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Current Issues in Context

FUJIWARA Kiichi
**Imagining the Past,
Remembering the Future**
Page 3

Gerhard LEHMBRUCH
**The Segmentation of Government
in Comparative Perspective**
Page 6

NISHIDA Yoshiaki
**From a Train Window: Why is Japanese Farmland
so Different from that in Europe?**
Page 10

Social Science Paradigms

HIROWATARI Seigo
The development of legal theory in postwar Japan
Page 12

TABATA Hirokuni
**From Collectivism to Individualism:
A Paradigm Shift in Japanese Labor Law Theory**
Page 16

MOHRI Kenzo
**The "Impenetrable Mystery" of
Market and Organization in Japan**
Page 18

Research Reports

Sung-Jo PARK
**The International Automotive Industry
– is Toyotaism Dead?**
Page 22

Cheng-Cherng CHEN
**Technology Transfer –
Changes in the Performance Paradigm**
Page 24

20th Century System Project

HASHIMOTO Jurô
Japan and Asia in the World System
Page 32

Internet Guide Page 20
Events Page 26
Conference Information

Reviews

Political Reform and Constitutional Change
Page 28

The White Paper on the Economy
Page 31

EDITORIAL NOTES

Personal Names

All personal names are given in the customary order in the native language of the person, unless otherwise requested. Hence in Japanese names the family name is given first, e.g., Taniguchi Hiromi, and in Western names the family name is given second, e.g., Linford Christie.

Romanization

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Capitalist Economies and International Relations Series, No.10, March 1995

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Imagining the Past, Remembering the Future

FUJIWARA Kiichi

JAPANESE politicians, it seems, will do anything but face their war crimes, and will even try to justify them. The Japanese Foreign Ministry has persuaded the American government not to invite Prime Minister Murayama to Pearl Harbor, arguing that it would "harm the relationship between the two nations." A member of the Hosokawa cabinet said the Nanking massacre was a myth. And a steady stream of cabinet ministers, Dietmembers, and leading journalists have claimed that Japan liberated Asia from the colonial powers.

These statements might suggest that the Japanese, unlike the Germans, have never confronted their past in an objective manner. However, such was not always the case. Japanese "amnesia" about the war, exemplified in the above comments, has emerged as a part of a revisionist literature which argues that mainstream Japanese historians, and intellectuals generally, were wrong in their postwar denunciation of the Japanese military and its actions. The revisionists, such as former Minister of Education Fujio and former Minister of Justice Nagano, are so zealous that they keep whitewashing Japan's role in the war even at the risk of losing office (in fact, their insistence that little killing took place in Nanking is correct: the worst massacres happened in the *suburbs* of Nanking). Justification of the war is a recent development in postwar intellectual history, although one may rightly argue that the arguments are logical extensions of the infamous prewar *Ajiashugi*, or "Asianism."

The new surge of nationalism has been in part fostered by the recent industrial development of East Asia. Pointing to the region's rapidly growing economies, nationalist-revisionists argue that the East has prevailed over the West, and that the Pacific War was only an initial step in this direction. By arguing this, they confirm something Namier once wrote:

*"One would expect people to remember the past and to imagine the future, [b]ut in fact, when discoursing or writing about history, they imagine it in terms of their own experience ... they imagine the past and remember the future."*¹

The new nationalists are certainly imagining their past – in a manner that suits their egos.

Pacifism and Hypocrisy

Yet even as the revisionist-nationalists sought to invent a glorious war in the past, the pacifists (myself included) might have been remembering the future. The Peace Issue (*heiwa mondai*) was, after all, the cornerstone of postwar political thought in Japan. One has only to look at Maruyama's brilliant account of Japanese fascism to see how

1 Lewis Namier, "Symmetry and Repetition", in his *Conflicts*. London: Macmillan, 1942.

Imagining the Past, Remembering the Future continued

the postwar denunciation of wartime leaders was essential to the construction of a war-free Japan.²

Maruyama's critique of fascism led to his famous defense of the Constitution's Article 9, which bans the maintenance of armed forces in Japan, and has served as a guiding light for a whole generation of scholars, students, and citizens. The arguments of Japanese pacifism are simple: all wars betray noble purposes, militarism is the worst enemy of democracy, and we must struggle to eliminate any legacy of militarism from our soil in order to establish a full-fledged democracy. Moreover, the establishment of democracy is essential to avoid future wars; but a government enmeshed in Cold War institutions and US-dominated foreign policy is not a democracy, even though its formal political procedures may make it seem one. Hence the rebellion against the Security Treaty with the Americans and the widespread antinuclear movements.

I grew up in this pacifist intellectual environment, but now I am puzzled by its hypocrisies. It says little about the atrocities committed by the Japanese military abroad.³ It also has little to say about the kind of foreign policy necessary to establish a war-free community of nations. As pacifists, we were supposed to defend our constitution against the Cold Warriors and the Americans; but it was the American Occupation forces who virtually dictated the draft of our Constitution. The Japanese almost always appeared as victims of war, victims of the irresponsible militarist government. We used Hiroshima as a symbol of antinuclear peace, but seldom referred to Nanking or, for that matter, Manila. While we proclaimed our victimization, outside Japan very few people cared to hear about Japanese suffering during the war.

Hiroshima

Ian Buruma focuses on such hypocrisies, and dubs Hiroshima "the exclusive site of Japanese victimhood."⁴ To Buruma, Hiroshima is a Japanese attempt to obfuscate war crimes by presenting themselves as victims. Much as I detest Buruma's naive belief in just wars, I can only agree with his assessment of the role Hiroshima has played in our minds.

There is something very moving, however, in the way the Japanese are horrified by memories of Hiroshima. Their passionate discussions of the atomic bombings call forth a vision of dusk and death, an age about to end, and a mankind foolish enough to exterminate itself. Perhaps this apocalyptic vision seems excessive, even bizarre. But substitute "Japanese people" for "mankind," and the meaning of the

2 Maruyama Masao, *Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963.

3 During the past decade, however, Japanese historians have produced an impressive range of documents and academic studies of Japanese colonial and/or military rule in Asia. See, for example:

『近代日本と植民地』(Modern Japan and the Colonies), 8 vols.、岩波書店、1992-93年。

倉沢愛子『占領下のジャワ農村の変容』(Transformation of a Javanese Village under Japanese Occupation)、草思社、1992年。

日本の占領期に関する資料調査フォーラム編『日本のフィリピン占領』(The Japanese Occupation of the Philippines)、龍溪書舎、1994年、ISBN 4-8447-8370-X。

4 Ian Buruma, *The Wages of Guilt: Memories of War in Germany and Japan*. New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1994, p.96.

“Hiroshima, to many Japanese, simply showed what you get when you start a foolish war”



war for the Japanese becomes clear. The war put an end to everything. The bombing of Hiroshima quite literally wiped out a whole city. Aside from any political propaganda, this stark vision of total destruction was what Hiroshima has meant to most of us.

It is quite possible that few Japanese care about the atrocities Japan committed overseas. At the same time, many Japanese do care about the Japanese victims, and about the grotesque violence their militarist government brought down on their heads. Hiroshima signifies the ugliest dimension of all this. Those who emphasized Hiroshima during the Cold War were not necessarily making apologies for the Soviets or parading their anti-American nationalism; Hiroshima, to many Japanese, simply showed what you get when you start a foolish war.

Moreover, beneath the pacifism lies a fatalistic vision of a future war. This nightmare image is not confined to the intellectual argument of the *senjo keimô*, or “Postwar Enlightenment.” A strange aspect of postwar Japanese mass culture is the prevalence of a vision of doomsday, of total annihilation in a world war. Dystopic scenarios are seen not only in the likes of *Akira*, Japan’s decadent version of *Blade Runner*, but also in *Doraemon*, a popular TV cartoon series which caters to middle-class children (including my daughters).

Buruma is wrong in attributing the Japanese view of Hiroshima to simple hypocrisy. It is actually worse than that. Hiroshima is a lesson through which the Japanese learn a frozen, remembered version of the future. When the Americans started to reduce their military presence in Okinawa, Okinawans simply could not believe it, for a major military operation involving US forces in Okinawa was supposed to bring destruction to the whole island. When the Americans and the Soviets agreed on nuclear disarmament, pacifists (again, including myself) could not believe that either, as it threatened our remembered future, however dystopian it was. Confronting the specter of fascism and the nightmare of nuclear war were noble and necessary acts; but what future is left for a Japanese intellectual when the specters and nightmares are gone?

The nationalist-revisionists, with their ridiculous attempts to invent our past, are irrelevant. We should be busy constructing blueprints for a better world in the wake of the Cold War. But our ability to imagine such a world is weak, atrophied by our long past of remembering the future.



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The segmentation of government in comparative perspective

Gerhard LEHMBRUCH

CHANGES in the former socialist countries raise afresh the insufficiently understood problems of transferring institutions from one historical-cultural context to another. A very important example of such transfer was, of course, the making of the modern Japanese state. The following reflections focus on one aspect of this process, the adoption of the system of functional differentiation of government – originally developed in France by the administrative reforms of Napoleon I.

Policy conflict between ministries is frequently discussed in Japan. It is often traced back to the vertical segmentation of ministries (*sekushonarizumu*) and of “policy networks” linking ministries and their clientele (*tatewari gyôsei*), and interpreted as a specifically Japanese organizational pathology. However, segmentation along jurisdictional lines and domain conflict can be found in many bureaucracies, including Germany’s (see Mayntz and Scharpf).¹ The constitution of the Federal Republic (GG Art. 65) stipulates that ministers have the autonomy to lead their department within the “policy guidelines” (*Richtlinien der Politik*) presumably defined by the chancellor (*Ressortprinzip*). The resulting impediments to “positive coordination” have received much attention.

