Japan in the 1960s
Following our March 1998 issue (SSJ 12) that examined Japan in the 1950s, Social Science Japan continues our look at specific decades of postwar Japan. This issue on the 1960s tries to move away from oft mentioned events of the decade such as the 1964 Tokyo Olympics and the continued LDP rule. Instead, we provide articles that explore the Japan Socialist Party, student demonstrations late in the decade, the stock market in the 1960s, and connections between population flows and economic growth during the decade. Two articles also give us fascinating looks at two influential intellectual figures, MARUYAMA Masao and YANAGITA Kunio, within the milieu of the 1960s. In addition, we include an overview and summaries of two volumes of the recently published 20 Seiki Shisutemu [20th Century Global System], a six volume series edited by the Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo.

In closing, Social Science Japan bids a heartfelt farewell to Associate Professor Jonathan LEWIS, who moves to Tokyo Denki University beginning in April. Jonathan was largely responsible for getting Social Science Japan off the ground five years ago and has remained a steady, guiding force ever since. We will sorely miss him and wish him nothing but the best for the future.

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Published by:  
The Information Center for Social Science Research on Japan  
Institute of Social Science  
University of Tokyo

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Distribution  
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http://www.iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp/

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Clashes between police and students, University of Tokyo, January 1969.  
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University of Tokyo students, 1968. From the “University of Tokyo Graduation Album, 1969”. Used with the permission of the Album Editorial Committee, University of Tokyo.

Editorial Notes  
Personal Names  
All personal names are given in the customary order in the native language of the person, unless otherwise requested. Hence in Japanese names, the family name is given first, e.g., HAYASHI Masumi, and in Western names the family name is given second, e.g., Jesse VENTURA.

Romanization  
Due to software limitations circumflexes are used in place of macrons, and omitted in most personal and place names.

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Students participated heavily in the two waves of social protest that opened and closed the decade of the 1960s. They are commonly known as 1960 Ampo and 1970 Ampo, because opposition to the Japan-United States Joint Security Treaty [Nichibei Anzen Hoshô Jôyaku], or Ampo, provided a focal issue for protests, while the decennial opening of the treaty for revision determined their timing. The student protests of the late 1960s leading up to 1970 Ampo were far more extensive, complex, and violent than those of 1960 Ampo and reached deeply into Japanese universities, but they have received much less scholarly attention.

The Legacy of 1960 Ampo

The 1960 Ampo protests contributed three key elements to the student protests later in the decade: political organizations through which students could be mobilized for protest activities; a determination to overcome the failure of 1960 Ampo by building a stronger protest campaign for 1970 Ampo; and a distinctive repertoire of protest tactics.

Student members of the Japan Communist Party had created the postwar system of student self-government associations and initially controlled its national federation, but in 1958 a majority of the federation's top leaders left the JCP to form their own independent New Left “party” and affiliated student organization. Together with another independent group and part of the Japan Socialist Party-sponsored student organization, they comprised the Japanese New Left in 1960.

The New Left and the Old Left had national organizations with similar dual structures in which an elite “party” of student and former student leaders provided ideological direction and continuity for a larger mass organization based on chapters in various university academic units. Each organization had a distinctive theoretical perspective from which it could formulate a position on virtually any political issue, and they competed vigorously by emphasizing their ideological and stylistic differences. The student chapters sought control of local student government, which brought access to resources and a broader forum for mobilizing students.

In the aftermath of the failure of the 1960 Ampo protests to stop the ratification of the revised treaty, all of the New Left student organizations struggled to draw lessons for the future. This produced internal dissension and factioning, but the organizations survived either intact or as separate factions. They re-emerged in the mid-1960s to begin mobilizing a new generation of students, aiming to build student activism through various protest campaigns leading up to 1970 Ampo.

Collectively these “sects,” as they came to be known, had developed a distinctive repertoire of protest tactics in addition to the petitions, one-day strikes, and mass street demonstrations that comprised the standard protest repertoire of postwar Japan. The most widely known student tactic was the zigzag or snake-dancing style of marching in street demonstrations. A second tactic was the secretly planned, sudden occupation of a symbolic space such as Haneda Airport or the Diet...
compound, usually for a brief period. A third tactic was a willingness to escalate demonstrations into violence by fighting with the police.

Student Protest in the Mid-1960s

Student protest in the mid-1960s developed along two separate fronts, often with the same leaders and participants. In 1965 and 1966 students participated in national protests against the peace treaty between Japan and South Korea, and in protests against the Vietnam War, both of which were viewed as feeding directly into the long-standing grievances against the Japan-U.S. Joint Security Treaty. The second arena for student protest emerged early in 1966 as students at Waseda University carried out a 155 day all-school strike to protest tuition increases, and conflicts erupted at over forty other schools over local grievances.

Student protest in Japan is often protest against the state, but it is also an interaction with the state, in which demonstrators clash directly with police as the agents of state control. The police response in the 1960 Ampo campaign was generally restrained, with about 250 arrests over the entire campaign. The bulk of those arrests came in one night of violent clashes in June 1960, in which several students were injured and one University of Tokyo student was killed.

When student protest began to rise again in the mid-1960s, the New Left student sects outfitted demonstrators with color-coded plastic helmets and wooden fighting poles for encounters with similarly equipped riot police. In a major clash at Haneda Airport in October 1967, violence surpassed the 1960 Ampo level. The toll for the day was one Kyoto University student killed, about 600 students injured, and 75 arrested. The arrest toll for a second incident at Haneda in early November was 345, surpassing the number for the entire 1960 Ampo campaign.

In 1960 the violence had peaked just as the single issue 1960 Ampo protest campaign reached its natural end. By contrast, the same level of violence was reached early in the run-up to 1970 Ampo, which was already a more complex, multi-issue campaign. Still to come were protests against the reversion of Okinawa (the major issue of the 1970 Ampo treaty revision), the new Narita International Airport, and a host of environmental issues.

Student Conflict in the late 1960s

As in the 1960 Ampo campaign, there was broad public sympathy with these protest issues, and the students were protected by support from the major opposition political parties despite their use of disruptive tactics. In addition to the New Left groups, thousands of students demonstrated with the Old Left or with single-issue organizations. Most did not engage in any violence, but the nature of student protest was increasingly defined by those who did. As violence escalated, sympathy and support for the New Left began to evaporate, and student protest came to be re-defined as criminal behavior. As violence escalated, that sympathy and support began to evaporate and student protest came to be re-defined as criminal behavior. Yet at the same time, students in Japan were well aware that they were part of a much larger wave of student protest that was sweeping across
Europe and the United States, and their rhetoric resonated with the Chinese Cultural Revolution and Third World revolutionary movements.

By the fall of 1968, student conflict in Japan had become more severe on both its on-campus and off-campus fronts. In addition to throwing stones and fighting with poles, students began throwing Molotov cocktails in demonstrations. Arrests escalated rapidly and became more indiscriminate, while injuries to both police and students mounted. In 1968, over 6,000 students were arrested for protest activity. In campus conflicts the one-day strike and temporary penetration of symbolic space hardened into indefinite strikes and student occupation of key campus buildings. Additionally, the rivalry and factionalism in the New Left sects had degenerated into violent internal conflicts in which students were injured and even killed.

In order to circumvent the problems of sect rivalry and mobilize unaffiliated students for campus protests, students at Nihon University and the University of Tokyo developed a new horizontal form of student organization, the All-Campus Joint Struggle Committee [Zengaku Kyōtō Kaigi, or Zenkyōtō], which welcomed all students and operated on principles of mass democracy at open campus meetings. This form of organization for on-campus conflict spread rapidly to campuses throughout Japan, and the number of schools paralyzed by student strikes grew almost daily. Campus protesters also adopted the technique popularized in the Chinese Cultural Revolution and employed in denunciation sessions by the Buraku Liberation League. They invited university officials to appear at mass meetings to face an angry student body demanding apologies for past conduct and major changes in university governance.

Even when the campus conflict was managed by an all-campus joint struggle committee, members of the New Left sects participated actively and often controlled specific buildings. In addition, the student occupation of a campus on strike provided a safe base and new resources for staging violent off-campus protests. College campuses had long been considered off-limits to police unless they were invited by university officials. The heads of private universities did not hesitate to call in the police to clear buildings and lock out students, but national universities were reluctant to compromise their independence by doing so.

The University of Tokyo conflict began early in 1968 as a protest by medical students over the working conditions of interns. When they occupied the Yasuda Auditorium clock tower, university officials promptly called in the riot police to remove them. This set off a major campus-wide conflict over the fact that the riot police had been called in, along with a host of other grievances. By October the Hongo and Komaba campuses were on strike, with students from various faculties occupying a number of buildings including Yasuda Auditorium. Well aware that they were risking the elite future they had worked so hard to attain, the students developed an ideology of self-denial and rejection of privilege to explain their actions. As the crisis continued, Zenkyōtō students fought pitched battles with members of the JCP-led student organization, who were bitterly opposed to the strike. On December 29, the university administration cancelled the 1969 entrance examinations.
The standoff continued into the new year, with university officials under mounting pressure to end it. Finally, early on the morning of January 18, 1969, 8,500 riot police sealed off the Hongo campus and began clearing the occupied buildings one by one and arresting the occupants. Students from all over the country flocked to the nearby Kanda-Jimbocho area and set up a “liberated quarter” with Parisian style street barricades where they fought with police in a supporting protest. On January 19, students from various sects occupying different floors of the Yasuda Auditorium clock tower fought all day with stones and Molotov cocktails as the riot police tore down barricades and then cleared the building floor by floor, reaching the last holdouts on the roof at dusk. In the two days of conflict 653 police, 141 students and 6 bystanders were injured, and 819 students arrested.

