we have already gained."³ Lieutenant Colonel James Doolittle's efforts on 18 April 1942 in leading sixteen B-25 bombers off the carrier *Hornet* to bomb Tokyo only served to reinforce the urgency of Japan's expansionistic drive. Yet on 4 and 5 June 1942 when the United States naval commander, Admiral Chester Nimitz, sunk the heart of Japan's carrier striking force as well as four of the Navy's aircraft carriers, Japan lost the strategic initiative. Although policy-makers at the time were loathe to admit it - the Navy high command report to the 10 June Liaison Conference deliberately conveyed a misleading picture of the disaster at Midway on the grounds that it was a navy secret - with the strategic initiative went any realistic hopes that Japanese policy-makers might still have entertained regarding their ill-begotten end-of-war-scenario.⁴

Into this morass stepped Japan's former Ambassador to the United States Nomura Kichisaburo. Throughout the Japanese-American negotiations of 1941, Nomura had argued against attempts to compel American acquiescence in Japan's hegemonic aspirations through the use - or the threat of the use - of force on account of the fact that Japan could muster only a fraction of the strength which the United States possessed.⁵ Now that Japan had opened war, he was not sanguine that it could avert disaster. In conference with the Emperor after his return to Tokyo, Nomura retorted: "It cannot be thought that America will end this war easily. If Japan is to complete this war, I believe deep meaning must be given to the possession of strategic materials."⁶ In light of the Liaison Conference's admission months earlier that, "the Anglo-American blockade of the inflow of important resources from the south" had caused "some damage," Nomura's was the clearest expression to date within the Japanese Government of the folly of Pearl Harbor.⁷

Having caused the Emperor pause for thought, Nomura then on 20 August submitted a long report to Foreign Minister Togo Shigenori which presented his foreboding awareness of the potential of Japan's new enemy, the likely outcome of Japan's war with the United States, and the postwar future that awaited Japan. Nomura conceded that "since the war started, [the United States] has been faced with loss after loss, and there is a considerable deal of despair."⁸ He noted the success with which Germany had met in sinking American vessels in the Atlantic, leaving the United States in the unenviable position whereby "the number of submerged ships greatly outnumbers the quantity of those under construction." With regard to domestic conditions, Nomura reported: "Not only are there extreme restrictions on the use of gasoline on the east coast, there is an ever-increasing accumulation of stocks in all ports, and the shipping problem



has led to the stagnation of all military action."⁹

Having frankly addressed the problems that the United States faced in fighting the war, Nomura then sought to dispel undue optimism that this might give rise to in Tokyo. He was certain that because "generally speaking, democracies do not prepare for war, the United States is resigned to losing *only* in the early stages of the war."¹⁰ This belief was buttressed by the fact that the United States was now "on the road to both full military strength as well as the expansion of its production capabilities." Nomura then dismissed as pure fantasy the faith that many of his colleagues placed in the possibility of bringing the United States to the negotiating table. He argued:

Unless the war situation in Europe is beneficial to us, unless diplomacy develops, unless the China Incident is quickly brought under control, and unless some good news for us is forthcoming, it cannot be thought that Japanese-American relations will easily give way to a mood for peace.

As far as Nomura was concerned, there were too many variables in the above equation. "In short," he professed, "we need to make preparations for a long war."¹¹

Like his colleagues, Nomura was under no illusions as to Japan's chances of victory once the war became protracted. Unlike his colleagues, he saw no way out of the situation. He predicted that once Japan had been exhausted by the war in China, the United States would then "launch a counterattack from Australia." Just as disturbing was their intention to "attack Japan's transport network by means of carrier-based aircraft and submarines." Regarding efforts to forestall such an outcome, Nomura believed it to be "impossible for Japan to attack the bases in Australia for some time."¹² As he put it to a different audience: "If I were to have a hand in choosing someone to fight, I'd make sure it was someone I could lick."¹³ In simple terms, defeat for Nomura was not as much a question of 'if' as it was one of 'when.'

Reconciled to his nation's ultimate defeat, Nomura turned to American war aims in the hope of divining the future to which Japanese policymakers must reconcile themselves. As an old sea dog well versed in the theories of Alfred Thayer Mahan, Nomura was particularly impressed by Washington's programme for a two-ocean navy.¹⁴ He maintained that this programme not only reflected the dramatic suddenness with which America's hitherto powerful



Notes

³ "Kongo Torubeki Sensō Shidō no Taikō", 7 March 1942, *Shūsen Shiroku*, Gaimusho, ed., p. 8.

⁴ Liaison Conference Roundtable Discussion, 10 June 1942, *Sugiyama Memo*, pp. 130-131. The Navy reported only one aircraft carrier sunk, one missing, and one heavily damaged, when in reality it lost four aircraft carriers.

Regarding Midway, which many historians regard as the turning point of the war, see Fuchida Mitsuo & Okumiya Masatake, *Midway, The Battle that Doomed Japan: The Imperial Navy's Story*, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1955); Samuel Eliot Morison, *Coral Sea, Midway, and Submarine Actions: May 1942-August 1942*, vol. 4 in *History of United States Naval Operations in WWII*, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1951); and Gordon W. Prange, *Miracle at Midway*, (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1982).

⁵ Regarding Nomura's role in pre-Pearl Harbor Japanese-American relations, see Peter Mauch, "Revisiting Nomura's Diplomacy: Ambassador Nomura's Role in the Japanese-American Negotiations, 1941," forthcoming.

⁶ Quoted in Nomura's official biography, Kiba Kōsuke, *Nomura Kichisaburō*, (Tokyo: Nomura Kichisaburō Denki Kankōkai, 1961), p. 777.

⁷ This admission came in spite of the fact that Japan had attained "command of the sea and the air in the Southwest Pacific." See "Sumiyaka ni Ei o Kuppuku seshinu Bei no Sen'i o Hōki seshimuru tame Kitei Keiryō no Suikō nomi o motte Jūbun to subekiya" 25 February 1942, *Shūsen Shiroku*, p. 7.

Notes

⁸ "Chū-Bei Ninmu Hōkoku," 20 August 1942, in *Nihon Gaikō Bunsho: Nichi-Bei Kōshō, 1941*, [Japan's Diplomatic Documents: The Japanese-American Negotiations, 1941], (hereafter referred to as *NGB*), Gaimushō, ed., (Tokyo: Gaimushō, 1990), vol. II., p. 294.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 370.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 294. (*Italics added*).

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 373.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 374.

¹³ Quoted in John K. Emmerson, *The Japanese Thread: A Life in the US Foreign Service*, (New York: Holt, Rhinehart & Winston, 1978), p. 251.

¹⁴ Regarding Mahan, and the considerable influence he wielded over the Japanese navy, see the prize-winning Asada Sadao, *Ryōtaisenkan no Nichi-Bei Kankei: Kaigun to Seisaku Kettei Katei* [Japanese-American Relations Between the Wars: Naval Policy and the Decision-Making Process], (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1993); and *idem.*, *From Mahan to Pearl Harbour: The Imperial Japanese Navy and the United States*, (United States Naval Institute Press, forthcoming).

¹⁵ "Chū-Bei Ninmu Hōkoku," 20 August 1942, in *NGB: Nichi-Bei Kōshō, 1941*, vol. II., p. 294.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 292.

isolationist sentiment had dissipated, but also reflected that nation's increasing determination to replace Britain as the world's predominant power. "The United States," he asserted, "is itself applying the policy of 'Britannia rule the waves.'" Gazing into his crystal ball, Nomura was certain that "above all the United States will establish its power in Asia."¹⁵

As for the question of what the United States intended to do with that power, the outlook for Japan was not as bleak as might be expected. At its base, Nomura asserted that Roosevelt's diplomacy was guided by a sincere desire to "turn the world from the diplomacy of force as practised by tyrants toward a diplomacy defined by the principle of reciprocity." If Roosevelt succeeded in this task, Nomura was certain that the President would be ranked alongside such "real politicians" as George Washington and Abraham Lincoln.¹⁶ Nomura noted that Roosevelt's basic war aim was borne out by the Atlantic Charter of August 1941, and was reinforced by the Declaration by the United Nations in December 1941.¹⁷ Emphasising the allies' aversion to "separate truces and/or a separate peace," and conversely their commitment to a "complete victory," Nomura recalled Roosevelt's overarching aim of a world defined by "freedom of life, the protection of religious freedom, and the maintenance of human rights."¹⁸ More concretely, American policy would be defined by the "call for freedom of the seas, an open door throughout the world...[and] equality of commercial opportunity."¹⁹ Given that Nomura himself had incessantly called for Japanese policy-makers to adopt these standards prior to Pearl Harbor, it was not too great a stretch of the imagination for him to believe that it might be possible once the war had ended.

In conclusion, then, Nomura's post-Pearl Harbor report represented the first systematic attempt by a Japanese official to reconcile his colleagues to defeat. Although Nomura did not specifically state the need to reach accommodation with the United States, his report grappled with the issues that would define Japanese policy following its surrender. In this regard, Nomura's report was the first, and, for a long time, the only call for a fundamental rethink of Tokyo's conceptions of the postwar world. Insofar as he sought to reconcile his colleagues to the overarching American aim of a "single world organisation," Nomura's report suggested the need for Japan to create a niche for itself in an American-conceived and -dominated postwar world.²⁰ Of course, the obstinacy of those in Tokyo whose views did not coincide with Nomura's carried the day well into 1945. Yet to dismiss his post-Pearl Harbor report as the ineffectual ramblings of a naval bureaucrat who ventured semi-successfully into politics and diplomacy ignores the fact that Nomura's contribution to Tokyo's



understanding of the so-called "American century" was a major factor in the origins of the Japanese-American postwar partnership.²¹



Notes

¹⁷ The text of the Atlantic Charter is reproduced in Joseph M. Siracusa, ed., *The American Diplomatic Revolution: A Documentary History of the Cold War, 1941-1947*, (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat, 1977), pp. 7-9. For a judicious account of both the conference and its context, see Theodore A. Wilson, *The First Summit: Roosevelt and Churchill at Placentia Bay, 1941*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969). See also Douglas Brinkley & David R. Facey-Crowther, *The Atlantic Charter*, (New York: St Martin's, 1994).

