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# Japan in the 1950s

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**COVER PHOTO**
Workers at a coal mine in Hokkaido, circa 1952. Special thanks to NAKAMURA Ei of Asahi Shimbun.

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**Editorial Notes**

*Personal Names*
All personal names are given in the customary order in the native language of the person, unless otherwise requested. Hence in Japanese names the family name is given first, e.g., ARIMORI Yuko, and in Western names the family name is given second, e.g., Gabriel WILSON.

*Romanization*
Due to software limitations circumflexes are used in place of macrons, and omitted in most personal and place names.

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**This** issue of *Social Science Japan* focuses on Japan in the 1950s. It addresses such disparate topics as the economy, feminism, consumption, management, labor, and the bureaucracy, in order to provide a clearer picture of Japan during this tumultuous decade.

A number of obvious features provide our basic understanding of Japan in the 1950s. With the unification of the Liberal and Democratic Parties into the Liberal Democratic Party, and the development of long-term Diet opposition headed by the Japan Socialist Party, Japanese politics began its long run under the "1955 System." Some scholars point to Japan's alliance with the US, at the core of the "20th Century Global System," and its friendly overtures to the "Resistance System" centered on the Soviet Union, as keys to understanding Japan during this period.[1]

In this issue, however, we will focus on some of the less well understood aspects of the 1950s. This was not merely a period of political party formation and consolidation of international poles. It was also a time of change that has had a tremendous impact on the social, economic, and political environments of today.[2]

Furthermore, it has become increasingly clear that in the late 1990s, Japan is in a period of genuine political, economic, and social restructuring, to a degree casting off some of the legacies of the 1950s. In order to comprehend this process it is important to examine how these legacies were formed. We hope that this issue of *Social Science Japan* will provide some useful food for thought.

In addition, this issue will be the last under the eye of outgoing editor David Leheny, who will return to Cornell to finish his PhD dissertation. On behalf of the Institute of Social Science, I would like to thank him for his hard work and his inventiveness as editor. We wish him success and hope that our relationship with him will continue throughout his career. His successor will be Robert Hellyer of the Department of History at Stanford University. In order to give Robert some time to learn the ropes, the next issue of *Social Science Japan* will be sent in the summer.

HASHIMOTO Jurô

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[1] Scholars interested in Japan and the 20th Century System may wish to read about such concepts as the "core system" the "resistance system" in the *20 Seiki shisutemu 1: kôsô to keisei* (The Twentieth Century System, Vol. 1: Design and Formation). This series is edited by the Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo, and published by University of Tokyo Press.

[2] I discuss some of the key economic changes at greater length in my article "How and When Japanese Economic and Enterprise Systems Were Formed," in the *Japanese Yearbook of Business History* 13 (1996).

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# The Heyday of Industrial Policy Activity



Japan in the 1950s

## HASHIMOTO Jurô

**The** English language literature on Japanese Industrial Policy (abbreviated below as JIP) is dense and growing, and in this article I examine these studies. In particular, I wish to show that, regardless of the content of their arguments about the effectiveness or utility of industrial policy, they often neglect the extent to which such policies were the product of a particular era, namely from the early 1950s to the early 1960s. Correspondingly, I will ask whether articles on JIP are usually treated as aspects of postwar Japanese economic history. In future research on JIP, scholars will need to pay attention to its formation in the 1950s, and must go beyond MITI and look at how the Ministry of Transport and other ministries and agencies understood the issues and created proposals for the legislature. They must also examine how such policies were debated and amended in the Diet and the process of policy implementation.[1] And our knowledge of MITI itself is fairly dense. Between 1989 and 1992, MITI published its 17-volume *History of Internnational Trade and Industry Policy*, and will soon publish an English-language version. We need to diversify our knowledge of JIP.



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With the US Department of Commerce espousing the "Japan Inc." line and Chalmers Johnson promoting his view of the "developmental state" in *MITI and the Japanese Miracle*, in the 1970s and early 1980s American observers began to understand the Japanese economic system as differing fundamentally from that of the US. This perspective saw the government and JIP as having a major role in economic development. MITI was at the heart of these studies, with scholars pointing to its considerable power.

In part because of these works, JIP began to attract increasing amounts of attention. Many scholars and researchers had begun to investigate the various aspects of JIP in detail, and have been active in publishing the results of their studies. Recent works stress the limited effects of JIP for Japanese economic development in the postwar period, or the failure to accomplish the policy objectives set by policymakers. If the policies were functional or successful, these are increasingly taken to be the unintended consequences of policies created for other reasons.

For example, David Friedman's *The Misunderstood Miracle* looks at the Temporary Measures for the Promotion of the Machinery Industry (TMPM) and asks whether it was successful or useful in the development of the machine industry. In taking on the concrete aspects of the creation of TMPM, Friedman provides an outstanding example of a more "step-by-step" approach than that used by Johnson. Friedman's argument is in fact the antithesis of Johnson's, in that that he counters the "bureaucratic regulation thesis" with the "market regulation thesis." Building off the famous work of Michael Piore and Charles Sabel in *The Second Industrial Divide*, Friedman finds that the "politics" in Japan's industrial development was not JIP per se,

but rather the traditions and legacies that left Japan with a "flexible manufacturing system" rather than the pure "mass production system" typified in the US. From the perspective of the JIS policymakers, the development of the machine tool industry was an unintended result of their policies, since the outcome was not what they had envisioned. While this work challenges the argument of *MITI and the Japanese Miracle*, it heaps praise on Johnson's work, referring to it as "an excellent account of the internal history of the MCI (antecedent of MITI) and the bureaucratic maneuvering" within the ministry.

Friedman's position is undermined, however, by his rather narrow understanding of the conditions under which the bureaucratic regulation might be correct or incorrect. He argues "there is not a single instance, then, in which the objectives set forth in the first two five-year plans on TMPM came close to being realized, and failure of the plans can be partially explained by a consideration of how small bureaus in MIT actually manage nearly 20,500 machinery firms," and concludes that managing these firms was all but impossible. This represents a fundamental misunderstanding of JIP. "Managing all firms" has never been the goal of JIP. Rather, the study of technological levels and the provision of low-interest finance to a few leading small or medium firms has been used to help "pick up" or to stimulate a much larger number of such firms in the same industry. It has been designed to help small firms overcome limited financial resources through management guidance, in order to allow them to enter the ranks of the leading firms on the international scene. This purpose tends to be obscured by the rambling and verbose nature of policy documents and the official records of policy discussions, so it remains unclear if one sticks primarily with published materials. While the work is somewhat difficult, one can get a better sense of the purposes of JIP by concentrating especially on primary materials.[2]

Another work engaging in concrete research on industrial policy, but which differs from Friedman's, is Scott Callon's *Divided Sun*. Callon's examines industrial policy for high-tech industries, zeroing in on MITI's establishment of four "high-tech consortia" in the 1980s. In this aspect of JIP, "the role of Japanese domestic politics was almost nonexistent," but MITI's efforts to mediate interests and conflicts among firms in order to support general development resulted in "a tendency to target technologies that are soon made obsolete in the rapidly changing marketplace." This, combined with budgetary limitations, demonstrate the fundamental ineffectiveness of JIP. Callon argues "whatever the past validity of this notion of a cooperative and functional Japanese industrial policy, it is now seriously out of date." Callon's chief success is in clarifying the ineffectiveness of traditional means of development for high-tech firms, which were limited by the absence of





reliable models for imitation, making it impossible to choose an appropriate path for industrial development of leading technologies. This argument hints at cases in which JIP was useful precisely because it identified appropriate industrial models overseas, and charted a course for technological and industrial development. If this is true, it suggests how an examination of the heyday of JIP in the 1950s would be indispensable for a better understanding of the phenomenon as a whole. In this sense, Callon's work does not contradict the central gist of this article.

Daniel Okimoto's *Between MITI and the Market* preceded Callon's *Divided Sun* by six years, and it argues that "while one need not look far to find pockets of conspicuous inefficiency in the Japanese economy, many of which are either directly attributable to, or exacerbated by" JIP, MITI has often been quite successful. His appraisal of MITI's work is rather high in this regard. Okimoto argues that, in general, a country's market structure is a central determinant of industrial policy. Because of Japan's organized markets, typified by its *keiretsu*, close banking-business ties, subsidiary and subcontracting networks, "from the standpoint of implementing industrial policy, the existence of direct channels of influence is an asset of enormous importance." MITI's intervention tends to follow a curvilinear trajectory based on the industrial life cycle. Based on this, Okimoto concludes that the market-conforming methods of government intervention have "largely spared Japan the fate that has befallen most countries that have relied heavily on industrial policy."

Okimoto admits, however, that "the weight of evidence strongly suggests that industrial policy has facilitated the development of Japan's high-technology industries, but causality has yet to be proven." He argues, however, that "even if it did little or nothing to facilitate the growth of targeted sectors (which is not the case), industrial policy would still perform the indispensable function of building consensus, sustaining communication networks, maximizing the use of resources, and consolidating ties between government and private enterprise."

Callon's response is that a detailed investigation of JIP in high-tech industries, particularly for the VLSI consortia, shows that it had at best little effect. And more important than "consolidated ties between government and private enterprise" has been the market competition between rival firms.

In fact, the "consolidated ties between government and private enterprise" posited by Okimoto did exist. But, pace Okimoto, they were established in the JIP heydays of the 1950s and 1960s. Here too the 1950s loom large as a necessary object of study for any comprehensive research on JIP.

## Notes

[1] On these issues, see J. HASHIMOTO, "Government as Coordinator: The Japanese Shipping and Shipbuilding Industries." In K. OKADA and J. TERANISHI (eds.), *Foes or Friends: The World Economy in Transition, Market and Government*. Maruzen, forthcoming.