The Telecom Wars Revisited

However, Japan’s intense inter-ministerial competition over bureaucratic turf has few real equivalents – at least in those Western administrations with which I am familiar. The famous “telecom wars” illustrate the phenomenon well. Technological advances led to the increasing functional interdependence of telecommunications and data processing, and shattered the closed world of telecommunications monopolies in many countries. West German social democrats responded in the mid-1970s with efforts to promote industrial policy in the IT sector. The attempts failed because the telecommunications administration would not subordinate its traditional organizational goals to industrial policy objectives. In the German administrative system such goal conflict is a familiar consequence of the functional differentiation of government.

In Japan, however, the organizational response was characteristically different. MITI and MPT both sought “market share,” and claimed responsibility for the new technologies from an industrial policy perspective. Thus, while the German conflict arose from divergent organizational goals, the Japanese conflict was about jurisdiction in a specific industrial policy field, and led the MPT to redefine its goals to allow it to expand into the new policy area.²

1 Renate Mayntz and Fritz Scharpf, *Policy-making in the German Federal Bureaucracy* (Elsevier, Amsterdam 1975)

2 Chalmers Johnson, “MITI, MPT and the telecom wars: how Japan makes policy for high technology”, in: Chalmers Johnson et al., *Politics and productivity: the real story of why Japan works* (Ballinger, Cambridge Mass. 1989).

“Japan’s intense inter-ministerial competition over bureaucratic turf has few real equivalents”

Staking Out Bureaucratic Turf

These cross-national variations seem to be related to significant institutional differences. The first is the difference in procedures for delimiting the jurisdiction of ministries (*Organisationsgewalt*, corresponding roughly to the power to issue regulations called *kansei*): In Germany this power has remained an important prerogative of the executive (as it was in pre-war Japan). Since the beginnings of the Federal Republic the *Organisationsgewalt* has quite frequently been employed by the Federal Chancellor in cabinet reshuffles to redistribute administrative responsibilities. In Japan, on the other hand, the post-war reforms have handed this power to the legislature in an attempt to strengthen it vis-à-vis the executive, so that the boundaries of ministries are now fixed by law. In contrast to Germany, these boundaries have barely changed since 1947. This constitutes an interesting puzzle: Why has Japan’s political leadership virtually never used the legislative procedure to redistribute bureaucratic authority?

A second institutional difference is the Japanese *genkyoku* principle, according to which ministerial departments claim comprehensive regulatory and industrial policy responsibilities for a specific clientele (e.g. an industry). The remarkable consequences of this principle have been well described in the case of biotechnology policy: In the race for industrial promotion of biotechnology, the Ministry of Health wanted to participate in policymaking on behalf of the pharmaceutical industry, its traditional clientele. Since, however, its responsibilities for this industry hitherto had largely been confined to regulatory activities, it found it necessary to establish new sections with industrial policy functions. This would be difficult to imagine in the German case: The Ministry of Health would almost certainly refuse to perform other than regulatory functions vis-à-vis this industry. A distinctive consequence of the *genkyoku* principle is hence the formation of mutually exclusive vertical interorganizational networks.³

Rational Choice or Cultural Context?

There might be an obvious “rational choice” explanation for this institutional difference: Given the importance of *amakudari* for the Japanese system of bureaucratic careers, the exclusivity of such networks has to be maintained in order to avoid poaching of *amakudari* opportunities by rival ministries. But this specific structure of opportunities cannot be separated from the cultural orientations that determined the adoption and adaptation of the European model.

After all, Japan has significantly modified the functional division of responsibilities characteristic of Western European administrations

3 Jeremy Howells and Ian Neary (1991), “Science and technology policy in Japan: the pharmaceutical industry and new technology”; Masami Tanaka, “Government policy and biotechnology in Japan: the pattern and impact of rivalry between ministries”, both in: Stephen Wilks and Maurice Wright, eds., *The promotion and regulation of industry in Japan* (Macmillan, London 1991), 81-131.

The segmentation of government continued

since Napoleon I. Even the practice of "negative" inter-ministerial coordination found in Germany is essentially determined by the principle of functional differentiation. Of course Japan has also ostensibly adopted the Napoleonic blueprint of specialized ministries. But cases such as that of the Ministry of Health suggest that in Japan, when exogenous change threatens established organizational domains, the functional differentiation underlying the original institutional blueprint may be eclipsed by segmentary differentiation. From the perspective of an evolutionary theory of differentiation, such segmentation is probably a regressive phenomenon. Yet the segmentary differentiation in turn induces a new functional differentiation, this time on the departmental level.

Thus some institutional patterns adopted by Meiji Japan seem to have assumed a cultural meaning different from the original context. Institutions are not simply technical arrangements: They stabilize meanings as well as social activities, and when transferred to a different cultural environment meanings may be subject to change. To borrow a metaphor from geology, the Japanese pattern of inter-administrative differentiation apparently results from an evolutionary fault line where different "cultures of differentiation" overlie each other. If this is case, one may ask to what degree functional differentiation is a specifically "Western" cultural invention. Its "universal" evolutionary significance – as postulated by Talcott Parsons – would then by no means be a foregone conclusion.

The Civil Servant and the Man from the Ministry

In the literature it is a commonplace that the overwhelming importance of "vertical" loyalties was an important institutional pattern inherited by the Meiji government from traditional Japan. The problem of administrative segmentation seems well suited to illustrate the underlying cultural difference with the European model. One has of course to keep in mind that in Western and Central Europe, the feudalism of the early Middle Ages had long before been replaced by the system of estates with their characteristic horizontal stratification. The emergence of the "civil service" in Germany (as in large parts of Europe) was deeply influenced by this heritage, wherein "estates" were not simply aggregates of individuals characterized by a specific position in the structure of society but also collectivities with a distinct identity. Hegel, whose thought was an influential ideological underpinning of the Prussian administration, described the bureaucracy as the "general estate," distinguished from the estates of trade and agriculture by its specific collective identity as an integrating force. For Hegel, the bureaucracy, as an estate, was

"general" insofar as it represented the "state" as guardian of the general interest vis-a-vis "civil society." This distinction was further developed by Lorenz von Stein and strongly impregnated the world view of German administrators.

It would be interesting to know whether any of the many visitors from Meiji Japan who consulted Lorenz von Stein on their travels to Europe reacted to this part of his thought. As Richard Minear and others have pointed out, the adoption of Western (and especially German) political theories by the Meiji reformers was rather selective and did not include the concept of a "state" that is institutionally separated from the "society" (a term that according to other authorities has no real equivalent in Japanese.) If this is true it follows that, unlike the German or French traditions, the concept of the state could not serve as a concrete reference for the professional identity of bureaucrats. Whereas German and French administrators could identify themselves as *Staatsdiener* ("servants of the state"), and British public officials call themselves "civil servants," it seems that the professional identification of Japanese bureaucrats focussed from the very beginning on the specific agency or ministerial department rather than on the "state" or the "civil service" as abstract entities. The Japanese bureaucrat, in other words, derives his or her professional identity not by demarcating the state from "society" or the "private sector", but by demarcating his or her ministry from rival bureaucratic entities.

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Further Reading:

John Creighton Campbell (1984), "Policy conflict and its resolution within the governmental system", in: Ellis Krauss, et al., eds., *Conflict in Japan* (University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu 1984), 294-333.

Albert Craig (1975), "Functional and dysfunctional aspects of government bureaucracy", in: Ezra Vogel, ed., *Modern Japanese organization and decision-making* (University of California Press, Berkeley 1975), 3-32.

Gerhard Lehbruch, "Ressortautonomie und die Konstitution sektoraler Politiknetzwerke: Administrative Interessenvermittlung in Japan", in: Karlheinz Bentele et al., eds., *Die Reformfähigkeit von Industriegesellschaften: Fritz W. Scharpf - Festschrift zu seinem 60. Geburtstag* (Campus, Frankfurt/M. 1995, 64-100).

にほん こくさい せいし かっかい
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From a Train Window: Why is Japanese Farmland so Different from that in Europe?

NISHIDA Yoshiaki


BOARD an express train in any major European city – within ten or twenty minutes of leaving the terminus, the view changes from houses and factories to fields. There is almost always a distinct point at which urban land gives way to agricultural land. Take a northbound train from Tokyo, however, and you reach Takasaki – a distance of about 100km to the north – still unsure whether you have left the city for the country. You see some fields, but they are dotted between built-up areas. Travelling west from Tokyo, you have to go beyond Odawara – 40 minutes by bullet train – to catch your first glimpse of contiguous fields. What are the reasons for this striking scenic difference?

Land Development and Farm Management in the High-Growth Era

The first reason is without question the difference between European and Japanese land laws, and especially between national planning policies. From around 1960 both Japan and Europe experienced economic growth; but whereas in Europe growth was accompanied by the introduction of national planning laws regulating the development of land, in Japan successive national development plans aimed to maximize economic growth, starting with the National General Development Plan of 1962. Even to this day, Japan lacks legal restraints on growth: the New Town Planning Law of 1968 classified land into urban and agricultural zones, but proved impotent in controlling the spread of urban areas.^{1,2} These differences in national land policies were undoubtedly one cause of the gap between Japan's unusually high and Europe's below-average growth rates during the period of strong global economic growth in the 1960s and early 1970s.