¹⁸ "Chū-Bei Ninmu Hōkoku," 20 August 1942, in *NGB: Nichi-Bei Kōshō, 1941*, vol. II, p. 370.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 294.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 370.

²¹ Henry Luce, the founder of Time, Life, and Fortune magazines, coined the term the "American Century." See Walter LaFeber, *The Clash: Japanese-American Relations Throughout History*, (New York: WW Norton, 1997), p. 216.

Japanese Distant Water Fisheries in the Early Post-war Period

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As Japan set out to revive its economy and society after the destruction of the Pacific War, Japanese and SCAP officials targeted the fishing industry as a means to provide for its own food needs and to lend impetus to reconstruction efforts at home. This paper analyzes the means by which Japan set about to revive the distant water fishing industry through new international agreements and the opening up of new fishing grounds on the high seas. In the process, it sought to rejoin the community of nations and contribute to the establishment of a new international oceans regime that endured for two decades until the imposition of 200 nautical mile (nm) economic zones in the mid-1970s.

Under the SCAP Occupation, MacArthur had established a rather severe system of fisheries restrictions, known collectively as the MacArthur Line, which permitted operations in domestic waters but ruled out all distant water operations with the exception of Antarctic whaling runs. While this authorized zone helped to abate an impending domestic food shortage by providing an important source of protein, it soon became clear that intensive catches in this diminutive jurisdiction were leading to problems of unsustainable overfishing. Moreover, SCAP and Japanese authorities targeted the fishing industry as an area critical to economic revitalization since it would allow for food self-sufficiency while relieving the United States of burdensome aid expenses and also provide the necessary impetus to rebuild essential economic sectors such as ironworks and shipbuilding. Thus, Japanese authorities pressured SCAP to permit access to new fishing grounds in distant waters so as to enable Japan to continue on its development path and to avoid ecological catastrophe.

Considerable wartime resentment, however, effectively prevented the possibility of a westward or southward expansion of fisheries activities. Instead, it seemed that the only outlet was into the northeast, the Sea of Okhotsk and Bering Sea, where there were no littoral states to object or exact restrictions. Washington decided, however, to make this expansion contingent upon the negotiation of a peace treaty and the realization of independence.

Initially there was considerable apprehension on the part of Korea and Australia, among others, regarding the revival of Japan's distant water fishing fleets, mostly arising from the poor reputation of Japanese fishers in the prewar period. Consequently, Korean, Indonesian, Chinese and Australian representatives pressured SCAP and the State Department to



enshrine restrictions on Japanese fishing in the early texts of the Peace Treaty. Somewhat alarmed by the extent of these requests, John Foster Dulles commented that the Peace Treaty was becoming an "international fisheries convention."¹ Instead Dulles and the State Department elected to leave restrictions out of the treaty altogether and devised an alternative in Article 9 that called on Japan to negotiate fishing agreements with signatory nations in order to access foreign fishing grounds.

Japan and the United States decided to negotiate the first fisheries treaty in an effort to establish a favorable precedent for ensuing negotiations as well as to quickly open up abundant fishing grounds in the North Pacific for Japanese fishers. In order to alleviate the concerns of countries that opposed Japanese fishing mostly over environmental concerns, Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru made a number of moves to illustrate Tokyo's voluntary compliance to international standards. In a letter Yoshida sent to Dulles in February 1951, the prime minister committed to voluntarily adopt restrictions on certain Eastern Pacific and Bering Sea fisheries so as to provide "convincing evidence of the desire of the Japanese government to deal with [the management of international fisheries] in an equitable manner, designed to promote good will and the mutual interest of all who... depend for their livelihood upon fishing in the high seas." Moreover, Japan joined the International Convention of Whaling in April 1951 in an effort to reduce fears of a revival of Japan's prewar neglect with respect to whale stock depletion. These actions served as reasonable justification for SCAP to push for the revival of the distant water fisheries.

Talks were thus initiated among delegates from Japan, the United States and Canada in November and December 1952, concurrent with Peace Treaty negotiations. SCAP conveyed temporary sovereignty to Japanese authorities for the duration of the negotiations since the Peace Treaty had not yet been completed and full sovereignty had yet to be restored.²

The negotiation policy of the Japanese foreign ministry was to defend the principle of freedom of the high seas by avoiding any restrictions on fishing activities.³ Moreover, they wished to secure American and Canadian support of this principle through a mutual declaration that defended the freedom as a universal right. In the Japanese draft of the convention, Article 2 stated that "no country concerned under this convention is to be subject to discriminatory exclusion from the exploitation of any high seas fishing



Notes

¹ United States, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, Vol. VI, 1951, p. 1184.

² Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Microfilm Series B'0039 (*Kitataiheiyo no Kōkaigyōgyō ni Kansuru Kokusai-jōyaku Kankei Ikken*).

³ *Ibid.*

Notes

⁴ Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Tripartite Fisheries Conference*, Tokyo, Japan, 1951, (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1951), p. 176.

⁵ *Op. cit.* 2.

⁶ *Op. cit.* 1, vol. XIV, p. 1446-7.

⁷ *Pacific Fisherman*, January 1951, (Seattle: Miller Freeman Publications), p. 15.

resource..."⁴ In other words, the Japanese argued that no restrictions should be applied to any single country in compliance with the standards of the earlier oceans regime, while conservation measures should be applied equally to all signatories. The Japanese negotiators hoped to avoid the adoption of any exclusionary principles for fear they might serve as adverse precedents in later negotiations with the USSR, China, and Korea.

The Ministry also emphasized the particular importance of fisheries to the economic revitalization of the post-war economy.⁵ This tactic was persuasive since Washington had already committed itself to the reconstruction of Japan through SCAP while the State Department wished to divest itself from financially burdensome aid expenses through the promotion of a self-supporting domestic economy. Moreover, Japan and the United States were concurrently negotiating arrangements for a mutual security treaty whereby the "economic stability and development of Japan shall be its prerequisite..."⁶ Such a strategy reasoned that fisheries were an important component of Japan's economic development and, consequently, to American security interests.

The Canadian and U.S. fishing industries, on the other hand, sought to exclude Japan from all fishing grounds in the Northeast Pacific. As resolved in the November 1950 meeting of the Pacific Fisheries Conference, a meeting held among United States and Canadian industrial fishing companies, West Coast fishers encouraged their respective governments to negotiate with the objective of ensuring that "Japanese fishermen will stay out of the fisheries of the Northeast Pacific Ocean which have been developed and husbanded by the United States and other countries of North America..."⁷ Fishing industry advocates cited Japan's earlier 'invasion' of the Bristol Bay salmon fishery in 1936-7 as well as potential threats to peaceful relations with Japan as substantial reasons to impose an eastern limit on Japanese high-seas fishing.

The United States government, however, concurred with the Japanese foreign ministry's position with respect to the defence of the freedom of the seas and the need for economic revival through fisheries expansion. Much more concerned with Communist victory in China, Soviet expansionary policy in East Asia, and the Korean War than fisheries in the Bering Sea, the State Department was mostly attentive to security needs in Asia. As stated in a CIA special estimate conducted for the State Department in 1951, Japan would play a critical role in establishing an "East-West balance of power in the Far-East" and it would be important to secure markets and natural



resources, such as fish, in non-communist areas.⁸ The fall of Nationalist China raised urgent problems regarding the replacement of the very important and proximate mainland economy with one large enough to support the Japanese market while friendly to American interests.

Part of the answer to this dilemma was to open American markets to Japanese exports to provide a source of dollars for the capital-poor Japanese economy, as in the case of tuna fisheries.⁹ This policy was adopted in part to prevent Japan from turning to the market of Communist China in search of export earnings. Another partial solution was to allow the Japanese into the North Pacific to secure access to another source of natural resources. The Tripartite negotiations were conducted under the understanding that the United States and Canada would allow Japan to fish in waters proximate to American coastal waters while making efforts to prevent Japan from entering selected, valuable North American fisheries, namely salmon, halibut, and herring. Thus Japan would be able to develop an export market and provide for domestic consumption needs without having a directly adverse affect on valuable North American fisheries.

While the contemporary oceans regime did not allow the exclusion of Japan from such fisheries, the North American delegations pressured the Japanese to adopt some *voluntary* measures to reserve these stocks for Canadian and American exploitation. Perhaps owing to Japan's role as a vanquished nation in the negotiations, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries agreed to a compromise whereby an abstention principle would be applied to Japanese fishers alone. Although the adoption of such a restriction may have seemed severe in terms of Japan's pre-war experience, the agreement nonetheless opened up a vast fishing area beyond the diminutive authorized zone for future use.

The resulting agreement, known as the International North Pacific Fisheries Convention (INPFC), was finally signed on May 9, 1952 and came into effect on June 12, 1953. The INPFC contained three important provisions. First of all, support for freedom of the high seas was included in the preamble in accordance with Japan's wishes.¹⁰ Secondly, the abstention principle was adopted in full, but included in the appendix of the treaty. While not readily apparent, this section served as the operating basis for the new treaty. The Japanese in effect agreed not to fish herring, salmon, and halibut east of an Abstention Line demarcated at 175 degrees West Longitude. Finally, the



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⁸ *Op. cit.* 1, vol. I, 1951, p. 204-5.