[2] J. HASHIMOTO. "Japanese Industrial Policy during Postwar Rapid Growth: A Case Study on the Extraordinary Measures Law for the Promotion of Machinery Industries." *Shakai Kagaku Kenkyû* (in Japanese) 45:4. "The Extraordinary Measures Law for the Promotion of Machinery Industries" is another translation of TMPM.

The benefits of looking carefully at the 1950s are obvious in one recent work, J. Vestal's 1993 *Planning for Change*. Vestal investigates the problems JIP was intended to solve, how it matched its means to its ends, and what kinds of tools — tax breaks, low-interest financial assistance, import restrictions, limits on foreign investment — were mobilized for JIP's goals. He also addresses how JIP was the product of a particular era, and how it was weakened in the 1960s, particularly in the late 1960s, when trade liberalization undermined some its tools. He concludes, "Japan has adopted a more Western type of industrial policy at a time when others are suggesting that Western countries increase their own use of industrial policy to more closely resemble [the Japanese style]....Japan itself no longer implements a 'Japan-style' industrial policy." In my judgment, this point is both true and well-made.

This is not to say that Vestal's work is perfect. JIP is still used to deal with potential problems in the market, such as externalities and the possibility of market failure. The Japanese economy of the 1950s had been badly damaged by war, and Vestal pays insufficient attention to how the special needs of the era, combined with the policy legacies of the wartime planned economy, created the conditions under which JIP started and succeeded. In addition, Vestal shows a keen eye in noting the importance of trade liberalization, but he is not clear about the importance to JIP's policy tools, such as the distribution of foreign exchange or of low interest financing. But these are really the result of having relied too much on secondary research materials. If the primary sources of industrial policy in the 1950s and 1960s find their way into studies of JIP, they will help to clarify the importance of JIS immediately after the war, and also of that era to our undestanding of the Japanese economy.

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# Japanese Labor in the 1950s

## Andrew GORDON

**The** Japanese experience of the 1950s began with a literal bang; explosions of war in nearby Korea jump-started the sputtering economy and caused political leaders to exult tastelessly in this "gift from the heavens." For the Japanese labor movement, the decade ended with something close to a whimper, as the massive "general confrontation of labor and capital" at the Miike mine in Kyushu ended in a major defeat for the union. In between, Japanese labor-management relations were marked by numerous sharp confrontations over both economic and political issues. On the surface, the two sides were sharply at odds in every instance, and unions failed in virtually all their major strikes, at least in the large-scale, private sector firms employing primarily men. But behind the scenes, corporate managers forged an enduring alliance with the "cooperative wing" of the labor movement in the automobile industry, in iron and steel, in electronics, in shipbuilding, and many others. The informal networks that developed among these cooperative factions at different workplaces eventually came together in the Japan Council of the International Metalworkers Federation (IMF-JC) in 1964, and they later spearheaded the drive to form the new national center, Rengo, in the 1980s.

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The broad outlines and many details of this story are well known among Japanese scholars of industrial relations in various disciplines. Some lament that the labor militance and radicalism of the 1950s gave way to a far more cooperative (or coopted) labor unionism in the ensuing decades, while others argue that cooperative unions gained a more formal, instutionalized and substantial voice than their predecessors. It would probably be fair to say that earlier generations of labor specialists on the faculty at the Institute of Social Science fell into the former group and increased numbers of current faculty share the latter perspective.

Without entering this debate directly, I would argue that however one evaluates the pros and cons of the shift, one must recognize both continuities and a legacy of the 1950s even as the dominant pattern of industrial relations steadily shifted away from confrontation to cooperation in later decades.

The argument about continuity works as follows. Militant unions in the 1950s argued that the company existed to provide a livelihood to its members and their families, not the reverse, that jobs for men were to be protected at all costs, that pay ought to reflect need-related factors such as age and rise predictably with seniority. To achieve these results, unions encouraged organizing from the base of the workplace aiming to win a voice in decisions at work. This unionism tried to set independent standards for work conditions that would take precedence over pursuit of profit. It

## Further Reading

Andrew Gordon's fortcoming book *The Wages of Affluence: Labor and Management in Postwar Japan* (Harvard University Press), examines the transformation of Japanese industrial relations from the late 1940s through the present. For additional information on postwar labor issues in Japan, see:

John PRICE. *Japan Works* (Cornell University Press, 1996).

KUMAZAWA Makoto. *Portraits of the Japanese Workplace* (Westview Press, 1996).

Sheldon GARON and Mike MOCHIZUKI. "Social Contracts" in *Postwar Japan as History*, Andrew Gordon ed., (University of California Press, 1993).

assumed that the interests of workers and capitalists were opposed, conflict was natural. But it also argued that the long-term objective of organized employees was to share or control managerial functions.

The new sort of unionism that triumphed by the 1960s differed in important ways. Its advocates agreed with corporate managers that the good of the company coincided with the good of all its members and of society at large. The interests of workers and managers, of labor and capital, were in basic accord, and they should jointly discuss ways to maximize the corporate good and the good of all. Unions had a legitimate role as watchdog, but the resort to open conflict was destructive. Efficiency, quality, and productivity were sacred values, and rewards to workers should reflect the value they gave to the company. Those men who made a full commitment to the company should be looked after to the best of a corporation's ability, and the proper role for women was to help them offer this commitment. The active participation of all members of the corporate community would help the company, the society and the nation.

Despite obvious differences, an important continuity linking these two sorts of unionism is the desire to participate in managerial decision making. Both the adherents of the unionism ascendant in the 1950s as well as supporters of a later "cooperative" union philosophy have sought a voice over decisions to close down worksites or bring new facilities on line, whether by taking public stands of "absolute" opposition or through increasingly elaborate institutions of "consultation." To put it in comparative terms, they both differ sharply from the workers at English Electric, studied by Ronald Dore in the 1960s, who almost unanimously rejected the idea that unions should have a strong voice over such matters [*British Factory-Japanese Factory*, pp. 217-18].

The equally important point concerning a legacy of the unionism of the 1950s is a bit different. Even in its diminished state as minority, the militant and sometimes radical unionist forces have long remained significant as an uninvited guest who might return to demand a set at the bargaining table. The fear that harsh unilateral cutbacks might breath new life into the older unionism has surely been one factor helping subsequent unions reach agreements to protect some jobs during times of retrenchment or technological innovation in merely "consultative" settings.

Finally, I should stress that much remains to be understood about Japanese social and political history of the 1950s. Particularly intriguing to me is the disjunction between the failures of most all unions in male-dominated





private sector firms to win their struggles, and the successes in several instances of collective action in industries with significant proportions of women: textile workers in 1954, bank workers in the mid-1950s, and hospital workers from 1960-61. This contrast calls into question an easy assumption that laboring men enjoyed greater social and political power than working women in the 1950s, and ought to be examined further.

## New Books

### •*Sentan gijutsu to chiteki zaisanken*

(Advanced Technology and Intellectual Property Rights)

*By* NAKAGAWA Junji and SANO Minoru

Tokyo: Nikkagiren Shuppansha, 1997

ISBN4-8171-6213-9

### •*Sengo nihon no shitsugyô taisaku: Kyûzaigata kôkyô doboku jigyô no shiteki bunseki*

(Unemployment Measures in Prewar Japan: A Historical Analysis of Public Works Stimulus Packages)

*By* KASE Kazutoshi

Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Hyôronsha, 1998. 470pp.

ISBN 4-8188-0967

# From Feminisms to Femininities:

## *Fujin kôron and the Fifties*

**Beth KATZOFF**

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**In** the late 1940s and 1950s, the monthly women's magazine *Fujin kôron* (Women's Review) focused on issues affecting Japanese women as citizens of a newly conceived modern nation. First published in January, 1916, on the heels of the general magazine *Chûô kôron, Fujin kôron* was reissued in April, 1946, after a two-year hiatus during the Asia-Pacific War. In its revived form, *Fujin kôron* drew upon its liberal history while committing itself to a new openness in intellectual discourse. By the late fifties, however, the magazine included fewer articles concerning women's liberation or women's participation in politics and more that would "help" women to become "feminine." Its content reflected a shift toward the "lighter" reading found within most women's magazines, or, in other words, a move from targeting enlightenment to promoting entertainment.

Women's magazines constituted a signficant market for early postwar periodicals. By 1958, *Fujin kôron* remained the representative critical magazine for women with a circulation of 260,000 at good times, although the popular *Shufu no tomo, Fujin kurabu, Shufu to seikatsu*, and *Fujin seikatsu* each sold 500,000-600,000 copies both home and abroad.[1] Every issue of *Fujin kôron* featured at least one symposium in which a group of men and women from various professional backgrounds discussed a particular subject with a moderator. By the end of the fifties, there were two or three symposia per issue, in which at least one topic was related to entertainment and the arts. Topics included: war, peace, technology, science, politics, prostitution, children, marriage, housewives, new religions, working women, and the general pursuit of happiness.

Women gained the right to vote in December 1945, and in April 1946, thirty-nine women were elected to the upper house of the Diet. In *Fujin kôron's* first postwar issue of the same month and year, YAMAKAWA Kikue (1890-1980), the socialist feminist who had written in *Fujin kôron* in the prewar period (and in numerous other publications), wrote about the significance of such a victory. Yamakawa presented women's suffrage as the symbol of freedom of speech for both women and men. Yet she also noted how difficult it was for women because they had no experience with this new right/responsibility. She blamed women's ignorance of politics on the Japanese militaristic government. Urging women to act now and to understand later, Yamakawa saw women's participation in politics through voting as a crucial contribution to democratic free speech.[2]

Two months later, writer MIYAMOTO Yuriko (1899-1951) frankly condemned the elections as a farce in which women were not treated as equal representatives. Miyamoto wrote: "only now do we realize that what the established political party demands from women representatives is that they add a bit of color to their public relations. They do not expect women's





social and political growth, nor do they hope for women's substantial participation in politics."[3] For Miyamoto, the newly obtained suffrage for women and women's political participation as candidates were not the ultimate goals for feminism, but rather, places in which further discussion of equal rights for women could take place.