Second, the clear distinction between urban and agricultural land in Europe and the blurring of the two in Japan as cities spread unchecked is reflected in agricultural practices. In 1988 the UK produced 105% of the amount of cereals it consumed, France 222%, West Germany 106% and Italy 80%; in 1991, Japan produced only 29%. From a different perspective, in 1974-5 64.5% of Japanese farm managers already had a side job, compared with 41.6% of West German, 29.0% of Italian, 21.5% of British and 19.6% of French farm managers. Ten years later in 1985 the numbers of European farm managers holding side jobs had increased to 43.0% in West Germany, 36.3% in the UK and 32.5% in France (Italy, at 26.3%, was an exception to the trend), but these figures were still far below Japan's 67%. Furthermore, by 1989 agriculture accounted for only 18% of the average Japanese farmer's income. These statistics tell the story of how Japan, in return for rapid economic growth, sacrificed much of

- 1 For information on land laws in Europe,
いなもと ようのすけ かいのうみちあつ まやま
see 稲本洋之助・戎能通厚・田山
てるあき はらだ すみたかへん
輝明・原田純孝編『ヨーロッパの
とち、ほうせい
土地法制』(Land Laws in Europe)
とうきょうだいがく しやがいかくけんきゅうじ
(東京大学社会科学研究所
けんきゅうほうだいごく しやう とうきょうだいがく
研究報告第32集)、東京大学
しやうばんがい ねん
出版会、1983年、ISBN 3032-
36372-5149
はらだ すみたか ひろわたりせいご ましだ
and 原田純孝・廣渡清吾・吉田
かつみ かいのうみちあつ むたぎく しやういせけん
克巳・戎能通厚・渡辺俊一編
むたぎだい としほう
『現代の都市法』(Contemporary
Urban Law: Germany, France, Britain
and the US) (東京大学
しやがいかくけんきゅうじ けんきゅうほうだいごく
社会科学研究所研究報告第48
しやう とうきょうだいがくしやうばんがい
集)、東京大学出版会、1993
ねん、ISBN 4-13-036101-5.
- 2 National General Development Plan:-
ぜんこくそうごうかいしはつけいかく
全国総合開発計画 (1962年)
New Urban Planning Law:-
しんとし けいいかくほう
新都市計画法 (1968年)



“From September to December 1994 I was Visiting Professor at the University of Milan. My seminars there suggested a rapid growth in interest in Japanese society among Italian scholars, an impression confirmed by the amazing popularity there of *Social Science Japan* and by the sharp rise in the number of students registering for Japanese language courses. However, a growing interest in Japan does not necessarily lead to better social science research on Japan. While many students are learning Japanese, their interest is more in the spoken than in the written language, and few are able to read materials in Japanese. The Universities of Tokyo and Milan should therefore do more under their exchange agreement to encourage the study of Japanese society in Italy and of Italian society in Japan.”

her farmland for building and turned most of her farmers into part-time workers.³

Agriculture in the Contemporary Political Economy

The striking difference between rural scenery in Europe and Japan, then, entails an equally sharp contrast in farm management. Both these differences have emerged since 1960 – before then, twenty minutes by train from any of the main Tokyo termini would have taken you out to the fields – and both are attributable to the different approaches to economic growth adopted in Europe and Japan.

A final point concerns politics. The onset of economic growth roughly coincided in Japan with the advent of the so-called “1955 system”, the unusually long and stable conservative rule of the Liberal Democratic Party. Farmers, of course, provided the LDP with one of its strongest power bases. However, social scientists must still examine why so many farmers supported the LDP given the way in which Japanese economic growth took place as well as the damage to farming communities and farming practices.⁴

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3 The figures for 1975 are from:

松浦利明・是永東彦編著『先進国農業の兼業問題—日本とヨーロッパの国際比較—』(Farmers' Side Employment in Advanced Countries: Japan-Europe Comparisons)、富民協会、1984年、275-276項。

For the 1985 figures, see EC, *Agriculture Statistical Yearbook 1989*, p.35.

4 For research in this area, see NISHIDA Yoshiaki, “The Rise and Decline of the Farmers' Movement and Transformation of the Rural Community in Postwar Japan”, Occasional Papers in Labor Problems and Social Policy, Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo, 1994.

The development of legal theory in postwar Japan

HIROWATARI Seigo

THE *raison d'être* of jurisprudence in prewar Japan was to put into practice the Western (mostly German and French) laws adopted in the Meiji Era to modernize the Japanese state and society. Prewar Japanese jurisprudence therefore had three defining characteristics. First, because the introduction of legal systems from abroad entailed the introduction of the legal theory which made those systems work, jurisprudence was to a large extent the study of imported law. Indeed, from the latter part of the Meiji Era – about 1910 onwards – the influence of German law was all-pervasive. Second, Japanese jurisprudence had a strongly positivist flavor. The modernization of Japan was a “top down” affair managed by central government, and the legitimacy of using positive law went unchallenged. As a result, no school of natural law emerged to question the role of authority and its use of law. Third, and related to the previous point, the study of Japanese law was for most scholars the study of government, and the major task of the law faculties of Japanese universities was to produce bureaucrats for the administration and the judiciary. In other words, Japanese jurisprudence was to a large extent the study of bureaucratic law.

These features of Japanese jurisprudence continued, albeit in less pronounced form, after the end of World War Two, but the study of law in postwar Japan acquired several new facets. Foremost was a new emphasis on the study of jurisprudence as a social science. The discipline was no longer required to treat law as a tool of government, but instead sought to shed academic light on the objective nature of law. In doing so, it was expected to explain the legal problems arising from the democratization of postwar Japan. This new pursuit of jurisprudence as a social science borrowed both from German social democratic legal theory dating back to prewar days, and from Soviet legal theory, and its approach was broadly Marxist. The second new facet was a uniquely Japanese conception of the process of modernization, according to which Japan was only incompletely modernized in the prewar era. By extension, the task for postwar jurisprudence was the thorough modernization of Japanese society and law. The third new aspect was the active defense of the principles and rules laid down in the new Constitution of 1946 as the basis of value judgements. These are the chief facets of what we can call “the postwar science of law,” and here too the parallels with postwar Germany are obvious.

The Dissipation of the Postwar Science of Law

The postwar science of law gradually started to lose its analytical vigour in the second half of the 1960s, in contrast to the Japanese

“The postwar science of law’s view of modernity became increasingly untenable during the 1980s”



economy, which continued its rapid growth. Several theoretical trends lay behind this decline. First, Marxist theory was challenged by the empirical methods of American sociology. The sociology of law had assumed a prominent role in the postwar science of law as the antithesis of the study of bureaucratic law as a tool of government, but now it split into two branches: the Marxist sociology of law, which emphasized the role of class power in law, and American-style sociology of law which emphasized a behaviorist line of analysis. Second, a new theoretical approach emerged which viewed law in the postwar capitalist countries as contemporary law, departing from the emphasis placed by the postwar science of law on the modernization of society and law. The theoretical framework for contemporary law centred on “state monopoly capitalism”, an analytical category borrowed from Marxist economics. This Japanese theory of contemporary law, which developed in parallel to the Western European debate about law under late capitalist systems, identified the expansion of government intervention into and management of the economy and society as the key characteristics of the modern state, and saw law as the means government used for such intervention and management. It therefore stressed the regulatory aspects of law. Third, the negative view of Japanese society and law as backward in comparison to the West was increasingly criticised, and calls increased for a proper appraisal of the special characteristics of Japanese law in international comparative context. The postwar science of law’s view of modernity, in which the West was advanced and Japan backward, became increasingly untenable during the 1980s as the Japanese economy continued its remarkable growth and American Japanologists, among others, changed their assessment of Japanese society.

As the postwar science of law declined, however, its central motif – the modernization of Japanese society – was taken up by legal theory focussing on citizens and citizens’ law. The idea of the citizen as a central element in the world of law was based on the idea of the citizen as an autonomous individual in modern society, and also on the figure of the urban worker, who was now able (or was at least thought to be able) to bring about further democratic reforms in Japanese society (as seen, for example, in the emergence of reformist local government in the 1970s). But citizens’ law was not so much a stage of legal development as a set of critical values and principles which could be used to attack contradictions in contemporary law and society. Thus, while theories of citizens and citizens’ law were linked to the conception of Japanese backwardness found in the postwar science of law, they no longer dealt explicitly with Japanese society in terms of modernization.

*The development of legal theory in postwar Japan continued**Groping in the Postmodern Dark*

The collapse of Soviet and East European socialism began with the revolutions in Eastern Europe of 1989 and finished with the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991. These events had a profound effect, both direct and indirect, on the social scientific ideas underlying Japanese jurisprudence, accelerating the diversification in legal ideas which had started in the late 1980s. For example, the economic analysis of law developed in the United States is being readily adopted by the younger generation of Japanese legal scientists. Along with this, there is an increasing emphasis in political thought on the role of the market, and these new ideas are changing the traditional methods of interpreting law, which were borrowed from Germany. Under the influence of the German sociologist Niklas Luhmann's system theory and of American sociological theory, the sociological analysis of law is being refined and given a new stress on the self-referential nature of law. From this sociological perspective, the analysis of the functions and operation of laws is of central importance, and the actual content of laws is not an issue. This is in stark contrast to the study of norm consciousness and the analysis of custom and normal practice in the postwar science of law. Furthermore, building on the theoretical results of practical philosophy and social philosophy (including Jurgen Habermas' theory of communicative behaviour), some Japanese philosophers of law are proposing "argument, process and agreement" as the elements making up legal structures. From this perspective, they claim, it is possible to see the processes by which citizens develop laws. This view decisively rejects the traditional idea of law as a system of coercion, and redefines legal systems as "forums for debate."