Following the conflict at the University of Tokyo, nearly 200 universities throughout Japan formed Zenkyôtô organizations and went on strike. In July 1969 the Diet passed a University Control Law that permitted the Ministry of Education to take control of any school that was unable to end a campus conflict within six months. Under increased pressure from the new law, university administrators sought internal solutions but also resorted more readily to calling in the riot police. By the spring of 1970, the wave of paralyzing student strikes had ended.

Off-campus conflict also continued to escalate throughout 1969, with injuries mounting as students openly carried incendiary devices in demonstrations, and homemade explosives proliferated. The total number of students arrested for group protests more than doubled in 1969, to 13,497. As the decade closed, the violence had isolated the students, arrests and criminal prosecution had taken a severe toll on their futures, and it was clear that 1970 Ampo would fail to achieve its goals.

Further Reading


With the collapse of the bubble economy in the 1990s, concern over the instability of the financial system and systemic risk has increased. In the wake of repeated bank runs on financial institutions and numerous failures since 1992, the Bank of Japan has repeatedly implemented special financing based on Article 25 of the Bank of Japan law. Based on this special financing measure, lending by the Bank of Japan has increased dramatically.

Article 25 of the Bank of Japan law is a provision that was adopted when the law was revised in 1942. It states that: “Upon receiving permission from the minister in charge, necessary measures for nurturing and preserving credit stability may be implemented.” The article is clearly ambiguous and while we may be apt to see this provision as one of the exceptional clauses tailored to the wartime economy, it remains misleading. With the gold embargo of 1932 and the move away from the gold standard, a managed currency system had, in reality, already been introduced in Japan but legally came into effect only with the reform of 1942. “Necessary measures for nurturing and preserving credit stability,” was designed to prevent the appearance of financial systemic risks after the abolishment of the gold standard but it was not clear how the kinds of risk were to be judged.

For a quarter of a century, Article 25 was not invoked. During that period, there was no crisis of the financial system that was deemed as requiring special financing from the Bank of Japan. The first time special lending by the Bank of Japan was executed was in 1965. Yet it was not banks that received this financing but rather the securities firms, Yamaichi and Òi. In 1997, Yamaichi became the only firm to twice receive special funding.

Why was the Bank of Japan’s special financing directed toward securities firms? The most direct causes were the continuing fall in stock prices and the deteriorating performance of larger securities companies in the first half of the 1960s. As the fall continued, along with receiving less in transaction fees, securities firms incurred appraisal loses due to the drop in the price of holding stocks. This created a crisis that saw numerous securities firms go bankrupt. Why was it not banks but a related sector of the financial industry, securities firms, which received help? As the securities firms were not supposed to receive this kind of assistance, there still remains doubt as to whether preventing the failure of securities firms fell under the realm of “protecting and nurturing the credit system.” The answer is that 1960s securities firms conducted business that was similar in nature to that of banks.
In order to understand this answer, we must consider the three special characteristics of securities firms in the 1960s. First upon orders from US occupation authorities (GHQ), postwar reforms encouraged direct financing in the market. Moreover, the United States stock market laws (directly translated into Japanese) were adopted for Japan as well. Based on the premise that the system should allow freedom for parties to enter or withdraw from the market, during the first stage of the period of high economic growth, the revenue of securities firms increased. With the upward turn in stock prices during the late 1950s and early 1960s, many securities firms became involved in the market, creating fierce competition.

The second special characteristic is that different from the United States, the level of accumulated assets in Japan was quite low with stable bank deposits the preferred method of savings. However indirect financing, that is to say bank lending, became more prevalent and a low ceiling or low-upper limit for growth in the stock market was created.

Thirdly, because large Japanese securities firms were competing with other large firms from other industries to hire college graduates, they were forced to hire employees under the common stipulation that the new hires would not be made redundant and would be employed until retirement. As a result, because labor costs were inelastic, the trading volume moved on a large scale to broker services and dealer services, creating a trade-off with securities services.

In order to deal with these three factors, the larger securities firms aggressively unearthed new list companies and increased investment to existing list companies. The securities firms underwrote stocks on a large scale, a practice that was intended to develop dealer business through planned, secure sales. However because of the restrictive legal stipulations in the system (as noted above), in order to expand the amount of customers, it was necessary to hold in reserve a certain amount of stocks. Moreover, because of the free entry provisions laid down by the GHQ, late comer firms actively entered the market and pursued customers. In order to finance the stocks that were held for sale, firms followed the practice of unyō-azukari. This system involved first the securities firms selling to customers financier’s bonds issued by the long-term credit banks. The securities firms would then pay the customer a fee to borrow these same bonds. The bonds would then be placed in reserve in banks and using the bond as collateral, securities firms would receive cash loans from the banks. Hence by paying a fee to customers, along with promoting sales, the actual yield from bonds increased and in turn, increased the amount of funds held in reserve for securities firms. The practice of unyō-azukari most closely resembled bank
deposit service activities.

These planned large sales and the unyō-azukari system functioned well as long as stock price continued to rise. However, these practices in themselves increased the supply of shares, creating one of the problems that led to a drop in stock prices. The most severe recession in postwar Japan that began in late 1963 also led to a fall in stock prices. When the ability of securities firms to pay the user fees to customers was also called into doubt, the unyō-azukari system began to fall apart. This increased the default risk of securities firms and it was believed that the banks that had made loans to the securities firms in exchange for bonds were weakening and on the brink of bankruptcy. In 1965, lines of people requesting the dissolution of unyō-azukari began to appear in front of branch offices of securities firms. Namely, the dissolution of unyō-azukari was in reality equal to the scale of a bank run. As this point, the government and the Bank of Japan offered special financing to the main banks that were associated with the failing Yamaichi Securities.

In conclusion, the seeds of 1965 stock panic were sown by American postwar reforms that helped to create an unsuitable financial system that was mismatched to the actual Japanese market. Hence a downturn in business cycles led to a serious economic recession.
In March 1960, EDA Saburo was elected Secretary General of the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) at the 17th party congress. Six months later at the 19th party congress, Eda and his followers introduced the theory of structural reform, which soon became the official party line. Although the structural reform advocated by Eda was a kind of Marxist theory with origins in the Italian Communist Party (PCI), it represented a flexible, realistic and strategic approach for the JSP. After gaining control over the party, Eda and his followers were criticized as revisionists and his position within the party weakened, leading to Eda’s resignation as party leader at the 22nd party congress in November 1962 and the fall from prominence of the structural reform group two years later. Many political scientists believe that the defeat of the structural reform group in the early 1960s led the JSP to become merely an impotent “opposition party” without the will to form a government.

What factors led to the defeat of the structural reformers? Through comparative research of the JSP and the West German Social Democratic Party (SPD), OTAKE Hideo contends that the theory of structural reform was similar to the Bad Godesberg program of the SPD. He concludes that the structural reform group was defeated because the JSP’s opposition to rearmament prevented the party from making an alliance with the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) that might have allowed it to form a coalition government. However according to KIJIMA Masamichi, a JSP official with close ties to Eda, the structural reformers were not attracted to reform measures such as the Bad Godesberg plan. Rather, the group tried to make reformism consistent with Marxism in order to gain support from party activists as well as from the general public. I believe that the structural reformers were defeated because the JSP organizational structure did not allow the party to build a base of support among party activists and in the general public. Simply stated, the institutions of the party led to the defeat of the structural reformers and hindered the JSP in the 1960s.

The party institution, which was chiefly to blame for the defeat of the structural reformers, had been constructed a few years earlier. At the 14th party congress in February 1958, the JSP leadership began a dramatic reform of party institutions, establishing an institutional reform council composed of ten regional representatives and five party executives. Largely reflecting the views of left wing activists in the party, the council was led by a JSP official, KATÔ Nobuyuki. Eda, then chairman of the party’s organizational committee and a principal member of left wing Suzuki faction, supported Katô.

Katô formulated his institutional reform plan based on the trustee system of
the Austrian Socialist Party (SPö). To make the party organization stronger both quantitatively and qualitatively, he proposed a dual party membership system consisting of popular members and activist members. Popular members would be obligated to pay only a party membership fee, while the activist members, selected from the pool of party members, were expected to play a more active and committed role in party affairs. He also proposed weakening the power of Diet members within the party organization by eliminating their automatic right of representation at party congresses.

While left wing activists welcomed Katô’s plan, it came under attack from other party factions and/or party-affiliated groups. SAKISAKA Itsuro, an orthodox Marxist and a leader of the Socialist Association, was opposed to easing restrictions on party membership. However he supported strengthening the power of activists while weakening the role of Diet members in the party structure. ASANUMA Inejirô, Secretary General of the JSP and a leading member of right wing KAWAKAMI faction, was opposed to increasing the power of activists and weakening the role of Diet members power. He did, however, approve of plans to ease restrictions on party membership. In the end, both Sakisaka and Asanuma stood against the proposed dual party membership system and Katô’s plan was not approved.