In the midst of a worlwide arms race, a cold war between the countries with nuclear capabilities, and the outbreak of a hot war in Japan's former colony of Korea in 1950, Japanese women took particular interest in securing peace. In July 1948, Miyamoto called for women's active participation in the peace movement. Denying women's wartime responsibility, she grieved that women had to deal with the legacies of a war they did not create:

> In the midst of the history of the Second World War, the Japanese women's situation was truly frustrating. As domestic wives and mothers...they could not oppose this war....It was in essence an inhumane fascist war, and, unknowingly, women were forced to bear a heavy burden. Japanese women — including the more than 600,000 widows — have the right to express their desires for securing peace.[4]

*Fujin kôron* printed many articles about peace, portraying Japanese women as victims of the war. Women were considered to have a special duty to promote peace based on their experiences as mothers. While mothers were encouraged to sacrifice their sons for the Empire during the Asia-Pacific War, mothers were encouraged to oppose the inhumanity of war after the defeat. The concept of maternalism — that motherhood distinguished women socially as well as biologically from men — was now used to foster a feminist peace movement rather than serving as a justification for women's participation in the politics of war.

Most articles in *Fujin kôron* were concerned with how women's personal happiness could be reconciled with social realities. Amidst the food shortages, unemployment, and rise in inflation in the early postwar years, *Fujin kôron* offered practical advice and debate. One noteworthy controversy was the so-called "housewife dispute," which began in February 1955, with ISHIGAKI Ayako's critique of housewives who focused on their "second job" rather than pursuing a more meaningful career, "a first job." Ishigaki's essay mourned women's loss of enthusiasm toward their lives, and suggested that they work outside the home.[5]

Despite interest in feminist liberation, *Fujin kôron* was also preoccupied with women's beauty. Designer fashion had come to Japan in 1947, with Tokyo women dressed in Christian Dior suits and sporting permanent wave hairstyles, which had been banned during the war because they were

## Notes

[1] *Shuppan nenkan 1955* (Publising Yearbook 1955). Tokyo: Shuppan Nyûsusha, 1955, p. 1639.

[2] YAMAKAWA Kikue, "Kaihô no teimei ni tachite" (Standing at the Dawn of Liberation), *Fujin kôron*, Tokyo: Chûô kôronsha, April 1946, pp. 28-32.

[3] MIYAMOTO Yuriko, "The Lesson of One Vote," *Fujin kôron* (June 1946), quoted in MATSUDA Fumiko, *Fujin kôron no gojûnen* (Fifty Years of *Fujin kôron*), Tokyo: Chûô kôronsha, 1965, p. 178.

[4] MIYAMOTO Yuriko, "Responsibility for Peace," *Fujin kôron* (July 1948), quoted in Matsuda, op. cit., p. 210.

[5] ISHIGAKI Ayako, "Shufu to iu dai-ni shokugyôron" (On the Question of the Second Job Known as Housewife), *Fujin kôron* (February 1955), pp. 48-53.

considered to be self-indulgent.[6] The fashion industry began to take off in the early fifties, with the earliest fashion models turning professional in 1951.[7] In 1953, a nationwide fashion boom coincided with the selection of the Japanese entrant to the Miss Universe Contest. Beginning in 1955, articles in *Fujin kôron* declared that *onnarashisa*, or femininity, was the goal of most women.[8] According to Ronald DORE's surveys of Japanese women in the 1950s, femininity was represented through such terms as "quiet," "reserved," "obedient," "submissive," "loyal," modest," and "gentle," although these were recognized as being somewhat "old-fashioned" in outlook. The new *onnarashisa* was very much based on the old norms coupled with a new directness, strength of character, and individuality.[9]

The epitome of the shift in *Fujin kôron's* policy from educating its readers about progressive issues to creating an ideal femininity is evident in the "Miss *Fujin kôron*" contest held in Tokyo on May 8, 1958. The winners were selected based on their appearance and their intelligence. The magazine claimed that after forty years of publishing they needed to create a "fresh spirit" and that a beauty contest would create the more "feminine" reputation they sought.

In addition to magazine content, *Fujin kôron's* editorial policies moved from a leftist intellectual approach in the early postwar period to a more "balanced," or "democratic" approach, beginning in 1957. In that year, HATONAKA Koji became chief editor, moving over from *Chûô kôron*. In order to attract a younger and wider readership, the magazine no longer targeted intellectuals, instead adopting a more youthful style. It was not until September 1958 that *Fujin kôron* had a female editor, SAEGUSA Saeko. A writer for the magazine since 1947, Saegusa added more "how-to" style columns and increased the number of articles related to humor, art, and entertainment.[10] This "democratic" policy sought to maintain Fujin kôron's market position, as the magazine faced intense competition from the newly introduced weekly magazines, such as *Shûkan josei* (1957), *Shûkan myôjo* (1958), and, later, *Josei sebun* (1963).[11] These magazines very much focused on fashion, style, and celebrity gossip, and *Fujin kôron's* shift in this direction in essence meant that the magazine's editors believed that the interests of its female readers would no longer sustain a forum for progressive ideas.

Although the women's liberation movement in the 1970s (*uman ribu*) was accompanied by a proliferation of women's magazines, these were largely insulated from the movement. The implicit connection between popular women's periodicals and the progressive ideas that *Fujin kôron* promoted soon after the war ended in the 1950s. Today, *Fujin kôron* is primarily read by mature middle-class women and is arguably no longer a forum for debate about progressive issues.

## Notes (continued)

[6] *Showa 2 man nichi no zen kiroku* (The Showa Era, Day by Day) Vol. 9 (Showa 25-27). Tokyo: Kodansha, 1989, p. 158.

[7] Ibid., Vol. 10 (Showa 28-30), p. 88.

[8] In the February 1956 symposium, "What is the New *Onnarashisa*?" for example, women professors, factory workers, journalists, waitresses, and others discussed *onnarashisa*, with some calling it an "imposed femininity." The general consensus was that women had not had time to be concerned with such things as their beauty, fashion, and manners during the war and reconstruction, but in the present period of the economic boom, they could develop their *onnarashisa*.

[9] Ronald DORE. City Life in Japan. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958, p. 187.

[10] Matsuda, op. cit., p. 240.

[11] INOUE Teruko, "Women's Magazines," *Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan*, Vol. 8. Tokyo: Kodansha Ltd., 1983, p. 268.

# The Toyota System in the 1950s

## FUJIMOTO Takahiro

**If** one takes the Toyota Motor Corporation as representative of successful Japanese manufacturing enterprises in the second half of the 20th century, it is important to go back and examine the 1950s, the very beginning of this half of the century. Toyota had been established back in the 1930s, but the foundations of its competitiveness grew between 1945 and 1960. What characterized Toyota was "improvement without mass production."

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In 1950, Toyota's industrial production was limited to roughly 10,000 trucks per year, and was substantially below its prewar peak. The company also faced major strikes in 1950, and appeared to be on the edge of banruptcy. At the opposite end of the 1950s, Toyota completed its first mass production assembly factory in Motomachi, but the company rolled out only about 100,000 units that year. In other words, the 1950s was a "pre-mass production" period for Toyota, preceding the era of motorization and rapid production growth after the 1960s. This period, however, also witnessed major improvements in its manufacturing systems.

Toyota had, during a period of insufficient capital and facilities in the late 1940s, been aiming at producing 1000 vehicles per month; it thus focused its efforts on improving its productivity without large-scale investment in plant and equipment. Therefore, the improvements that characterized this period reflected "soft" rather than "hard" changes, including the establishment of standard operating procedures, the levelization of the production rate, the introduction of the product-flow layout, and multi-task assignments in job designs. In 1948-1949, however, Toyota found its finished goods inventory piling up due to the Dodge Line recession. The company tried to weather the crisis by cutting back on 2000 jobs, but the large-scale labor conflicts in 1950 made this course problematic. With the experience of this crisis, Toyota charted a course for a new labor policy for stable, long-term employment, as well as "limited-volume production," or the production of only what the company predicted it could sell.

The company's fortunes were aided by the outbreak of the Korean War; Toyota's increased production leaned heavily on the supply of its trucks to the American armed forces during the conflict. However, Toyota could not afford to make massive capital investment, so it expanded production volume with existing prewar equipment, and with an unchanged level of employment. Thus, with the experience of labor conflicts and previous cutbacks, Toyota concentrated on improving productivity without increases in employment, and fixed upon the idea of "limited-volume production" as its main instrument against recession.

Immediately after the end of the labor discussions, TOYODA Eiji, SAITÔ Shôichi, and other Toyota leaders traveled to the US, where they visited such factories as Ford's River Rouge plant. Having had this experience, Toyoda and Saito returned to Japan and initiated the Production Facility Modernization Five-Year Plan (1951-1955). Replacing outmoded equipment and increasing mechanization, the company, with this plan, aimed at doubling production capacity, to reach the 3000 units-per-vehicle level. Toyoda Eiji himself was furthermore impressed with the large conveyer line at Ford, and instituted both conveyer-driven belt production lines and standardized palette boxes.