The common denominator of this diversification process can be crudely summarized as a retreat from the view of law as something which changes in response to historical stages of development in society (the developmental stage theory of law) in favour of an approach which asks how, or whether, existing laws can be improved. However, this does not mean a complete affirmation of existing laws. Like Marxist theory, the new sociology of law seeks to identify the contradictions in existing law - in other words, in modern law - but from different perspectives than Marxism. One such perspective views law as a means of ensuring human liberty which has, in the process of internalization, been taken over by authority as a means of maintaining order. Postmodern legal theory goes further, exposing the limitations of modern law and developing new legal strategies. Following the ideas of the French postmodernist philosopher Jean-Francois Lyotard, this legal theory denies the modernist idea that some universal values must be chosen and decided by the legal system, and instead attributes

the self-reproduction of law to the way it regulates its own role as the operator of nonlegal social subsystems. Exponents of postmodern legal theory account for only a small number of Japanese legal scientists, but their work represents a final parting of the ways with the universalist "postwar science of law."



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Further reading on current Japanese legal theory:

『社会変動のなかの法』(Law and Social Change)、岩波講座・社会科学の方法Ⅳ、1993、岩波書店、ISBN 4000104969.

棚瀬孝雄編『現代法社会学入門』(An Introduction to the Contemporary Sociology of Law)、1994、法律文化社、ISBN 4589017709.

田中成明『法的空間—強制と合意の狭間で—』(Legal Space: Between Coercion and Consensus)、1993、有斐閣、ISBN 413031145-

X.

小林秀久・神田秀樹『「法と経済学」入門』(Law and Economics - An Introduction)、1989、弘文堂、ISBN 4335350708.

村上演一『仮想の近代—西洋の理性とポストモダン』(Imagined Modernity: Western Rationality and Postmodernism)、1992、東京大学出版会、ISBN 4130100718.

廣渡清吾『現代日本法解釈学の歴史的位相』(Contemporary Japanese Interpretation of Law in Historical Perspective)、『法の解釈と法社会学』(Interpretation of Law and Sociology of Law)、日本法学会会編、1993、有斐閣、ISBN 4641027048.

Announcement

Abe Fellowship Program Public Symposium
US-Japan Relations 50 years after the Second World War

26 July 1995

Anyone interested in attending this symposium, or in seeking further information about the program itself, should contact Dr. Mary-Lea Cox at: Abe Fellowship Program, Tokyo Office, Ark Mori Bldg 20F, 1-12-32 Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo 107; tel. (03)5562-3506; fax (03) 5562-3504; e-mail: 0006848374@mcimail.com.

From Collectivism to Individualism:

A Paradigm Shift in Japanese Labor Law Theory

TABATA Hirokuni

IN recent years more and more researchers of Japanese labor law have become convinced of the need for a stronger recognition of the individual in industrial relations. In view of the traditional ascendancy of groups' and organized bodies' interests over those of the individual in Japan, this conviction represents a fundamental change in labor law theory.

The Autonomous Worker in a Pluralist Society

According to Nishitani Satoshi, this ascendancy of group over individual rights can be traced back to the conditions of poverty in which workers found themselves after World War Two, when Japanese labor law theory was being formulated (it is important to remember that Japanese labor law was only systematized after World War Two). Nishitani also finds that today's workers have far more diverse demands, such as psychological freedom, than did those in the immediate postwar years. Hence, a legal theory that engulfs the individual in a sea of group rights is incompatible with these new demands. On the other hand, the subordination of trade unions to company management, and the strong pressure to conform that companies are able to exert over their workers, place severe limitations on individual autonomy in both trade unions and companies. Nishitani therefore advocates a new theory of labor law, one that respects the worker's freedom and individual interests, as part of a broader agenda of reform aimed at turning Japan into an individual-oriented, pluralist democracy.¹

Japanese labor law theory, born in the inter-war period, was strongly influenced by the labor law theory of the Weimar Republic, which gave priority to group over individual interests. This theory is now being challenged even in Germany.

The Autonomous Worker in a Free Labor Market

Many countries are shifting towards labor law based on the principles of contract law, with a new stress on the freedom of the individual. This shift appears strongly linked to broader socioeconomic changes such as the decline of the classic labor movements centered on male workers in manufacturing industries, the increase in white collar and female workers, and the diversification and increasing fluidity of the labor market. In other words, labor law is being transformed in response to socioeconomic change.

In part, the new labor law aims to make the free labor market function smoothly – an aim based, of course, on the assumption that there is a free labor market. In place of transactions between labor and capital,



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- 1 西谷敏、「労働法における個人と集団」(The Individual and Groups in Labor Law)、有斐閣、1992年。
- 2 菅野和夫・諏訪康雄、「労働市場の変化と労働法の課題」(Changes in the Labor Market and Challenges for Labor Law)、『日本労働研究雑誌』418号(Japanese Labor Research No.418)、1994年12月。

“Are the Japanese labor market and industrial relations practices moving in the direction of the neoclassical or the social market?”

which were the ideal type under “classical” labor law, the new labor law expects work contracts for individual employees to assume a central role. Hence it envisages legal and administrative intervention in the labor market only when problems arise peculiar to employment relationships, that is, which do not occur in normal markets for goods and services.

In Japan, Sugeno Kazuo and Suwa Yasuo theorize along similar lines. They define labor law as “a legal subsystem which establishes the framework for and supports the daily operation of the market economy.” They also call for a revision of labor law to increase the bargaining power of individual workers in the labor market by “abolishing policy instruments which have been rendered superfluous by, or have become obstacles to, the functioning of the market, and amending those parts of law which have become incompatible with the market.”² Inherent in this argument is the judgement that the role of law is to encourage the operation of labor-market mechanisms, rather than merely adjust legal practices to market trends.

The Durability of Japanese-Style Industrial Relations

The two arguments outlined above have a common aim of changing the traditional conception of the worker in labor law as an economic weakling; however, the images of the worker which form the basis for the arguments are very different.

Whereas Sugeno and Suwa assume an autonomous worker in a free labor market, Nishitani views the worker, though economically weak, as an autonomous individual who voluntarily seeks solidarity with others. In other words, the former is a neoclassical view of the labor market, while the latter tends towards a European, and especially a German, idea of a social market.

Contemporary labor law theory thus faces a shift from collectivism to individualism, but an important question is: Are the Japanese labor market and industrial relations practices moving in the direction of the neoclassical or the social market? While Japanese-style labor practices in large companies, such as long-term or lifetime employment and wages based on both seniority and merit are certainly changing, their dominance is unchallenged.³ Meanwhile, female and part-time workers still find themselves greatly disadvantaged in the Japanese labor market, and the activities of Japan's enterprise unions are still rooted in the company-oriented thinking of their members.⁴

Only time will tell what impact the changes in labor law and labor law theory will have on Japan's industrial relations, or indeed whether Japanese-style industrial relations will give rise to a new and different paradigm.

- 3 仁田道夫「バブル崩壊後の日本の雇用変動」(Changes in Employment

in Post-Bubble Japan)、東京大学

社会科学研究所ディスカッション・ペーパー『日本の政治経済シ

ステムは変わるか』(Is the

Japanese Political Economic System

Changing?)、1994年。

- 4 大澤真理『企業中心社会を超えて

ージェンターで読むー』(Beyond

the Corporate-Centered Society: A

Gender Analysis of Contemporary

Japan)、時事通信社、1993年、

ISBN 4788793245。

田端博邦「現代日本社会と労使

関係ー労働運動における会社主義

と労働組合主義ー」(Industrial

Relations in Contemporary Japanese

Society: Company-Centeredness and

Trade Unionism in the Labor

Movement)、東京大学社会科学

研究所編『現代日本社会』第5巻

(Contemporary Japanese Society

Volume 5)、東京大学出版会、

1991年、ISBN 4-13-034105-7。

The "Impenetrable Mystery" of Market and Organization in Japan

MOHRI Kenzo

*"A flexible workforce that is willing and able to take responsibility for matters such as quality control and local problem-solving and is unlikely to make use of the inherent fragility of the system as a bargaining counter."*¹

*"The butcher shows his benevolence by never taking advantage of the fact that the customer doesn't know rump from sirloin."*²

THESE two quotations depict relationships in two important spheres of Japanese society: the first, from Oliver and Wilkinson, describes a key element of the employee relations necessary for the success of the Japanese manufacturing system; the second, from Dore, is a concrete example of the Japanese "relational contract ethic". The observant reader will of course have noticed Dore's reference to Adam Smith's theory of the market economy:

*"It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer and the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity, but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our necessities but of their advantages."*³

While Oliver and Wilkinson and Dore are addressing different areas of Japanese society, both their examples depart, or at least deviate, from classical norms of market behaviour. The two quotations also share an acceptance of what Dore calls "the adversarial pursuit of market advantage" as the normal and proper form of classical market behaviour. The subtext of these two short passages, therefore, seems to be that Japanese-style industrial relations and Japanese-style trading practices – leaving aside the question of how uniquely Japanese these concepts really are – require the abandonment of, or at least a measure of discretion and restraint in, the adversarial pursuit of market advantage.

When social scientists use such phrases as "impenetrable Japan" or "the Japanese enigma," they are usually referring to the so-called secrets of Japan's industrial and organizational success: the blurring of the boundary between spheres of activity governed by the market principle and the organization principle, and the skillful combination of market efficiencies and organizational efficiencies.

If we agree that in Japan market behaviour is restrained by organizational behaviour, are we concluding that Japan is on its way to becoming a "de-marketized" society? To put it another way, is Japan an organization-oriented society in which the organization is constantly encroaching on the market? If hierarchical relationships, the governing principle of Japanese social structure, do indeed extend beyond the boundaries of individual organizations, and affect the relationships between organizations, then it is surely not inconceivable that submission and compassion could be factors in

1 N. Oliver and B. Wilkinson, *The Japanization of British Industry: New Developments in the 1990s*, Blackwell, Oxford, 2nd edition, 1994, p.14.