Thereafter the council, largely reflecting the views of left wing activists, decided to strengthen the power of activists, to weaken the role of Diet members in the party, and to refrain from easing restrictions on party membership, moves supported by Katô and Eda. Asanuma at first opposed these decisions, but changed his mind after the party’s defeat in the June 1959 House of Councilors’ election. Consequently, at the 16th party Congress in October 1959, the party removed the automatic right of Diet members to be represented at party congresses, although it delayed its implementation for two years. While institutional reform followed the plan of Sakisaka, it was initiated and implemented by Katô and Eda. The structural reform group thus emerged from the movement for institutional reform and came to gain support from activists in the party.

Disassociating himself from the SASAKI faction (formerly the SUZUKI faction), Eda became the leader of the structural reformers and ascended to the office of Secretary General of the JSP in March 1960. Eda and his group had initiated institutional reforms that strengthened the role of activists in the party. Because their reform measures were consistent with Marxism theories, like-minded party activists gave their support. As a result, the structural reform group became the leading group in the JSP.
In the spring of 1961, the Sasaki faction began to attack the structural reformers. In response, the structural reformers formed their own Diet members’ faction which in turn, decreased support for the group among activists. In July 1962, Eda proposed “the Eda Vision” of a future socialist society based on the high living standards of the United States, the high social security levels of the Soviet Union, British Parliamentary democracy, and the “peace” constitution of Japan. It seemed to many activists that “the Eda Vision” was reformism which merely aimed to flatter the general public. Under pressure, Eda resigned his position as secretary general and NARITA Tomomi, another leader of the structural reform group, succeeded him at the 22nd party congress in November 1962.

Although structural reformers maintained a dominant position over the Sasaki faction (which consisted mostly of members of the Diet), the Socialist Association continued to mobilize activists who opposed the reformist stance of the structural reformers. Attracting activists rapidly after the Miike mine dispute in 1959-60 and as result of the controversy over structural reform, the Socialist Association transformed itself from a coterie of theorists into a vibrant activist organization. While its penchant for orthodox Marxist theory was not shared by the general public, activists found the group’s message especially appealing. Hence, Sakisaka’s institutional reform program eventually led the Socialist Association to achieve great power within the JSP . As a result, left wing factions, in cooperation with the Socialist Association, gained control of the JSP at the 24th party congress in December 1964.

Eda and Narita, the two leaders of the structural reformers, took different political paths after their defeat. Eda gradually changed his thought from Marxism to social democratic reformism in hopes of gaining greater support from the general public. The structural reform group became the Eda faction, consisting mostly of Diet members. Narita, however, remained a solid Marxist, organizing activists and building a party organization centered on “Narita’s three points.” Working in cooperation with the Socialist Association, Narita maintained a dominant position in the JSP until 1977. Given his strong commitment to Marxist theory and the general public’s lack of interest in that theory, it was inevitable that the Narita-led JSP would gradually lose support in the general elections of the 1960s and 1970s.

Notes (continued)

1In January 1964, Narita pointed to three areas of JSP weakness: 1) no consistent, daily political activity 2) a party dominated by Diet members 3) dependence upon support from labor unions.

Further Reading


Amid the long recession of the 1990s, we Japanese nostalgically recall the 1960s. Back in those days, the economy enjoyed 10% annual growth and was hailed as a miracle. Growth changed Japan so much that today, it is rather difficult to imagine how Japan looked before the period of high economic growth began. For example, in 1950 almost half of Japan’s labor force worked in agriculture and even in 1960, one out of three workers was still a farmer. High growth in the 1950s and 1960s transformed Japan into the nation we know today. What led to such a high level of growth? Amid the many explanations, I have my own theory. It emphasizes population flows and household formation as fundamental factors that sustained high economic growth.

The Japanese economy in the 1950s and 1960s was a two-sector economy consisting of a rural agricultural sector and an urban manufacturing sector. In the process of economic growth, population began to flow from the countryside into urban areas. The dual structure of the economy enabled the manufacturing sector to hire labor at a level of real wages which, given a degree of ‘disguised’ unemployment in the agricultural sector, was lower than the marginal product in the industrial sector. Growth in the manufacturing sector, therefore, led to high profits in that sector rather than an increase in real wages. The high profits in turn were supposed to induce a high rate of investment. All of this, of course, is what Arthur LEWIS (1954) described as a typical process of growth in an underdeveloped dual economy.

The Lewis model has been successfully applied to the century-long development of the Japanese economy by a number of economists such as OHKAWA and ROSOVSKY (1973). In the Lewis model, however, population flow between two sectors is taken to be solely the result of the growth of the modern manufacturing sector. Many economists demonstrate that internal migration was in fact quite sensitive to the growth of the manufacturing sector; more people left rural agricultural areas for urban industrial cities in booms, and vice versa. Yearly fluctuations of population flow were therefore a result of industrial growth. In the Lewis model, the key factor behind this industrial growth is the low real wages made possible by the existence of disguised unemployment in the agricultural sector. However, in contrast to the Lewis model, I believe that, in the case of the post-war Japanese economic growth (1955-70), population flows between two sectors comprised the major factor generating high demand for products of the industrial sector. In my view, population flow was a cause as well as a result of economic growth.
Lewis’s theory does not actually hold for many developing countries. The basic problem with the theory is that it suggests that growth of the modern industrial sector is sustained by high profits guaranteed by repressed real wages, while demand for products in the modern industrial sector is assumed to emerge automatically as production grows. In reality, however, demand does not automatically emerge. Furthermore, we must explain how demand is generated.

The growth of the Japanese economy from 1955 to 1970 was basically led by domestic demand, and in this process, population flow and household formation played a crucial role. Because of the large-scale population flows, the number of households dramatically increased during the period of high economic growth. We should pay particular attention to the fact that in this period the growth rate of households formed a hump shape at a high level, while the growth rate of population was quite stable at a much lower level of about 1%. As a result, for two decades beginning in 1955, the population of Japan increased by 20% from 90 million to 110 million, while the number of households increased by 80%. In particular, the number of traditional, three-generation merged households hardly increased at all. Instead, “core” or “nuclear” households, consisting of a married couple, possibly with unmarried children, and unmarried single households dramatically increased, particularly in urban industrial areas. When three generations of family members lived in a traditional single household in rural villages, each such household needed only one refrigerator, television set, washing machine, and car. When young people left their rural villages for urban industrial areas, they formed new households. Each of these new households necessarily generated additional demand for houses, consumer durables, and electricity. In this way, the rural-urban population flow sustained high domestic demand in the period of high economic growth between 1955 and 1970.

Along with the creation of a larger number of households, the high growth period saw the diffusion of newly available consumer durables. Anyone who lived in those happy days should be able to vividly describe how so many consumables came to be a part of the Japanese home. The diffusion was facilitated by the steady decline in prices of those products over time on the one hand, and an increase in incomes on the other. Electric washing machines, for example, first appeared in the Japanese market in 1949; at that time, a machine cost ¥54,000 while the average annual labor income was about ¥50,000. Understandably, only 20 machines were sold per month! However only six years later, the price of washing machines had fallen to ¥20,000 while the average annual income had risen to above ¥200,000. About a third of households could then afford to own washing machines. The same story holds for other consumer durables as well. What is more,
this process accelerated in the 1960s. Since it was the cities that led this diffusion process, urbanization led not only to the creation of new households but also to a sustained high demand for consumer durables. By the end of the 1960s, however, most of the then available consumer durables had saturated the domestic market.

This whole process of domestic demand-led high economic growth during 1955-70 can be summarized as follows. By raising the demand for labor capital accumulation in the industrial sector, a population flow from the agricultural areas to the cities was created. In addition to these widely recognized channels, I want to emphasize another oft neglected but very important fact. By creating new households and thereby raising the demand for consumer durables and electricity, the population flow in turn ultimately sustained the profitability of investment in the manufacturing industry. I also believe that the role of newly available consumer durables was not confined to demand for those products themselves. Through the input-output interrelationship, they augmented the demand for intermediate goods such as steel and electricity, and accordingly encouraged high levels of investment in those sectors.

In this virtuous circle for high economic growth, low real wages were not as instrumental as Lewis (1954) contended. Rather, it was the growth of domestic demand that sustained the profitability of investment. And for a growth in consumption demand, a steady rise in real wages, rather than a continuing low wage, is a contributing factor. A steady rise in real wages sustained effective demand in the post-war Japanese economy because the key product was consumer durables, which, having not yet achieved international competitiveness, had to find outlets in the domestic market. This provides an important lesson for today’s developing countries. In contrast, the pre-war Japanese economy was, like today’s newly industrialized economies, a typical export-led economy. The key industry was cotton, and low real wages were critical for its international competitiveness.