One additional practice Toyota learned from Ford at this time was the suggestion box system, which Toyoda and Saitô introduced to their company upon their return. Furthermore, they introduced the American concept of TWI (Training Within Industry), which was supposed to educate managers, factory heads, and foremen with regard to the Taylorist notion of "scientific production." A training program focusing on continuous production improvement activity within the factory itself was an integral part of the TWI conception. After 1955, it was made clear within Toyota that activities for improvement (*kaizen*) were the responsibility of foremen and work group leaders.

On the other hand, while quality control training began in 1953 for assistant managers and work group leaders, Total Quality Control (TQC) was not instituted on a company-wide basis until the 1960s. Furthermore, in the second half of the 1950s, the Small-Medium Business Agency reported that quality control of some of its *keiretsu* suppliers was insufficient; Toyota had to respond by systematizing assessments and diagnoses of production problems at *keiretsu* firms. There is another report, however, that Toyota's product quality had already reached the internationally competitive level, as far as trucks were concerned, by the end of the 1950s.

The well-known "just in time" (JIT) concept had actually developed been formed before the war by the firm's founder, TOYODA Kiichirô, but the *Kanban* method itself was introduced only from the late 1950s. In fact, it was called the "supermarket system" at that time. It has been reported that the *kanban* system was first floated as an idea in a 1949 memo, but was not acknowledged in tax accounts until later, so its introduction was delayed.

Changes in labor relations also occurred during the late 1950s, but because these are being covered in another article in this issue (See Andrew Gordon's article in this issue), I will not discuss them here.

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



In 1959, with these changes in production underway, Toyota created the Motomachi plant, Japan's first high-volume assembly factory specially designed for passenger automobiles. This factory consolidated all aspects of vehicle assembly, from press and welding to painting and final assembly. In this regard, it would match the typical size of the mass production factories in the US. Other practices that have characterized the Toyota-style manufacturing system, like TQC, target costing, the diffusion of design-in parts transactions, subassembly delivery of components, *kanban* and JIT systems were not introduced on a company-wide scale until after the 1960s.

To sum up, the 1950s, for Toyota, was the era of small-volume truck production prior to the stage of mass production and rapid growth. But it is undeniable that the Toyota System that enabled it to develop rapidly in the 1960s had its roots in the 1950s. The soberminded work in this period that actualized the firm's "productivity increase without mass production" system (in some shops, productivity is said to have improved tenfold between 1945 and 1955), together with the company's subsequent expansion after the 1960s, provided a solid basis for Toyota's continuing international competitiveness.

## New on the Bookshelves...

### *20 Seiki shisutemu 1: Kôsô to keisei*

(The 20th Century Global System: Design and Formation)

Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo (ed.).

Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1998.

*Featuring articles by:*

HASHIMOTO Jurô, FUJIWARA Kiichi, FURUYA Jun, WADA Haruki, BANNO Junji, HIRAISHI Naoaki, TANAKA Takahiko, KOBAYASHI Jôji, NAKAGAWA Junji.

ISS CONTEMPORARY JAPAN GROUP

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*The ISS Contemporary Japan Group serves as a forum to provide foreign researchers at the Institute with critical feedback on their work. It also often invites non-affiliated scholars to present their research. Researchers visiting Tokyo are most welcome to attend Group meetings. Contact Associate Professor HIWATARI Nobuhiro (hiwatari@iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp) or MIYAOKA Isao (miyaoka@iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp).*

## Battles over Bad Blood: Has Anything Been Learned from the HIV Scandals?

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*November 19, 1997*

**PLACING** Japan in an explicitly comparative context, Dr. Feldman provided a detailed report on the scandal regarding the Ministry of Health and Welfare's handling of HIV-tainted blood supplies, a scandal that led Minister KAN Naoto to offer a public apology to hemophiliacs infected with the virus. Although he carefully noted the many steps at which Japan might have opted earlier to use heat-treated blood products, thus saving many of the victims from HIV infection, Dr. Feldman pointed out that this scandal is hardly unique to Japan. Many observers have pointed to this case as being a classic example of the overly close ties between bureaucrats and industry in Japan; without minimizing the appalling choices that made this possible, Dr. Feldman argued that the same kind of scandal has occurred with distressing ubiquity in most of the advanced industrial countries.

## Change for the Sake of No Change: The Domestic Consequences of the Regionalization of the Japanese Economy

Walter HATCH
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*Keio University*

*December 4, 1997*

**Mr. Hatch**, the co-author (with Kozo YAMAMURA) of *Asia in Japan's Embrace* (Cambridge University Press, 1996), took up some of the issues in his book, but applied a new framework emphasizing the domestic roots and consequences of Japan's overseas investment and assistance in Asia. Arguing that overseas investment and regionalization of production reflect an effort to protect and even to expand some of the characteristics of Japan's economic system, Mr. Hatch traced the regional development of Japan's production alliances, employment systems, and other features of the economy. Rather than merely retrenching in the face of international competitive pressures, Japanese firms and the Japanese government are using overseas investment and aid to provide some breathing room that will sustain Japan's economic institutions.

## *Contested Norms: The International Politics of Whaling*


**Christine INGEBRITSEN**
*Assistant Professor*
*Department of Scandinavian Studies*
*Adjunct Assistant Professor*
*Department of Political Science*
*University of Washington*


*December 11, 1997*

**Professor** Ingebritsen's analysis of the international politics of whaling focused on the creation of norms governing what states can and cannot do. Facing increased pressure from countries like the US, where whaling is illegal, countries like Japan, Norway, and Iceland have attempted to shift the terms of debate in order to ensure that whaling actually fits within international norms of environmental conservation and scientific exploration. By invoking historical and cultural factors that have supported whaling, monitoring whale populations to make whaling sustainable, and combining whaling activities with scientific exploration of whales, these countries contest the international norms regarding the practice.

## *The Big Send-Off: Identity Politics in Japan's Outbound Tourism*


**David LEHENY**
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*Cornell University*


*January 21, 1998*



**Mr. Leheny** began his talk by asking why the Japanese government in 1987 made the decision to promote outbound tourism, making a target of ten million overseas travelers per year within five years. Although there are a number of obvious reasons why the government would have wanted to create the policy (to reduce the trade surplus, to support Japanese firms hoping to expand abroad, etc.), it was a policy option that would have been unavailable to policymakers in many other advanced industrial countries. Leheny argued that the policy was possible in Japan because of an institutional environment in Japan that gives the state a place in the leisure activities of citizens, and also in determining how Japan should be exposed to international influences and experiences.

# The Bureaucratic System in the 1950s

MAKIHARA Izuru

**For** Japan, the 1950s was characterized by tremendous change on a number of fronts. On the international scene, Japan's diplomatic independence was followed by the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration, and then the revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty. In domestic politics, the Occupation ended, followed by the consolidation of conservative party power under the Liberal Democratic Party, and then to the stability of the Ikeda cabinet. And the economic policy moved from reconstruction, to a period of "stop and go" cycles, and then to Ikeda's famous Income Doubling Plan.

Contemporary political appraisals of Japan from the 1950s can roughly be divided into two camps. One tended to concentrate on the "reverse course" created in policies by the ruling LDP, designed to countermand some of the Occupation reforms, and on the harsh resistance by progressive forces empowered by these reforms. The second examined how, alongside the 1955 combination of the Liberal and Democratic parties and the linking of the left and right factions of the Socialist Party, Japanese pressure groups were created through the "organizing tendency" of the society. The former group correspondingly would later see Japan's economic course in the 1960s and onward as reflecting the shift in leadership styles from highly conservative Prime Minister KISHI Nobusuke, ousted in the AMPO riots of 1960, to his successor, IKEDA Hayato. To the second camp, the economic course could be explained only with reference to the oligopolistic character of Japan in the 1960s, and how this helped to strengthen centralized power under the bureaucrats. As a result, both of these approaches have been showered with criticism from the pluralist school, which pays attention to the diversification of political parties and the growth of social movements in the 1960s. The pluralist scholars, however, have not written analyses that pry into policymaking under bureaucratic dominance in the 1950s. Furthermore, although the pluralists have emphasized the development of the *zoku* (policy tribes) and the growing inclusiveness of the LDP as the grounds for a party-centered framework, they neglect to examine any transformation in the bureaucratic system that might allow for an overall change in the character of politics. A structural analysis of changes in Japanese politics must examine how the bureaucracy has changed.

In so doing, it is useful to consider how the different theories noted above might conceptualize such transformations. The "reverse course" school, for example, would concentrate on how the functions — i.e., policing, eduction, regional administration, etc. — of ministries related to the prewar Home Ministry (*naimushô*) were redistributed and reconstituted after the MHA was dismantled under the Occupation. Conversely, the "organizing tendency" school would examine how associations for agriculture and small-medium businesses, among others, formed economic groups with policy clout. We thus need to separate analytically the transformation of the MHA-style bureaucracies from that of the economic bureaucracies.

The end of the Occupation meant, among other things, the first time that the new Japanese Constitution was used substantively. The former MHA





functions as well as the distribution of power between the center and the local governments thus became problematic. More specifically, the structure and maintenance of institutions for order — notably the police and the military — became one serious issue. Another was the proposal to the Diet of the abrogation of public elections for local Boards of Education and the reform of the prefecture system. Because these were regarded as constitutional problems, the conservative LDP — which favored Constitutional revision — and the progressive parties that defended the constitution clashed with one another. Ultimately, the National Public Safety Commission and the Defense Agency became independent bureaus of the Prime Minister's Office, while the latter powers were held by the governors and local leaders. In order to consolidate these, some suggested the creation of regional governance (*dôshûsei*) while others proposed the reconstruction of the Home Ministry (*naiseishô*), but both of these efforts were fruitless. As a result, central policymaking and personnel authority are incomplete, and some power for the governors has been secured.