⁹ The State Department resisted attempts to levy tariffs on Japanese tuna imports in 1951-2 even when American tuna boats were dry-docked due to poor market conditions. Their reasoning, as outlined in a report submitted to a Ways and Means Committee of the Senate in 1952, highlighted two urgent matters: 1. Japanese exports were an important source of dollars for post-war reconstruction, and 2. further trade restrictions may have pressured Japan to trade heavily with Communist China and driven the Japanese to pursue unfair trade practices in other products in an effort to earn the dollars they needed. *Testimony of Harold Cinder, Secretary of State for Economic Affairs before the Senate Finance Committee, February 6, 1952. Op. cit.* 2

¹⁰ International North Pacific Fisheries Commission, *International North Pacific Fisheries Commission Handbook*, (Vancouver: INPFC, 1990).

Japanese Distant Water Fisheries in the Early Post-war Period *continued*

agreement established a supervisory organization, the International North Pacific Fisheries Commission (INPFC), to provide an annual trilateral forum to coordinate dialogue and to supervise biological studies on designated stocks.

Unlike several other extant fisheries organizations, such as the International Whaling Commission, the INPFC was relatively decentralized. It did not formulate quotas, could not enforce decisions upon its members, and did not have a formal dispute-resolution process. While the INPFC supervised scientific studies of fish stocks and regularly employed 'conservationist' language at annual meetings, it was not a resource conservation regime. Allocation of salmon, herring, and halibut was its effective function, not the management of environmental sustainability. Instead conservation considerations were the voluntary responsibility of each national government. The most important role of the INPFC was to re-open the North Pacific to Japanese fishing after a period of severe restriction imposed by the MacArthur Line.

This was the first international treaty Japan was to conclude as an independent nation after the conclusion of peace. It served as an important precedent in subsequent fisheries negotiations with China, Korea and the Soviet Union whereby Japanese negotiators were able to largely sidestep any attempts to impose restrictions or 'voluntary' abstentions as so widely feared by Japanese government officials. This treaty helped put in place an oceans regime and fisheries system that would continue until 1976 with the imposition of 200nm fisheries zones first by the United States and followed by the Soviet Union and Canada, among others. The promulgation of the INPFC ended the restriction on Japanese fisheries, including the MacArthur Line, and permitted the distant water operations to soon resume their place as the foremost fisheries in the world.

□

The role of Tanaka Kakuei in the Sino-Japanese Normalisation of 1972

Sebastien CK Fung

Diplomatic normalisation in 1972 has long been considered one of the most important issues in the contemporary history of Sino-Japanese relations. Over the years, a considerable amount of research has been conducted on the questions of how and why normalisation was achieved. Nevertheless, one significant area that remains to be explored is the role of Tanaka Kakuei in the normalisation process. This paper examines Tanaka's role, discussing both his preparatory moves and the steps he took towards normalisation once he had been elected as prime minister.

The Preparatory Phase

Sato's Resignation and Tanaka's Determination

Nixon's sudden announcement in July 1971 that he would visit the People's Republic of China (PRC) before May 1972 triggered the fall of Sato Eisaku, whose disapproval ratings in a poll taken in August 1971 increased by 12% *vis-à-vis* a month earlier (Lee, 1976: 106). Sato's popularity further eroded and reached its lowest ebb in December 1971 after the defeat in October of the two U.S. resolutions to keep Taiwan's seat at the United Nations, which were co-sponsored by Japan.

The consequences of Sato's decision to support the U.S. resolutions were disastrous as Japan's official political advances towards rapprochement with the PRC almost came to a halt. With growing pressure from the Japanese public to normalise relations with the PRC after Nixon's announcement, Sato's inability to accomplish normalisation became increasingly evident to the extent that his replacement became a certainty. The leaders of all the major LDP factions began preparing for the competition to succeed Sato. Tanaka was among them.

Tanaka served as the minister for the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) until Sato's resignation in June 1972. During his early days as minister, Tanaka did not come out in clear support of normalisation. It was possible that he feared an open and clear endorsement of normalisation might cost him votes at the coming party election, as pro-Taiwanese factions within the LDP held considerable power (Ogata, 1988: 46). Despite the ambiguity of his stance on normalisation, Tanaka showed a positive attitude towards strengthening bilateral relations by approving a plan to allow bank credit and loans for PRC-related trade and signalling to business leaders to encourage politicians to normalise relations with the PRC (Zhao, 1995: 79). MITI under Tanaka also set up a new section entrusted with PRC trade, and



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The role of Tanaka Kakuei in the Sino-Japanese Normalisation of 1972 *continued*

considered the elimination of all discriminatory tariffs imposed on imports from the PRC (Lee, 1976: 175). All these moves were warmly received and considered as goodwill signs by the PRC government. Whether Tanaka was credited for these moves and thus left a good impression among the PRC leaders remains an open question.

Tanaka's Understanding of Sino-Japanese Normalisation

Tanaka began to explore the possibilities of establishing diplomatic ties with the PRC in July 1971. The first step he took was to seek advice from an expert on the PRC. At Tanaka's request, Hashimoto Hiroshi, head of the China Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and also an advocate of Sino-Japanese normalisation, submitted to him a report on the policy of the PRC. The report, submitted to Tanaka in January 1972, was comprehensive, clearly illustrating what steps should be taken to normalise relations with the PRC and possible problems and impacts arising from the normalisation. The report later became the blueprint of Tanaka's policy on the PRC. Then in February 1972, after meeting with Aichi Kiichi, a long time confidant, and Hashimoto, Tanaka was convinced that the normalisation of Sino-Japanese relations, and the severing of ties with Taiwan, pursued within the framework of the US-Japan Security Treaty, was a realistic option. Tanaka then made up his mind to work towards this end. This was only five months before he became prime minister.

Tanaka's Alliance with Contenders also Advocating Sino-Japanese Normalisation

The PRC issue developed into a hot topic for all contenders in the party presidential election. Heads of the main factions were keen to draw a line between themselves and the unpopular Sato and showed their dissatisfaction with Sato's pro-Taiwan orientation.

Tanaka and Fukuda Takeo were the two front-runners for the LDP party presidency. They both supported normalisation but held different views on how it should be carried out. Fukuda tried to show that he was able to manage the PRC issue but in a rather cautious way. In sharp contrast to Fukuda's cautious and reserved posture, Tanaka expressed a more positive and straightforward attitude towards rapprochement with the PRC. In March 1972, he requested Fujiyama Aiichiro, who was visiting the PRC, to deliver a message to Chinese leaders on his behalf to indicate his desire to initiate talks on normalising relations. In response to Tanaka's message, Zhou Enlai, the Chinese Premier, welcomed Tanaka's visit to the PRC should he become prime minister.



Nevertheless, we should note that no matter how active the stance he took on the issue of normalisation, Tanaka knew clearly that a win in the election would only be possible if he gained support from other factions within the LDP, as Fukuda had already secured Sato's full support to run for party president. This led Tanaka to negotiate with Ohira Masayoshi and Miki Takeo to form an alliance to go against Fukuda. The issue of normalisation became the central issue for discussion in their negotiations. On July 2, 1972, the three formed an anti-Fukuda alliance by reaching a pact, which put Tanaka into a favourable position in the LDP presidential election.

Notes

¹ See also Lee, 1976: 115.

Phase of Action

Most Japanese policymakers in the Sato government and the Japanese people felt that they had been betrayed by the U.S. over Nixon's sudden announcement of his PRC visit without prior notice. Given such a situation, Tanaka clearly understood that once he took office, normalising relations with the PRC before the U.S. did was a matter of survival in domestic politics (Ogata, 1988: 50). Tanaka wasted no time and explicitly stated his supportive stance on the normalisation issue at his inaugural press conference on July 5, 1972.

Intra-party Co-ordination and Seeking Endorsement from Foreign Allies

Criticism of Tanaka's stance on normalisation within the LDP was plentiful. In fact, opposition from the pro-Taiwan groups remained very strong. In order to deal with growing opposition from the pro-Taiwan groups and to contain them in a party committee controlled by the mainstream groups, Tanaka transformed an LDP committee on the PRC into *Nitchû Kokkô Seijōka Kyōgikai* (The National Council for Japan-China Diplomatic Normalisation; hereafter *Kyōgikai*) in July 1972. The distinctive nature of *Kyōgikai* was that it bypassed the LDP's normal policymaking organs and was placed under the direct supervision of Tanaka (Fukui, 1977: 74).¹ Apart from the strategy of containment through the setting up of the *Kyōgikai*, Tanaka also maintained his personal contacts with pro-Taiwan politicians like Kishi Nobusuke, Ishii Mitsujiro, Kaya Okinori and Funada Naka, right up to and after his visit to the PRC (Ibid.: 76).

Tanaka never forgot to consult with his foreign political allies on the normalisation issue. On the one hand, he himself went to meet Nixon and tried to obtain U.S. approval on normalisation while on the other, he dispatched Shiina Etsusaburo to Taiwan to seek the understanding of



Chiang Kai-shek.

Tanaka held talks with Nixon during his stay in Honolulu from 31 August to 1 September 1972. Although Tanaka was not able to gain full support from Nixon for his China policy, a green light to continue preparations for normalisation, at least, was granted by the U.S. Compared with Tanaka's visit to the U.S., Shiina's visit to Taiwan in September 1972 was considered tough. In fact, the Shiina mission was treated with an unfriendly public reception and high-ranking Taiwanese officials slammed Tanaka's new PRC policy as a betrayal of Taiwan.

Co-operation from the Bureaucracy

Tanaka limited the number of officials involved in the preparatory process of Sino-Japanese normalisation. A working group with four officials was formed in the Foreign Ministry to take full charge of subsequent activities related to the normalisation issue. The four officials ran the working team in extreme confidentiality and only Tanaka and his foreign minister, Ohira, were informed of the progress of their work.