2 R. Dore, *Taking Japan Seriously: A Confucian Perspective on Leading Economic Issues*, The Athlone Press, London, 1987, p.186.

3 Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, 1776, The Modern Library edition, New York, 1937, p.14.



“It may be that Japanese society provides a working solution to the ‘Adam Smith problem’”

trading relationships between companies. Or is our definition of market behaviour as the strengthening of competitiveness (or bargaining power) by exploiting the weaknesses of one's trading or negotiating partner perhaps too narrow? To put it yet another way, are markets and market behaviour in Japan perhaps fundamentally different from those in the West? After all, do not many Japanese habitually put their hands together before eating, in a gesture of un-Smithian gratitude to the butcher, the baker, the farmer and all the others to whom they are obliged for their dinner? This suggests a social division of labour, and furthermore that social relationships formed in the market are to be understood not so much as a network of self-love and self-interest as a set of social bonds comprising mutual obligation and mutual trust.

It may be that Japanese society provides a working solution – if only a partial one – to the “Adam Smith problem”. Japan unites the seemingly mutually exclusive worlds of, on the one hand, the market economy, self-love and self-interest, in short the world of *The Wealth of Nations*; and on the other hand the realm where sympathy, that is, seeing things from the other's point of view, plays an important, nay indispensable role – the world, in other words, of *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*.

Then again, are such phenomena as *dangô*, *karôshi*, and *tanshin funin* evidence of an escape from market discipline and a repression of individual rights by social powers represented first and foremost by private companies?⁴ Are these powers subjecting Japanese society – or at least some sectors of it – to “a social tyranny more formidable than many kinds of political oppression”. Is the tyranny beyond even what J.S. Mill conceived, “penetrating much more deeply into the details of life, and enslaving the soul itself?”⁵

4 *dangô* (談合):- bid-rigging – “a form of collusion that has long been regarded as endemic in the Japanese construction industry”. (*Asian Wall Street Journal*, 1991, 613)

karôshi (過労死):- death by overwork.

tanshin funin (単身赴任):- workers separated from their families due to long-term posting.

5 J.S. Mill, *On Liberty*, 1859, *Collected Works of J.S. Mill*, Vol. XVIII, University of Toronto Press, 1977, p.220.

□ MOHRI Kenzo was Professor of British Economic History at the Institute of Social Science until March 1995. He is now Professor of Economic History at Senshû University, Tokyo.

New Book

きっかわ たけお
橘川武郎

にほん てんりよくぎょう はってん まつなが やすさえもん
『日本電力業の発展と松永安左工門』

Matsunaga Yasuzaemon and the Development of the Electric Power Industry in Japan

なごやだいがく しゅっぱんかい ねん
名古屋大学出版会、1995年 ISBN4-8158-0252-1

Using the INTERNET

for social science research on Japan

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As the Internet has grown, many researchers want to reach out and make use of the Net to acquire information about their specialties and network with their colleagues all over the world. This is certainly true for the Japan scholar, and the number of available sites and modes of access is increasing daily. Beyond basic one-to-one e-mail, there are a number of ways to plug into the Net. This article presents four of these ways, and suggests how to use them to access interesting English resources related to Japanese politics, economics and society.

FTP

FTP stands for "file transfer protocol," and is what the Internet was originally intended for. It allows one to retrieve files to one's own computer. FTP allows you to access these sites using **anonymous** as your user name and your email address as your password. Some particularly rich sites for Japan material:

- > **fcs.arizona.edu/japan** – Offers the famous Kahaner Reports, a rich source of information on all things technological about Japan.
- > **Internet Initiative Japan:** ftp.iiij.ad.jp/pub **University of Tokyo:** ftp.u-tokyo.ac.jp/pub
- > **ftp.cc.manash.edu.au/pub/nihongo** – Australia's Monash University's archive of Japanese language related freeware and shareware. It's all here for both Mac and DOS/Windows.

LISTSERV Mailing Lists

These are a kind of "conference call" via e-mail, in which one subscribes to an ongoing discussion group, administered and perhaps moderated at some central location, and receives as ordinary e-mail all postings to that list. Messages sent to the mailing list e-mail address are typically re-mailed to all the other people on the list (sometimes subject to moderator discretion for relevance, weirdness, etc.) Many lists also have a "digest" option, which allows you to receive a group of postings all bundled as one message, cutting down on e-mail clutter. You have to ask for permission to join a mailing list by sending a subscription request message to the moderator. A typical subscription request takes the form: **list-request@address** where **list** is the name of the mailing list and **address** is the moderator's e-mail address. Typically, the subject line should be left blank, and the body of the message should be the word **subscribe**, the name of the list, plus your name and e-mail address. This may not always be right, but if you screw up, you'll get a mail message back telling you how to do it right. Some popular Japan-related mailing lists:

- ❖ **JAPAN** <japan@pucc.princeton.edu> General discussion of Japanese politics, business and economics. Can be pretty wide ranging, but a digest option is available. Been around for a while.
- ❖ **H-ASIA** <h-asia@msu.edu> Newer, moderated list with more discussion on historical and related issues for all of Asia, but with a lot of Japan-related material. Also try the e
- ❖ **EASTASIA** <eastasia@univscvm.csd.sc Carolina.edu>.
- ❖ **EFJ** <efj@twics.com> Stands for "Electronics Frontiers Japan." EFJ hosts wide-ranging discussion on issues related to Internet, telecom, computers, etc., in Japan. Many Japanese participants.
- ❖ **DEAD FUKUZAWA** <fukuzawa@ucsd.edu> Begun by former students of Chalmers Johnson at U.C. San Diego. Definitely unmoderated and sometimes highly personalistic, but many interesting non-UCSD scholars participate.

Subscribe to all these lists and you'll never be lonely again. At any rate, if a particular list is not to your liking, just remember that the opposite of **subscribe** is **unsubscribe**, following the same procedure.

USENET Newsgroups

There are thousands of Usenet newsgroups on every subject imaginable. To access them, you need special newsreading software, either on your machine or that of your Internet provider. You can then subscribe to as many newsgroups as you wish. The big advantage here is that this is completely separate from your e-mail, and you only check it out when you want. In terms of true interactivity, this is still the heart of the Internet, but that means there is a very high ratio of communications of, shall we say, limited general interest. English language groups of particular interest:

- * **comp.research.japan** – Postings of scholarly articles and conference proceedings, mostly regarding Japan and technology.
- * **sci.lang.japan** – Discussion of Japanese language and language/computer issues. It's amazing how heated discussion of the merits of various Kanji dictionaries can get.
- * **soc.culture.japan** – I've heard this group described as the electronic version of the letters to the editor in the Japan Times. You'll encounter every imaginable form of culture shock and xenophobia on this list, as well as occasional interesting discussions.

World Wide Web

The Web (or WWW) is the most exciting aspect of the Net at present, offering rich graphic pages connected in webs via hypertext connections. It's easy to "net surf" all over the world, clicking from one site to another. The Web should ideally be experienced graphically through Netscape or Mosaic-type browsers, but can also be accessed strictly in text form via Lynx, available on many Unix systems. There are many new Web sites in Japan, with almost every major company and many government agencies getting on the bandwagon. Here we concentrate on pages that point to Japan-related Web sites, offering a gateway into many useful pages, and pages of particular importance or beauty. In some cases you may be given an initial choice between English and Japanese. Unless your computer has special kanji font system software, you won't be able to view the Japanese text. Here goes:

- **The University of New Mexico US-Japan Center** <<http://nobunaga.unm.edu:8001/>> The best overall site for Japan Web connections.
- **Stanford U.S.-Japan Technology Management Center** <<http://fuji.stanford.edu/>> Another attempt at a general clearing house of Japan-related sites/info, it appears to be being superseded by **Japan Window Home Page** <<http://jw.stanford.edu/>>, new joint effort of NTT, Smart Valley and the Stanford Center: this might really develop into something.
- **CERN/ANU Asian Studies WWW** <<http://coombs.anu.edu.au/WWWVL-AsianStudies.html>> Effort by the Australian National University to give broad information on all of Asia.
- **JICST's WWW Home Page** <<http://www.jicst.go.jp/>> A Japanese government effort that concentrates on science and technology but gives an up-to-date web of Japanese sites.
- **GLOCOM Home Page** <<http://www.glocom.ac.jp/>> Glocom is a Tokyo think tank tracking Japan's emergence into cyberspace, and collects a lot of interesting local policy information.
- **NTT Home Page** <<http://www.ntt.jp/>> is still a source of up-to-date info on Japan sites and infotech-related R&D, but now the NTT boys have created the **NTT DYNAMIC LOOP INFORMATION Home Page** <<http://www.info.hqs.cae.ntt.jp/>>, a very high tech, beautiful page that seems connected to everything in the world.
- **Ministry of Post and Telecommunications Home Page** <<http://www.mpt.go.jp/>>
- **MITI Agency of Industrial Science & Technology** <MITI, <http://www.aist.go.jp/>>
- **Nomura Research Institute Home Page** <<http://www.nri.co.jp/>> Lots of action here recently.
- **SUNSITE JAPAN Home Page** <<http://sunsite.sut.ac.jp/homepage.html>> Sun computer systems.
- **WIDE Project** <<http://www.wide.ad.jp/wide/index.html>> WIDE, based at Keio University, were the originators of the Internet in Japan back in the 1970's

And let us not forget: **The Institute of Social Science Home Page** <<http://www.iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp/>>

WARNING: surfing these pages can be highly addictive. "A few minutes" to check one site for one piece of information can easily turn into several hours. But, with the proper self-restraint, a great deal of valuable information can be gathered in a very exciting way.

The International Automotive Industry

– is Toyotaism Dead?