The high economic growth during the 1960s ended around 1970. By then, the pool of the ‘disguised’ unemployed in the agricultural sector had been largely exhausted. Therefore, population flow from the rural sector and the associated urban household formation both sharply declined. At the same time, the producers of consumer durables were faced with a saturation of the domestic market. In this way, the domestic-demand-led virtuous circle of high economic growth was lost. In closing, we should note that this structural change occurred around 1970, a few years in advance of the first oil embargo in 1973.
In the winter term of the 1967 school year, I first attended Professor MARUYAMA Masao's open lectures, “The History of Political Thought in Japan” at the Faculty of Law, University of Tokyo. I was also able to participate in Professor Maruyama’s seminar on the same topic. These lectures and seminars had a profound influence upon me, and have directed the path of my research as a scholar. Professor Maruyama’s fresh perspectives and deep insights on issues were made all the more interesting because they were interwoven with humorous anecdotes. His lectures and seminars were without fail, a distinct pleasure. I experienced an intellectual thrill and I remember at times being inspired as if an electrical current had surged through me. By reaching back to remember the atmosphere of those days, I hope to leave a useful record of those spirited days.

The Lectures

Upon finding a full room on the first day of his lectures, Professor Maruyama joked, “So all you boys and girls have come to see ‘the Maruyama.’” Before diving into his first topic, he explained the reasons why he had chosen the pre-modern period as the main topic for the lecture sessions. He then proceeded to introduce collections of documents and other reference material to be used in the course. He stressed that the history of political thought in Japan was still a new field with many areas that had not yet been explored. Professor Maruyama also advised students to review their readings before class and to take notes that would summarize the main points of the lectures.

To make sure that he would keep to the time allotted for the lecture, he removed his watch and placed it on the desk. Changing to his bifocal glasses, he sat down behind the podium, opening his lecture notes and a file stuffed with historical documents chosen from various sources. During the course of the lecture, he often wrote on the blackboard quotes from the sources used in that session. Writing quickly, I was able to take down in shorthand most of what Professor Maruyama said, in the process filling two large, college ruled notebooks. On the left page, I jotted down my lecture notes, leaving the right page open so that I could add details about other related sources I studied outside of class.

Overall Professor Maruyama’s lectures focused on three key factors of different origins in the pre-modern periods. He reconstructed the ideal type of these intellectual factors and discussed how they influenced one another. As he explored these three key factors, he emphasized that the processes of interaction between the three formed the intellectual history of early modern Japan. First, he tried to formulate a “prototype” of the ancient Japanese way of thinking and ancient value judgements which was based on the myths of the *Kojiki* and *Nihon Shoki*. He argued that “prototype” had...
three aspects: historical consciousness, political thought and conceptions of morality. Second, he analyzed the principles of rule that were the basis of the bakuhan system (the political relationship that formed the Japanese state of the Edo period). He suggested that the leaders of the period consciously developed a system of rule based on the principles of “isolation and discrimination” along with “imitation.” Third, he discussed the Confucian world-view, which constituted the “aspect structure” for Japanese in the early modern period. Using the Chinese classics and the works of Chinese philosophers from the Song period (960-1279), he examined the key Confucian concepts of the mutual relationship between heaven and man, the virtuous king vs. the hegemon, the distinction between the civilization of the middle kingdom and barbarians, and the concept of the realm (tenka). He also pointed to some of the contradictions in Confucian thought, such as loyalty to the king vs. filial piety. While he stressed the importance of the political-economic processes, he emphasized that we would focus on “intellectual history proper.” Professor Maruyama suggested the intellectual history of early modern Japan should be understood as a process whereby various elements of the three intellectual factors connected and collided with one another. Needless to say, he was using the methods of Max WEBER in this analysis.

In his lectures, for the first time I was exposed to the concept of “prototype.” I also learned about explanations of rule that were based on adapting to the times, namely a view of history in which “immanent energy” (ikiiohi) developed, “situationalism,” and the “joint rule” theory embodied in the term matsurigoto. Particularly interesting for me was Professor Maruyama’s analysis of early modern Japanese political thought. Based on research amassed after the publication of his 1952 work, Nihon Seiji Shisô shi Kenkyû [Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan], he demonstrated a systematic and comprehensive analysis that represented a fresh historical interpretation of Tokugawa thought. For me this represented the starting point for my future research. At that time it seemed like an enormous intellectual wall towering over me that I would never be able to climb.

In the closing weeks of the term, Professor Maruyama focused on “Nativism (kokugaku) as an Intellectual Movement.” As was shown in the structure of the lectures, Professor Maruyama saw MOTOORI Norinaga as a thinker who restored the idea of “prototype” to Japanese thought after many centuries. Because of this achievement, Professor Maruyama saw Norinaga as a key figure in the history of political thought in Japan. I still remember how in the last lecture, Professor Maruyama stressed that Norinaga was “truly great.” It seemed that for Professor Maruyama,
Norinaga was the intellectual opponent that he respected the most.

We were allowed to use our notes during the exam in February of the following year. We were instructed to compare the differences in the arguments surrounding political legitimacy in Japan contained in the writings of YOSHIIDA Shōin, YAMAGATA Taika and Norinaga. It was a remarkable question. Years later when I asked Professor Maruyama about that question, he laughed and said, “If it was now, I would not assign such a difficult question.”

The Seminars
As many students wished to enroll in the Maruyama seminar, all were required to write a short essay describing why they wanted to participate. I wrote how I had just read and been inspired by the themes in the book, Gendai Nihon no Kakushin Shisô, a three way discussion by Professor Maruyama, UMEMOTO Katsumi and SATÔ Noboru. Those who met the entrance qualifications were then required to read the course text, FUKUZAWA Yukichi’s Bunmeiron no Gairyaku during the summer holiday. I well remember how boring it was to read Fukuzawa’s book during the dog days of summer.

The list of those attending the seminar that year included graduate students, a research associate from a University of Tokyo research institute, and twenty-eight undergraduate students. The twenty-eight of us were divided into eight groups and we would begin each session by practicing reading the text out loud. The presenter for that week would then provide a ten-minute summary of the week’s reading and then for an additional twenty-minutes, would offer points for discussion. This would be followed by a period of discussion. I also remember that Professor Maruyama stressed that as another aspect of our training, we must keep within the thirty minutes allotted for our presentations. Although the seminar was supposed to end at around 5PM, it often went much later. Not a morning person, Professor Maruyama seemed to grind through the morning lectures but enjoyed the afternoon seminars. However after 5PM the students’ stomachs began to rumble. As they paid increasingly less attention, I think they missed Professor Maruyama’s remarkable flow of ideas. While I took copious notes during the lectures, I too was not always able to remain attentive during the seminars. As I regretted this, I was pleased when Professor Maruyama published Bunmei-ron no Gairyaku o Yomu [Reading the Outline of a Theory of Civilization] which in a sense allowed me to review the ideas expressed during the seminars.

I was happy that participating in the seminar allowed me to practice reading the classic works of Japanese intellectual history. While I was bore
reading Fukuzawa alone during the summer break, I soon learned that when the book was placed in the hands of Professor Maruyama, it came alive and we could see the fantastic power of the work. One by one, the words took on greater meaning and Fukuzawa himself seemed to speak to us from between the lines. I cannot forget the strong impression the seminar made on me. For the first time I learned how to analyze the inherent aspects of the classics of Japanese intellectual history.

Looking back on those days, I realize that the lectures and seminars combined show Professor Maruyama’s basic approach to the history of political thought in Japan. It is suggestive of Professor Maruyama’s own intellectual approach that we discussed the Gairyaku in the seminar while in his concluding lectures, he focused on Norinaga. It goes without saying that Fukuzawa was a hero for Professor Maruyama and he saw him as the most influential critic of Japanese civilization. During our last session (held in March 1968 at the Seminar House in Hachiōji), Professor Maruyama told us that in a short six-month seminar, we had not even scratched the surface of the rich and challenging intellectual thought contained in the Gairyaku. Professor Maruyama had read the Gairyaku fourteen times (although it might be sixteen) and each time had discovered something new. He wanted all the “boys and girls” to read it again and again.

In the lectures, we covered the ancient and early modern periods and concluded with Norinaga. In the seminar, we were given an overview of the origins of modern Japan. He generously provided us with the knowledge he had gained of his “erudite opponent” and “greatest hero.” They were the best lectures and seminar sessions I have ever experienced.

YANAGITA Kunio died in the early 1960s. Yanagita, a unique and prolific researcher of customs, was subsequently termed the founder of research on rural life in what has come be known as Japanese ethnology. It is often stated that as a scholar of social history, Yanagita extracted only the traditions of the oldest layers of society while omitting the customs of today. This view is quite mistaken. If Yanagita had not been keenly interested in modern times, he would not have written about daily life (clothes, food, and homes) in *Meiji-Taisho-shi seso-hen* [The History of the Meiji and Taisho periods: Social Conditions] and *Momien izen no koto* [Things Before Cotton]. Nor would he have examined the Japanese language in *Kokugo-shi shingo-hen* [The History of New Words in Japanese].

It is said that before his death, Yanagita strongly opposed collecting his books into a complete edition and there are still many who attest to this. However late in his life, Yanagita’s collected works had already begun to be published in the form of *Teihon Yanagita Kunio shû* [The Selected Original Works of Yanagita Kunio]. In the 1960s not only scholars of ethnology but also scholars of history, politics, literature, and sociology, have started to become aware of the value of anthropology to their research. While we cannot say that it became an academic trend, in many respects a “Yanagita boom” developed. This basis of this was actually the *Teihon* that were being published in the 1960s.

