

Social Science

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Japan and Asia

Deepening the Academic Dialogue

SINCE the late 1980s Japanese interest in Asia has been increasing, as the recent flood of books and articles on Asia shows. At the same time, a great number of new Japanese programs to support research on Japan in Asia have started, bringing many of the region's scholars to Japan. The boom in Asian research on Japan has therefore been called "another kind of Japanese official development assistance". However, Asian scholars have their own reasons for being interested in Japan.

Asian social scientists primarily see an instructive precedent in Japan's embrace since the Meiji era of the "developmentalist state". Asian researchers accordingly pay great attention to the core elements of Japan's developmentalist state – the leading role of the government, production and management systems, the emphasis on practical education, indigenization and improvement of new technology, and land reform. China's intensive research on the Japanese economy since 1978 and the Look East Policy in Malaysia are only the most obvious examples of a much wider trend.

Unfortunately, much Japanese research on Asia and much Asian research on Japan is mediocre. We have heard a lot of simplistic arguments trumpeted from the Asia bandwagon, by Japanese economists especially. And, although in China and South Korea several textbooks are available on the Japanese economy, politics, society and history, throughout South-East Asia there are few standard research works on Japanese politics or economics written in the vernacular by local scholars.

In Thailand, for example, Matsushita Kônosuke's biography and his book on total quality control have been translated into Thai, but there is not one real study in Thai of the contemporary Japanese economy or politics. One of the main reasons for this dearth of local publications on Japan is that many of the Thai students returning from study in Japan find that they can earn an academic's monthly salary in two or three days interpreting for Japanese companies or translating Japanese comic books. The increase of personal academic contact between Japan and Asian countries thus does not necessarily deepen mutual understanding.

This issue of *Social Science Japan* addresses the academic dialogue between Japan and Asia from several perspectives: the current state of research on Japan in several Asian countries, Japan's bilateral relations with Asian countries, Japanese research on Asian countries, and research looking at Asia as a region or set of subregions rather than as a disparate group of countries. We hope that this issue will help to broaden the international network of researchers on Japan beyond the United States and Europe.



Japanese Political Studies in Thailand Tall Stories

Nakharin MEKTRAIKAT



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ALL students of Thai politics today, whether serious or not, have taken at least one or two classes on Japanese politics and history. This represents an educational advance quite appropriate for Thailand and other NICs in an era of globalization. However, unless some long-standing problems are addressed Thailand will find it difficult to deepen its knowledge of the Japanese political economy.

First, Thai students have fallen into the trap of seeing Japan as Thailand's historical twin, the only other Asian state to have remained independent and non-colonized. This, in my view, is a myth. The tall story of Thailand's similarity to Japan, which has its roots in the imaginations of the late 19th and early 20th century Thai elite, has been reinforced and amplified (for reasons too complex for this brief discussion) to become a central element in contemporary Thai education.

Second, Thai students exhibit a lamentable lack of critical judgement with regard to history. Those carrying out political studies of Japan are no exception; their simplistic studies that represent Japan as a duplicable model for Thailand's development are not based on an understanding of the origins of the Japanese system.

Third, Thai students need to discover fundamental structural differences between the Japanese system and the so-called "Thai type". The notions of feudal and patrimonial patterns of political society are still valuable in this context.

If these three shortcomings in Thai approaches to studies of Japanese politics are dealt with, then an effective challenge can be mounted on the hoary tales of Thailand's independence and its similarity to Japan that appear without fail in Thai texts.

The Thai approach to the study of Japanese politics, which emphasizes the affinity between Thailand and Japan, is not only misleading in itself; it is also responsible for reinforcing the conservative view of Thailand's own history. According to this view, both Thailand and Japan are rice-growing societies, primarily Buddhist, and monarchical in political structure. But the comparison, which is invariably flattering to Thailand, is based on ignorance of the Thai state and a readiness to swallow received ideas. For example, it is commonly said in Thailand that during the Chulalongkorn reign (1868-1910) Thailand was at the same level as Japan, and furthermore that Chulalongkorn's attempted reforms were aimed at achieving a Thai nation-state similar to Meiji Japan's. Ideas such as these must be subjected to more critical evaluation.

The reader should not misunderstand me. Comparative studies of Thailand and Japan can certainly be worthwhile, as can the study of Japanese politics from a Thai perspective. But these studies must be

“ the hoary tales of
Thailand’s independence
and its similarity to Japan
need to be challenged ”

carried out with an awareness and appreciation of what are hard facts and what is myth, and with critical theories appropriate to the study at hand.

Thai political studies could benefit from a background knowledge of many elements of Japanese politics: political factions, cliques, gangsters, coalitions, disharmony, friction, charisma, indecisiveness, the power of prerogative, and privilege, to name but a few. A study of Japanese politics yields concepts such as ideas of nation and state, *gunbatsu* and *habatsu* politics, *oyabun-kobun* relationships, money politics in its various forms and organization of business interests, all of which would be useful for Thai students seeking a better understanding of Thai society. I am arguing for comparative study as a two-way process of cultural learning, cultural transmission, and self-realization.

We must not overlook the complicated history of Thai-Japanese relations. In the late 19th century, during the war period and up to the present day, Thai society and politics have been influenced to a greater or lesser extent by an influx of people, activities, technologies and all kinds of products from Japan. A knowledge of the sources and purposes of these influxes is vitally important for an understanding of Japanese politics as well as for an appreciation of their effects on Thailand.

Finally, Thai researchers of Japanese politics should set aside theoretical standpoints and concentrate instead on carrying out serious empirical studies and on applying their knowledge. The definitive Thai texts on Japanese politics have still to be written.



ANNOUNCEMENT

Asia in the 21st Century: Towards a New Framework of Asian Studies

Institute of Oriental Culture, University of Tokyo. **International Symposium**

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Studying Japan in Malaysia **The Look East Policy**

SHAMSUL A.B. and Wendy A. SMITH

IN 1981 the Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed launched the "Look East Policy" (LEP). The policy aimed to encourage Malaysians "to emulate and learn work ethics and attitudes... inspiration, methods, and skills", from Japan for the purposes of Malaysia's own economic development. As a result, Malaysian interest in Japan has experienced a quantum leap.

Interest in Japan takes various forms, both academic and nonacademic, but all the learning is harnessed towards a clear ideological and materialist agenda for Malaysia. Thus Malaysia is not just a passive recipient of anything Japanese. Malaysia is making a conscious effort to "localize" many aspects of whatever it borrows from Japan. This localization is particularly necessary because of Malaysia's multi-ethnic society and the intricate relationship between "ethnicity and the economy". The Japanese who flooded Malaysia after the LEP was introduced experienced this relationship at first hand, although some remained themselves stubbornly ethnocentric.

Malaysia tried to learn from the so-called "Japanese model" in two major areas, ideas and practice. Often the two overlapped – "the idea of the practice, the practise of the idea". This learning was conducted in the economic atmosphere of an unprecedented increase in Japanese direct investment in Malaysia.

Complementing this accelerated learning was increased Japanese involvement in two areas: first, in specially-packaged "professional training" programs such as those organized by JICA, which are tied to increased Japanese participation in the local economy; and second, in a seemingly endless succession of noneconomic and broadly categorized "cultural exchange" programs, many generously funded by Japan-based foundations but with Malaysians as majority participants.

Nearly all the "cultural exchange" programs involve efforts, from the Japanese perspective, to educate Malaysians about Japan or, from the Malaysian perspective, to study Japan in the hope that some parts of its successful formula will rub off on Malaysian society. Two important programs are worth mentioning. First, the "Japan Studies Center", established in 1991 with a grant from Keidanren. The Center is located within the Malaysian government's foremost "think-tank", the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (Malaysia), or ISIS. The main objective of the Center is "to promote greater cultural exchange between Japan and Malaysia" through research, information exchange and dissemination, with active Japanese participation. It organizes conferences, lectures and a network group and publishes a newsletter, numerous reports, and books that are distributed widely in Malaysia. Second, a "Language and Preparatory Studies" program was established in 1982 to prepare

*“ Those who believe in Japan
and have religiously implemented
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Malaysians for enrolment in Japanese universities and technical institutions. Funding for this program was provided by Japan's Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund, the Malaysian government, and various "philanthropic" sources in Japan. There are other minor programs for secondary school students and the general public. The aim of these programs is to allow as many Malaysians as possible to become proficient in the Japanese language, to help their further studies, and to make them more "Japan-aware".