The economic ministries, on the other hand, were not as affected by the Occupation. As Chalmers JOHNSON's *MITI and the Japanese Miracle* points out with regard to the conflict between the "international" and "domestic" factions of the Ministry of Trade and Industry, policy directions were often determined by factional disputes within the ministries. These factional differences were themselves the products of different wartime career patterns of the figures involved. The international faction in MITI, for example, included figures who were dispatched to the Cabinet and participated in the Materials Mobilization Plan. The domestic faction, symbolized by SABASHI Shigeru, had generally been *genkyoku-man* ("bureau man") bureaucrats, who had built their careers within several bureaus (*genkyoku*) dedicated to the protection and development of one particular industry. In other words, the internationalists tended to have a cross-jurisdictional perspective, while the domesticists worked to protect the exclusivity of the organization, and this distinction was important in different ministries.

In the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, for example, had a "Materials Mobilization" faction and an "agricultural policy" faction.The Ministry of Finance similarly witnessed a split during a foreign currency crisis between those who had been dispatched during or after the war to the Cabinet and had learned Keynesian deficit-spending techniques, like SHIMOMURA Osamu of the Secretariat's Research Division, and the career officials of the Budget Bureau. In the midst of this crisis in 1953, the Secretariat bureaucrats managed to overcome resistance from the Budget Bureau officials with little experience outside the ministry, and pressed ahead with the "one trillion yen" budget campaign, and established themselves as leaders of the budget-setting process. Himself influenced by Shimomuira and the other brains in the secretariat campaign, future Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato developed some of the ideas that would later gel as the Income Doubling Plan.

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As a result, policymaking authority shifted: for domestic policy, to local or regional leaders, and for economic policy, to the Minister's Secretariat of individual ministries. There were a number of efforts to consolidate a decisionmaking framework, by centralizing domestic policy authority or by establishing a greater core for economic policymaking (see Aoki, 1988, Chapter 7, for a discussion).

For example, the "new centralization" movements of individual ministries and agencies in the 1960s sought to establish authority over local governments in given policy areas. In opposition, heads of reforming localities made clear their leadership by initiating rapid and successive policy changes. The Ikeda and Sato cabinets, in order to overcome this opposition, began to initiate policy changes through budgeting and National Land Plans, which helped to blunt the autonomy of local leaders. The Tanaka cabinet would adopt this policy wholesale. LDP *zoku* politicians thus began their perhaps overly close relationships with ministries as a consequence, so that they would have some access.

Similarly, under the pressure of economic internationalization, "structural policy" under bureaucratic guidance developed, symbolized in part by the Basic Agricultural Law and the Draft Law of Special Measures for the Promotion of Designated Industries (*tokushin-hô*). Because these were established by the "domestic" and "agricultural policy" factions (both of them *genkyoku* bureaucrats) of the ministries, efforts to link them under broad national goals were frustrated by the factions' determination to protect specific industries. Consequently, the secretariat bureaucrats and external policy experts began to create a framework that would allow for a longer-term perspective on policy that would focus on the needs of the country as a whole. Under Prime Minister Sato, this included the use of intellectuals and experts in private discussion organs, which developed into the policy discussion councils (*shingikai*) we know today under the Ohira and Nakasone cabinets.

As future research topics, studies of change in the bureaucratic system will have to address the use of National Land Plans and related budgeting, as well as the development and role of the *shingikai*, in efforts to consolidate a decision-making framework.

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# Manufacturing Desire:

## The "Electrical Lifestyle" and the Nurturing of the Japanese Consumer


### Simon PARTNER


**The** 1950s are generally recognized as a period of economic recovery. The comment in the 1955 Economic White Paper that "It is no longer the post-war" is now known by every Japanese schoolchild. This statement was intended to indicate that all the major economic indices - production, incomes, and standard of living - had returned to or surpassed their prewar level.

But the nature of Japan's economic recovery is much less well understood. Influential scholars have pointed to the "priority production system" of the early postwar years; to the guiding hand of MITI which became a "virtuoso player" on the instruments of economic control; and to the suppression of consumer demand in favor of upstream industries.[1] Indeed, it has become virtually a cliché that economic growth in the 1950s was based on prioritizing production and industry at the expense of consumption.

This was far from being the case. The 1950s was perhaps the most revolutionary decade in all of Japan's modern history, precisely because it heralded the era of mass consumption in Japan. The contrast between the impenetrable gloom of analysts looking at Japan's prospects in 1950, and the bemused commentaries on Japan's "consumer revolution" of a decade later, is nothing short of astounding. Nowhere is this revolutionary change in lifestyles more evident than in the amazingly rapid spread of electrical goods ownership, including televisions, washing machines, and refrigerators. Indeed, the creation of consumer demand for electrical goods in a society that seemed much too poor for such luxuries was the vital precondition for the subsequent stellar rise of Japan's electrical goods industry.

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**The Prospects in 1950**

In 1950, annual per capita income in Japan was \$97 (at the prevailing exchange rate of ¥360=\$1). The wages of a typical "middle class" salaried employee in Tokyo were approximately \$600 per year - still woefully inadequate to procure the benefits of a consumer lifestyle. By contrast, a television set in 1953, when television broadcasting was launched in Japan, cost \$470 including luxury tax. It is not surprising that both General Douglas MacARTHUR and Prime Minister YOSHIDA Shigeru gave a cold reception to early overtures for the introduction of television. Japan, which was pleading dire poverty to avoid massive reparations payments, could not afford such a "luxury."

But when restrictions on foreign travel were relaxed in 1950, Japanese executives who made the pilgrimage to America in search of the keys to that nation's amazing prosperity came to a very different conclusion. America, they concluded, was enjoying unprecedented affluence precisely because of the power and influence of the consumer. "The consumer is king!" trumpeted returning executives, as they turned their attention to the knotty problem of how to create a similar consumer-oriented boom in Japan. MATSUSHITA Kônosuke, founder of the Matsushita Electrical Industrial

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ISHIKAWA Hiroyoshi. *Yokubô no sengoshi* [A Postwar History of Desire]. Tokyo: Kôsaidô Shuppan, 1989.

Company, traveled to America in January 1951. When he visited a vacuum factory, he commented:

> Newly hired female factory workers are paid $55 for a five-day week, or $230 a month. If you calculate that in yen, it comes to ¥82,800, equivalent to the salary of a company president. Right now in America, about 80% of the people belong to the middle class. I feel now that I understand well what this means, and I feel painfully that I would like Japan to get to that point as soon as possible. I am constantly thinking that there must be a way of achieving that.

### The Keys to Prosperity

As a result of these perceptions, Japanese managers in the early 1950s began an unprecedented effort to reproduce the "keys" to American prosperity in Japan. Central to their effort was the introduction of the latest technologies of demand-creation, including marketing and advertising.

This was not just the project of a few visionary business leaders. The movement to introduce demand-creating technologies into Japan was a part of a massive, concerted program of technology introduction that was sponsored by Japanese and American business as well as the two countries' respective governments. Among the best-known oucomes was the introduction of advanced product technologies into Japan, including the latest television, radar, and transistor technologies.

Less well-known are the accompanying efforts to introduce management technologies, including marketing. These efforts were undertaken independently by companies, but also concertedly through the activities of the Japan Productivity Center (JPC), a US-government funded organization that during the 1950s sent a total of 4,000 business and labor leaders to America to study the mechanisms of American management. "Productivity" at the time had a much wider compass than its relatively narrow definition today: Toshiba president ISHIZAKA Taizo, who led the first group to the US, defined his mission as nothing less than to investigate "why the US economy continues to be so prosperous, and what are the underlying causes [of American prosperity]." The third group to cross the Pacific went specifically to study marketing, and the JPC's magazine, *Manejimento*, took marketing as one of its key themes.

### The Technologies of Desire

Electrical goods companies faced a challenge in creating demand for new products that their American mentors did not have to worry about. Ordinary Japanese people still lacked many of the bare essentials of life, including food, clothing, and adequate housing. Against this background, persuading people to buy high-priced convenience goods was a hard sell. Japanese companies used every tool at their disposal to generate demand for their products, and their success is a tribute to the insidious power of the technologies of desire.





At the highest level, electrical goods companies worked to create an ideology that would foster the purchase of electrical products. Several of them seized on the slogan "The Bright Life" to symbolize the lifestyle they wished to promote. The "Bright Life" was thoroughly Western - advertising materials uniformly portray permed and befrocked housewives greeting their besuited husbands with bright smiles - and it represented the scientific and rational, in contrast to the "feudal" traditions of conservative Japan. There is a great deal of irony in the constant emphasis on scientific rationality (as for example in the weighty scientific analyses of the calories saved by using an electric washing machine as opposed to washing by hand). Electrical goods companies' internal research indicated that the decision to buy a product like a television or washing machine was in fact highly irrational: it was often made on the spur of the moment, and it was most often precipitated by the youngest members of the family. This process is illustrated in the Ozu film *Ohayô* (1958) in which two children go on a prolonged strike until their parents buy them a television.

The close ties of electrical goods companies with the burgeoning mass media, and the extraordinary boom in advertising, which grew to 1.5% of GDP in 1959 (nine times the 1953 ratio), were supported by large investments in the distribution and financing of electrical goods. In particular, installment lending grew enormously during the decade, with loan payments totalling 5% of GDP by 1960. Adding loan payments to cash purchases, the typical household was spending 11% of its income on durable goods purchases in 1960.

**The Costs of the "Bright Life"**

What were the opinions of the consumers themselves in the midst of all this campaigning? The evidence is that people were, rightly, very sceptical about the benefits of electrical goods to their lifestyles, particularly given the real hardships that accompanied daily life throughout the decade. The few "raw" opinions that find their way into the ideologically saturated media often question the benefits of entertainment products such as television, and "convenience" products such as washing machines and refrigerators. Washing machines saved labor, yes, but what was the benefit of that when unskilled labor cost only ¥40 ($0.11) an hour? Refrigerators preserved food, but was that really necessary when most shops delivered to customers daily?