Tanaka's careful use of a small ad hoc task force can be understood in that he did not want any mistakes on the part of the officials (Fukui, 1977: 87). The official stance of the Foreign Ministry at that time was reported to be supportive of normalisation. However, at an unofficial level, there were always heated internal debates among Foreign Ministry bureaucrats over the China question. It was later revealed that a few top-ranking Foreign Ministry officials were aware of the potential Sino-Japanese rivalry for regional leadership and were therefore reluctant to promote better relations.

Linking up with the Business Community

The Japanese business community had started paying visits to the PRC since 1971 and these visits were widely regarded as facilitating the emergence of a domestic atmosphere favourable towards closer ties with the PRC. Tanaka was well aware of the importance of the business community to normalisation and therefore tried to explore the possibility of co-operating with them.

Way back in the spring of 1972, several months before becoming prime minister, Tanaka already met, on a monthly basis, with business leaders of *Getsuyō Kai*, a group formed by the leaders of *zaikai* to support Sato's successor. From those gatherings Tanaka understood that the businesses



were ready to approve anyone who could open the door to the PRC as the new prime minister (Zhao, 1995: 92). However, leaders of *Keidanren* at that time gave their support to Fukuda because of his educational and bureaucratic background and right-wing foreign policy. Tanaka's back-up was mainly from a group of *zaikai* leaders, especially those of *Sangyô Mondai Kenkyûkai* and *Keizai Dôyûkai*, who were active in Sino-Japanese trade. *Keidanren's* support of Fukuda in the LDP presidential election did not deter Tanaka from seeking their help to promote normalisation with the PRC as he knew clearly that movements within the business community could facilitate the emergence of a domestic atmosphere favouring closer ties with the PRC.

Conclusion

That Tanaka gave his support to Sino-Japanese normalisation only in the very last days of the Sato cabinet undoubtedly makes us question his enthusiasm in promoting Sino-Japanese normalisation. Evidence shows that his understanding and vision of Sino-Japanese relations were rather limited. The blueprint for normalisation is also very likely to have reflected the initiative and ideas of Ohira and Miki. My discussion in this paper, however, clearly elucidates that without Tanaka's decisiveness and his personal commitment, the normalisation issue may have gone undecided for a longer period.

With use of his superb political skills, Tanaka secured strong domestic political support for normalisation, especially within the LDP and in the Diet. Moreover, he managed to organise the PRC task force within the Foreign Ministry and received co-operation from the ministry's bureaucrats. Tanaka's appointment of Ohira as foreign minister and their subsequent close and complete co-operation was even more crucial to a rapid normalisation.



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Changes in the Norms of "De-politicisation" and "Non-interference" in Japan's Post-war ODA Policy

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Over the course of nearly half a century since its inception in 1954, Japan's Official Development Assistance (ODA) program has undergone substantial change, both in terms of the objectives underpinning Japanese aid and the financial amounts involved. It might be argued, nevertheless, that there exist *de facto* policy norms that have hardly changed at all during this period: the *de facto* policy norms of "non-interference" in internal affairs and the "de-politicisation" of aid.

Moreover, the principles of non-interference and de-politicisation can be seen to have played a prominent role as *de facto* norms circumscribing Japan's post-war economic diplomacy as a whole. With respect to the former, Japan has attempted, as far as possible, to refrain from intervention and/or involvement in the domestic politics of the Third World, and with respect to the latter, Japan's economic diplomacy has sought to keep political issues and economic activities separate. The question we might ask, then, is whether or not this is still the case.

ODA and involvement in internal affairs

Those involved in Japanese aid (including both the bureaucracy and non-governmental specialists) have, generally speaking, frowned upon close involvement in issues related to political systems or internal affairs. It might be argued that the reason for this stance lies in the existence in Japanese diplomacy of the vaguely-defined ideology of non-intervention that has taken shape during the post-war period, an ideology that has as its rationale the avoidance of entanglement in the internal affairs of foreign countries.

Japanese ODA from the early post-war period through the 1970s and into the 1980s was closely linked to Japan's economic interests; however, over time the relative weight of Japan's short-term economic interests has decreased *vis-à-vis* political and diplomatic considerations. Nevertheless, in those places on the receiving end of Japanese aid, the understanding that aid is for the purpose of economic development alone and that political factors should be kept from the agenda as a matter of course remains deeply entrenched. The request-based system (*yōsei shugi*) in Japanese ODA policy, by which in principle ODA is granted in response to an official request, has served to tone down the extent of involvement in the receiving country's internal affairs. While this principle has been somewhat revised in accordance with more recent emphasis on policy dialogue (*seisaku taiwa*) and policy-based lending (*seisaku shien*), it remains as before a fundamental



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principle of Japanese ODA (Inada, 2001b).

On the other hand, in recent years an emphasis on "good governance" in the receiving country, together with the concomitant view that even with respect to aid the political system of the receiving country should come under scrutiny, has been gaining international currency. Japanese aid officials have increasingly found themselves unable to ignore this prevailing trend, but there remains considerable scope for discussion of by what criteria such governance might be best evaluated and assisted. A number of approaches exist internationally, such as that emphasising administrative performance favoured by the World Bank, and that focusing on democracy favoured by the United States (USAID). Japan has tended to be extremely wary of the latter type which is bound up with overt political implications (JICA, 1995). However, the arguments that the principles of de-politicisation and non-interference that Japan has hitherto adhered to are anachronistic, and that Japan should become actively involved in the domestic political issues of the Third World have been garnering support even within Japan. In actual fact, moreover, as Japan strengthens its collaboration with international bodies and NGOs, it is thereby gradually increasing the degree of its intervention in the political affairs of the developing world (Inada, 1993).

The linkage between ODA and national security

Post-war Japanese ODA policy, furthermore, has steered clear of involvement not only in the receiving country's domestic politics, but also in its military and national security affairs. This traditional norm remained in full force until the 1990s, since which, however, there have been a number of significant turning points.

The watershed between the estrangement of ODA and national security concerns and their subsequent linkage can be traced to the Four ODA Guidelines released in April 1991. This was a landmark development, where political considerations were publicly linked to ODA guidelines for the first time. As for how to apply the designated four *caveats* to the actual distribution and implementation of ODA, however, the Japanese approach has been to treat each case on an individual basis "taking into account the overall situation" (*sôgôteki ni kan'an suru*). How to balance these new considerations against such factors as the development needs of the receiving country and its economic and historical links with Japan has constituted a thorny issue with each new case (Shimomura, Nakagawa and Saito, 1999).



For example, China's nuclear tests in May and August of 1995 severely tested Japan's ability to respond in a manner that preserved the balance between expression of opposition to China's development of nuclear weapons and yet took into account the close historical and economic links between the two countries (Katada, 2001). On the other hand, in response to the nuclear tests carried out by India and Pakistan in May 1998, the Japanese government suspended economic aid almost without exception. The freezing of aid to both countries in this case can be said to have expressed the Japanese government's stance of opposition to nuclear testing, but was implemented on the grounds that economic links between the two countries and Japan were not so close as those with China.

Further, in recent years, Japanese ODA has become increasingly involved with aid programs of an unmistakably political hue, related to national security and regional stability, in the form of conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction aid (JICA, 2001).

The prototypes for this kind of reconstruction aid were the Indochina reconstruction assistance in the late 1970s after the Vietnam War, and the Cambodia reconstruction assistance following the establishment of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in 1993. In both these cases the tangible involvement of Japan in economic support with significant political and diplomatic overtones was groundbreaking. Towards the end of the 1990s, the sequential need for post-conflict reconstruction aid in, for example, Kosovo and East Timor, occasioned much debate in Japan (Inada, 2001a: chp. 7). Consequently, the newly-formulated ODA medium-term goals of August, 1999, cited "Conflict and Development" as a priority issue, and emphasised the need for Japan to henceforth assume a leading role in the areas of conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction support. As it has since turned out and by way of example, Japan adopted a stance of active involvement with respect to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Assistance Conference held in December, 2001.

Have the "traditional norms" of the post-war period changed in any way?

Have, then, the "traditional norms" of Japan's post-war aid diplomacy changed, or do they remain unchanged?

Since the 1980s, Japanese ODA has become increasingly linked to international politics, and even the Japanese government, under the concept



of "comprehensive security" (*sôgô anzen hoshô*), has officially redrawn the line between politics and economics as goals of aid. The official declaration that political considerations might be linked even to the use of aid, as ensconced in the Four ODA Guidelines of 1991, was a development of no little significance. The fact of the matter is, however, that Japan remains disinclined to interfere in the receiving country's internal affairs or political systems. The continuing influence of the norm of non-interference would seem, as before, to owe much to the bitter experience of the path to defeat in the Second World War.

Nevertheless, the view that international society should take precedence over national sovereignty in order to support and achieve the universal values and goals such as a minimum standard of living and the guarantee of basic human rights has been rapidly gaining currency throughout international society. It is in this context that "international norms" have been developing apace in recent years. Indeed, international society has been increasing its involvement not only in post-conflict reconstruction in the Third World, but also in the conflicts themselves, and aid donors, by means of their assistance, have come to exert significant influence on political processes in developing countries.

In conclusion, it can be said that Japan has been compelled to gradually review and revise the "traditional norms" of its post-war ODA in accordance with the development of new norms of behaviour evident throughout international society.

□

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Japan in Regionalisms

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The end of the Cold War saw the burgeoning of a range of regional organizations, suggesting a move away from the ideological confrontation of the Cold War era, which had constrained the growth of regional organizations, towards the reconfiguration of the global political economy on different spatial scales. The deepening and widening of the European Union (EU), together with the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) by the United States, Canada and Mexico, illustrate the ways in which the strong states in the international system were restructuring spatial relations in Europe and North America in the wake of the Cold War. In the Asia Pacific, the 1989 proposal to establish the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, which can best be understood as the outcome of a joint effort by both Japan and Australia to promote 'open regionalism', sought to link together the Pacific and Asian wings of the global political economy. In this sense, the moves in this part of the world towards greater regional integration mirrored what was occurring in the other two key economic centers of the world, leading some commentators to predict the emergence of a tripolar global political economy linked to the economic power of Germany in Europe, the United States in North America, and Japan in the Asia Pacific.