In the academic sphere, numerous local and foreign (mostly Japanese) researchers have carried out macro- and micro-level studies of the economic and noneconomic effects of the Japanese presence in Malaysia. Many of these studies have been conducted by Japanese academics within particular Japanese companies in Malaysia, on commission from head offices in Tokyo. The results of these studies are rarely made public, even in Japan.

"Japanese studies", which has mushroomed in tertiary institutions around the world since the mid-1970s, certainly exists in Malaysia. But it forms only a small part of the larger corpus of knowledge that Malaysia is eagerly consuming in the hope of emulating Japan's success.

Japanese studies in Malaysia is state-sponsored and supported by the Japanese government, business and people, both in ideological and material terms. Hence, critics have denounced Japanese studies in Malaysia as a form of "Japanese hegemony" or "Japanese neo-imperialism". In some respects, this criticism is justified: Those who believe in Japan and have religiously implemented the LEP tend to be rather reactionary. Some have even suggested that Japan should not look back and apologize for its war atrocities, but should concentrate instead on the future, or the "way forward", and guide the rest of the world towards economic success.

Some analysts have suggested that Malaysia's preoccupation with Japan and its effort to study Japan are also informed by a domestic political agenda; namely, as a way for the Malay-dominated government to decrease its dependence on, and hence reduce the importance of, local Chinese compradors. Others feel that the Malaysian government has been motivated by a desire to modernize the nation using the "Japanese model", meaning with as little Western influence as possible. (But aren't the nation-state and modernization themselves Western inventions?) The Malaysian government continues to perceive Japan as a society which has been able to keep its own "traditions" despite Western influence, both before and after the Second World War. Malaysia seems bent on emulating Japan's ideological success.



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Japanese Studies in China

TONG Shiping

THE recent history of Japanese studies in China is a turbulent one, and despite many achievements over the years the field still faces many problems. This article briefly surveys the development of social science studies of Japan in China, and outlines the current crisis.

The first Chinese research institute to concentrate entirely on Japan was the Japan Research Institute of Jilin University (吉林大学日本研究所), founded in 1964 to carry out research on the Japanese economy. However, the Cultural Revolution put a stop to all research on Japan. Then in 1972 a boom in Japanese language learning broke out, laying the foundations for later research. In 1978 the "Four Modernizations", which included the introduction of a market economy and measures to open the Chinese economy to the world, sparked off a debate among Chinese economists which led to a full-scale revival of research on Japan. Many economists turned to Japan to see what they could learn for their own country, and they focussed particularly on the processes of Japanese modernization, on Japanese economic structures, and on Japan's adaptation of imported technology. This research in turn gave rise to a debate about the applicability of Japan's experiences to China's economic situation. As a result, the emphasis in Japanese studies shifted towards research on the Japanese economy; more than half the papers on Japan published since 1978 have been in the field of economics.

The other outstanding area of study has been history, with researchers at the universities of Beijing and Nankai leading the way. During the 1980s, the focus of historical research on Japan moved from ancient history and the Middle Ages to modern times.

Despite these promising developments in the 1980s, however, Japanese studies in China currently faces difficulties on four fronts:

- Many able Japan scholars, and particularly economists, are leaving government and academic institutions for jobs in the private sector. Their motivation is obvious – academic salaries are low, and economic growth is creating lucrative openings in private companies.
- The Chinese government's relaxation of restrictions on overseas study, and the increased availability of scholarships from the Japan Foundation, Japanese companies and other organizations, has resulted in a rapid rise in the number of Chinese scholars and students going to study in Japan. And not only are scholars going in greater numbers than ever before, they are also staying longer in Japan.
- The diplomatic isolation of North Korea and the continuing Chinese-Taiwanese friction are indirectly

“ more than half the papers on Japan published in China since 1978 have been in the field of economics ”

affecting Japanese studies. Until now, many researchers of Korean or Taiwanese descent living in mainland China have concentrated on Japan, but their interests are now switching to their countries of origin.

- The rise of the yen since the mid-1980s has made Japanese publications and materials prohibitively expensive. This problem has been exacerbated by the budget cuts faced by universities and research institutes.

However, there are some bright points. My institution, Fudan University, established a Center of Japanese Studies in 1990 with financial support from a Japanese pharmaceuticals company. It sends Chinese researchers to Japan and invites their Japanese counterparts to China. The Center has also held international symposia almost every year since its foundation. among other benefits, the symposia have contributed greatly to the Center's relationship with the Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo.

□ TONG Shiping is a Lecturer at the Japan Reserch Center, Shanghai.

International Symposia held at Fudan University, Shanghai since 1990

- | | |
|--|---|
| “Price Problems and Policy” | “The Competitiveness of Japanese Enterprises” |
| “Economic Growth and The Role of Government” | “The Japanese Social Security System” |
| “The Privatization of Public Enterprises in Japan” | |

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Indonesia, Japan and the European Union

Zainuddin DJAFAR

INDONESIA and the other ASEAN states are working hard to create an Asian Free Trade Area (AFTA). Indonesia, however, is the ASEAN country least well prepared for regional integration, and is struggling to carry out economic, political and social reforms to facilitate its continued integration with other ASEAN countries.

The main problem for Indonesia is the gap between skilled and unskilled labor, a consequence of the badly thought-out non-oil exports policy of the 1980s. In a country where 80% of the workers have only an elementary school education, the sudden shift of priority to non-oil exports demanding many skilled workers widened the gap between the skilled and unskilled. The Indonesian government is at last showing signs of introducing crash training programs to increase the supply of skilled workers.

As it proceeds with economic and political reforms, what can Indonesia learn from Japan's experience of modernization? The most striking lesson is that modernization has to be prepared for. The educational and socio-cultural foundations for Meiji modernization were laid during the Tokugawa era. As a result, when the Meiji leaders embarked on modernization the Japanese population was already generally literate, skilled, self-reliant and open to new ideas. We find this same combination of abilities and attitudes in the East Asian NICs today. This suggests that a country can change not only the skills levels but also the cultural attitudes of its people.

The above description of the prevailing lack of skills in Indonesia, however, suggests that Indonesia currently lacks the foundations for rapid modernization. Given the urgency of AFTA integration, it seems that Indonesia is going to have to construct a modern political economy while still laying the foundations for it.

However, while ASEAN citizens are aware of the benefits of economic cooperation in terms of higher living standards, they are starting to question the consequences of untrammelled economic and technological development heedless of its human and environmental costs. The rush for economic growth in Asia and elsewhere has eroded social values, jeopardized the environment and exacerbated international conflicts.

Another consequence of regional integration is that, as a member of ASEAN, Indonesia finds herself in a triangular relationship with Japan and the European Union. Indonesia is Japan's largest trading partner in Southeast Asia, and the favorite country for Japanese investors. The European Union, by contrast, is less enthusiastic about economic relations with Indonesia, and its investors favor Singapore. Without shared economic interests, Indonesia, Japan and the EU will not implement the policies necessary for Indonesia's economic

“Indonesia is going to have to construct a modern political economy while still laying the foundations for it”

development: cooperative import policies, a shift from primary commodities exports to semifinished goods and manufactures, and accelerated technology transfer. At the moment, those common economic interests do not exist, and therefore neither Indonesia-Japan nor Indonesia-EU relations currently favor Indonesia. Japan and the EU decide every aspect of their trade with Indonesia without reference to Indonesian interests. Under these conditions it is very difficult for Indonesia to push ahead with autonomous economic development.

Zainuddin DJAFAR is Chairman of the International Relations Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia.