The common assumption that intellectual trends are created by the appearance of the collected works of one author is somewhat misleading. While the arrival of a collected work causes an impact, it is not on the scale of the social impact produced by the 1964 Tokyo Olympics or the boost to intellectuals’ historical consciousness in the wake of the “Meiji centennial” of 1968. However, it is important to note that before the *Teihon* was published, few readers were aware of the broad perspective that Yanagita explored in his works. In many respects, Yanagita was the eloquent historical sociologist whom everyone had heard about but nobody had read. His combined works included well over one hundred separate volumes, and a bibliography of studies in magazines that numbered more than 4000 works. However it is not the sheer volume but rather the scope of his work, that is most impressive. His complicated array of intellectual pursuits ranged from agricultural economics and discourses on the Japanese language, to religion and folk songs. To the extent that a Yanagita Kunio “discourse” existed, the 18,376 page *Teihon* functioned as the base structure or *Unterbau*.

There were also various readers of the *Teihon* edition. Some were Marxists who had failed in their drive for an intellectual revolution. Others were populists who had grown weary from recent political struggles and found in Yanagita ideas that soothed like a medicated bath. It is often pointed out that the “*Nihon Bunka-ron*” of the 1960s was tinged with a sense of compensation, and the movement was intended to restore Japanese self-confidence lost in World War II. The analysis of the special characteristics of one’s own culture is represented in the terms “vertical society,” “Japanese-style management,” “the anatomy of dependence” and “interpersonalism” (*kanjin-shugi*). These are ideas that went beyond asceticism and were popularized, leading to the birth of a positive, original mystique. This is the
popular ideology of the “Nippon-jin ron.” The “Nippon-jin-ron” scholars liked to quote Yanagita and as a result, Yanagita’s words became a part of this wave of cultural nationalism. In these quotes, Yanagita appeared as a respected elder scholar, describing an inherent spirit, explaining the meaning of ethnology that had been forgotten. The fact that Yanagita was a person who continued to ask questions was buried and instead, he became someone who answered the question: “What is Japanese culture?” Yanagita was a critic of history. Yet because he is continually quoted as the authority on lost traditions, it has become difficult to see his radicalism as scholar of what is today called the “creation of tradition.”

Conversely, today opinions have shifted, with Yanagita being described as a hidden advocate of colonialism, a tactical orientalist who worked like a plotting, intellectual bureaucrat. Namely he has been painted as a fabricator of the idea of Japan as a mythical and cultural center, and his hidden belief in a national ideology exposed. However in the end, this criticism was an impatient response to the incomplete, coarse praise of the late 1960s and the 1970s. As the motives of this criticism were based in groundless suspicion and because the arguments become entangled in their own rhetoric, they should be ignored.

It is a waste of time to continue the ideological disputes concerning the special characteristics of the Unterbau in the Teihon edition. For close to forty years, basic research on Yanagita has stagnated and at last today, a new edition of the complete works of Yanagita is being compiled. Although it is difficult to describe the work of forming the complete works in a few words, its main focus is to present the real works of Yanagita. In other words, to bring to the surface the process of producing the texts. The organization by themes has given way to a principle that places these studies in selected time frames.

For example as is the case with Karl MARX’s Das Kapital, the final form is not the complete form. I do not agree with Hegelianism that concludes that the final text implicitly includes the most complete form. The texts of Yanagita Kunio do not integrate one unified thought. The Teihon edition published in the 1960s make evident both areas in the original text where Yanagita’s writing remains unclear and his corrections. If we suppose that Yanagita was deified, then based on the clearly recorded diversity of the text in the new complete works, we should expect numerous interpretations by the readers. Actually since the 1960s in the Yanagita Kunio debate, one Yanagita has been unjustly deified and publicized. In the text there is another Yanagita that no one has hijacked. By moving ahead with the project, “the possibility of Yanagita Kunio” that Yanagita himself could not develop will be able to appear in the text of his complete works.

In the history of publishing, the practice of producing collected works is still a relatively new enterprise that began less than a hundred years ago. Today its importance has not diminished. Before writing a single volume of criticism or a critical biography, research needs to first be conducted from the most basic level. Such an approach will allow us to make use of the inheritance of the 1960s, and will surely move research ahead in the future.
The Death of Continuous Inflation

An overview of the series

Edited by the Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo, the six volume series, 20 Seiki Shisutemu [The 20th Century Global System], focuses on the international political-economic system of this century that we have termed “the 20th Century Global System.” These volumes are a collection of research that seeks to understand how and when the system formed as well as the ways it continues to change today. Different from the usual approach of social science that is based upon theoretical and empirical research on narrowly focused topics, we try to examine the “big question.”

Strictly speaking, we look at the 20th century after World War I, when men sought to create a blueprint of a political-economic system that would reconstruct the world order. Overall, the residents of the White House and Kremlin had the most profound influence on this blueprint.

In order to create this system, several problems had to be solved. First, the most evident was the disaster of World War I. Realizing that international conflicts of the 19th century had ultimately been resolved by war, leaders searched for a system that would use other means of conflict resolution. The problem lay in how to actually develop this system. Specifically, how to find a plausible means to replace war as the primary means of resolution for large-scale international conflicts.

At the same time, the designers of the world system also had to solve domestic economic problems. Specifically, in order to prevent large-scale unemployment it was necessary to restructure networks of free trade that collapsed during World War I and to stabilize currency rates.

Concerning these problems, three ideas came to the forefront after World War I. First in the United States and Britain a plan developed and was revised, eventually coming to fruition in the form of the Bretton Woods system of the 1940s. In the end, this would become the world system. Second, France and other continental nations looked to return to the old political-economic system of the nineteenth century. Third, after the Russian Revolution, the Soviet Union visualized a worldwide socialist revolution. If we look broadly at the course of 20th century history, the idea to return to the 19th century system prevailed for a time immediately after World War I. In the end however, the Bretton Woods system became central and after being shaped by various types of opposition, it developed into a revised form that became the 20th century economic system. Continually
facing outside pressure, the Soviet bloc was also created. *20 Seiki Shisutemu 1: Kōsō to Keisei* [The 20th Century Global System 1: Design and Formation] examines system formation and aspects of the process such as security and the international monetary system.

The 20th century system did not develop as expected. Economically, two factors had a decisive influence on how national economic systems were reorganized. On one hand, the system was based upon large managerial corporations that were able to set the prices of their products on the market. At the same time, large, powerful labor unions were able to gain increases in real wages through negotiations with management. However the lack of free competition on the market caused problems. As wages and in turn, productivity increased, so did labor costs. This cost increase was shifted to prices, thereby creating a system that controlled price competition. The response to this cost-push inflation mechanism of the economy depended on control of demand and big governments. However in the United States, the center of the 20th century global system from the late 1930s, prices continually increased.

If we take 100 with the data prices of 1913, then price fluctuations between 80 and 120 in the period from the beginning of 19th century to the beginning of the 20th century would equate to a stable price level. If we compare this to the price fluctuations from the 1930s to the 1980s, we see the clear contrast. After the 1930s, prices continued to increase and reached the high level of 900 by 1980. We can view this continual price increase as a representative index of the development of the 20th century economic system. However by the end of the 20th century, the continuous rise in prices came to an end. The death of continuous inflation suggests a transformation of the 20th century system. Examined from various angles, this transformation is the topic of *20 Seiki Shisutemu 6: Kinō to Henyō* [The 20th Century Global System 6: Function and Transformation].
A Summary

In this volume, we examine the 20th century not as a period of crisis, but one of growth. To this end, we focus on American style production methods that made possible economic growth on a worldwide scale.

If we first look at production capacity from the perspective of the goods produced, then it follows that we must next examine the production system and ask how technological levels are related to the people involved in the production process. How did the American production process originate from American manufacturing methods? Additionally, we need to analyze how the prototype of the American production system, “Fordism,” matured into the polished, mass production method known as “Sloanism.” In this volume, we illustrate the human side of the production process in the areas of production strategy, labor relations and management organization.

Overall, we analyze the historical development of the “whole,” not merely the “structure” which is strictly bounded by the rules of history. We discuss a “system” that was introduced as a blueprint for the political-economic integration of the world. However as a concept of a new world order this blueprint did not develop along the lines envisioned by its designers. We explain how the “real structure” came into being, the actual historical circumstances that produced it, the resistance to the system and how it transformed itself into a “definable structure.” In order to present the process where “concepts are transformed into structures through struggles” we use the word “system.” Specifically, we aim to use “system” to focus on a point in time where historical trends and possibilities for restructuring intersected.

As the United States is taken as the central nation in this volume, we focus on American style production and how it grew into a system of industrial technology and production. Moreover, we look at the basic infrastructure that developed to support the system, tracing how competition between ideas solidified the system. We also emphasize the excessively political nature of the market system that grew from Sloanism in distribution practices, while also tracing American labor relations within the process of structural development. Through both we can see a fascinating view of the system and its history through the lens of these combative relationships.