In essence, the APEC proposal gave institutional shape to the regionalization processes that had been gradually knitting Asia and the Pacific together during the Cold War years. Led by Japanese business investments, trade and the embedding of cross-border production systems in East Asia, Asia and the Pacific had been linked together economically, with the American market acting as an absorber of last resort for the exported-oriented economies of East Asia. These regionalization processes, which had gone forward as a result of Japanese manufacturers setting up production facilities in other parts of East Asia, particularly in the wake of the rise in the value of the Japanese yen following the 1985 Plaza Accord, provided the basis for pushing forward with a regionalist project—a state-led project to link together the Asia and the Pacific through APEC. While Japan played a leadership role in establishing APEC, following the 1993 Seattle meeting of the forum the US began to use it as a vehicle for promoting the liberalization and deregulation of the East Asian economies. In this way, the US's globalist project to promote liberalization was given shape on the regional level.

The US's more active role in promoting liberalization through the APEC process has been viewed somewhat ambivalently in Japan: on the one hand, the internationally competitive sectors of the Japanese economy which are



able to benefit from the trend towards greater liberalization, such as the electronics, electrical and automobile industries, have been generally supportive of the liberalization process. Keidanren, the business organization representing many of the big players in these sectors of the economy, recognizes that with the move to greater regional integration and the potential for the EU and NAFTA to become more protectionist, Japanese firms must remain globally competitive. On the other hand, the agricultural, construction and many other sectors of the economy remain globally uncompetitive, which generates strong resistance to liberalization and deregulation on their part. This resistance is powerful in both the bureaucratic and political world, with the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries opposed to opening up the agricultural sector, and many governing party politicians gaining support from these non-competitive sectors of the economy, leading them, too, to resist liberalization. In this situation, the Japanese government has at times joined with the developing economies of East Asia which are opposed to the liberalization of agriculture through the APEC process, as seen at the time of the 1998 Kuala Lumpur meeting of APEC.

In response to the emergence of a regionalist project promoted by the stronger economic powers in the Asia Pacific, and differences over liberalization, in 1990 Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad of Malaysia followed up the APEC proposal with a proposal to create an exclusively subregional East Asian grouping of states, the East Asian Economic Group, without participation by the US, Australia, New Zealand and other 'non-Asian' states. This sought to provide a vehicle to promote the interests of East Asia, with Japan viewed as playing a leadership role representing East Asian interests in global institutions. After some concern in both East Asia and elsewhere that such a subregional grouping of states would become a competitor to APEC, the proposal was modified in favor of establishing the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) as a sub-group within APEC, though without changing the non-Asian membership of the grouping.

At first, the proposal was not viewed sympathetically by Japan, especially by the officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who were concerned about the reaction of the United States. Officials in the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI, now the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry), however, were more sympathetic, viewing the EAEC as a vehicle to promote Japanese interests in the light of the closer economic integration



of the sub-region. While the proposed member nations fluctuated, particularly over the question of whether Taiwan should be a member (Taiwan is a member of APEC), the start of the Asia-Europe Meetings (ASEM) in 1996, and the need this created for an 'East Asian' voice to negotiate with the Europeans, consolidated the membership of the grouping. In the intervening years, the EAEC has become institutionalized as the Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) plus Three (Japan, China and South Korea).

The extent to which an East Asian subregionalist project, as opposed to an Asia Pacific regionalist project, could play a role in the region has divided opinion, with some commentators arguing that, due to differences—in political systems, level of economic development, culture, and so forth—East Asia would remain fragmented, whereas others have instead argued that, irrespective of these differences, East Asia could emerge as an important regional actor. In essence, the East Asian financial crisis of 1997 served as a catalyst for the greater consolidation and integration of East Asia as a region composed of the ASEAN plus Three. As for Japan, the crisis served to alert policy makers to the risk of subregional instability brought about in the economic, rather than military, dimension of East Asian relations, bringing to the forefront of concern the question of what role Japan should play in maintaining order in East Asia. The proposal to establish the Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) illustrates the pro-active role Japan played at the time. Although the proposal was not realized due to the opposition of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the US and China, with the former two in particular concerned about the potential for the AMF to establish softer conditionalities for loans than the IMF, in the intervening years Japanese policy makers have continued to play a leadership role in building regional financial arrangements between Japan and the economies affected by the crisis. This can be seen, for instance, in financing under the 1998 New Miyazawa Initiative, which offered support to the affected economies, and the currency swap arrangements being put in place under the Chiang Mai Initiative of May 2000. These initiatives illustrate the way in which the Japanese government is taking measures to strengthen East Asian integration and stability, particularly in the area of finance, as part of a wider strategy to ensure Japan's position in the region and the world.

While regionalism in the Asia Pacific and subregionalism in East Asia are being institutionalized by the state, the end of the Cold War also opened up wider opportunities for non-state actors to play a role in promoting cross-



border economic integration. Indeed, while the state remains as the dominant actor in the promotion of regionalist and subregionalist projects, substate political authorities, such as prefectures, cities and towns, as well as small-and medium-sized enterprises, not just the giants, are also active in promoting microregionalist projects, which involve subnational parts of different states in crossborder activities. The Japan Sea Economic Zone and the Yellow Sea Economic Zone are two such microregionalist projects which have been pushed forward in the wake of the Cold War. Their aim is to link subnational parts of Japan to subnational parts of other East Asian economies: the former, which is being promoted by Niigata prefecture and city, attempts to build an economic bridge across the Japan Sea to South Korea and China, but ideally aims to involve North Korea and economies even further afield; the latter, which is being pushed forward by Fukuoka prefecture and the cities of Fukuoka and Kita Kyushu, aims to build a bridge across the Yellow Sea to subnational parts of the same countries. Both of these microregionalist projects are being promoted in the context of the central government's attempt to encourage greater decentralization and economic revitalization.

In this way, Japanese state and non-state actors are playing an active role in different levels of regionalism, whether on the regional level of the Asia Pacific, the subregional level of East Asia, or the microregional levels of the Japan Sea or Yellow Sea economic zones. While the Japanese government has recently taken an interest in promoting Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), as with the agreement signed with Singapore in January 2002, and proposed with Mexico, South Korea and Chile, these FTAs should not be understood as the Japanese government's abandonment of regionalism, but rather should be viewed as means for Japan to strengthen its own competitive position in different levels of regionalism and the wider world.



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The Birth of the Diplomatic Marketplace and the Departure from Imaginary Realism

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In the wake of the "9-11" incident a new world order has begun to emerge, shaped by the liberalisation of diplomacy and the birth of a diplomatic marketplace.

In this world order, polarised at one extreme by the overwhelming military pre-eminence of the United States, diplomacy is being liberalised as well as trade, and each country seeks to maximise its own advantage in the context of a competitive marketplace in which every country has a stake. Rather than a country's interests consisting of a monolithic entity, moreover, in this marketplace a multiplicity of domestic interests are pursued on a case-by-case basis.

The world of the 19th to early 20th centuries, characterised by balance-of-power politics, revolved around military strength. In the post-Cold War world, as the benefits pursued by each country became a two-track process, diplomacy came to require a much more complicated formula, somewhat akin to flying an aeroplane through atmospheric turbulence. In the 21st century, in contrast to the former balance of power era, not only governments but now also non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and transnational organisations linked by the Internet have come to play a part in the process of diplomacy.

The liberalisation of diplomacy began to develop in response to the competitive interplay between strategies brought by each country to the marketplace, and has been further catalysed by the current Iraq situation. Here, the process of liberalisation has been further induced by a dangerous game of military brinkmanship between the Bush Administration and Saddam Hussein's regime, which may or may not yet bear diplomatic fruit. As regards the United States' intended military campaign against Iraq, not only the neighbouring Middle Eastern nations, but also the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, China, and even Spain and Turkey are each working for their own diplomatic interests. As the situation approaches the final stage of American military action against Iraq, each country is engaged in diplomacy that seeks to maximise its gains and minimise its losses. The marketplace sanctions no alliances, only competition.

France, while openly critical of U.S. military action, is now preparing to dispatch troops in the event of the commencement of hostilities. In a similar vein, Germany, while advocating extreme caution, is preparing, in the event of an attack on Iraq to either allow the use of U.S. military bases in Germany or to also provide the U.S. military with logistical support. Russia, while



pledging to support the U.S. as a trade-off for guarantees of its interests in Iraq, maintains a contrary position within the U.N. Security Council. Turkey, too, which in the event of hostilities will provide bases on the frontline, is navigating the conflicting waters of public opinion and diplomacy with a view to thus maximising its gains. The diplomatic market place, even now, is permeated with a realism in which nobody is to be trusted.

Within the previous context of the Cold War, the basis of diplomacy for countries other than the U.S. and Russia was the loyal fulfilment of their roles as members of the respective alliances. Japan, Korea, and the N.A.T.O. states, for example, trading national defence with U.S. involvement, largely followed the U.S. lead in foreign policy. This is not to say that, in line with the times, national security was never prioritised over alliance obligations, as evidenced by West Germany's Eastern Policy and the former Yugoslavia's western diplomacy.

Japan's national security policy is characterised by the name given to its "Self Defense" Forces. The Japan-U.S. Security Treaty has formed the core of Japanese diplomacy and its military. This can only be said to be based on imaginary realism. This characterisation is evidenced by the Law on a Situation in Areas Surrounding Japan (*Shûhen Jitai Hô*), according to which the object of self-defence consists of the abstract "situation in a neighbouring area posing a threat to Japan's security." However, when and whence such a threat might occur is difficult to predict. The vague spectre of international terrorism, moreover, which is not even known to be targeting Japan, and Japan's commitment to logistical support of a military campaign against Iraq, which poses Japan no immediate threat, are hardly related to self-defence.