Sung-Jo PARK

It is well known that the production system in the Japanese automotive industry (frequently known as the “Toyota production system” or more recently the “lean production system”) has been undergoing substantial changes during the last few years. The reasons for these changes include the shortage of labor, workers’ disinclination to undertake dangerous, difficult and dirty work (the so-called “three Ks” – *kiken*, *kitsui*, *kitanai*), and pollution and traffic congestion caused by the just-in-time delivery system. The latter problems have led car makers to locate new plants in peripheral areas such as Kyushu, Yamaguchi Prefecture and Hokkaido. I have visited some of these plants and their subcontracting firms, and on all my visits I have been told of efforts to “humanize work and the workplace.” This reminds me strongly of the idea of *Humanisierung der Arbeit* (commonly abbreviated to HdA) which is widespread in Germany. The efforts of Japanese automotive makers in this direction are certainly impressive, and have prompted some experts to conclude, prematurely in my opinion, that Toyotaism is a thing of the past.

My current research investigates convergent trends in production systems and work organization in Western Europe and Japan. More specifically, I am looking for common features of work humanization in Japan and Germany. Germany has a relatively long tradition of group work, rooted in the industrial relations culture of the 1960s. The question is: Does the adoption of the Japanese group work system by German companies automatically imply a dehumanization of work in German car plants?

In carrying out this research, my concern is not confined only to group work, but encompasses all aspects of restructuring of the production system within the wider context of changes in the Japanese management system, such as the revision of lifetime employment, seniority wages and promotion systems.

Optimizing the production system

Increased competition throughout the world automotive industry caused by the emergence of Japanese car makers has forced Western manufacturers to learn from Japan by adopting its management and work organization systems. *Kanban*, *kaizen* and *keiretsu* are three more Ks with which Western car manufacturers are now thoroughly familiar. These efforts to learn from Japan seem to be bearing fruit, and also imply the international transferability of the lean production system without regard for culture. However, the observations and interviews I have carried out in Western Europe, Japan and Korea suggest that change in production and work processes is not characterized by radical shifts from “Western” to “Japanese” concepts.

Instead, car makers everywhere are trying to achieve an optimal mix of artisanship, Fordism and Toyotaism. The many uncertainties resulting from market, technological, environmental and other factors, force producers to respond flexibly to fluctuations in demand with respect to both quantity and quality. It is reasonable to hypothesize that those producers who achieve the most successful production system mix will be at a competitive advantage.

Finally, optimization of the production system mix has to take into account the following trends in the world automotive industry:

- increased competition in the markets for small and medium-sized (i.e. 2500cc and less) cars, due to the proliferation of new Asian manufacturers and the movement down-market of large and luxury car makers;
- rapid modularization of automotive parts coupled with single/global sourcing, forcing a fundamental reorganization of vertically-tiered subcontracting systems in Japan and Korea;
- greater salience of environmental and recycling issues, coupled with a trend towards energy substitution;
- intensified competition in Asia as European and American car producers attempt to break the Japanese domination of Asian car markets.



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“Every researcher engaged in empirical investigation is familiar with the difficulty of gaining access to industrial plants, government institutions and people, especially in a foreign country. The Institute of Social Science (Shaken) has been an invaluable help to my fieldwork here in overcoming problems of access. Furthermore, the Institute's facilities (library, photocopiers, documentation, etc.) are easily accessible, and the staff always helpful. Shaken is widely acknowledged to be the most internationalized of all Tokyo University's social science-related institutions, hosting many foreign scholars and boasting a long tradition of cooperation with overseas universities. We Berliners, in particular, have come to appreciate the value of cooperation with Shaken.”

わた はるき ちょうせん せんそう
和田春樹『朝鮮戦争』

The Korean War

いわなかしまてん ねん
岩波書店、1995年 ISBN4-00-001369-6

かわい まさひろ こくさいきんゆうろん
河合正弘『国際金融論』

International Finance

とつきょうだいがくしゅうはんかい ねん
東京大学出版会、1994年 ISBN4-13-042041-0

Technology Transfer – Changes in the Performance Paradigm

Cheng-Cherng CHEN



THE central argument of this article is that technology transfer depends not only on technology itself but also on the national characters of both licensing and licensee countries. Since 1965, Japanese technologies – not only engineering skills but also management practices – have been transferred to Taiwan, where they have widely influenced the indigenous industries. Taiwanese industries have blended Japanese technology with native Taiwanese culture to produce a hybrid Taiwanese-Japanese technology. From 1985, many Taiwanese industries equipped with this hybrid technology started to invest in China. Thus Japanese technology is being transferred, albeit indirectly, to China, where it is diffusing rapidly.

Transfer from Japan to Taiwan

The scope of technology transfer depends on the technical agreement under which it takes place. The technical agreement regulates all matters concerning the product to be licensed, such as the exclusivity of manufacturing and distribution rights, the area in which the product may be sold, technical documentation, personnel assistance, acceptable quality levels, modifications and improvements, responsibility for claims, royalties, the use of trade marks, and secrecy.

Take, for example, the first item in the above list, concerning the exclusiveness of manufacturing and distribution rights. A licence generally includes the non-exclusive right to manufacture and assemble the product on Taiwanese territory, and the licensee has the right to distribute the product itself and to have it distributed by third parties under licence in Taiwan. In other words, the Taiwanese licensee can not assume the exclusive right of manufacturing and distributing the licensed product.

A second example concerns territory and exports. A license agreement typically prevents the licensee from manufacturing the product under license in other countries, and only permits distribution of the licensed product as a single part (that is, not built into other products) within Taiwan. Generally, the licensed product cannot be exported as a single part without the permission of the Japanese licensor.

A third example concerns responsibility for claims. Agreements generally exempt the Japanese licensor from claims arising from manufacturing and distribution, even if the licensed know-how and technical documentation are shown to be fundamentally defective. Furthermore, the Japanese licensor is not liable for infringement of the license right by third parties who have rights that predate the current agreement. Such terms are of course unfair to the Taiwanese licensee.

*“The Japanese may become
broader-minded and
more far-sighted”*

The above examples show that many Japanese licensors give Taiwanese licensees worse conditions than those considered normal by international standards. But Taiwanese companies have accepted such unfair agreements in their eagerness for technology. Now that Japan is an economic giant and is becoming an economic leader in the Far East and ASEAN, Japanese licensors may be more prepared to give better terms to Taiwanese and other foreign licensees. Broad-mindedness and an ability to take a long-run view are, after all, necessary qualities in a leader.

Transfer from Taiwan to China

Now let us focus on the foreign, in this case Taiwanese, licensee. Owing to their history of colonization by Japan, the Taiwanese have smoothly accepted Japanese technology. This historical influence has three aspects: first, with a few exceptions there were no major political conflicts between the Japanese and the Taiwanese during the colonial period; second, most older Taiwanese speak Japanese and most younger Taiwanese are learning it, making for easy communication; and third, the Taiwanese have a diligent nature that places a high value on learning.

Since 1985 many Taiwanese industries have been entering China, investing capital and transferring technology there. The Taiwanese (Chinese) component of the hybrid Taiwanese-Japanese technology being transferred has facilitated transfer to the mainland. We could imagine a different scenario if Japanese technology were to be transferred directly to China. Of course the technology would be transferred, but with difficulty. The main reasons for these difficulties would be: first, Chinese memories of Japan's wartime aggression are still fresh; second, most older Chinese cannot speak Japanese, although many of the younger generation are learning the language and thereby enhancing Sino-Japanese communication; and third, proud of their long history and culture, Chinese are unwilling to bow down to the Japanese.

Over the next ten years, hybrid Taiwanese-Japanese technology will continue to be transferred to China, thereby indirectly diffusing Japanese technology to China. In the long run, over the next twenty to thirty years, Japanese technology will be transferred directly to China. A change in both Japanese and Chinese performance paradigms may occur as efforts are made to facilitate this direct transfer: the Japanese may take a more lenient attitude in their external relations, becoming broader-minded and more far-sighted; the Chinese, on the other hand, may find it in their interests to abandon their extreme pride and excessive dignity.



**Cheng-Cherng CHEN is
Professor of Economics at the
National Taiwan University.
He was Visiting Professor at
the Institute of Social Science
from April to September 1993.**

The ISS Contemporary Japan Group

The Institute of Social Science Contemporary Japan Group (Kokusai Gendai Nihon Kenkyūkai) serves as a forum to provide foreign researchers at the Institute with critical feedback on their work. It also often invites non-affiliated scholars to present their research. The Group's meetings are attended by ISS faculty and foreign researchers, and Japanese and overseas researchers affiliated to other institutions in the Tokyo area. Researchers visiting Tokyo are most welcome to attend Group meetings.

Alexander SCHULLER

Free University of Berlin

2 November 1994

The European Health Care Systems – A Comparative View



Professor Schuller, a medical sociologist, addressed some of the politics of the European health care debate in an era of resource constraints and

European integration. His familiarity with circumstances in Greece broadened the comparative base beyond the Northern European states.

INFORMATION

about Group activities can be obtained by electronic mail from Kiichi FUJIWARA (fujiwara@iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp) or Andrew DEWIT (dewit@iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp), and on the ISS WWW Events Diary – <http://www.iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp/center/events/eventsdiary.html>

Martin KENNEY

University of California at Davis

16 November 1994

Japanese and Korean Investment in Mexican Maquiladoras



Professor Kenney reported on his research on foreign-owned plants near the Mexican border with America. Since there has been considerable investment in these facilities by Korean and Japanese firms, Professor Kenney has used the opportunity to test the degree to which characteristic patterns in the organization of production have been transferred. The data suggest that some Japanese-style practices are evident in Japanese-owned plants.