ANNOUNCEMENTS

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Contact: Prof. SATO Shin'ichi, Faculty of Literature, University of Tokyo. Tel. 03-3812-2111x3745

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Contact: Contemporary China Association of Japan Office

ATTN. Chinese Department, College of Arts and Sciences, University of Tokyo. 3-8-1 Komaba, Meguro-ku, Tokyo 153.

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Japanese-Korean Relations in the 1990s

Patrick KÖLLNER

1995 marks two important anniversaries in Japanese-Korean relations. The first is the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the Pacific War, which also meant the end of Japan's harsh colonial regime in Korea. The second is the thirtieth anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea (hereafter Korea). The fact that it took two decades to resume intergovernmental relations hints at the problems that have plagued bilateral relations since World War II. Today, despite increasingly close security and trade ties, Japanese and Koreans retain deep-seated negative perceptions of each other.

This psychological gap belying cultural and geographical closeness is often said to be a legacy of the past. Historical legacies, however, do not exist in a vacuum. The psychological gulf between the two nations in the postwar period has been nurtured by the politics of national identity in Korea and Japan. Korea's authoritarian leadership promoted rivalry with Japan and harped upon the suffering of the Korean people during the colonial period, as part of its attempt to build a national identity for the newly-independent state. This perpetuated animosity towards Japan.

Of course, Japan did annex the Korean peninsula and engage in what one scholar called "cultural genocide". Koreans were forced to adopt Japanese names, speak Japanese, pray at Shintô shrines and worship the emperor, and hundreds of thousands of Koreans were sent abroad as slave labor or "comfort women". After the war, Japan's political leadership selectively forgot and distorted historical facts: In school textbooks and elsewhere Japan was portrayed as the victim of the war, while the country's own wartime atrocities were glossed over. This was an integral part of the efforts to build a new national identity around the "peace constitution" and the pursuit of economic goals. Japan's political leadership refused to face the past because of its own involvement and the fear that coming generations would be plagued by feelings of guilt and a lack of national pride.

The politics of nationalism continue today. The Korean government has decided to commemorate this year's fiftieth anniversary of the liberation from colonial rule in typically nationalist style. One of the more bizarre activities is the systematic removal of thousands of metal stakes driven into the ground by the Japanese at locations Korean geomancers deemed crucial to the country's "life lines." The main event, however, will be the dismantling of the imposing former headquarters of the Japanese governor-general built in front of the royal Kyôngbokkung palace in Seoul in order to underline who was in charge.

In Japan earlier this year, the country's parties fought over the wording of a resolution commemorating the end of the war. Former Foreign

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“ the predicted dissolution of the glue binding the two countries has not occurred ”

Minister Watanabe Michio even went so far as to suggest that Japan peacefully annexed the Korean peninsula in 1910 rather than colonized it. The result was a fire-bombing of Japan's culture center in Seoul, and a confirmation of Koreans' worst perceptions of the Japanese.

Such incidents that reinforce negative perceptions are the more regrettable at a time when intergovernmental relations overall have become much more future-oriented and rational than they were in the emotion-driven 1970s and 1980s. For example, since 1992 the Korean government has tried to alleviate trade friction by pursuing industrial cooperation in order to change Korea's import-inducing industrial structure rather than trying to curb Japanese imports.

Moreover, in a number of industries relations between Korean and Japanese corporations are becoming less one-sided. For the first time Korean firms have set up research institutes and conducted takeovers in Japan, and joint business projects in third countries are increasing. Recently there has also been significant growth in more balanced and reciprocal industrial alliances between Japanese and Korean electronics and automobile manufacturers.

In the security arena, the end of the Cold War has actually led to a higher degree of convergence in threat perceptions and to intensified bilateral cooperation in the military realm. Hence, the dissolution of the glue binding the two countries, predicted by some analysts, has not occurred.

Under what conditions could these positive trends in economic and security relations be reflected in general perceptions of the other country? First, Japan's political leadership would have to confront the past honestly, even though this would entail painful soul-searching. The successful management of the present and shaping of the future depends on knowing the past. Second, Koreans would have to learn to define their own national identity not by reference to Japan but on the basis of their country's achievements and interdependence with the world at large. Concerning the first point at least, recent events do not justify optimism. Whether a new generation of politicians will make a difference remains to be seen. Several more anniversaries may pass before Japanese' and Koreans' perceptions of each other finally move beyond the proverbial "close but distant country" syndrome.



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Comparative Welfare Regimes The East Asian States

Ito PENG

MANY of the West's industrialised nations are facing fiscal constraints, ageing populations, high unemployment, and increasing inequality in their income distribution. Policy makers and academics in these nations, forced to reevaluate their welfare regimes, are asking a number of questions: What new risks do people face in postindustrial societies, and what new issues confront society at large? Under the new social and economic orders, how can we best define social welfare, and what might a welfare state look like in terms of family, work, and state arrangements? Given the rapid integration of the global economy, is it possible for a nation to maintain a distinctive welfare state?

Comparative study of emergent welfare regimes in the Pacific Asian countries of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan can offer useful perspectives on these questions for two reasons. First, there are interesting similarities and differences between these countries' welfare regimes and those in the West. As industrial (Taiwan and South Korea) and postindustrial (Japan) societies, these countries have the same concerns as many Western industrialised nations: ageing populations, declining fertility rates, and the prospect of economic slow-down and fiscal constraints. On the other hand, the Pacific Asian countries are not yet experiencing the sluggish economic growth, high unemployment, and growing income inequality afflicting their western counterparts. Taiwan and South Korea continue to enjoy relatively high economic growth; moreover, their cumulative post war economic growth combined with their democratic reforms in the 1980s have helped to consolidate their social welfare systems.

The second reason for examining these countries is that economic globalization implies that the future of welfare states will become more intimately linked with economic and social policy developments in other parts of the world. The Pacific Asian countries of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan will no doubt play an increasingly important role in the development of social welfare in the west.

Some recent comparative studies have attempted to include Japan in their analyses. Most of these studies, however, have sought to fit Japan into one of a variety of existing social welfare models conceptualised from a western framework rather than examining it on its own terms. Hence Japan has typically been located either alongside many of the continental European corporatist-statist welfare regimes, or regarded as an exception to the rule. In recent years, however, the latter position has been challenged by some scholars who argue that we may need to consider Japan as a possible new pattern, or even a dominant pattern shared by other western and non-western "exceptions". Others, pointing to recent developments

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“ Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea all exhibit a progressive interlocking of the state and the family in the development of welfare ”

in newly industrialised Pacific Asian countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, suggest that there may be a new and qualitatively different type of welfare regime based on these countries' shared Confucian values.

This comparative work, however, presents a fairly schematic survey of social welfare systems in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. It is thus difficult to ascertain, for example, how the changes in the welfare systems over the last few decades have affected the nature of the welfare mix with regard to the state, the market, and the family. Moreover, these studies rarely provide an accurate assessment of the growing tensions between the momentum towards a greater consolidation and universalisation of welfare and the contrary movement aimed at containing fiscal expansion by re-emphasising the primarily role of the family and community in providing social welfare in the future.

In my research, I have found that all three countries - Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea - exhibit a progressive interlocking of the state and the family in the development of welfare over the last few decades, in response to economic development, public and political pressures, and, in the case of South Korea and Taiwan, democratization. Hence, for example, in Japan there is a noticeable shift towards widening the parameters of universal social insurance schemes in the forms of proposed pension reforms and long-term-care insurance for the elderly (*Kaigo Hoken*); in Taiwan, the introduction of the National Health Insurance scheme; and in South Korea the consolidation of the national pension scheme since the mid-1980s. However, the consolidation of social insurance schemes in these countries has been carefully balanced by an increased expectation on the family to provide care and support. Japan's recently announced New Gold Plan (the revised version of the ten-year community care plan for the elderly set in 1989), for example, stresses the greater role played by family members, particularly women, in providing care to their elderly relatives, and the desirability of multi-generational households over nuclear families. A similar emphasis on the caring roles of the family and community is also seen in the South Korean state's renewed public emphasis on the country's Confucian cultural tradition, and in Taiwan, by the proposal for "planned change" through mutual-aid and community-building.