Should the moment of truth arrive with the outbreak of war, Japan would do well to determine its interests, investigate the range of available policy options, and take action while allowing for a flexible response to possible developments. Japan is, of course, providing the American military with bases and has approved their unconditional use against Iraq. At the same time, Japan depends on Middle Eastern oil. A wide range of policy options exist for Japan *vis-à-vis* the Middle East, including Iraq, where unlike the Korean peninsula, there exists little confusion of domestic and diplomatic interests.

For example, since January this year, the Bush Administration has repeatedly delivered its "ultimatum" to Hussein that without the latter's

Editor's Note

This piece was originally written in February of 2003, before the war in Iraq began. References to the "intended military campaign," or the "proposed military attack" against Iraq, therefore, reflect the time that it was written. While the verb tense and the abstract nature of some of the verbs may change, however, the author stands behind the original argument he presents.



immediate engagement in disarmament an attack on Iraq is only a matter of time. While what is being demanded of Iraq is disarmament, the U.S.'s strategic goal is actually the overthrow of the Hussein regime, one part of the so-called "axis of evil." Furthermore, while the U.N. inspection team seeking the disposal of weapons of mass destruction looks unlikely to garner evidence commensurate with U.S. allegations, the situation has already reached the brink of war due to the U.S.'s unilateral actions.

However, military action is not the only option available for achieving Hussein's overthrow. An alternative route exists by which Hussein might be forced to step down of his own accord, and that is by the encouragement of democratic forces within Iraq. This route would accomplish the goal of regime change with minimum cost. Even in the case of a military campaign against Iraq, there is a real possibility that the U.S. would opt for a strategy that sought only Hussein's removal without a subsequent long-term occupation of enormous cost. The proposed military attack on Iraq may constitute merely a series of threats woven into a carefully formulated overall strategy with a wide range of options.

True diplomacy is not only a matter of financial expenditure and military commitments; rather, it consists also of the administration of wisdom. Japan is under the scrutiny of not only governmental adherents of realism, but also the people of the world linked by the Internet and seeking peace by means of their very co-operation. This is the restoration of liberalism, supported by the investments of individuals in the diplomatic marketplace in a globalising world.

Trust in wisdom will be heightened by maintenance of the balance between goals and methods, and by demonstration of the will to carry through. If there is anything to be learnt from the U.S. campaign against Iraq, it is that such actions as the dispatch of the Aegis destroyer or those that resulted in international criticism following the Gulf War are inappropriate. Rather, the goals of Japanese diplomacy need to be more clearly defined at the same time as they need to allow for a flexible response to shifting circumstances, and for this, Japan needs the relevant vocabulary, logic and ethics. □

For Further Reading

Alexander T. J. Lennon, ed., *What does the World want from America?* MIT Press, 2002.

Stephen M. Walt, "American Primacy: Its Prospects and Pitfalls," *Naval War College Review*, Spring 2002, Vol. LV, No. 2, pp. 9-28.

National Security and Human Safety

Hatsuse Ryuhei

The questions of whether and how a nation's military security policy enhances (or degrades) human safety in that nation are moot points in security discourse. Regarding the relationships between national security and human safety, the *Human Development Report 1994*, issued by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), proposes a profound transition in thinking from nuclear security to human security, or from the narrow concept of national security to the all-encompassing concept of human security (UNDP, 1994: 22, 24). In Japan, Professor Mushakoji Kimihide, a specialist in international politics, argues, "Nations must seek national security policy commensurate with human security." He recommends, for instance, that a policy of economic sanctions should be enforced in such a way so as not to starve the babies of the sanctioned, or that military intervention should avoid inflicting heavy civilian casualties on the target nation (Mushakoji, 1999: 11). Mushakoji's argument, however, does not go on to describe the complex of relationships between national security and human safety. This paper addresses the above questions, and discusses these relationships.

Two approaches

There are two ways to approach the relationships between national security and human safety. One is the macro-view, which starts with the anarchy of international politics, and the other is the micro-view that deals first with safety of individuals. Takeuchi Kei, a professor of economics, notes that the macro-view and the micro-view give us different pictures of experiences on and responsibility for war (Takeuchi, 2002: 11-16). The analogy of macro- and micro-economics can also be applied to the epistemology of national security issues.

How to define the relationships is in essence determined by two factors : the recognition of the regulatory forces of international anarchy on national security policy, and the consideration of human safety factors in national policy. On one hand, neo-realists, admitting no choice but military strategy in security policy, pay little attention to the suffering of the victims of national security strategy. Traditional realists, while adopting a similar position, make room for consideration of the victims in both their own and the adversary nations. On the other hand, supporters of Gandhi's doctrine of non-violence barely consider the regulatory aspects of the international political structure on state behavior. Japanese post-war pacifists, meanwhile, being clearly oriented toward non-violence, stress elements of cooperation at



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the international level.

Professor Murakami Yoichiro, a specialist in the philosophy of science, observes the possibility that the "ruling out of 'the survival' of some individuals is indispensable to 'the security' of a collective encompassing them" (Murakami, 1998:199). This is also observed in national security policy. That is, the military cannot fail to lose a certain number of officers and soldiers due to combat or disease in any operation once war has begun. In addition, since the First World War, total war and air bombardment have taken a heavy toll on civilians.

Focusing on the victims of war, both military and civilian, pacifists cry out against military security policy. In contrast, realists account for the human costs involved in war in the following ways. Firstly, they choose to stop waging war once their own human costs have exceeded a tolerable limit. Secondly, they try to reduce the costs to the minimum, and if possible to zero, by utilizing highly sophisticated weaponry. Thirdly, they pension the families of the war dead, and/or annually hold a national ceremony to honor them.

In addition, human safety is not distributed equally throughout a nation. A system designed to guarantee military security in emergency situations can deprive some people of safety in their everyday lives. A good example of this is those people who live near the U.S. bases in Okinawa. Their safety is often compromised by official and private misdemeanors on the part of the U.S. military forces. The Japanese Government and many Japanese people agree to compensate them financially for the loss of their safety, whereas those concerned with human safety at the micro-level claim that Japan should abrogate the bilateral security treaty as soon as possible.

Epistemological difficulties and practical "solutions"

In discussions of the relationships between national security and human safety, we encounter epistemological difficulties, which in practice tend to generate rather emotional "solutions."

Firstly, we cannot easily verify by empirical data any of the theses: (a) "military security policy enhances human safety in the nation;" (b) "the physical security of a nation is threatened when its military security policy is insufficient;" (c) "military security policy degrades human safety in the nation;" or (d) "the level of human safety *in the physical sense* is high when



national military expenditure is relatively small." As proof of (a) and (b), we have only such circumstantial evidence as a marked difference of military capabilities between the nations concerned. As proof of (c), we often refer to "security dilemmas," which cannot be verified by historical data. As proof of (d), many Japanese like to cite the Peace Constitution of Japan, which is, in fact, merely evidenced by (e) "the level of human security *in the economic sense* is high when national military expenditure is relatively small."

Turning to (f) "military security policy enhances *economic safety* in the nation," we have as historical evidence the experiences of the modern imperialist countries of Western Europe, Japan, Russia and the U.S., the last two of which exploited mainly domestic colonies to their advantage. By way of contrast, however, the former Soviet Union collapsed due to the insupportable burden of military expenditure during the Cold War confrontation, which collapse has resulted in the complete devastation of human safety. Thus national security policy in the military sense can work either positively or negatively for the *economic safety* of a nation.

Secondly, we cannot in principle measure the efficacy of a deterrence policy that is sufficiently effective. This is because we cannot identify the specific factors contributing to an effective deterrence policy when there has never been any attack from the deterred nation. In contrast, when deterrence has failed, it is immediately clear that military power has not been sufficient for deterrence, which implies only that the deterring nation should have built up its military capabilities yet further. This, however, gives little indication of what would have constituted a sufficient deterrent. Thus, if deterrence is efficient, we have no way to measure its efficacy, and if it is not, we know only that it is inefficient.

Thirdly, we encounter the problem of temporal dimension, as historical judgement changes over time. For example, the Japanese people (except, of course, the war dead) continued to derive a lot of benefit from the state's military policy until 1937, when Japan embarked on a prolonged war against China. From then on, however, they lost several million abroad and at home in a series of wars against Asia and the Allies. The policy "to enrich and strengthen the country" proved to be a failure in the historical long-term, although it had looked to prove a great success in the short-term. Nazi Germany's intrusion into the Soviet Union, and the U.S. involvement in the civil war in Vietnam similarly aroused unyielding resistance from their



adversaries. At least in the short-term, however, a military march often stirs up public support.

Fourthly, as military expenditure is part of national expenditure for human safety, its overall effect cannot be calculated without looking at its negative effects on the livelihoods of the people concerned. How to divide the national budget between military and civil purposes is a crucial issue in discussions on the relationships between national security and human safety. For instance, in developing countries with a limited budget, greater military expenditure often leads to less investment in the economic infrastructure, thus further restricting improvements in living standards, exacerbating social instability, and potentially triggering internecine conflict. This, in turn, might lead to the intervention of foreign countries in the failed state, where human safety has all but vanished.

In sum, the gamut of the relationships is resistant to verification, and space for theoretical discussions is very limited. This is where emotional feelings come in. Popular nationalism and the desire for better material standards have come to be identified with positive thinking about military security, which tends to be the majority view in public opinion on security policy. The negative view of military security, however, while also allied to the desire for better material living standards, tends not to be accepted widely by the public, as it lacks the support of the nationalist faction.