In this same way, we trace the American style production system and the sub-systems that developed to support it. This process included the following three aspects: (1) almost all parts of the American method developed simultaneously during World War II, (2) during the wartime mobilization, aspects of the system were strengthened by wartime restrictions, (3) with the end of wartime mobilization, the system matured and for a short time, produced a social and economic balance. (‘The Golden
1950s”). Yet even with prosperity, key factors were already beginning to disturb that balance. Due to polished, large scale production methods, the dealer-franchise system, and organized industrial labor unions, large scale production industries were systematized. Also under the Wagoner Law, collective bargaining was stifled. The impact of the wartime system on mass production methods was diluted because of changes in industrial technology and organization. The end of wartime mobilization caused a stall in demand that hurt the automobile industry. The response to these factors and the subsequent impact upon organizations brought the system into balance. Furthermore, the outbreak of numerous labor disturbances and interventionist labor laws pushed the development of “transactional unionism.” Analysis of changes in the financial system, especially the transitional effects brought by World War II, indicates that federal finances in the postwar period continued to be based on the wartime tax system. This favorable economic climate supported the American version of the welfare state.

We hope that this volume will make clear the historical process behind the development of “the American model” and how it spread to other parts of the world. That worldwide diffusion and the process by which “concepts are transformed into structures through struggle” are dealt with in 20 Seiki Shisutemu 3: Keizai Seichô (II) Juyô to Taikô [20th Century Global Systems 3 Economic Growth (II): The Spread of the System and Counter-Responses].

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Part 1 Theory and the History of Economic Growth
1. “The Era of Rapid Economic Growth” HASHIMOTO Jurô
2. “Theories of Economic Growth and Japan’s Rapid Growth” OTAKI Masayuki

Part 2 American Style Production Methods

Part 3 Aspects of American Style Production Methods
When considering developing countries in the postwar period, “economic development” or “development” are words that quickly come to mind. If we also consider the move toward a market system by socialist countries in second half of the 1980s as a broad plan for development, we realize that developmentalism is a fundamental theme in the 20th century global system. In this volume, we aim to unpack the concept of developmentalism by thoroughly examining the formation and processes related to developmentalism in a number of developing countries.

Developmentalism has taken two forms. First, there are the “late-comer” states, developing nations where the government takes an active role in the economy and society in order to quickly industrialize (the “catch-up model” of industrialization). Consequently, these states have come to be known as examples of “late industrializers.” Second in the ideologically charged world of the cold war, some states created centralized, authoritarian, political systems that promoted development in order to oppose domestic or international communism. In other words through the political lens, developmentalism can be understood as a crisis management system.

Indeed developmentalism is often used in connection with authoritarianism, for example with the terms “repressive developmental state” and “developmental dictatorship.” Developmentalism has also come to be connected with state-led industrialization or is seen as synonymous with the Asian model of economic development (which includes Japan).

However defining “developmentalism” as part of an authoritarian political system is not sufficient. We still need to uncover why many developing countries came to accept the ideology of “development.” To that end, this volume discusses how developmentalism grew from “economic system competition” between the superpowers in the areas of economic growth, technological progress and economic aid. In the cold war system, states had to choose between economic systems in order to realize economic growth. For the United States, economic aid to developing countries became an important tool in its diplomatic strategy. For developing countries, success in economic development became a means for unifying the nation. The ideology of development came to permeate the nation state, creating a situation where it became necessary for regimes to continue to promote developmentalism to remain in power.

In order to support development, states pursued social policies that involved concentrating political power, manipulating currency exchange rates and intervening in the labor market. Governments also implemented agrarian reforms and income distribution programs. However the end of
the cold war led to movements for greater democratization. Opposition 
groups voiced their displeasure with repressive, centralized political 
systems and government intervention in labor markets. Economic 
liberalization and the globalization of national economies also made it more 
difficult for governments to implement monetary source allocation and to 
manipulate currency rates and trade flows.

As a result developmentalism has entered a transitional period that has 
produced a discourse on “post-developmentalism.” However the 
contributors to this volume contend that as long as growth-oriented 
ideologies exist in the collective consciousness of societies throughout the 
world, development will remain an integral part of economic and social 
systems.

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The surprise decision by Japan’s Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHW) to rush through approval of Pfizer’s erectile dysfunction therapy drug, Viagra, has refocused attention on pharmaceutical regulation in Japan. Particular attention has been paid to the fact that almost forty years after it went on sale in the United States, the low dose contraceptive pill is still not approved in Japan.

Although the approval of a new drug takes on average about two years, the government decided to fast track the approval of Viagra in less than six months. The Ministry of Health and Welfare defends this decision on the grounds that Japanese are already obtaining the drug through the Internet and other avenues. They contend that this dangerous, unregulated use can be prevented by making Viagra officially available. As evidence of the perils of unregulated use the MHW points to the cardiac-related death of a 63-year-old Japanese man who received Viagra through unofficial channels.

Critics have been quick to highlight the irony of the MHW’s decision to deny a safe and effective form of contraception to women, while rushing through approval of a sex aid for men. A closer analysis of the MHW’s reasoning behind both decisions serves to further illuminate the incongruity of the ministry’s stance on these issues.

For many years, the MHW stressed that they were withholding approval because of doubts about the safety of the pill. However in 1992 the MHW gave ground on the safety issue, finally admitting in the face of overwhelming evidence, the safety of the product. However they continued to withhold approval on public health grounds. In light of the AIDS epidemic in other countries, the MHW argued, the pill should not be approved for fear that it might contribute to a potential future epidemic in Japan. Eventually the MHW’s own public health committee decided in June 1997 that the pill had not contributed to the spread of disease in other countries. Members of the deliberating committee nevertheless said that prescription of the pill should be conditional on regular tests for sexually transmitted diseases. In its deliberations over Viagra, the MHW made no mention of STDs or ever suggested that men taking the product should be forced to undergo lectures or examinations.

In March 1998 another barrier to approval appeared in the form of a petition from an environmental group, the Network of Ecology and Women, which claims that hormone excreted in urine of women on the pill may upset the ecological balance. The MHW eagerly latched onto this pseudo-scientific claim, which has absolutely no basis in evidence, as another excuse to delay approval.
Critically examining the MHW’s claim to be protecting the health of women, it is well to consider that an estimated 20,000 women in Japan, denied access to the mini-pill, are instead taking high and medium dose estrogen pills for contraceptive purposes. High dose pills, which are available in Japan, carry a higher risk of cancer and circulatory disease than more advanced, low dose products. For this reason, the US Food and Drug Administration forced high dose products off the market in 1988.

Any discussion of the pill’s safety cannot be made without reference to the high rate of abortion in Japan. Statistics gathered by local authorities record 300,000 abortions each year in Japan but this is thought to underestimate the true number by about half. Abortion is clearly big business in Japan.

Turning our attention to Viagra for a moment, we may consider that it has been on the market for less than one year and has already been connected to more than 133 deaths in the United States alone. The pill, by contrast, has been marketed for almost 40 years and has been taken by more than 300 million women. A recently published twenty-five year study of 46,000 women in the United Kingdom found that ten years after the arrival of the pill, the chances of dying from cancer and other diseases was the same for women who had never taken an oral contraceptive.

Because proceedings of the Central Pharmaceutical Affairs Council and other MHW committees are not open to the press or public, it is very difficult to determine the true motivating forces behind the ministry’s stance on the pill. Everyone from condom manufacturers eager to protect sales to a cabal of right wing pressure groups afraid of women’s independence and declining birth rates have been blamed for the stalemate. But the pecuniary interest which doctors have in maintaining a high abortion rate, and the strong representation which they enjoy on the MHW’s councils means doctors and their representatives attract a great deal of suspicion.

The lack of transparency in the MHW’s regulatory processes certainly suggests that decisions are open to manipulation by well placed pressure groups. To illustrative how a powerful interest group can influence policy, let us examine the part the Japan Medical Association (JMA) has played in the debate over reforms to Japan’s medical and pharmaceutical reimbursement system.

This JMA, currently chaired by TSUBOI Eitaka, yields enormous influence with the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), mainly because of the large financial contributions the JMA makes to the party. Although information on the source, size and ultimate destination of political contributions is
notoriously poor in Japan, the JMA makes no secret of the power they wield over the government.

In order to understand the dynamics of medical/pharmaceutical policy reform it is necessary to understand the medical lobby’s vested interests. In particular it is necessary to understand the concept of yakkasa, “drug price gap,” and the role it plays in hospital revenues. The yakkasa is the difference between the centrally set reimbursement price paid to doctors by the National Health Insurance system, and the discount price at which drugs are actually purchased. The yakkasa, which currently averages about 10%, provides an economic incentive to prescribe more drugs. Unlike doctors in other OECD countries, Japanese doctors commonly dispense as well as prescribe pharmaceuticals.

Although the average price of individual drugs is generally lower in Japan than in the United States, spending on pharmaceuticals as a proportion of total medical spending is higher in Japan. This, the MHW acknowledges, is partly accounted for by the higher volumes dispensed to Japanese patients. The structural incentive for higher prescribing volumes provided by the current reimbursement system has meant that all attempts by the government to control the over consumption of drugs in Japan have been actively opposed by the JMA.

In 1996, the MHW, alarmed by the impending bankruptcy of the health insurance system, suggested that more should be done to control spending on pharmaceuticals, which was thought to be out of line with other OECD countries. One way of doing this, they suggested, was to charge patients an additional fee for the cost of their prescriptions. The LDP’s coalition partners agreed to an increase in the burden on patients on the condition that the pricing system for pharmaceuticals would also be revised, with a view to reducing what were seen as unreasonably high profits by the industry.