These developments suggest parallel shifts towards consolidation and privatisation of welfare in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, whereby both the state and the family will be expected to play increasingly greater roles. One possible scenario for the future of welfare in these countries is that the state will take on a greater role in the development of social insurance, while social care becomes increasingly concentrated in the family.



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Reforms in Post-Maoist China and *Perestroika*: A Comparison

WADA Haruki

ペレストロイカと

かいかく かいほう

改革・解放

ちゅう ひかくぶんせき

中ソ比較分析

(Reforms in Post-Maoist China
and Perestroika: A Comparison)

Edited by
WADA Haruki and KONDO Kuniyasu
University of Tokyo Press, 1993.
ISBN4-13-030092-X

AFTER Mao Tse Tung died in 1978, Deng Xiao Ping assumed power and set about reforming and opening up the Chinese economy. Eight years later, *perestroika* started under Gorbachev. *Reforms in Post-Maoist China and Perestroika*, written by six ISS and three other China and Soviet Union specialists in 1992-3, compares economic policies and performance, political reforms, legal systems, and ethnic and state structures in the two countries.

The book traces the roots of state socialism in the two countries back to the late nineteenth century. State socialism in both China and the Soviet Union was established to counter foreign threats and the probability of total war; hence, external changes eventually caused cataclysmic domestic change in both countries. China's rapprochement with the US in 1972 and the Soviet Union's in 1988-89 together put an end to state socialism, and also to the era of world war. The era of the world economy had begun.


China embraced the market economy (pausing only to rename it the "socialist market economy") and repressed those calling for democracy. The one-party state is the locomotive pulling China's market economy. By contrast, the Soviet Union gave priority to political over economic reform, pushing ahead with *glasnost* and democratization. This policy brought the Communist Party and then the Union itself into crisis. Industrial reform, however, made slow progress and supplies of consumer goods ran short, a situation that has improved little in Yeltsin's Russia.

Chinese and Soviet reforms exerted significant influence over each other. *Perestroika* encouraged the students to call for democratization in Tianenmen Square, but the subsequent fall of the Soviet Communist Party prompted Chinese intellectuals to steer away from the Soviet "model". In 1991 calls were heard for the Soviet Union to learn from China, but the Union's days were already numbered.

Mao's China was a decentralized country in which economically rather autonomous regions competed with each other. By contrast, successive Soviet policies resulted in an extremely centralized state in which different regions were dependent on each other and paralysis in one part quickly spread to the whole system. China was thus able to reform gradually, whereas for the Soviet Union the whole system had to be changed or not at all.

For Russia, the only way forward seems to lie in democracy and the hard work of its remarkably levelheaded population. For China, the question is whether political reform will take place under the Communist Party's hegemony. If both countries embrace nationalism, it will be difficult to avoid a confrontation sooner or later. The effect on the global economy and environment of two new huge and growing market economies also demands further investigation.

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CONTEMPORARY

ASIA

こうざ げんだい
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The Kôza Contemporary Asia series represents the best current Japanese social science research on Asia. The four volumes contain edited lectures (kôza) held to celebrate the 40th year of the Asian Political Economy Association. The Association is Japan's largest body of researchers on East, South-East and South Asia, with a current membership of 940.

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History

*Nationalism and
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For Asia, the 20th century was the century of the nation-state, as country after country gained independence from colonialism. This volume examines the development of nationalism and the formation of nation-states throughout Asia. It also discusses the effect of Asian nationalism on Japan and the postwar legacy of Japanese military rule for South-East Asia.

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Volume three examines interactions between political systems and economic development, and the role of political leaders. The study covers China, North Korea, Vietnam, the NIES and ASEAN nations, India and others. There is also a comparative analysis of the Indian and Korean models of economic development.

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edited by HIRANO Ken'ichirô

The final volume focuses on regional security systems, regional cooperation, and human networks throughout Asia. Key themes include Cold War structures, post-Cold War relations between Japan, China and the United States, the emergence of ASEAN, regional economic cooperation and problems of overseas Chinese populations.

Regional Industrial Development The Current Debate on Milieu and Innovation

Theodor LEUENBERGER

REGIONAL development processes can only partly be explained by individual economic aspects, such as industrial or sectoral structures. Explaining the decline of industrial regions requires an examination of the interactions between economic aspects and social, cultural and political processes. Research into regional innovation thus increasingly focuses on qualitative examinations of causal connections between a region's economic, technological, social and cultural potentials.

Such an approach is the basis for the theory of "regional milieu". This research program regards the region not as a neutral location of economic units but as a milieu of spatial cooperation and interaction correlations. The concept of the milieu expresses the correlations and forms of integration that are relevant to innovation and development processes and through which the different economic, social and political agents and institutions of a region are linked.

In contrast to the growth orientation of traditional theories of regional development, the concept of the "regional milieu" focuses on a region's capacity for innovation and change. This change of perspective is rooted in changes in basic social, technological and world-economic conditions which, according to this approach, make completely new demands on the regional agents' innovation and learning capacity, and also cause a reassessment of the region. It is also assumed that in spite of the growing concentration of capital, the significance of the region has not decreased; indeed, it has increased substantially.

In the early 1960s, discussions of regional politics focussed on regions with weak structures, particularly from the angle of "underdevelopment" and "lack of modernization". Today's change in perspective has brought "successful" regions to the centre of attention. "Region" no longer stands for backwardness, but is considered a precondition for successful modernization strategies: integration into regional milieus is regarded as crucial to a company's capacity to innovate and thus its success or failure on the world market. This research approach focusses on explaining innovation, and hence, will mostly be used to examine milieus that are considered to be innovative.

Milieus are primarily "boosters" and may - depending on the nature of the milieu - also act as "filters". The latter role is seen in two ways: first, by filtering out external pressures that would threaten the development path of the region; second, by excluding new agents that cannot be integrated.

If, for instance, a region that has specialized in one particular industry for historical reasons adopts a specific modernization strategy, the effects of economic, social and political retroaction within the dominant regional milieu may block a departure from the existing

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“ “Region” no longer stands for backwardness, but is a precondition for successful modernization strategies ”

development path. Even if it can be seen that this development path has no economic future and is already in crisis, correction is often only possible once the dominant milieu has started to disintegrate.

Is it possible for innovation to emerge from the very core of a traditional industrial milieu? Faced with a major crisis, old industrial regions often prove capable of adapting to the demands of new technology, of renewing their organization and their structure, and of overcoming a technology timelag if not actually taking the lead in developing new technology. The success of the “Swatch” clearly shows how an industrial area forged in a bygone technical and commercial tradition can, after a period of severe recession, adapt to new technology, products, markets, firm structures, and labor skills.

Renewal of industrial milieus rarely involves total and simultaneous upheaval in markets, products and technologies. Where there is an industrial milieu composed of small and medium-size enterprises employing highly skilled workers, and given sufficient technological continuity, technological “aggression” can be absorbed and can even set off new developments. The capacity of firms to recycle their existing know-how determines how a region innovates.

A very fruitful link between industry and milieu is the concept of the regional cluster. The cluster is a bottom-up concept that supplements the traditional top-down concepts of the comprehensive industry and sector. A cluster consists of a region’s specific production and wealth-creation structures, of the interconnections and interactions among companies, and of the predominant corporate strategies and concepts. The cluster is particularly suitable for an examination of regional production and service networks from the perspective of horizontal and vertical relations, and of technological interdependencies. Regional clusters are, as it were, the intersection points between the industries, which take their bearings from the economy as a whole and are thus globally oriented, and the regional milieu. Industry, cluster and milieu, then, are not alternative research concepts but supplementary ones. In my view it is only their combination that enables us to analyze and explain the problem of a region’s structural change.

The 1980s trend towards regional and local autonomy was accompanied by a move away from traditional in-house research and development towards cooperative information exchange between research parks, universities, and cultural facilities. Silicon Valley in the US, Tsukuba Science City near Tokyo, Kwangju in South Korea and Hsinchu City outside Taipei are local milieus where innovation capacities have been greatly enhanced in this way. A comparative study of local innovation milieus in Western Europe, the US and East Asia promises to deepen our understanding of innovation strategy and performance.