Recent changes in international politics

Since the end of the Cold War, international politics has become uni-polar under U.S. hegemony, and in accordance with that change, other developed countries have tended, whether willingly or unwillingly, to jump on the U.S. bandwagon. These countries have jointly begun to administer an international regime of military security with global reach, thereby enhancing their own human safety to a greater or lesser extent. In contrast, regional powers such as Iraq or the former Yugoslavia have found themselves vulnerable to the military power of the U.S. and its allies in the developed world. Thus military build-up by the regional powers does not necessarily enhance their own human safety. Furthermore, military assistance by developed countries to developing countries quite often jeopardizes human safety in the receiving countries, through the support of oppressive regimes or the creation of puppet governments that eventually become military targets themselves, as in the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan. Although oppressive governments or failed states have military capabilities,



they cannot provide their people with human safety as they either lack the political will or the administrative wherewithal to do so.

Recently a remarkable asymmetry of military capabilities has become increasingly evident among nations. Two cases in point are the strategies of one-sided air bombardment that the U.S. and its allies adopted in the Gulf War and the air bombardment of Afghanistan. In both cases, although the offensive lost a very small number of personnel, this strategy resulted in numerous casualties, both civilian and military, in the countries attacked. The targets were not limited to military personnel and installations, but included the social infrastructure such as roads, bridges, ports, public buildings, and hospitals, which are also the domain of the non-combatant. In addition, civilians were targeted *by mistake* in air bombardments, and, moreover, continue to run the risk of death or seriously injury by the explosion of unexploded cluster bombs even after the cessation of hostilities. In the face of these new trends in military strategy, many people from both developed and developing countries have started to question the legitimacy of such tactics. While, in response to such criticism, the perpetrator might offer monetary compensation to the *mistaken* victims, such offers are hardly likely to be accepted by the targeted nation.

Concluding remarks

In discussions on the relationships between national security and human safety, we have two methods of approach. One is the macro-view that has its starting point in the structure of international politics, and the other is the micro-view concerned primarily with individual safety. The former is positive about military security policy, whereas the latter is rather negative. Both approaches interpret and respond to the inevitable victims of military policy in different ways.

Many people think that human safety in its physical and economic senses goes hand-in-hand with military security policy. But this view tends to be based more on nationalistic empathy or identification with the imagined benefit community than on reasoned calculation.

The possibility that military security policy enhances human safety in a nation is very limited. From the short-term view, it might appear that the military strategy of the U.S. and its allies in the developed world has enhanced the respective human safety of those nations. The U.S. hegemony



of recent years, however, has raised new questions and problems related to the political effects of an absolute supremacy of military capability. □

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The Ending of Wars and International Order: Leadership or Accord?

Fujiwara Kiichi

Order and changes in international relations are seemingly deceptive topics on which previous literature offers but poor answers. Neo-realists have argued for the anarchy inherent in the structure of international politics; liberals have envisaged incremental changes either due to globalization and interdependence or the spread of democratic ideals and institutions.

Little of substance has come out of this debate. Is Ken Waltz in any way smarter than Raymond Aron, or, for that matter, de Vattel? Are we sure that a liberal reading of a global economy differs substantially from Adam Smith or the Manchester liberals? Focusing on either permanent anarchy or incremental development toward order, both approaches risk neglecting the actual political arrangements that may be at work.

We might as well start from actual and existing orders instead of debating the prospects of would-be futures. For orders, as such, are neither utopian nor unreal; a glance over European history will show that comprehensive political arrangements among nations have actually emerged and have survived longer than skeptics have predicted. Such developments have been neither incremental nor irreversible: neither the Congress of Vienna nor the Paris Peace Conference could avoid the Crimea War or World War I. Orders are possible, but they may not stay.

Another glance at history tells us that major efforts toward the construction of international orders took place after major wars, beginning from the Peace of Westphalia after the Thirty Years War and the Congress of Vienna, not to mention peace-making after the two World Wars of the 20th Century.

International orders are either named after great powers or after great wars, and peace settlements named after major wars have had more concrete substance than *Pax* named after empire. For one thing, major wars are rare. I define major wars here not only in terms of size or scope but also in terms of perceived damage, a sense that a world has come to an end. Even in European history, very few rank among such wars: the Thirty Years' War, the Napoleonic War, the First and the Second World Wars, and possibly the Cold War, which did not end in any major battles but nevertheless entailed the potential of total annihilation. Runners-up to the list would include the Seven Years War of the 18th century and the Crimea War, but by comparison both fall far short in magnitude to the others.



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The Ending of Wars and International Order *continued*

After each major war, a major settlement followed. It was as if all orders are formed after major wars, only to be succeeded by another one in the wake of a new major war. After the Thirty Years war, the Peace of Westphalia; after the Napoleonic war, the Congress of Vienna; after the First World War, Versailles; and the Second World War ended with the largest number of summit meetings, all still remembered as the blueprints of our present world. The only exception to the rule would be the Cold War, which ended with a great many summit meetings but left little legacy in terms of new international institutions or order.

If orders have emerged after major wars, why is this the case? John Ikenberry has written a wonderful work that focuses on periods of peace-making after major wars: the Thirty Years War, the Napoleonic Wars, the First and the Second World Wars (*After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). A wonderful marriage of history and theory, Ikenberry's attention on order formation as historical events, as intentional endeavors of diplomats and political leaders in given time and space, marks a sharp departure from the more abstract comments written in the "social sciences" of international relations specialists; his attempts to draw broad common patterns of behavior shared among the victorious powers after major wars lie beyond the reach of more conservative historians.

I wish to comment on his work because I share many of his arguments; the choice of major wars as well as the order formation, in fact, is almost the same as an essay I had written a couple of years ago (Fujiwara, Kiichi, "World Wars and World Orders: International Politics in the Twentieth Century," in Institute of Social Science, ed., *The Twentieth Century Global System*, vol. 1. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1998, in Japanese). But there seem to be important disagreements as well. I will try to highlight some of them here.

The main thrust of Ikenberry's thesis is that victors are not necessarily tyrannical in imposing their will on the losers; when the victor finds it beneficial and rational to bind itself under the rule of law, what emerges after a major war is not necessarily an empire, but a constitutional order in which stability is provided not by a preponderance of power, but by limits to the return of power. This is a remarkable twist from the traditional view that only envisages either balance of threat or hegemony.



In order to establish these points, Ikenberry has carefully defined his agenda. He discusses the *construction*, as opposed to *evolution*, of international orders, thus giving concrete substance to the ambiguity inherent in the discussion of orders. Ikenberry, however, does not break down that order along issue areas, but takes on the overall designing of international institutions, as compared to more specifically defined political institutions and agreements. The period after major global wars, then, is the critical period of institutional design for a new world order.

I share his selection of major wars (the Thirty Years War, the Napoleonic War, and the two World Wars) as well as the settlements that succeeded each as critical thresholds for reorganization of international orders. I am not convinced, however, about the reasons why. War ending periods are important for Ikenberry because the victor of that war takes the initiative in constructing the post-war order. In the opening, he writes "What do states that have just won major wars do with their newly acquired power" as the central question of his book; he answers immediately that "states in this situation have sought to hold onto that power and make it last" (Ikenberry, 2001: xi). Post-war orders emerge as a victor's design to prolong its power.

Ikenberry's 'constitutional' model may not compare at the same level to the other two 'hegemonic' and 'balance of power' models. Both the balance of power and the hegemonic order here are depicted as representation of power distribution, one of mutual equilibrium and the other of monopoly. Only the third 'constitutional' order counts as an order not merely dependent on power resources, with its reference to the organizing principle of the given order. How, then, does it connect to the distribution of power? Is a constitutional order more likely to emerge out of diffusion of power, or from hegemony? To put it more bluntly, does the emergence of a constitutional order require a benevolent hegemon?

Ikenberry's attention to law in international relations is a welcome contribution in a field that pays little attention to legality. His law, however, only appears along with a 'constitution': notice that 'rule of law' is given as the organizing principle in a constitutional order. But it has been, and in many ways still is, the nature of international law to function in the absence of a worldwide constitutional body. The balance of power, on the other hand, is reduced into a mere balance of threat, disregarding the possibility of norms and accord in a diffusion of power capabilities along the lines of



The Ending of Wars and International Order *continued*

Hedley Bull. How, then, are we to discuss the Concert of Europe that developed in early 19th century Europe?

The order that emerges from Ikenberry's threefold scheme, then, is one that entertains an implicit hegemonic power whose authority is not merely coerced but accepted by other nations. Here lies the implicit necessity of a central authority in the form of a hegemonic power that is willing to accept legally binding institutions. The 'constitutional' category is a 'constitutional' hegemony.

But is it the case that only hegemonies produce orders? I disagree; the victors, in fact, did not dictate most post-war constructions. There were no clear victors that came out of the Thirty Years' War. In the Congress of Vienna, Metternich played a critical role in spite of the declining fortunes of the Hapsburgs. Both Britain and France refused Wilson's initiatives in Paris, even though the Americans had the leverage in terms of power distribution. Focusing on the victor's initiative, then, may be inadequate to explain the construct of orders after major wars.

Ikenberry's scheme fits well to those cases where a clear winner took a strong initiative in the construction of the post-war order: his discussion on the settlement after World War II (Chap. 6) is the best in the book. I think he is less convincing in his other cases, mainly due to the absence of a functional equivalent of the United States.

It may not necessarily be the victor, but rather the accord of major powers that made the post-war settlements possible. Of course US initiative has been critical in a number of international economic regimes; I disagree, however, in stretching that too far. Ikenberry makes the most of victor's initiatives, but another dimension, one of coercion or accord, is conspicuously absent in his scheme. Governments can agree without a central authority or hegemony. That, in fact, is the basis of international society, a society of nations under anarchy.