The government, too, was concerned at the high proportion of incomes spent on electrical products. The 1960 White Paper on National Life commented on the situation of "imbalance" that had arisen in Japanese lifestyles, as 60% of urban families owned televisions, but - in a reflection of the continuing abysmal housing conditions - only 13% were connected to sewer mains. It is an imbalance that has continued to the present day.

## Notes

[1] NAKAMURA Takafusa, *The Postwar Japanese Economy* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1981), p. 39; Chalmers JOHNSON, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982), p. 201; Merton PECK and Shûji TAMURA, "Technology," *Asia's new Giant: How the Japanese Economy Works*, Ed. Hugh PATRICK and Henry ROSOVSKY (Washington: the Brookings Institution, 1976) p. 553.

# Against the Grain:

## Prime Minister Ishibashi Tanzan and the 'China Question'

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**That** in December 1956 a man of ISHIBASHI Tanzan's liberal and 'pan-Asianist' persuasions should have made it to the top of Tokyo's greasy pole often comes as a surprise to those unfamiliar with 1950s Japan. It speaks volumes for the unpredictability of LDP politics during the early years of the "1955 System," and for the discomfiture still widely felt at Japan's role in the US security structure.

The political uncertainty following the end of the Cold War has sparked renewed interest in Ishibashi's diplomatic principles, what MASUDA Hiroshi has called his "little Japanism" (*Shônihonshugi*).[1] That ill health should have forced his resignation after just 66 days in office has prompted much speculation on what might have been, but here we will concentrate on the diplomatic record and Ishibashi's foreign policy priority, namely, resolving the "China question."

As an economic journalist on the Liberal *Tôyô Keizai Shinpô*, Ishibashi had long been an outspoken critic of Japanese imperialism in China. Japan's "Twenty-One Demands" of 1915 became a formative event in Ishibashi's thinking and he remained a small thorn in the government's side throughout the Asia-Pacific War. Attempting to put his Keynesian principles into practice, as Finance Minister in YOSHIDA Shigeru's first cabinet, resulted in Ishibashi being purged in 1947 (perhaps with Yoshida's collusion.) He returned as HATOYAMA Ichirô's Trade Minister in December 1954, retaining the post through two cabinet reshuffles, while actively promoting improved relations with the PRC. Thus when Ishibashi pulled off an upset victory, overturning KISHI Nobusuke's 72-vote lead in the first ballot to win the first real LDP presidential election by just seven votes, it was widely assumed that he would move quickly to normalize relations with Beijing.

American disappointment at Ishibashi's elevation was manifest, for here was a Japanese leader they might not be able to control. Even before Ishibashi's cabinet was announced, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Walter ROBERTSON, was in Tokyo browbeating the new LDP president. Ishibashi was subjected to the usual diatribe against "international communism," and responded with the standard assurances. Yet Ishibashi also complained that, "the US, by restricting trade with China on the one hand and limiting Japanese imports to the US on the other, was 'placing the squeeze' on Japan." Unlike his predecessors, Ishibashi's case for Japan-China trade seemed to rest purely on grounds of economic necessity: "the Japanese Government does not disagree with the general policy of the US and the Free World regarding trade with Communist China," Ishibashi conceded, adding, however, that "the US must recognize that Japan's economic





position is a precarious one, and that Japan's life depends upon foreign trade."[2] Robertson concluded that the "era of more or less automatic Japanese compliance with American wishes on China was over".[3]

Privately, Ishibashi and others continued to reassure American visitors that they "were aware...of problems involved in trade with Communist China and they didn't wish to overstep the proper bounds."[4] But within days of his meeting with Robertson, Ishibashi publicly declared that although, "In expanding our trade with Red China...I will closely consult with the US,...I believe that the US will gradually change its attitude toward Red China."[5] On the premier's traditional New Year visit to the Grand Shrine at Ise, Ishibashi was more forthright, stating his intention to further ease the trade embargo against Beijing and expressing a willingness to consider signing a payments agreement and exchanging trade representatives, both key Chinese demands since April 1955.[6] US Secretary of State John Foster DULLES concluded that the Japanese would soon end their support for Washington's line on China and the Eisenhower Administration stepped up its efforts to dissuade them.

Certain sectors of Japan's business community were meanwhile trying to push government policy in the opposite direction. Nor was interest in the Communist trade confined to the left-wing fringes, as indicated by the numerous large firms that were joining the relevant trade associations.[7] Within the government, however, opinion was divided. In late January 1957, a conference of Japanese ambassadors based in the Asia-Pacific region concluded that as the US was unlikely to relax its containment policy against China, Japan should avoid establishing closer relations with the People's Republic and leave trade in the hands of private business interests.[8] Earlier that month, in an effort to reconcile policy differences, Trade Minister MIZUTA Mikio, announced that the government planned to establish an inter-ministry special economic council to review national policy on trade with both the Soviet Union and China.

Ishibashi also had to contend with divergent views within the ruling party. One biographer has claimed that, "The appointment of Kishi, who was anathema to Peking, as Ishibashi's foreign minister was the best evidence against the possibility of a breakthrough with China."[9] Obviously, Kishi was given the foreign minister's portfolio in an effort to preserve party unity, and to the extent that he represented a faction of the LDP that was closely associated with Nationalist China, this statement holds true, but Kishi was anti-Communist not simply anti-PRC. Prior to Ishibashi's victory, Kishi had stated: "With the normalization of diplomatic relations with the Soviet

## Notes

[1] MASUDA Hiroshi, *Shônihonshugi - Ishibashi Tanzan Gaikô Ronshû* (Little Japanism: The Diplomacy of Ishibashi Tanzan), Sôshinsha, Tokyo, 1984.

[2] Memorandum of Conversation, Ishibashi & Robertson, Dec. 19, 1956, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-57, XXIII, pp.235-40.

[3] A.J. de la Mare (Wash.) to Oscar Morland (Tokyo), Jan. 10, 1957, FO 371/127239, Public Records Office, Kew.

[4] Memorandum of Conversation, Mike Masaoka & James Martin, Jr., Jan. 15, 1957, 611.94/1-1557, RG Record Group 59, National Archives, Washington D.C.

[5] "Ishibashi's Economic Policies," AmEmbTok to DOS, Dec. 28, 1956, 794.00/12-2856, ibid.

[6] HIRANO Yoshitarô, "Nichi Bei Kankei no Shôrai" *Ekonomisuto*, Vol.35(4), Jan. 19, 1957, p.26.

[7] SHIGEMORI Tadashi, "Shiberia Kaihatsu to Nisso Bôeki," *Keizai Orai*, Vol.9(2), Feb. 1957, p.40.

[8] *Asahi Shimbun*, Jan. 26, 1957.

[9] NOLTE, Sharon H., *Liberalism in Modern Japan: Ishibashi Tanzan and His Teachers, 1905-1960*, Univ. of California Press, Berkeley, 1987, p.327.

[10] KISHI Nobusuke, 'Sôri Kôho to Iwarete', *Bungei Shunjû*, Vol.34(12), Dec. 1956, p.77.

## Notes (continued)

[11] "Ishibashi Tanzan - sono Hito to Seisaku," *Shûkan Asahi*, Vol.61(54), Dec. 30, 1956, p.8, and *Asahi Shimbun*, Dec. 26, 1956.

[12] KURZMAN, Dan, Kishi and Japan, Ivan Obolensky, New York, 1960, p.298.

[13] ISHIBASHI Tanzan, "Nitchû Fukkô to Chûso Ronsô ni Tai suru Watashi no Mikata,"*Tôyô Keizai Shimpô*, Nov. 16, 1963, pp.9-10, and Masuda Hiroshi, *Anadorazu, Kanshôsezu, Hirefusazu - Ishibashi Tanzan no Tai Chûgoku Gaikôron*, Sôshinsha, Tokyo, 1993, pp.229-30.

Union, trade with that country will be promoted to a certain extent and trade with Communist China will likewise be promoted irrespective of whether or not she is recognized."[10] At the new cabinet's inaugural meeting on Christmas Day 1956, the policy of promoting trade with China won unanimous approval. Foreign Minister Kishi even agreed that the PRC should be allowed to open a permanent trade mission in Tokyo, although Ishibashi was forced to acknowledge that, "The restoration of relations with China will be very hard for the time being."[11] A few days after taking over as acting premier, following Ishibashi's hospitalization on January 24, Kishi delivered the keynote address to the new session of the Diet. He described Japan as "economically interdependent with Communist China", which therefore, "must take proper measures, while cooperating with the Free World, that will lead toward the easing of the embargo against China and toward expansion of Japan's China trade."[12]

Following his involuntary resignation on February 23, 1957, Ishibashi was not content to retire quietly into the shadows. In September 1959, sixteen months after the PRC had declared an economic and cultural boycott of Japan, he visited Beijing — with Kishi's reluctant blessing — and agreed with China's leaders that politics and economics were inseparable: thereby contradicting the basis of Kishi's China policy. Subsequently, he played a leading role in the intra-party opposition to Kishi's revision of the Security Treaty. On a second visit to the Chinese capital in October 1963, he even attempted to effect a Sino-Soviet reconciliation. Ishibashi naively tried to 'talk some sense' into Chinese Premier ZHOU Enlai: "the Sino-Soviet controversy seems to me most absurd. Why do you have to engage in something so stupid?" Needless to say, such mediation efforts had no discernable effect on the Communist schism, and may have cost Ishibashi his seat in the general election held on November 21, 1963.[13] Until his death a decade later, Ishibashi continued working tirelessly to improve Japan's relations with her Communist neighbors. Given two years at the helm instead of two months, Japan's postwar history could have been very different.