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Policy Networks and Two-Level Theory An Unconsummated Marriage

Jonathan LEWIS

THE focus on Japan's domestic political economy in international trade negotiations prompts us to reflect on how to study policy processes simultaneously taking place on the domestic and international stages. One possible approach is a combination of policy network analysis and two-level theory. Both methods have been used separately in studies of Japan, but a combination of the two could tell us more about how Japan's international relations interact with domestic government-business relations, bureaucratic rivalry, and the role of politicians.

Policy network analysis is a set of analytical tools for describing which actors are involved in deciding particular policies, the strategies they follow, and how they depend on each other for funding, information, authority, and other resources. Policy networks span both institutionalized policy-making processes and informal channels of communication such as old-boy networks. By means of systematic description of such variables as numbers of private and public actors, levels of resource dependency between actors, and levels of professionalization, policy processes in different sectors and countries can be compared. Policy network analysis rejects state-level generalizations of "strong-state, weak-state", and makes neither elitist assumptions of restricted policy processes nor pluralist assumptions of open ones.

Two-level theory addresses the relationship between international negotiations and domestic politics. A branch of game theory, it depicts a national representative simultaneously negotiating at the international table with representatives of other nations and, at the domestic table, with those who must ratify and implement any agreement reached. Each representative has a "win-set", the range of possible international agreements which would be acceptable to domestic constituents. If the two sides can agree on an outcome which lies within both sides' win-sets, the negotiations are successful. If the win-sets do not overlap, the negotiations break down. Two-level theory is important because it cracks the conundrum of whether to consider countries as unitary actors pursuing diplomatic strategies or as mere aggregates of domestic disputes and alliances.

The two methods would seem to have little in common. One is a framework derived from sociology and organizational analysis to facilitate the description and comparison of policy *processes*, the other a theory derived from economics regarding how to achieve particular policy *outcomes*. What is the case for combining the two?

First, the gap between processes and outcomes disappears when one studies particular cases. This fact is reflected in the growing sophistication of both methods: Policy network analysts are advancing theories about the kinds of policies likely to result from particular

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“policy networks offer a useful extension of two-level theory’s “domestic table””

types of networks, while two-level theorists are investigating the formal and informal processes by which particular outcomes are reached.

Second, policy networks offer a useful extension of two-level theory’s “domestic table”. I suggest we can identify three categories of foreign pressure on domestic policy networks: those which aim to change the networks dealing with an existing issue; those which create a new issue to be dealt with by existing networks, and those which create new issues requiring new networks.

In the first category, Schoppa’s study of the Strategic Impediments Initiative talks suggests that Japanese agreement on changes to domestic market structures is more likely to be forthcoming if the US could arouse the interest of a previously uninvolved Japanese constituent. However, Schoppa omitted to discuss how, even if new interest groups acquired a direct interest in an issue, they could gain access to policy networks. In Japan as elsewhere, not all members of a policy community necessarily have access to the policy network.

An example of an initiative in the second category was the invitation to Japan to participate in the International Space Station. US proposals were immediately taken up by the Japanese aerospace policy network, and the subsequent pattern of resource dependencies – government funding, contracts for all the major aerospace manufacturers, and a minimal role for space science despite its formal prime importance – followed that of most other aerospace projects. Participation in the space station fitted in neatly with existing Japanese space policy, and the network already in place was able to coordinate policy across many institutions very quickly.

Similar requests for Japanese cooperation on the Texas Supercollider, however, met with silence and prevarication, suggesting that the case falls into the third category. Japanese participation would have required the creation of a new policy network to deal with the new issue and fight for government funding of it. Moreover, Japanese equipment companies had little incentive to form such a network because the Supercollider offered their potential US competitors in the superconducting magnet market an opportunity to catch up.

While there is some evidence of loose global policy networks emerging in areas where international private capital or shared professional expertise are the chief resources, most policy networks are still emphatically national; the more so, the greater the dependence on public funding, protection and regulation. The time is therefore ripe for a combination of policy network analysis and two-level theory. The union of bedfellows from different ends of the social science spectrum could produce unexpectedly robust offspring.



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ISS Contemporary Japan Group

The ISS Contemporary Japan Group serves as a forum to provide foreign researchers at the Institute with critical feedback on their work. It also often invites non-affiliated scholars to present their research. The Group's meetings are attended by ISS faculty and foreign researchers, and Japanese and overseas researchers affiliated to other institutions in the Tokyo area. Researchers visiting Tokyo are most welcome to attend Group meetings. Contact Associate Professor Kiichi FUJIWARA (fujiwara@iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp) or Andrew DEWIT (dewit@iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp).

Stephen REED

Chuo University, Tokyo

April 20, 1995

Why Not Rational Choice?

Professor Reed argued that the underlying assumptions of rational choice are tautological and bad psychology and that rational choice has very little empirical work on which it can credibly ground its assertions. However, because rational choice is based on assumptions shared by most people, uses mathematical logic, and has attractive normative characteristics, it renders extremely convincing arguments. A truly scientific approach produces more accurate but less convincing arguments. In other words, "a physicist trying to influence a Congressman would be well-advised to avoid mentioning the curvature of space and to use outdated but comprehensible Newtonian physics instead."



John CAMPBELL

University of Michigan

May 16, 1995

Is There a Japanese-Style Welfare State?

Professor Campbell noted that Japanese social policy has mainly aimed to catch up with the West since the 1950s. The early 1970s initiation of the "welfare era" drew very heavily on foreign models, such as the US passage of Medicare in 1965. However, Japan is now constructing a new *Kaigo Hoken* (long-term-care insurance) system, which establishes financing for the kinds of services that were envisioned in the Gold Plan, and in fact expands the range of services. *Kaigo Hoken* is an innovative development, and not imitation. Hence, Japan is at the forefront of new welfare policymaking, and is not taking its usual approach of implementing what has been tested elsewhere. Japan's moves contrast starkly with those of the US, which is in the process of dismantling its already inadequate provisions for long-term care.



Jill NORGREN

City University of New York
May 24, 1995

The New American Culture Wars: The Debate Over Cultural Pluralism in the United State

Professor Norgren said that culture wars are nothing new in the United States, as there is a long history of efforts to redefine the terms of the American social contract. Earlier struggles centred, for example, on demands to include the white male working class. More recently, there have been movements to incorporate native Americans and other marginalized groups. Fights about what kind of history to teach in the schools must therefore be seen in terms of these struggles.

Masaru KOHNO

University of British Columbia, Vancouver May 18, 1995

The State of Japanese Political Studies: Rational Choice and Its Critics.

Professor Kohno argued that attacks on rational choice from within the Japanese politics community appear ignorant of the scope of the methodology as well as the nature of the analytical challenge. The argument between adherents of the bureaucracy-dominant and pluralist models is not a theoretical debate. It is a simple, descriptive debate concerning which concept or phrase captures most accurately the Japanese policy making process. It is not a debate about assumptions, logic or hypothesis derivation. Rational choice applications, by contrast, force the students of Japanese politics to be more aware of methodology and the logic of argumentation.

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Kenji HAYAO

Boston College June 5, 1995

The Decline of Political Institutions: The End of LDP Rule and the Future of Japanese Politics

Professor Hayao suggested that one way to understand current Japanese politics would be to see it as largely resembling American politics on the eve of the end of the New Deal coalition. Pre-civil-rights era America, like contemporary Japan, was characterized by back-room political dealmaking, powerful producer interests, and the use of distributive politics in order to quell potential unrest. However, the network of interests and institutions – and the high economic growth rate – that supported such politics unravelled in the US and is also doing so in Japan.

Allison WETHERFIELD

Visiting Foreign Researcher, Faculty of Law, University of Tokyo
July 11, 1995

Sexual Harassment Law in Japan

Ms. Wetherfield spoke on the problematic decision of the Japanese Ministry of Labour to impose the American definition of sexual harassment on the Japanese legal culture. This move has, in Ms Wetherfield's opinion, hindered Japanese women's opportunities to exploit the momentum from several favourable court rulings. Recently, Japanese courts have become much more restrictive in their judgements on sexual harassment cases.