Louis PAULY

University of Toronto

22 November 1994

Financial Market Structures in East Asia, North America, and Europe: Enduring Distinctions and Policy Consequences



Professor Pauly's talk centred on whether idiosyncratic systems of corporate governance and financing require adaptations in the rules governing international trade and investment. He outlined recent research on the comparative political economy of financial markets, giving special attention to the East Asian markets. His conclusions speculated on the implications of the great powers' accepting a new principle for ordering their economic interaction in sensitive sectors, one that embodies a mutual respect for structural differences that may reasonably be expected to persist.



Germain HOSTON

University of California at San Diego 5 December 1994

The State, Identity and the National Question in China and Japan

Professor Hoston's talk covered the intellectual background of her recent book as well as some of the differences between Japanese and Chinese Marxism. Audience questions covered these issues and the more general question of differences between the East and the West.

Barnett RUBIN

Columbia University
6 February 1995

After the Empire, Part II: Russia, Chechnya, and Central Asia



Professor Rubin spoke on the ethnic mix of the Central Asian region, and how that compounds the fractious politics of adjusting to the end of the Soviet Union. He also speculated on Russian intentions concerning Chechnya, as well as the likely effects the invasion of Chechnya would have elsewhere in the region. Audience questions dealt with these issues and Professor Rubin's work in preventive diplomacy.

Ellis KRAUSS

University of Pittsburgh
17 February 1995

NHK and the State in Postwar Japan: The Politics of Broadcasting and the Broadcasting of Politics

Professor Krauss argued that Japan's national broadcaster, NHK, has focused on the bureaucracy more as a consequence of the need to avoid friction with politicians than because of the actual political significance of bureaucrats. See Professor Krauss' chapters in the forthcoming volume on media and politics, co-edited with Susan Pharr (University of Hawaii Press).



Ehud HARARI

Hebrew University of Jerusalem 9 March 1995

Mass Media Participation in Japanese Public Policy Network Organizations

Professor Harari's work focuses on variations in how mass media are included in Japan's dense network of deliberation councils, and the extent to which they influence developments in public policy.

FORTHCOMING

- | | |
|--------------|---|
| April 20 | Stephen REED, Chuo University, Why Not Rational Choice? |
| May 16 | John CAMPBELL, University of Michigan, Is there a Japanese Welfare State? |
| May 25 or 26 | Jill NORGREN, City Univ. of New York, The New American Culture Wars: The Debate Over Cultural Pluralism in the United States |
| June | T.J. PEMPEL, <i>University of Wisconsin</i> |

Watanabe Osamu Political Reform and Constitutional Change

わたなべ おさむ せいじ かいかく けんぽう かいせい なかそね やすひろ おざわ いちろう
渡辺 治 『政治改革と憲法改正』 —中曽根泰弘から小沢一郎へ—

あおき しょうてん
青木書店、1994 ISBN 4-250-94001-2.

Reviewed by SHINDO Hyo

SINCE the early 1980s, Japanese politics have been undergoing reform on three levels. The first level is policy reform, which has generally been in a neo-conservative direction, exemplified by the 1982-87 Nakasone Cabinet's administrative reforms and privatization program, which aimed at a "general settlement of postwar conservative politics," and the deregulation and decentralization of the 1990s. The second level is reform of the political system itself, as seen since 1990 in the debate over constitutional amendments relating to the despatch overseas of Japanese military forces, and more recently in the sweeping electoral reforms of the Lower House. The third level is a realignment of the party system: the 1993 split of the long-governing Liberal Democratic Party and the establishment of an "anti-LDP" coalition government were movements towards a two-party system.

In *Political Reform and Constitutional Change*, Watanabe Osamu attempts a comprehensive and radical explanation of political reform in contemporary Japan on all these levels. Before discussing the book, however, it is necessary to place Watanabe on the complicated spectrum of Japanese political science, which I divide into three broad streams. First there is the *conservative* camp, which is further subdivided into three groups. *Realist conservatives* such as Murakami emphasize reform of policy rather than of the system: for them, policies must be changed to adapt the "developmental state" of the high-growth era to international changes following the end of the Cold War.¹ *Liberal reformist conservatives* such as Otake, meanwhile, see reform in general as a process of liberalization, but distinguish between neo-conservative reforms aimed at turning Japan into a strong military power and socioeconomic libertarian reforms; their sympathy is for the latter.² Finally, the strongest of the three groups at present is the *authoritarian reformist conservatives*, who include Kitaoka, Satoh and Sasaki.³ The post-Cold War decline of US hegemony, they say, requires Japan to contribute to the maintenance of the world order by becoming a major political power. In order to achieve this end, Japan's political system must be changed to produce a two-party system, which will in turn lead to strong political leadership. For the authoritarian reformists, this is the framework within which all political processes are to be understood. (There is a fourth group in the conservative camp, the *anti-American authoritarians*, but they have no political scientists willing to defend their views).

The second broad stream is formed by the *civic liberals*, who oppose the conservatives but are themselves divided into two opposing groups, the *realists* and the *fundamentalists*. Of the former, Yamaguchi views political processes since the collapse of socialism and the end of

- 1 村上泰亮 『反古典の政治経済学』
じょうげ
上下 (Against Classical Political

Economics, Volumes One and Two).
ちゅうおうこうろんしゃ
中央公論社、1992年、ISBN 4-12-
0012136-X & 4-12-0012037-8.

- 2 大塚秀夫 『自由主義的改革の
じだい
時代』 (The Age of Liberal Reform).
ちゅうおうこうろんしゃ
中央公論社、1994年、ISBN 4-12-
002342-7.

- 3 北岡伸一 『政党政治の再生』
(Reinventing Party Politics).
ちゅうおうこうろんしゃ
中央公論社、1995年、ISBN 4-12-
002397-4.

さとう せいさぶろう こが せいせい
佐藤誠三郎 『『国家』なき配分
せいせい
政治の危うさ』 (The Danger of

"Stateless" Redistribution Politics).
こが せいせい
『THIS IS読売』 1994年9月号.

ささき たいし せいせい
佐々木毅 『政治家の条件』 (What
ささき たいし
Makes a True Politician?). 講談社、
1995年.

“Watanabe offers the most radical and systematic analysis to date of recent reforms”

the cold war affirmatively, seeing in them a trend towards a two-party system in which self-reformed conservative political forces are opposed by realistic, citizen-oriented social democrats.⁴ On the other hand, the fundamentalist Takabatake criticizes the same processes as the completion of the “neo-conservative revolution,” a “general conservatization” resulting from the degradation and decline of social democratic parties.⁵

A similar split can be observed in the third and final group, the *radicals*. The *realist* radical Ushiro, taking the realignment of the Italian party system and the transformation of the Italian left as his model, sees a trend in Japanese politics towards a two-party system comprising a new conservative party and a reformist party.⁶ The *fundamentalist* Watanabe's *Political Reform and Constitutional Change*, on the other hand, offers the most radical and systematic analysis to date of recent reforms.

Watanabe first dissects the conditions which supported postwar conservative politics. Why, despite the existence of a democratic parliamentary system in Japan, did “political dominance by one conservative party” (the LDP) occur? The answer lies first in the social governance structures established in the 1950s and 1960s, which centered upon control of workers by management in large private companies and upon political control of the regions through pork. By such means social democratic parties were prevented from achieving majorities in the Diet. Secondary factors were Japan's military alliance with the United States, and the United States' economic and political hegemony. (Although Watanabe places little emphasis on Cold War structures). Given these domestic and international conditions, conservative politicians were spared the need to strengthen their political authority and were instead able to devote themselves to economic growth and to the distribution of pork to conservative constituencies. However, following the Oil Crises these conditions changed in several respects. First, America's waning hegemony forced a restructuring of the Japan-US military alliance. Second, emergent Japanese multinational enterprises started to demand changes in state structures to take account of Japan's new status as a major economic power. Third, the fiscal crisis meant that economic growth was impossible to sustain under the existing system.


It was in order to break out of this impasse of conservative politics that Prime Minister Nakasone undertook an “authoritarian reform” of policy in the 1980s. Chief among his reforms were: deregulation; income tax reductions and the introduction of the Consumption Tax (a value added tax); the jettisoning of the agricultural class and small businessmen by committing Japan to free trade; the strengthening of

- 4 やまぐちしろう にほんせいじ どうじだいてきよ
山口二郎『日本政治の同時代的読
み方』(A Contemporaneous
Interpretation of Japanese Politics)、
朝日新聞社、1995年、ISBN 4-02-
256835-6.
- 5 たかばたけあきとし にほんせいじ こけざうてんがん
高島通敏『日本政治の構造転換』
(Structural Changes in Japanese
Politics)、三一書房、1994、ISBN 4-
380-94234-1.
- 6 しろうふさお せいけんこうたい
後房雄『政権交代のある
民主主義』(Democracy with Changes
of Government)、窓社、1994、ISBN
4-943983-79-0.

Watanabe Osamu **Political Reform and
Constitutional Change** *continued*

administrative structures and the concentration of authority in the hands of the prime minister; and constitutional change to allow the buildup of Japan's military forces.⁷

However, Nakasone's reforms did not aim to change social governance structures. The Liberal Democratic Party continued to rely on the control of workers by companies and on the distribution of pork, and as a result the reforms were wrecked by opposition from within the party. Learning from Nakasone's failure, conservatives subsequently recognized that policy reform required a thorough overhaul of the postwar conservative political structures themselves. Such a reconstruction implied a multistage program of authoritarian reforms:



The leader of this program was, of course, Ozawa Ichiro, and it was he who, as part of the program, caused the LDP to split.