# International Networks for Social Science Research on Japan

## February 5-6, 1998, University Museum Muses Hall, University of Tokyo
## Hosted by the Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo

This symposium brought together leading Japan specialists from around the world to discuss the potential for, and barriers to, the development of international research networks. This is a very brief summary of the workshops held on day two of the symposium.

### Session 1: Japan in the World

**Harukiyo HASEGAWA** (Sheffield) sketched out three approaches to the analysis of Japan's role in the world. A realist approach to the question points to an emerging Pax Japonica, which of course touches on issues of Japan's military presence in the world. The liberal approach concentrates more on the socioeconomic aspects, while a critical Marxist approach would emphasise Japan's role in the world production system. Hasegawa stressed the importance of addressing research themes of common interest to scholars in all the countries represented in international research networks.

**Y. MAMIYA** (Kyoto) noted that technology will be a key factor in the way globalization develops. While economic development has a fairly well-charted trajectory, with a rolling international division of labor, technological development may lead to a small number of countries moving further and further ahead of other areas.

**KANG SANG JUNG** (Tokyo) argued for more attention to be paid to "the world in Japan" in order to gain a more balanced understanding of Japan's role in the world. The question of how Japan understood and adapted Western technologies and civilization in the 19th century is just one example of an area we need to grasp in order to explain Japan's role in the world today.

### Session 2: Political Discussion in Japan

**Gesine FOLJANTY JOST** (Halle) described the evolution of environmental politics in Japan since the 1960s. She argued that the effectiveness of the contemporary state in this and other policy areas can be divided into three categories: strategic capacity (the ability to make overall policies for the medium and long-term); innovation capacity (the ability to respond to major shocks); and integration capacity (the ability to resolve political disputes).

**J. ASUKA** (Tohoku) pointed to the importance of clarifying who receives what costs and benefits from environmental legislation. He found that the check-list of state capacity offered by Foljanty-Jost on its own is not adequate to explain the effectiveness of environmental legislation.

## International Networks for SSJ *continued*

**John CAMPBELL** (Michigan) related the behavioral revolution in American political science in the 1970s, with its shift from the analysis of individuals to the analysis of numbers. He stressed that in planning joint research projects, it is important to realize that truly comparative research is extremely difficult, and it is therefore wise to set modest but realistic aims.

**Junko KATO** (Tokyo) underlined the influence of American research on Japan policy processes on Japanese political scientists in the 1970s and 1980s. She described how the rise of rational choice in American political science in the second half of the 1980s gave rise to a controversy within the discipline, within which Japan was taken up as a key test case owing its long period of LDP rule, strong bureaucracy and exceptional economic performance

### Session 3: Japan and the Asian Economy

**Hongfan JING** (Fujian Academy of Social Sciences) argued that the Japanese economy has played three roles in the Asian economy since the end of WWII. First, Japanese economic development has stimulated development in other East Asian countries. Second, it has brought economic growth directly to other Asian economies in the shape of direct investments. Third, Japan is now playing a leading role in the shift from a vertical to a horizontal division of labor in the region. There are some limitations to Japan's role, however, such as the underdevelopment of her domestic market.

**Kitti LIMSKUL** (Chulalongkorn) found both domestic and international causes for the current Asian financial crisis. The short-run effect of the crisis will be a return to basic economic activities such as agriculture. In the medium term we will see a shift to a three-currency global economy, but only if Japan expands its domestic markets and starts to run trade deficits (which is the only way for other countries to get hold of yen). In the long term we might see the development of regional economies based on units other than money, such as natural resources or pollution rights, which will require a very different understanding of Japan's role in Asia.

**K. NAKAGANE** (Tokyo) expressed doubt about Jing's portrayal of an increasingly horizontal division of labor in Asia, citing the many complaints from other Asian countries about Japanese companies' reluctance to transfer their advanced technologies to other Asian countries.

**A. TANAKA** (Tokyo) quoted thoughts on globalization in the works of Marx and Engels and Polanyi to show that the concept has not emerged overnight. The current Asian financial crisis, furthermore, might represent the beginning of the prolonged period of economic instability which Polanyi envisioned.

## Session 4: Japan and International Relations in Northeast Asia

**Konstantin SARKISOV** (Russian Academy of Sciences) saw two new trends in the sub-region. First, diplomatic efforts between many of the major countries (Russia, China, US, Korea, Japan) which are actually bringing results. Second, a shift in the balance of economic and political relations. South Korea, for example, is now much more cautious regarding unification with the North.

**Young-Sun HA** (Seoul National) talked about the future of northeast Asia and Japan, at a time when scholars are divided on whether adolescent Asia is reemerging or having its miracle exposed as a myth. Politically, the absence of institutional measures to control clashes of interest is prompting countries to increase their military capabilities. Economically, efforts towards sub-regional integration have generally taken place within the confines of the economic order established by global organizations such as the WTO and IMF. Culturally, the replacement of Sino-centric values by strong nationalistic ideas has erected great barriers to integration, but there is a great opportunity for information technology to help form a new postmodern identity of a northeast Asian community.

**H. KIMURA** (Nichibunken) argued that the current fluidity offers Japanese scholars a chance to participate in the formation of thinking about a subregional order rather than follow American or European scholars. The same instability, however, makes joint research physically and financially very difficult, and the dependence of scholars in poorer countries on funding sources in richer countries carries the danger of distorted research.

**T. IGARASHI** (Tokyo) called for northeast Asian scholars to go beyond merely discussing the nature of the current transition period, and to contribute to formulating a vision for the future economic and political development of the sub-region.

[A longer version of this report, written by Jonathan LEWIS, appeared on the SSJ-Forum email list. For information on how to subscribe to the SSJ-Forum, see our homepage (http://www.iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp).]

Research Report

# Money Politics in Japan

## (or, Pork Corrupts, and Absolute Pork Corrupts Absolutely)

Verena BLECHINGER

**Political** corruption seems to be more pervasive in Japan than in other democracies. The 1996 issue of *Chiezô*, the Asahi Encyclopedia of Current Terms, lists 24 major corruption scandals in Japan since 1976. Among these, the Lockheed (1976), Recruit (1988) and Sagawa Kyûbin scandals (1992) made international headlines. Although almost all newly inaugurated prime ministers since the mid-1970s placed "political reforms" on their agenda, no noticeable action followed. Since the early 90s, however, the issues of "money politics" (*kinken seiji*) and corruption have dominated public debate in Japan. In 1993, the LDP was ousted after nearly four decades of government by a coalition of parties running on the promise of reform, and one year later, a package of new legislation which aimed at making Japanese politics "cleaner", was inaugurated. For a better understanding of the process of political reform and for an assessment of the measures taken, one has to ask why corruption is so common in Japanese politics and which aspects of the political system encourage its occurrence. A look at the practices of political finance offers an explanation.

The position of Japanese Diet members in their constituencies can be compared to that of self-employed entrepreneurs in the service industry. It is a common argument in research on Japanese elections that electoral victory is determined not so much by political arguments or ideological preferences, but by the quality of the relationship of a Diet member with his or her (but usually his) core voters. For this reason, politicians spend much effort satisfying voters, who are organized in a Diet member's *kôenkai*, while intensively lobbying for new votes. One way to ensure the loyalty of the local electorate and to improve one's chances of re-election is the acquisition of funds for local projects, including subsidies or public construction contracts, from the national government. Politicians therefore usually endeavor to become intermediaries between officials in the ministerial bureaucracy in Tokyo and local interest groups. As a consequence, a candidate's contacts (*kone*) within the bureaucracy and the quality of his service to the constituency become decisive factors for a politician's career.

The effort of Diet members to bring as much pork to their own constituencies as possible might be seen as a feature common to most Western democracies. But in Japan, politicians also spend time cultivating personal contacts with influential local voters. Such activities include assistance with bureaucratic matters like the handling of tax problems or speeding tickets as well as support in finding jobs or a place at a prestigious private university for the children of important *kôenkai* members. Moreover, politicians are expected to give generous gifts at family or personal events in their followers' private lives. The late LDP faction leader WATANABE Michio once stated that a Japanese Diet member always carried a white necktie (for weddings) in his right pocket and a black one (for funerals) in the left, hurrying from one event to the next and leaving generous sums. The distribution of money or

presents during or prior to election campaigns also has to be seen in this context.

Just like enterprises, Diet members need capital to provide their services to voters. Not only do gifts for *kôenkai* members or election campaigns cost money, but so does the operation of bureaus, with their personnel, in Tokyo and in the electoral district. A Diet member's state employee salary and the help of his party and faction do not cover all such costs. In prewar times, many politicians were *idobei seijika*, who had spent their whole private assets for their political career, so that after a few years just the well (*ido*) and the fence (*hei*) of their estates was left. Currently, however, "politicians spend other people's money, not their own" (Masumi 1985: 224).

Until the introduction in 1994 of public funding for political parties and a simultaneous restriction of corporate funds benefiting individual politicians, Diet members drew the majority of their revenues from corporations and interest groups. The relationship between politicians and their "sponsors" was thereby determined by mutual obligations, which corresponded in essence to those in the "service contract" between politicians and their supporters in the electoral district. While local interest groups expected their Diet member to provide benefits to their region, corporations who financed individual politicians hoped for their backing in the central bureaucracy, which was hardly accessible for businesses trying to push for a new market. The difference lay in the rewards politicians received for their mediation. Whereas groups of supporters in an electoral district were able to mobilize great numbers of votes, sponsors from the private industry made financial contributions.