The JMA lost no time in voicing its opposition to increasing patient co-payments, claiming that it would limit people’s access to care, particularly for older people. Although they did manage to dilute the original proposal, new pharmaceutical co-payments were introduced in September 1997, along with an increase in the co-payment for medical services in general.

The original proposal called for all patients, including the elderly, to be charged a fixed percentage of their medical expenses. But pressure from the JMA resulted in a 2,000 yen per month cap on senior citizen’s co-payments. The JMA evinced further consternation last December when they extracted a pledge from the LDP to abolish the pharmaceutical co-payment for senior
citizens. According to local media reports, this deal was struck behind closed doors and made by the LDP in return for the JMA’s support in an upcoming by-election. Under the current National Health Insurance financing arrangements, the working population is being left to cover the ballooning medical costs of the elderly who are entirely insulated from the costs they incur. Some politicians, including former Prime Minister HASHIMOTO, have recognized the unfairness of this situation. Yet the enormous political influence and prestige of the JMA that champions these policies, combined with the political apathy of younger generations, the high turnout of seniors and the demographic skewing which gives the senior lobby progressively more political power, all indicate that change is unlikely.

An inter-party committee, chaired by former LDP Minister of Health and Welfare, NIWA Yuya, was established in 1996 to debate changes in the pricing and reimbursement of pharmaceuticals. In September 1997 they released details of their proposal which called for the introduction of a reference pricing system. Under reference pricing, pharmaceuticals would be grouped into categories based on therapeutic area or pharmaceutical action, all of which would be reimbursed at the same level. The patient would cover the difference between the reimbursement price and the actual price.

The JMA, while supporting a reduction in pharmaceutical spending, came out strongly against this proposal. Although once again dressing up their opposition in terms of defending patients’ rights, protection of their revenue is the more likely motive. Throughout 1998 the issue of pharmaceutical pricing was widely debated, but at present it seems unlikely that reference pricing will be introduced. The relevant LDP committees have failed to examine the MHW’s latest proposals meaning that a bill is not likely to be drafted before the Diet resumes later this year.

The resulting stalemate in reform of the medical insurance system guarantees ballooning deficits with no solution in sight. While no simple panacea exists for this and other complex issues, greater openness in government would facilitate a rational determination of trade-offs, something which will become increasingly important as Japan’s society ages and the economy matures.
World War II casts a long, dark shadow over the Japanese past, preventing many historians from imagining children in prewar Japan as anything more than the “little citizens” (shôkokumin) of an emerging nation-state. However, the origins of Japan’s modern version of childhood lie less in the political history of the Japanese nation-state and more in the socio-cultural history of the middle class, including the following three important, yet understudied constituent parts: child professionals, social reformers, and middling families. From the 1890s through the 1920s, the child expert, in search of a professional identity and social influence, and an emerging stratum of social reformers and middling families, in search of a new cultural identity, joined together to create a “new child’s world,” a world that, after World War II, spread to become a nationwide ideal and Japan’s modern version of childhood.

In order to understand the modern nature of Japan’s version of childhood, it must be placed alongside similar histories in the United States and Europe, not as an example of Western influence and Japanese imitation, but as a story of comparisons and commonalities in modern social experience within and across national borders. Moreover, the story of the making of modern childhood must be written using overlapping and interwoven narratives and told in the context of changing social experience. My study is a social history of ideology, which explores both the evolving debates on the “child’s world” and the palpable changes these debates wrought in the lives of an emerging middle class, including its children and adults. Finally, by placing the history of modern childhood in its rightful place alongside the history of the middle class, one can glimpse important parts of the still largely incomplete social history of Japan’s modern transformation in the years before 1945.

During the crucial time from 1890 through 1930, the middle class placed children at the center of its strategic employment of culture to create and maintain its social position. This process, which historians of the middle class call “culture-building,” is defined by Sharon STEPHENS in the book *Children and the Politics of Culture* as “the production and reproduction of collectively held dispositions and understandings.” Through the making of the child’s world, the middle class built a new adult world upon the following ideals and practices: meritocratic achievement, scientific living, nostalgia, and leisure. In both their rise to cultural power (1890-1910) and consolidation of cultural hegemony (1910-1930), social reformers, child experts, and middling families emphasized the necessity of distinguishing between the world of child and adult and yet, at the same time, built a new culture where childhood became increasingly central to the world of the middle class adult.

From 1890 through 1910, a middling stratum rose to prominence in Tokyo,
Osaka, and other urban centers, invoking the new ideals of scientific living, meritocratic achievement, and Smilesian self-help. This rising class, eager to establish the means to reproduce its new social position, looked to its children as the “future adults” of the next generation of a middling sort. During this time, childhood became serious in the extreme as aspiring parents turned the child’s educational success into a measure of a family’s intrinsic talents and social worth and also into a means of class reproduction. Middling homes of the mid and late Meiji period were infected not only by educational fevers but also by educational anxieties, such as those surrounding the question of when to start the child’s education or the problem of the child’s future beyond elementary school. Beginning as early as the 1890s, aspiring families subscribed to new magazines like Yonen zasshi [Child’s Magazine], Shojo sekai [Girl’s World], and Shôkokumin [Little Citizens] to supplement and complement the child’s elementary school education. As new mappers of the child’s world, mid and late Meiji children’s magazine editors like ISHII Kendô and IWAYA Sazanami placed all children, boys and girls, in the category of “future adults” and interpreted childhood as a training ground for adulthood. Taking a leaf—complete with content, illustrations, and layout—from contemporary American and British children’s magazines, new publishing ventures like Hakubunkan and Gakureikan offered young readers tales of adult heroes like Benjamin FRANKLIN and NINOMIYA Sontoku, moralistic fables, and countless recipes for worldly success. During the first decade of the 20th century, the growing importance of education as a passport to future success forced families to consider the potential benefits of pre-and post-elementary education. Child experts and parents debated the educational and psychological merits of sending a child to kindergarten and later, sparked by the 1917 publication of KIMURA Hisashi’s book Sôkyoiku to tensai [Early Education and Genius], located the potential origin of educational success in the child’s pre-school years. At the same time, families subscribed to magazines such as Shôgaku fukushu to juken [Elementary Review and Exam Preparation], built children’s rooms within the home, and consulted with professional educators and psychologists, all efforts to guarantee the child’s successful entry into middle school/girl’s higher school and, ultimately, the adult world beyond.

In its ascent to cultural power, the middle class in Japan, not unlike the middle classes in the United States and Europe and the time, strategically eschewed the use of class-based language and presented its new culture, especially the world of childhood, as modern living based on universal values and norms. Central to their creation of a modern lifestyle was the adoption of scientific child rearing first popularized in the early 20th century by child psychologists, pediatricians, and educators. In professional journals like Jidô kenkyû [Child Study], books like Katei kyôshi to shite no haha...
[The Mother as Family Educator] and Oya no tsutome [The Parent’s Duty] and lectures at local women’s clubs, scientific child experts like TAKASHIMA Heizaburo and KUBO Yoshihide explored, created, and marketed a new child’s world based on an understanding of what they claimed were the child’s standard, universal needs and desires. Strongly influenced by G. Stanley HALL’s child study movement in the United States, this new professional class urged parents, particularly mothers, and educators to indulge the child’s natural playfulness and imagination in order to produce a disciplined, responsible adult. Attracted by science’s claim to universal truth and its promise to produce better “future adults,” middle class families and social reformers like HANI Motoko and HIBI Osuke solicited the knowledge of child experts and, through women’s and family magazines such as Hani’s Katei no Tomo [The Family Companion] and Shufu no tomo [The Housewife’s Companion] and the Mitsukoshi department store’s wildly successful children’s exhibitions (1908-1921), thrust the child expert and the new child’s world further into public prominence.

However during the 1910s and 1920s, in response to both a dissatisfaction with the singular pursuit of worldly success and a fear of imitation by the upwardly mobile lower orders, the middle class turned its eyes away from the future, to the present, and to a version of childhood that I call the “child-like child” (or anti-adult). While never able to abandon its concern with the reproduction of status, the middle class in Japan, similar to its counterparts in the West, grafted onto its cultural identity a concern with nostalgia and leisure in an effort to consolidate its social position through an apparent neglect of the future. In its embrace of a new type of children’s literature and the idea of the child’s right to play, the middle class redefined itself by asking children not only to “become” future adults but also to “be” a child-like child.

Through its subscription to neo-romantic children’s magazines like SUZUKI Miekichi’s famous Akai tori [Red Bird] and OGAWA Mimei’s Dowa [Children’s Stories], middling families strove to cultivate a concern for emotional well-being, to raise their children in a more humane manner, and at the same time, strengthen their social position. A nostalgic longing for a simpler and purer existence and a therapeutic desire to return to the world of childhood served to differentiate, in their minds, a true middle class from lower orders who sought from life only advancement and success. In this new literature, writers and poets like Suzuki, Ogawa, and KITAHARA Hakushu wrote children’s stories and children’s songs, exchanged letters, and penned essays apotheosizing the childlike child as the embodiment of qualities judged absent from the modern world, including purity, goodness, innocence, and emotional spontaneity. Magazines like Akai tori published adult-authored children’s stories as well as essays, poems, and artwork by
children in an attempt to liberate what they called “the human spirit.”