Urban Housing in Postwar Japan

Ann WASWO

IN the realm of postwar urban housing, as in other facets of Japan's postwar experience, there have been notable continuities with the country's prewar past. At the policy level, where they have been most pronounced, these continuities have included a marked tendency among bureaucrats and politicians to regard cities as instruments for and emblems of the achievement of national goals, and a bias in [comparatively modest] state spending on housing toward the developmentally 'useful' new urban middle class. Only recently, and at much greater cost to taxpayers than would have been the case a few decades earlier, has much official attention been paid to the quality of urban life so far as ordinary urban residents are concerned – that is, to the city as an environment for people. Even had the Occupation authorities not dissolved the Home Ministry in 1947, it is unlikely that a radically different set of urban land or housing policies would have been achieved.

What is striking is the degree to which the urban public has accepted the state's urban housing policies and the relatively costly, cramped living space available to most of them throughout most of the long postwar period. Some observers attribute this to Japan's temperate climate and to a Buddhist-inspired disposition to transcend the trifling inconveniences of mundane existence, but it seems likely that other factors have played a greater role. Chief among these factors are the availability of inexpensive company housing for a small but potentially vocal minority of urban/industrial employees, fairly widespread faith in the notion that hard work and assiduous saving would lead to realization of the new, postwar home ownership dream and an automatic betterment in living conditions, and – more generally – the possibility of 'denying' the city and its problems by moving to the suburbs. While the first of these factors continues to operate in somewhat attenuated form, the second and third reached an impasse in major metropolitan areas during the mid- to late 1980s, owing principally to massive increases in urban and suburban land prices. Not even middle-class Japanese wives in these regions, who had hitherto been remarkably successful in rationalizing the long commuting distances their husbands had to endure for the sake of a 'proper' family home, or Japanese politicians, many of whom used to be able to sway public opinion, have yet found a way of coping with this new situation. The elderly and the poorly paid, who form the majority of those who inhabit substandard public and private housing in Japan's inner cities, have yet to find anyone to champion their cause, much less an effective means of championing it themselves.

There is considerable variation in housing conditions among the cities of Japan. In quantitative terms (average floor area per dwelling, number of rooms per dwelling, etc.) accommodation in small to

Current Research

My new research project is on the social history of urban housing in postwar Japan. The main topics I am investigating are:

- 1) the development and characteristics of postwar housing policy
- 2) the development and characteristics of the private-sector housing industry
- 3) regional and class differences in urban housing conditions
- 4) popular attitudes toward housing and the home, with particular attention to the emerging role of urban housewives in determining where and how their families live
- 5) the origins and implications of the widespread shift from Japanese to Western-style interior design and furnishings in urban housing of all sorts – rental apartments and *manshon*, as well as detached, single-family dwellings.

“ I am struck by the key role of Japanese women in engineering their family’s departure for the suburbs ”



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medium-sized provincial cities is at least as spacious as and, in not a few cases, more spacious than that prevailing in France, Germany or the United Kingdom. It is in the largest cities of Japan, most especially in Tokyo and its surrounding satellite cities and “bedtowns”, that conditions are, quantitatively, at their worst. Here, even the well-educated and relatively well-paid tend to live in the small, cramped quarters an official of the European Union once woundingly described as “rabbit hutches”. In my research I am, of course, considering Tokyo and other densely-populated metropolitan districts, but I am also trying to keep the larger picture in mind. It is well worth emphasizing that, as of 1990, almost as many Japanese lived in cities with under 100,000 inhabitants as lived in cities with over 1,000,000 inhabitants. To the former, the great cities of Japan had at some point in the postwar era – around the late 1970s, I suspect – ceased to function as models for the urban future of their communities and become instead examples of problems they wished to avoid.

One of the attractions of this project to an historian like myself, whose previous research has focused on the Meiji and Taisho eras and relied primarily on written texts, is the opportunity it provides to grapple with such “new” forms of evidence as the visual inspection of *danchi* and other urban housing sites, oral testimony from those who are described, rather revealingly, in the trade as the “users” of urban housing, and observations made over the years on strolls through the furniture displays of major department stores. An even greater attraction is the challenge of making some sort of sense of a relatively small, seemingly manageable but nonetheless significant aspect of Japan’s long postwar era. At this point, early on in the project, I find myself struck by what I regard as the failure of the state in the early postwar years to make apartment-living an appealing alternative to the single-family dwelling for large numbers of urban Japanese. This failure was mostly the result of the state’s parsimony in allocating land and floor space for the construction of public housing units in the 1950s and 1960s and its preference for the mass production of those units, rather than site-specific design. These policies contributed to urban sprawl and the “mini-development” of houses in city suburbs, as those in apartments sought to escape at the earliest opportunity from what quickly came to be regarded as an inferior way of life. I am also struck by what seems to have been the key role of women in rejecting apartment life at this time and engineering, by means of their influence over the rate of saving from household income and a wide range of lobbying activities directed at their husbands, their family’s departure for the suburbs. These are among the topics I will be concentrating on during the remainder of my stay in Japan. I hope eventually to make my way even closer to the present!



Social Science and the Kobe Earthquake

INAMOTO Yonosuke

MORE than six months have passed since a major earthquake struck the Kansai area on January 17, 1995. In addition to the relief work still being carried out by volunteers, experts in many disciplines are contributing to the recovery of the area. Responding to requests from local authorities and other organizations in the Kobe area, the Urban Land Use Research Group, organized by the Institute of Social Science and comprising 40 specialists in law, economics, urban planning and sociology, is playing its part in the effort to support Kobe's recovery.

Our main tasks can be summarized as follows:

- *processing and analyzing from a social science perspective the vast amount of information relating to the recovery of the area*
- *giving an objective evaluation of recovery measures taken so far*
- *making impartial suggestions to local government and citizens*

We are carrying out these tasks with respect both to the city as a whole and to housing in particular.

The City

At the time of the earthquake, both the resident population and commercial activities in the area were about 20% above the recognized maximum levels. Kobe, in other words, was seriously overcrowded. The problem confronting recovery efforts is how to fit all these people and activities back into the same space as before, while at the same time creating more open public spaces as firebreaks. Reallocation of land and urban redevelopment must therefore be carried out with precision and speed. At the same time, public plans and proposals will come to nothing without the active and organized participation of the people living in the affected areas. The question of how to achieve true cooperation between citizens and local government, which has been an issue throughout Japan, has now acquired crucial importance for the Kobe City administration. Kobe City, which was one of the most advanced in Japan in terms of provision of public amenities, faces a massive challenge.



Kobe Earthquake Statistics

People	
Dead	5502
Missing	2
Injured	41524

Houses	
Destroyed	100282
Badly damaged	108402
Damaged	185756

Public buildings destroyed or seriously damaged 549

Other buildings destroyed or seriously damaged 3126

Fires reported 294

Road damage (no. of places) 9403

Source: Japanese Ministry of Construction.

May 30, 1995

All kinds of people directing the rebuilding of the city— local government officials, urban planners, architects, and lawyers – are asking social scientists for concrete assistance. Matters we have been asked to deal with include:

- *sorting out the many and various rights to land*
- *compensation for damage to businesses and property*
- *protection of the economically disadvantaged*
- *effective systems for coordinating citizens' recovery efforts*
- *the division of authority between national and local government*

Housing

Relations between residents of overcrowded Kobe before the earthquake were based on formal and informal consensus. Before housing can be rebuilt, residents have to reach new agreements on many difficult points. The rebuilding of houses destroyed in the earthquake is being delayed by disputes between neighbors over boundaries. Part-owners of apartments with different incomes and life-styles cannot agree how to rebuild their apartment blocks. Negotiations between former tenants and their now rent-less landlords over the provision of alternative accommodation or the return of the tenants' deposits frequently break down. While these disputes drag on, more than 300,000 people are still living in temporary accommodation, including refugee centers.