Japan's electoral system also encouraged corporate extortion. With multiple candidates from the same party running in the same district, politicians competed for donations in order to cultivate connections that would substitute for party or policy differences. Corporations thus were able to offer funding to certain politicians, or to threaten to support another, unless their demands were met. This destroyed the independence of individual Diet members, which was constrained already by the demands of local supporters. In particular, the relationship between senior LDP politicians specializing in a certain sector of the economy (*zoku giin*) and the companies which funded them were determined by a give-and-take mentality. These Diet members used their authority to the advantage of their sponsors, for example in illegal betting arrangements concerning the announcement of public construction contracts under the *dangô* system.

As a result, political corruption in Japan grew in an environment, which saw politicians, especially of the longtime ruling LDP, desperately acquiring as much funding as possible to ensure their re-election, while their voters expected gifts like invitations to famous hot spring resorts. The seniority structures inside the LDP, in which a Diet member's intra-party influence grew with the amount of money he could provide to assist younger

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politicians in their campaigns, added further to this dependence on political donations. Therefore, LDP Diet members were not only keen to please their sponsors in the private industry to keep the flow of money steady, but were also trying to circumvent the legal requirements of the Political Funds Control Law (*Seiji Shikin Kiseihô*) to collect more funds than permitted. While this law contained detailed regulations regarding the maximum amount of money to be donated to a fund raising organization per year, it had, for example, no provisions about the number of such organizations one politician was allowed to set up. Such loopholes in the legal framework of political finance, together with a judiciary that did not exert strict control of the flows of money between politics and economy, rather mild penalties, and a weak opposition led to the development of mutual dependence between politicians and their donors under the long one-party rule of the LDP.

Political corruption in Japan therefore should not be misconstrued as moral failure on the part of individual politicians, but needs to be understood as a symptom of structural deficiencies in the political system. It is rather doubtful that the laws for political reform passed in 1994 will be able to bring about real change and prevent corruption over the long-term. Although the penalties for bribery and other instances of corruption have clearly increased, and important triggers of corruption have been removed by the introduction of public party funding and the curtailment of donations from private industry to individual politicians, the new regulations still contain loopholes. It is, for example, still possible to make donations to a party and to add conditions about its special use, e.g. for a single politician. On the other hand, as local offices of Diet members in their single-seat constituencies have usually been turned into LDP offices, a political donation to the local office is practically equivalent to one to the politician himself.

The success of politicial reform in Japan therefore depends not so much on the implementation of new laws, but on the commitment of all actors in the political system. As long as the politicians' service mentality vis-à-vis their electors and the voters' expectations for it continue, corrupt structures will remain in place and make "clean politics" unlikely in Japan.

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**Research Report**

# Social and Economic Factors in Unemployment in Japan


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**The** importance of the unemployment problem in Japan has been rising steadily since 1990. The unemployment rate is increasing, and it recently reached its highest levels in the decade (3.5% in May 1997). It is still relatively low when compared with the levels of the USA, UK, German, France, Italy, and Canda. Nevertheless, the *tendency* for the number of jobless people to rise is a serious problem. It also causes other problems, such as the underutilized capacity of the workforce, the deterioration of working skills, deprivation, and social exclusion.

In Japan, the stress is put on the first and second consequences. Deprivation and social exclusion, however, should not be neglected. Since 1977, the share of those who replied to a questionnaire that "their standard of living has increased over the previous year" has dropped below that answering that it has deteriorated since the previous year (*White Paper on National Life*, 1995). The increase in household incomes in real terms is insignificant — 0.9% over the previous year; living expenditures have dropped; net savings also drop because of the increase of household liabilities. Household expenditure trends are affected mainly by the decreased propensity to consume; the effects of disposable income are statistically insignificant (*Family Incomes and Expenditure Survey*, 1995)

### The Unemployed in Japan

The breakdown of who the unemployed are does not differ significantly in Japan from what we see in the other advanced industrial countries. We see in Japan a higher rate of unemployment for women than for men., but the difference is not statistically significant. This does not mean, however, that the labor force is equally mixed, because the level of women's labor force participation is lower than for men. In Japan, this is in part because of the difficult that many women face in regaining employment after maternity leaves.

The distribution of the unemployment of men and women according to age is quite different. There are two unemployment peaks for men: at the beginning of their professional careers (between 15-24 years of age) and at the end (after age 55). Young women lose their jobs more frequently than do men. But those that are employed after the age of 35 tend to have fairly stable positions. Those most likely to lose their jobs are those in small firms or with non-regular employment.

Increasing unemployment tends to be determined by the business cycle as well as the mismatch between the supply of and demand for labor. The ratio of job openings to active job applicants in 1995 has decreased from the level in 1994, particularly with reduced labor demand in the machinery and material sectors. Newcomers of the second baby-boom generation of the early 1970s also helped to boost the supply of labor.

Equally important in determining the level of unemployment is the behavior of the Japanese firms. The difficult economic environment practically mandates the cutting of labor costs, resulting in a reduced number of new hires, the promotion of early retirement schemes, and the use of unemployed mid-career professionals as part-timers. Japanese management of human resources to some degree also reduces labor mobility, particularly for the young.

There are also important social reasons for unemployment. Some of them are based on family life and schools and their roles in the education of children. Educating people about career choices, as well as encouraging young workers to seek self-realization rather than merely a paycheck in their careers would help to make labor use more satisfactory for workers and employers alike. The curricula of universities and colleges, which ostensibly focus too much on academic rather than vocational training, and graduation tests are often the targets of criticism. Detractors argue that Japan's higher education system leaves young people ignorant of their own abilities at the time of their graduation, ultimately leading to disappointment with their chosen careers.

Finally, some social policies seem to make matters worse rather than better. Some of their measures still encourage employees to work permanently for same employer for their entire lifetime. These need to be reassessed in terms of how certain institutions (annual pay systems, personnel evaluation systems, goal-oriented careers, etc.) affect the management of labor.

**In Place of Conclusions**

The reasons outlined above point to two (among many) of the guiding principles that seem to be important for dealing with unemployment in the near future. The first is social policy to assist the unemployed must be more diversified and better oriented to particular needs of the members of different social groups. In this way, unemployment could be tackled on a broader social basis. It has to include not only the companies and institutions in the labor market, but also activate the individuals, family, schools, universities and mass media, as well.

The second guiding principle is that Japan needs to establish better coordination between the measures in economic and social policies that deal with unemployment. These include questions about unemployment benefits and their duration, active measures for employment promotion, management of the employment system, pensions systems and social assistance, the public qualification system and on-the-job training, employment assistance for the young and elderly in the labor market. The best way to achive coordination between the policies is to increase the economic importance of the social measures and the social significance of the economic measures.

## Further Reading


Economic Planning Agency. *White Paper on National Life* (1995).

HAMADA K. and KUROSAKA Y. "Trends in Unemployment, Wages and Productivity: The Case of Japan." *Economika* 53 (1987).

Management and Coordination Agency. *Family Incomes and Expenditure Survey* (1995).

TACHIBANAKI T. and SAKURAI K. "Labor Supply and Unemployment in Japan," *European Economic Review* 35 (1991).

Highlights in *Japanese Labor Issues*, Japan Institute of Labor (1997).

## *What's a data archive? And why make one for Japan?*

A data archive (sometimes known as a "data library" or a "data bank") is a system that maintains data from research in order to make them available for secondary use. The data archive stores the data in the form of a database and also establishes a method for searching and retrieving data, so that the data are not scattered and lost after their use in the primary survey. A number of data archives have been established already in North America and in Western Europe, which facilitate research in almost any field or for almost any educational purpose.

Japan, however, had been something of a laggard in establishing a data archive, in spite of the vast number of statistical surveys carried out by Japanese researchers. As a result, in some cases the data produced by these original surveys has been lost forever.

# Shaken's New Data Archive

## *The Social Science Japan Data Archive (SSJDA)*

In order to prevent further deterioration of primary data collections, and also to improve social science research on Japan and research from a comparative perspective, the Information Center for Social Science Research on Japan, at the University of Tokyo's Institute of Social Science, has created the Social Science Japan Data Archive (SSJ Data Archive, or SSJDA).

At present, our data archive contains data from only about 70 social surveys, but we plan to increase this number over time. We are hoping that as many researchers and research organizations as possible will open data archives as well. Even if our data archive is, at the beginning, a small-scale one, we might be able to achieve large-scale results if other organizations are willing to carry out data archive projects on their own.

For this reason, the SSJDA project is not merely an independent, stand-alone idea. We are hoping that other researchers and organizations, who share our thinking on the importance of data archives for Japan, will open their own, and will share information with us so that we can create a data request system that will build bridges between the archives.

## *Depositing and Using Data*

In principle, the data archive is for academic use. This means we will accept applications for data use primarily from researchers at universities or research institutes, or from graduate students. When the application for data use has been approved by the SSJDA staff and also by the researcher or organization that supplied the SSJDA with the given data, the applicant can use the data. In so doing, however, the data user will have to abide by the rules and regulations for data use; these regulations will be written on the application form for the data.

Specific instructions on using and depositing data can be found by following the SSJDA links on our web page (http://www.iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp/). Scholars will need to plan ahead in order to receive data in a timely fashion; there will probably be a 2-3 month lag between the initial request for data and the SSJDA's provision, as our staff ensures that the proper procedures and regulations are being followed, in order to protect the data as well as the rights of the researcher who collected and deposited the data.

The protection of the rights of the data depositor is of paramount importance to the SSJDA. It is our hope that researchers on Japan will consider ours to be a safe and reliable way to store and to protect data, and to ensure that it will be used responsibly in the future, either by the original researcher or by approved applicants.