The opposite side of this argument is that absence of major wars may lead to a policy of status quo, preserving a previous state of affairs rather than constructing new institutions. At that phase, institutions, accords, or norms that were supposed to go with the end of the previous war may be enforced to totally new environments and different power distributions, thus increasing the gap between an assumed order and the reality. If this



observation holds, patterns of order and disorder will most possibly be cyclical, rather than unilinear or evolutionary. Unlike an evolution from anarchy to an integrated and a rational order, there may be a cycle of order and disorder, following the cycle of major wars.

The implication here is that a given order in international relations need not endure. The Cold War came to an end without a nuclear war. This peaceful ending may speak much of the future of international orders, if any such future remains for us.



Siting Schemes: Central Governments, State Learning, and Local "Public Bads"

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Over the past four decades, as nations have developed economically and their populations have grown, demands for energy, national defense, waste removal, transportation, and correctional facilities have increased dramatically. Nations have had difficulty siting and constructing the power plants, garbage dumps, roads, railroads, incinerators, military bases, jails, airports, and halfway houses essential to modern life. As a result, resistance to projects such as nuclear power plants and waste dumps has increased to the point where it has been labeled a "disease," a "syndrome," and a "dragon to be slain." The United States, Germany, and Canada, for example, despite a dire need for new waste facilities, have not opened new hazardous waste treatment plants since the mid 1980s. In Japan, the amount of time necessary to site a fossil fuel plant has more than doubled since the 1960s while that for a nuclear power plants has tripled. Despite President George W. Bush's stated interest in increasing the number of nuclear power plants in America none have been ordered since 1978.

Prior research on the siting of noxious or unwanted facilities has produced two main bodies of work, one that focuses on theoretical solutions to such siting problems and another that focuses on citizen activism. The largest body of work can be found in proposed solutions to the "Not In My Back Yard" (NIMBY) problem, with researchers often proposing voluntary strategies for facility siting involving, among other mechanisms, reverse auctions and increased citizen participation.¹ In the other arm of research analysts focus upon the motivations and actions of contentious citizen groups who resist state planned projects.² Both of these primarily qualitative literatures focus on citizens and deal mostly with recent cases and negative outcomes in single countries.

My dissertation differs from most of these earlier efforts because I focus on the actions of the governments, rather than citizens alone, in comparative perspective. I investigate long term governmental strategies in such siting attempts using cases with both successful and unsuccessful outcomes. Through in-depth qualitative investigation of cases drawn from fieldwork in Japan, and a quantitative analysis of a database of cases from Japan, France, and America, I examine the ways in which central governments advance state-promoted but often controversial projects. Most importantly, I seek to understand how states learn from competitive interaction with their challengers, that is, the conditions which allow governmental agencies to systematically alter their strategy and tactics due to past experience with similar circumstances.

Citizens resist attempts at siting a myriad of types of facilities, ranging from medical treatment centers to high speed rail lines, military bases, homeless shelters, prisons, dams, airports, waste dumps, and power plants. Within this enormous universe of cases, my thesis focuses only on projects which are sponsored or initiated by central governments. For example, while industrial waste repositories and prisons often trigger "Not In My Back Yard" (NIMBY) responses, jails and waste facilities in most advanced democracies are usually owned either privately or by local governments. Nuclear power plants, airports, and dams comprise facilities involving enormous capital investment and long lead times and require government assistance to compensate for market failure, and my thesis focuses on government strategy in these three fields. In these cases, the government itself is often the entrepreneur or becomes involved through intensive regulation. For example, national governments around the world continue to be deeply involved in nuclear power projects at a number of levels. Researching, planning, siting, and building these reactors requires enormous levels of capital formation, high level coordination among companies, and state intervention through direct funding, tax subsidies, assistance with research and development, regulatory changes to environmental and tort law, and the amortization of risk across the population.

Facility Siting as a Window on State-Citizen Interaction

My thesis investigates projects originating in national policies which provide benefits for the majority of citizens, but which negatively affect certain areas more than others. Labeled by some as local "public bads," they are in essence the converse of public or collective goods, such as national defense, which have the characteristics of diffuse costs, less-concentrated benefits, nondivisibility and nonexcludability. In the language of political economy, I am investigating facilities that have broad, diffuse benefits but highly focused costs. Facility siting provides an extraordinary window into state-citizen interaction because such cases are geographically and chronologically bounded, generate high levels of media and secondary literature coverage, and spark heightened citizen participation even in a time of declining involvement in politics.

Even though such projects, with their enormous capital requirements and long lead times, require government intervention to compensate for market failures, they are the worst cases for governments to handle. The geographically dictated concentration of nuclear power plants, dams, waste



Notes

¹ See Euston Quah and K.C. Tan, *Siting Environmentally Unwanted Facilities: Risks, Trade Offs, and Choices* (Northampton MA: Edward Elgar, 2002); Hank Smith and Howard Kunreuther, *Mitigation and Benefits Measures as Policy Tools* (Draft manuscript 2000); Howard Jenkins-Smith and G. Bassett, "Perceived Risk and Uncertainty of Nuclear Waste," in *Risk Analysis*, 14(5) 1994 pp. 851 - 856; and Michael Gerrard, *Whose Backyard, Whose Risk: Fear and Fairness in Toxic and Nuclear Waste Siting* (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1994).

² See Thomas Wellock, *Critical Masses: Opposition to Nuclear Power in California, 1958 - 1978* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978); Dorothy Nelkin and Michael Pollak, *The Atom Besieged* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1981); Elaine Touraine, Zsuzsa Hegedus, Francois Dubet, and Michel Wieviroka [translated by Peter Fawcett], *Anti-nuclear protest: the opposition to nuclear energy in France* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Christian Joppke, *Mobilizing Against Nuclear Energy* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993); and Velma Garcia-Gorena, *Mothers and the Mexican Antinuclear Power Movement* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1999).

dumps, and other facilities is a reality from which local citizens cannot escape. With costs concentrated on a small group in a local area, barriers to collective action are greatly reduced (Olson 1965, 1982).

State Strategies and Learning

The literature on the tools and strategies available to central states when dealing with protest and resistance has fallen primarily within the "social control" category, focusing on policing, surveillance, and repression mechanisms. Political scientists have applied the theory of social control, initially developed by Edward Ross, in studies of the repression of political opposition (Scheerer & Hess 1997). These works have focused on the ways in which authorities attempt to maintain stability through police and armed responses to protestors (Della Porta & Reiter 1998, Braithwaite 1989). While it is certainly true that the most common state response to protest and resistance is visible policing, surveillance, and the panopticon (Foucault 1979), researchers have begun to uncover additional means of absorption, co-optation, and repression (see Nakamura 2002). However, many researchers still focus only on contentious citizen challengers as sources of tactical innovation, without attempting to investigate creative and unexpected responses from state actors.

My research has uncovered a wide spectrum of tools created by state authorities, ranging from hortatory (with the Japanese Prime Minister presenting yearly awards to local leaders who promote the siting of such facilities) to educational (providing schools with curricula stressing the need for such projects and sending educators to targeted areas to hold workshops) to incentive-providing mechanisms (through such laws as the Three Laws Relating to Electricity Production, *Dengen Sanpou* in Japanese, which provide funds for new roads, schools, medical and welfare facilities, job training, and the like). The government has created, among other days, Nuclear Power Day and Nuclear Power Safety month, stressing the safety and necessity of its nuclear program through public concerts, commercials, and events. The Japanese government invites bureaucrats from local governments whose towns have been targeted for nuclear power plants to seminars in Tokyo, providing them with materials and arguments for use in convincing local citizens about the need for reactors. Citizens in towns targeted for power plants receive discounts on electricity and benefit from a huge increase in property taxes. The central government also provides money so that citizens in targeted areas can be taken on tours of operating nuclear power plants in other areas so that they will feel less apprehensive about having one of their

own.

Central governments still have recourse to coercive tools like eminent domain in which the state appropriates land held by private citizens for market or less than market value; merely the threat alone of receiving pennies on the dollar for one's land is often incentive enough to sell. However, most advanced democracies have moved away from these coercive mechanisms to the more subtle strategies outlined above. Further, these "submerged" tools have been refined and adapted over time as authorities have interacted with citizen challengers. The intensity and length of the period of interaction between state authorities and citizen challengers which takes place in facility siting provides an ideal opportunity to investigate the possibilities of state learning.

The field of political science has only begun to develop theories about "state learning," or the ability of government bureaucracies and networks to deliberately modify strategies based on previous experiences. Currently, the field has four main approaches to state learning: rigidity, garbage can, punctuated equilibrium, and incremental approaches. Space precludes a fuller discussion of each, but in short, rigidity approaches argue that organizations like states rarely change strategies despite altered environments or intense opposition (see Kitschelt 1986). The garbage can approach argues that "solutions" to external problems are merely streams of internal resolution that coincided with such difficulties (March and Olson 1976). Punctuated equilibrium approaches argue that systems remain in status quo until a major shock, such as war or mass demonstrations, at which point authorities move to solve the problem, and then return to status quo (Calder 1986, Skocpol 1992, Kryder 2000, Kasza 2002). Incremental approaches argue that states change their policies only slowly regardless of the magnitude or pace of external difficulties (Argyris and Schon (1978) call this single loop learning). My thesis moves away from these earlier approaches to develop the idea of institutional coevolution, in which the state alters not only its strategies and tactics but also its institutional structure to better cope with its challengers, and predicts the conditions under which such competitive learning will occur. In this dialectic between state and citizen, the central government further refines its siting strategies in an attempt to improve their effectiveness in what may be a continuous stream of changes. This idea of rapid and sustained response to changing externalities can be found in studies of organizational behavior but has not



Siting Schemes *continued*

been well developed in other contexts.

Through its investigation of facility siting my dissertation sheds light on the ways in which citizens have responded to various state approaches to siting and the manner in which states in turn have reacted to citizens. I hope that my thesis will yield insights into state-citizen interaction that will benefit citizens and decision makers alike.



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