Social science can help to break these impasses by suggesting systems for consensus-building agreements and dispute resolution in the many different situations which have arisen. Before such practical suggestions can be made, however, legal specialists have to clarify what the law says about the rights of individuals. The legal specialists in the Urban Land Use Research Group are currently working on these problems.

In both city and housing recovery efforts, of equal importance to the "hard" side – replacing buildings and infrastructure – is the "soft" side – the establishment of new understandings between individuals and between organizations, and the development of systems for the transmission of information. We have to respond to the earthquake with specific proposals quickly. As Kobe's recovery proceeds, the Institute of Social Science's interdisciplinary research will continue to play its part.



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Possibilities Created by Immigration to Japan How far *Kokusaika*?

Katherine TEGTMEYER PAK

Japan's foreign population now stands at 1,320,000, plus at least 300,000 who are undocumented, 60% more than in the early 1980s. The rapid increase has prompted heated public debate, although the issue has recently subsided somewhat due to the recession, which makes the looming labor shortage and supposed structural need for foreign labor seem less inevitable. But the potential for social change inherent in the "internationalization" (*kokusaika*) of the heretofore "homogeneous" Japanese nation-state keeps the discourse of immigration politics very much alive.

In 1988 and 1989 immigration received daily coverage in the mass media. Attention focused on the rapid increases of migrants from throughout Asia and the Middle East - at one point it was estimated that people from these areas were entering Japan at a rate of 10,000 per month. The migrants were working without proper documentation in sectors of the economy suffering labor shortages, often recruited by underground brokers with ties to the *yakuza*; thus the entire situation was ripe for sensationalist media coverage. The growing perception of a loss of control prompted bureaucratic involvement, and by 1988 the Ministries of Justice and Labor were at the center of a heated debate and jurisdictional struggle on the appropriate response to the problem. The Ministry of Justice's position - that the problem was essentially a question of controlling entry - won out, and the principle response took the form of the 1990 revision to the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act rather than a response premised on labor market demands. The prohibition on unskilled labor was firmly retained and indeed, strengthened, with the addition of sanctions against employers and brokers. At the same time the government created a new entry path for *Nikkeijin* (descendants of Japanese emigrants), justified as easing the reunification of Japanese families. This latter move ignored the obvious fact that the vast majority of *Nikkeijin* who quickly came to Japan did so out of the same economic motives as the unacceptable unskilled workers from Asia. With these moves, the national government renewed its basic stance of having a policy of entry control and regulation and not a policy of immigration. Nonetheless, as a demonstration of Japan's willingness to "internationalize", the 1990 revision of the Act included a loosening of restrictions towards skilled professionals, a category which is popularly equated with whites from North America, Europe and Australia, although it does include increasing numbers from Asia.

Many of the participants in the immigration politics discourse are not satisfied with this "resolution". The most extreme views portray the entry statutes as a thinly disguised system of racial differentiation. In any case, their application is seen as creating numerous legal barriers

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“ The most extreme views portray the entry statutes as a thinly disguised system of racial differentiation ”

between non-Japanese working in Japan, with particularly detrimental consequences for the human and labor rights of those who have come from Asia. This perspective is generally framed within a local context, with the loudest voices concentrated in those areas with the largest concentrations of migrants. The true significance of this perspective is that it is not limited to polemics against government policy.

Combinations of locally based NGOs and local governments are slowly but steadily constructing a policy of accommodation in response to the realities of Japan's de facto emergence as a destination for international migration flows. Cities such as Kawasaki and Hamamatsu are engaging in what Hamamatsu City refers to as "handmade internationalization", which is intended to be more substantive and more broadly based than the official internationalization. The point is to develop access to the social services offered at the community level. Towards this end, both cities have commissioned major surveys of the foreign residents to determine what their living conditions and needs are. Additional movement includes increased capabilities to offer consultation to the foreign community in a wider range of languages; translations of practical information into multiple languages; tentative efforts to address the needs of the growing numbers of foreign children in local schools; access to local housing for foreign residents; and in Kawasaki's case, a plan to implement a representation program for foreign residents modeled after those in France and Germany.

Such initiatives do not address many of the serious problems faced by people working under exploitive conditions without the safety net provided by the welfare state, especially people without proper documentation. Local governments are clearly constrained by the determination of legality made at the national level, and in general, they do not disagree that "illegals" should not be given access to social services (with the possible exception of health care). But where officials are unable or unwilling to take direct action, many NGOs are. Local officials keenly follow the activities of the NGOs, and in some cases contribute quietly to their causes by publicizing their services and even giving direct financial support.

The justification for these local initiatives is inevitably in terms of an internationalization much broader than that offered by the national government's vague acknowledgment that perhaps certain kinds of foreigners should be allowed into Japan. Local internationalization, in contrast, starts from the premise that the foreigners are already here; thus the question is how to define their position within Japanese society. Internationalization towards Asia has a particular resonance at the local level. This should be recognized as a challenge to the long term fascination with the west, and the implicit assumption that "internationalization" is a question of dealing with only the other advanced industrial democracies and their citizens.



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Rebuilding The Social Security System

The Report of the Prime Minister's Advisory Council on
Social Security, July 1995

しゃかいほしょうたいせい さいこうちく
社会保障体制の再構築

あんしん く せいさ しゃかい めざ
—安心して暮らせる 21世紀の社会を目指して—

Reviewed by **OSAWA Mari**

LAST month the Advisory Council on Social Security delivered to the Prime Minister its strongest set of recommendations in 33 years. These recommendations fall into four categories.

First, the government currently adds the burden of social insurance premiums and other forms of taxation to derive the "national burden". The government's stated top priority is to prevent this national burden from exceeding 50% of national income, even in the face of Japan's ageing society. But this "national burden" reflects only part of the cost of a maintaining a decent standard of living for all citizens. Hence, the report advocates using the word "public" rather than "national":

"If the public burden... were increased and a truly comprehensive social security system established, then the burden on individuals (for example, payments for medical treatment or welfare services, private insurance, or support, care and rearing in the family) and the burden on companies would be reduced. Conversely, if the public burden were reduced, the burdens on individuals and companies would increase."

The Council has thus recognized that the unpaid, mostly female, work of raising children and caring for the sick and elderly in the home, is part of the nation's social security burden.

Second, the report highlights inequalities in social security provision depending on region, profession, size of employer and gender. In order to resolve gender inequalities, the Council recommends that the basis of social security be the individual rather than the household as at present. Spouses supported by employees currently pay no basic national pension nor health insurance contributions, and have no access to employees' income-related pensions. (Note: such spouses have an annual income of less than 1.3 million yen. They number approximately 12 million, of whom 99.7% are women). The Council advises extension of income-related pensions to cover part-time employees, equity in spousal pension rights, and reform of survivors' pensions.

Third, the report recommends establishing a public insurance nursing system, under which care services for the elderly would be funded from social insurance. This recommendation attracted the greatest publicity when the report was published, and is in step with the Ministry of Health and Welfare's own plans.

Fourth, the report urges reform of the qualifications for the basic old-age pension. To qualify for a basic pension under the present system, one must join the pension scheme and pay contributions for at least 25 years. The report calls a reduction in the numbers of senior citizens failing to qualify for a pension due to their not having joined the scheme early enough or not having paid sufficient contributions.

Taken as a whole, the Council's report is surprisingly gender-sensitive. We await the government's response.

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Gender Inequality in the Japanese Workplace

AIBA Keiko

THE significance of Osawa Mari's book *Beyond the Corporation-Centered Society* lies in its analysis of how Japanese companies maintain gender inequality in paid work through occupational gender segregation.¹

In most OECD countries there is noticeable gender differentiation by industrial sector and occupational category. However, in Japan women and men are differentiated by employment status and size of firm. Women are more likely than men to work as part-time workers in smaller firms. Women also change their employment status and type of workplace as they grow older. In other words, unmarried women tend to work as full-time workers in larger firms, while married and middle-aged women tend to work as part-time workers in smaller firms. Osawa challenges the received view that these segregated occupational structures result from women's choices. Instead she attributes them to Japanese firms' need to maintain the *nenko* system of life-long employment and seniority-based wages for their male employees.