At the same time, the middle class created and promoted a culture of leisure, represented by the figure of the child at play, in order to promote the image of itself as a class no longer rising but as a class arrived, able to enjoy the present while letting the future take care of itself. Nonetheless, parents’ and child experts’ references to play as the child’s universal right to be “child-like” and to express its spontaneous and energetic nature hide the nonetheless class-specific nature of the child’s culture of play. Often referring to play as the “child’s work,” child psychologists and professional educators advocated the importance of play to the child’s physical, emotional, and mental development. In the early 20th century, department stores, child experts, and toy producers moved quickly to turn new ideas into children’s goods, as the 1911 founding of the Tokyo Toy Association by toy producers and Mitsukoshi’s child experts makes clear. The resulting educational toy boom of the 1910s and 1920s produced toys classified according to the child’s age, gender, and personality, advice books entitled How to Select and Give Toys to Children and a new middle class interest in toys as objects whose value, according to the child psychologist, Takashima, lay in their regard for “practicality, education, hygiene, exercise, price, aesthetics, technology, safely and durability.”

The creation of a new child’s world from 1890 to 1930 was nothing less than the creation a new, middle class adult world. A social and cultural history of prewar Japanese childhood illuminates the neglected topic of class formation in the prewar era, revises the notion of the birthplace of the middle class as the postwar 1950s and, by reconnecting the prewar to the postwar, ends the artificial separation of Japan’s 20th century into two easily distinguishable halves.
Introduction
If we wish to contrast and compare different manifestations of modernity and understand the pace and direction of their evolution we must examine the institutions and organisations which constitute modern society. Moreover, we also need to examine the needs, goals, and values of the individuals within these organizations, specifically how those individuals interact with each other and the institution or organisation. Such an analysis will allow us to begin to understand the nature of modernity and to construct some ideas about the nature of the relationship between the individual and modern society.

One of the pivotal institutions of late-twentieth century Japan is the “salaryman,” working in a large and complex business enterprise. While it is simplistic and reductionist to speak in terms of stereotypes, we clearly cannot avoid him, his values, and the institutions of his employment if we seek to find some answers as to the nature, direction, and pace of Japan’s development.

This paper is a summary of an investigation conducted in Japan in 1998 into Japanese male white-collar university graduates’ work values and the relationship of the ‘salaryman’ with the system of employment in large Japanese corporations. I hope that the data produced by this study will help to improve our knowledge of the development of Japanese institutions and organisations and to refine our understanding of Japan’s experience of modernity.

Theoretical Background
While the issues of modernisation and convergence are complex and fraught with difficulty, outlined below is an introduction to some of the ideas that form the foundation of this research project. In his survey of value systems in 43 societies, Ronald INGLEHART (1997) suggests that a major generational change, or paradigm shift, has occurred in industrial societies. He calls this a change from materialist to post-materialist values. More explicitly, and echoing MASLOW’s (1970) hierarchy of needs, he describes this shift as a move from the need for security and material comfort to a desire for self-expression and quality of life. Claiming not to be determinist or teleological in his conclusions, he declares that certain consequences for values are likely if a society develops in a particular direction.

BERSTEIN (1997), MATHEWS (1996), and SUGIMURA (1997) concur with Inglehart that a major shift towards the desire for self-fulfillment has taken place. Bernstein’s historical overview of work values in the United States describes a long-run development from their Lutheran-Calvinist origins, through a period of material opportunity and psychological alienation in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, to the modern quest for individual self-fulfillment. Mathews, in comparing American and Japanese beliefs about what makes life worth living, suggests that American and Japanese societies are in a similar state of late-modernity. He describes a parallel and non-
converging development from the certainty of transcendental belief structures, through a fragmentation of belief and loss of meaning, to the construction of a “late-modern pragmatism” of self-definition in the present. Sugimura concentrates more narrowly on Japanese work values and speculates about a collapse in the spirit of diligence that brought Japan such rapid and sustained economic success. He links this collapse to wider social developments such as the growth of knowledge-based industries and says that work has become more than an economic activity. He describes a quest for self-realisation where the individual seeks to develop himself and his talents freely while contributing to the organisation’s success. Thus, Sugimura’s Japanese company employee is more social than Bernstein’s American; self-realisation is not possible outside the organisational context.

Anthony GIDDENS (1990 and 1991) provides us with an intriguing and theoretically important link between the institutions of modernity and value systems. He claims we are experiencing a radicalised and globalised “high-modernity” characterised by a thoroughgoing individual and institutional reflexivity. The traditional, pre-determined life-roles have disappeared, leading to fundamental problems of ontological security and existential anxiety which require a “Reflexive Project of the Self” to generate programmes of actualisation and mastery for which the individual is solely responsible. In other words, he argues, in conditions of late-modernity we contemporaneously aspire to, and are compelled to seek self-fulfillment. However, Giddens does not deal in depth with the issues of the pace and direction of the development of late-modernity across societies, implying that the very idea of a national society is becoming squeezed between the complementary forces of globalisation and individuation.

Perhaps the most hotly debated work on the issue of the pace of Japan’s development, its links to value systems, and institutional convergence is that of Ronald DORE (1990 [1973] and 1987). He contended that the “late-development effect” and the Confucian, or communitarian, work ethic had allowed Japan to leap ahead of the UK in its industrial development, and although Japan had to some extent converged on the industrial institutions of the West, henceforth the UK would converge on Japan. LINCOLN and KALLENBERG (1990) partially confirm Dore’s thesis, though they credit the values of Japanese employees to management’s implementation of welfare “corporatism”, saying that this is the foundation of the critical difference between Japan and the US, that of the quality of Japanese labour.

Research Method
This project is a qualitative investigation of three large Japanese corporations. One is a manufacturer of high technology products employing 7,000 people, the second a financial institution employing 12,000 people, and the third a regional utility provider employing 20,000 people. The companies were chosen with the following considerations in mind:
• Each company should be a large corporation.

Notes
While the term salaryman originated in the 1920s and has come to have various overtones, depending on one’s perspective, it is still widely used in Japan. The 1990s Japanese salaryman, narrowly defined for the purposes of clarity, is a male, white-collar, university graduate, core employee of a large Japanese corporation.
The Salaryman and Japan’s Modernity continued

- Manufacturing, financial services, and miscellaneous services should be represented.
- A range of exposure to global and domestic competition should be represented.
The study took the form of:
- A set of semi-standardised interviews with a variety of male university graduate employees of each company.
- A set of semi-standardised interviews with a personnel manager and a union leader from each company.
- Collection of company documentation.
- Interviews, information, and documentation from related organisations and institutions.

Results and Conclusions
Japanese labour institutions seem to be experiencing a gradual and steady yet extensive marketisation and rationalisation. At the national level there is growing evidence that a mature labour market, as the term “market” is commonly understood to mean, is in the intermediate stages of formation. The external market for university graduates is undergoing a structural adjustment to a more fluid and complex structure. In addition, intermediate institutions such as the government, personnel placement and dispatching agencies, and headhunters are playing a more active role in facilitating and extending this marketisation and rationalisation.

At the organisational level the internal labour market in large corporations is also undergoing a structural adjustment. The flow of information on job vacancies within the firm is becoming increasingly rationalised and less unidirectional. Thus the so-called “internal labour market” is for the first time coming to resemble a market in its most commonly understood manifestation. Moreover, there is a steadily increasing amount of attention being played not only to ability, but increasingly, performance, at the expense of age and seniority, as a method for evaluating remuneration, promotion and even continuing employment. Consequently, more flexible and flatter employment hierarchies are emerging within corporations. However, the degree of exposure to competition may influence the pace of these developments; meaning that the greater the intensity of competition the faster a corporation might rationalise and marketise its labour institutions.

At the level of the individual, although material and psychological security are still much sought after in the 1990s, employees are not as confident as their predecessors that they have secure long-term employment. Thus some are examining their own experience and training and seeking to upgrade their skills and knowledge as an insurance against unexpected events, as well as to make themselves more attractive in the external labour market. There does, also, seem to be a greater emphasis being placed on individual self-fulfillment among younger employees. But, employees’ desires, needs, values and motives seem to be more fragmented and differentiated than
Based on the above, one might conclude that Japanese labour institutions are converging on the West (by “the West” I mean a stylised Anglo-American model). However marketisation and rationalisation might also be a function of the development of a society and economy into a period of “high-modernity”. In this sense, Japan’s elites, in what MARUYAMA Masao (1965) terms “purposive development”, chose a path for development for which there have been certain consequences. No doubt, with the development of global media and information systems, the ineluctable expansion of world trade, and the adoption of similar technologies and institutions, there has been some convergence in consciousness and institutions at a superficial level. However, at a deeper level, what Japan is experiencing now is not so much convergence, or westernisation, but continuing modernisation. One of the consequences and causes of this transformation into “high-modernity” at the level of individual consciousness is the emergence of the “Reflexive Project of the Self”. Once more, this, I believe, is not a convergence on western value systems, but, in Giddens’s (1990) words, a consequence of Japan’s modernity. Thus, the main conclusion to this study is that Japan and the West are developing along parallel paths in a similar direction, with Japan roughly following the Western example. However, Japan’s circumstances (as does her society) remain particular to Japan.

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