Osawa's work, however, needs to be further developed. First, do we assume that men and women with the same employment status in the same company are equally rewarded, both internally (with opportunities for developing skills and for promotion) and externally (with wages and fringe benefits)? I suspect that both job content and rewards are very different for men and women with similar status. Second, Osawa does not examine to what extent occupational gender segregation affects the gender gap in pay. It is well known that jobs in Japan are vaguely defined and that wages are less likely to be determined by job content. Therefore gender segregation at the job level may not affect the gender gap in pay. This point has yet to be clarified by empirical studies.

The major difficulty in carrying out such empirical studies is the lack of data. Compared to the US, Japanese government statistics give wage data for very broad occupational categories, and no information on the skills content of those categories. One solution is to collect data through union organizations. However, the researcher can not take for granted the cooperation of unions, which are generally organized around companies and give priority to maintaining harmonious relations with management. This attitude was well illustrated by a case in which three unions of Sumitomo Group companies rejected a request by female members to publicize important data proving gender discrimination in promotion by their employers. (The workers subsequently collected the data by themselves and presented them in a Counter-Report to the United Nations in 1992.) Despite these difficulties, it is very important that social scientists shed new light on the structures and consequences of occupational gender segregation in Japan.



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Japanese Policy on Climate Change

Jacob PARK



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IN 1990 the Japan government adopted an action program to arrest global warming. The plan set a target of stabilizing carbon dioxide emissions at the 1990 level by the year 2000. This was not a particularly radical target, but it is worth noting that Japan adopted the plan three months before the US took formal policy action on climate change. Japan's new policy was even more noteworthy when one considers that in the 1970s the country failed to ratify a single major environmental convention.

Four important global and domestic factors can be cited in the development of Japan's climate change policy. First, unlike other environmental issues such as deforestation and endangered species, global warming has a particular resonance in Japanese public consciousness. While the threats of deforestation and animal extinction seem far removed from the daily life of most Japanese, the prospect of hotter summers and colder winters is more immediately threatening.

Second, non-governmental organizations such as Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature seem to be exerting more influence on policymaking in Japan. This growing influence was recently shown when Tanaka Makiko, Science and Technology Agency Director-General, urged Greenpeace to take prompt action to stop France's plans to conduct nuclear tests in the Pacific.

Third, Japanese businesses see a large commercial opportunity in the climate change problem. Unlike biodiversity, for example, climate change offers Japanese companies a chance to exploit their well-established energy-efficiency and environmental technologies. Both Japanese industry and government (particularly MITI) understand perhaps better than any other country the potential role of green technologies in international trade. Japanese companies are already the world's leaders in desulfurization technologies and flue-gas cleaning systems, and stand to benefit from any international agreement to prevent climate change.

Fourth, activism on climate change gives the Ministry of Foreign Affairs a post-Cold War agenda for its foreign policy and a way of countering Japan's eco-terrorist image. Under pressure to assume an international political and security role commensurate to the size of its economy, Japan has started to use environmental issues as a way of taking the sting out of foreign criticism over burden-sharing.

No single factor, then, can explain Japan's climate change policy. A multiplicity of global and domestic interests lies behind Japan's relatively high-profile position on climate change compared to other international concerns such as UN peacekeeping and other environmental issues such as deforestation.



Japanese Education Reform



ODANAKA Naoki

THE so-called “general direction” of the Course of Study for primary and secondary schools, introduced in 1992, is stated as follows:

“Teachers must help students to acquire the will to study actively and the ability to respond effectively to social change. Teachers must also respect the personality of each student.”

Since the Meiji era, Japanese education’s task has been to supply all students with an homogenous body of knowledge. Education thereby maintains the existing social hierarchy, and this in turn keeps up the pressure on people to improve themselves in order to rise socially (“social climbing”, or *shusse*). The 1992 reforms, however, seem to cast education in a new role, this time as the supplier of heterogenous knowledge depending on each student’s preferences. Do the reforms therefore mean an imminent end to the existing hierarchy, and an end to social climbing?

The reforms are certainly based on an awareness of the serious educational problems caused by social climbing. Social climbing has resulted in intense scholastic competition, massively distorting school life. The reforms represent an attempt to moderate this competition by fostering diversity in the knowledge taught in schools. But only three years after its introduction, the Course of Study is being criticized by many teachers. According to I. Kurosaki, diversification has ironically resulted in students being ranked at an even earlier stage of their education, in primary school, thereby exacerbating the problem of social climbing.

Higher education has also seen a succession of reforms since the mid-1980s. Of particular note is the priority given by certain universities to graduate courses. These universities plan to become “super universities”, breaking with the “levelling of universities” policies that were introduced after the second world war. Their plans mean a shift from “every university is open to everyone” to “some universities are open to everyone and some super-universities are not open to everyone”.

In higher as in primary and secondary education we are witnessing a trend towards diversification and greater competition, and an accompanying increase in the incentives for social climbing. Whatever the aims of the reforms, their results seem to go against the broad trend since the 1970s, identified by Y. Takeuchi, away from social climbing towards a more elitist, less socially mobile society.

What can be done? The answer can only lie in changing society as a whole, not just the education system. Given that social climbing is still too deep-rooted in Japanese society to be replaced fully by elitism, the only option is to attempt to pluralize the existing social hierarchy. But what would this mean in practice? And who would do it? The fog lying over Japanese education shows no signs of clearing.



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Annual Meeting of the Japanese Association for Mathematical Sociology

すうり しゃかがいがかい たい かい たい かい
数理社会学会第20回大会

September 25 and 26, 1995

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「国家と企業—産業規制と組織化の国際比較—」

State and Enterprise: International Comparisons of Industrial Regulation and Organization

Business History Society of Japan Conference

けいえいし かつかい たいかい
経営史学会 大会

September 30 - October 1, 1995

Osaka Gakuin University

Contact: Prof. Takeo KIKKAWA, Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo. Fax 03-3816-6864

Japan Political Science Association 1995 Conference

October 7-8, 1995

Hôsei University, Tokyo

Contact: JPSA Office, Tel. 075-753-3262 Fax 075-753-3290

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しゃがいせいさく けいかい せいさく けんきゅう たいかい
社会政策学会研究大会

October 21 and 22, 1995

Faculty of Economics, University of Kanazawa
Kanazawa City, Ishikawa Prefecture.

Contact: Professor Kazuo NIMURA, Society Representative and Coordinator Tel. 0427-83-2307 Fax 0427-83-2311

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民主主義科学者協会法律部会学術大会

October 21 and 22, 1995

Ryūkoku University, Kyoto.

Contact: The Law Section of the Democratic Scientists Office, Faculty of Law, Nagoya University, Chigusa-ku, Nagoya.

History and Representation

Association for Japanese Intellectual History Symposium

にほん しぎし がっかい
日本思想史学会 シンポジウム

October 22, 1995

Faculty of Literature, Ritsumeikan University, Kyoto

Contact: Prof. Nobuhiro KATSURAJIMA, Faculty of Literature,
Ritsumeikan University, Tel. 075-465-1111x3920

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中京圏における鉄道網の形成

The Formation of the Railroad Network in the Chûkyô Area

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戦後50年と平和憲法

The Peace Constitution 50 Years After the War

Science Council of Japan Symposium

にほん がくじゅつがいご しぎ
日本学術会議主催シンポジウム

November 8, 1995

Science Council of Japan Meeting Hall, Tokyo

Contact: Science Council of Japan

7-22-3 Roppongi, Minato-ku, Tokyo 106 Tel. 03-3403-6291

にほんきぎょう こくさいか さいけんとう
日本企業の国際化の再検討

Reexamining the Internationalization of Japanese Enterprises

Japan Academy of International Business Studies

こくさい けんきぎょうがっかい
国際ビジネス研究学会

November 18 and 19, 1995

Kobe University

Contact: Prof. Hideaki YOSHIHARA, Economics and

Management Research Center, Kobe University, 2-1 Rokkodai-
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