Today, conservative reforms are proceeding, albeit with some difficulties. Is there no alternative to conservative reform? Watanabe sees no prospect, in a society where organized labor and the new urban middle class are consigned to such a structurally subordinate position, of an assumption of power by liberal or social democratic forces, and he ends his book with a discussion of how to block authoritarian reform. *Political Reform and Constitutional Change* has aroused strong reactions, both positive and negative, but is essential reading for all those seeking a critical understanding of Japanese politics in the 1980s and 90s.



SHINDO Hyo was a Research Associate of the Institute of Social Science until March 1995. He is now Associate Professor at the Faculty of Law, University of Nagoya.

7 渡辺治『日本国憲法「改正」史』
(A History of Constitutional
"Amendments" in Japan)、日本
評論社、1987、ISBN 4-535-57652-1.

The first of a series of
short introductions to
Japanese White Papers

The White Paper on the Economy

けいざいはくしょ
経済白書

Reviewed by **WAKITA Shigeru**

JAPANESE White Papers on the Economy are notorious for their excessive use of the latest economics and econometrics jargon, despite being written entirely by government officials. This contrasts with the US *Presidential Report on the Economy* which, though written by academic economists, avoids technical terminology. That said, the latest (1994) *White Paper* is moderately readable, even for researchers unfamiliar with modern economics.

The *White Paper* focuses mostly on the Japanese economy's main short-run problem – the long recession. Chapter 1 summarizes the phases of the business cycle, focusing on the unexpected yen appreciation in mid-1993, while chapter 2 examines the causes of the current recession, mainly excessive inventory levels. The arguments of the first two chapters are uncontroversial. Graphs and tables are well used to give a clear picture of the current condition of the Japanese macroeconomy.

Chapter 3 is devoted to the long-run problems of de-industrialization, de-regulation, and employment. The *White Paper* repeats the standard arguments of modern economic theory regarding de-industrialization and de-regulation. On employment, the *White Paper* demonstrates clearly how recent non-academic arguments that the system of "lifetime commitment" is collapsing are contradicted by turnover rate statistics. In fact, Japanese newspaper articles have announced the collapse of Japanese-style management repeatedly during the last 20 years; in recessions the press warns that firms are about to fire vast numbers of middle-aged workers, and in booms it deplores young workers' movement to better jobs – basing both claims on the flimsiest anecdotal evidence. The fact is that the Japanese labor market is stable, and labor market practices are not going to change drastically. Although Japanese big firms do hoard many incompetent workers, which looks like inefficiency, this retained labor represents an "ability-insurance mechanism" consistent with the arguments of modern applied microeconomics.¹ Labor-hoarding also offsets macroeconomic fluctuations.² The 1994 *White Paper's* arguments regarding Japanese employment practices are most welcome, and make it a good starting point for an academic study of the Japanese labor market.

□

- 1 Shigeru Wakita, "Efficiency Wage Model of Adverse Selection Reconsidered,"

Economics Letters, Vol. 40-2, (1992) 235-40.

おきた しげる にほんてき
脇田成「マクロとミクロの日本的
労働慣行」(Macroeconomic and

Microeconomic Analysis of Japanese

Labor Market Conventions) 、

『社会科学研究』東京大学

社会科学研究所 Vol. 46-2 (1994) 220-306.

- 2 Shigeru Wakita, "Chronic Labor Hoarding: Direct Evidence from Japan," Forthcoming in *The Japanese Economic Review*.

WAKITA Shigeru was a Research Associate of the Institute of Social Science until March 1995. He is now Associate Professor of Economics at Tokyo Metropolitan University.

Electronic Access to the 1994 *White Paper on the Economy*

As well as the hard-copy *White Paper*, the Publishing Division of the Ministry of Finance produces a CD-ROM version (in Japanese), and offers an English summary on the Internet from the Japanese Prime Minister's Residence World Wide Web server –

<http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/summary.html>

Japan and Asia in the World System

HASHIMOTO Juro

**Progress Report on the
ISS research project
*The 20th Century
System: Formation and
Transformation***

WE are currently witnessing a breakdown of the world political economic system. The former socialist countries have turned to the free market, only to experience a fall in industrial production equalling that in the United States during the Great Depression, and ethnic and religious conflicts on a scale not seen since the turn of the century. Elsewhere, border disputes have become a frequent occurrence in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. The international political order, which had a semblance of stability during the Cold War, is crumbling. Meanwhile, the international economic order is also rocking on its foundations, ten years after the 1985 Plaza Accord put an end to the postwar Bretton Woods system. (Under that system the US had played a disproportionately important role, deciding world commodity prices and interest rates.) Trade and economic friction have become major problems, and the compromises reached to resolve them, such as import and export controls and voluntary self-restraint agreements, frequently contravene the principles of the GATT.

Japan's role in this system during this period of instability is more important than ever before: witness the debates regarding her participation in the UN Security Council and the leadership of the World Trade Organization. This makes it crucial to examine the transformation of the 20th century political economic system from a Japanese perspective.

Key Features of the 20th Century System

The world system can be broken down into subsystems consisting of international organizations (that is, international economic systems) organized by sovereign states, and subsystems comprising individual countries. A comparison of the subsystems of the 20th century system with those of the 19th century shows three striking differences:

- (1) The independence of former colonies, the multiplication of sovereign states and the spread of democracy as a system of government;
- (2) The predominant role of the United States;
- (3) The establishment of a large number of international organizations with increasingly important roles.

Each of these differences deserves investigation, but their relationships to each other are of particular interest here. (1) and (2) together raise the questions of what kind of system American democracy represented, and how it was adopted and adapted by US-occupied countries or newly independent states. (2) and (3) together point to an international

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Century System project, contact
TSUCHIDA Tomoko at the Institute
of Social Science
tsuchida@iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp*

economic system under American hegemony formed in accordance with an explicit set of American ideals and aims. In other words, the 20th century system is a world system "designed" by America, but the question remains: How much of the burden of running this "designed" system has America shouldered herself, and how much has she entrusted to such institutions as the IMF and the GATT? Finally, (1) and (3) together force us to consider the impact on international organizations of the massive increase in the number of member states.

The second half of the 20th century has seen spectacular economic growth across the globe. Economic growth has facilitated a more equitable distribution of incomes, and become the standard means by which the world's policymakers – again, influenced by the US – aim to achieve full employment. Many causes of economic growth have been pointed out, but particularly in the US case the major factors are industrial structure, product, design and manufacturing technologies, and labor management methods. These American advances have been transferred to other countries, often at remarkable speed. The 20th Century System project focuses mainly on the effects of this transfer on Japan-US relations. The project investigates features of the Japanese economic system that have been created in the process of absorbing and consolidating the impact of the US economy, in areas such as industrial relations, the distribution system, salaries and welfare payments.

Asia in the World System

The fourth quarter of the 20th century has seen major changes in industrial structure, technology and company organization. We must not overlook the role played in these changes by the economic success of Japan and other Asian countries pursuing developmentalist strategies. Asian economic development was, after all, a significant factor in the collapse of the command economies. By explaining the shape, outcomes and problems of Asian "developmentalism" and comparing it to, for example, the Latin American case, we will be able to establish the international effect of Asian economic growth, which will in turn help us understand the relationship between national and regional subsystems.

After decades enmeshed in the rivalry between the American and Soviet systems, Asia has emerged from the seismic political and economic shifts of recent years as one of the protagonists of the late 20th century world system. An accurate portrayal of the consequences of Asia's current emergence will surely provide a reliable platform from which to survey its role in the next century .



**HASHIMOTO Juro is Professor
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of Social Science and
coordinator of the 20th
Century World System project.**

Conference Announcements

ちゅうごく こくゆうきぎょうかいかく
「中国の国有企業改革」

Reform of State-Owned Firms in China

にほん げんだい ちゅうごく がっかい かんとう ぶかい しやんき けんきゅうかい
日本現代中国学会関東部会 春季研究会

15 April 1995 1400-1700

Rm 306, Bldg 8, College of Arts and Sciences, University of Tokyo
(Komaba Campus)

Papers: LI Jiesheng (Kokushikan University), 「経営請負責任制の展開と
だつし かんけい しやと こうてつ ちゅうしん
労使関係—首都鋼鉄公司を中心に」

KUNIYA Satoshi (Niigata University), 「株式制をめぐる法的諸問題—
かぶしきせい ほうてきしよもんだい
Jinbei Motor Companyを中心に」

Commentators: KOKUBUN Ryosei (Keio University), KIZAKI Midori
(Yokohama National University)

Contact: Assoc. Prof. TAJIMA Toshio, Institute of Social Science,
tajima@iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp

きぎょう せんごし
日本企業システムの戦後史

The Japanese Enterprise System Since 1945

しゃかい けいざいし がっかい たいかい
社会経済史学会大会

21-22 May 1995

Department of Economics, University of Tokyo

On 22 May, 6 papers will cover topics including the selection of
managers, personnel assessment, production technology, cross-
shareholding, and the financial system.

Contact: Prof. HASHIMOTO Juro, Institute of Social Science.

しん しゅぎ ちいき きょうりよくこうそう
「新アジア主義と地域協力構想」

The "New Asian-ism" and Regional Cooperation

せいけいがっかい かんとう ぶかい たいかい
アジア政経学会関東部会第36回

27 May 1995

Takushoku University

Presenters: MATSUMOTO Ken'ichi, freelance commentator

SUZUKI Yuji, Hosei University

KIMURA Michio, Institute of Developing Economies

KAJIWARA Hirokazu Chiba Keizai University

Commentator: SUEHIRO Akira, Institute of Social Science

Contact: NAKAJIMA Sei'ichi, Takushoku University

Tel 03-3947-2261 Fax 03-3943-2558

せんご とうなん せかい けいせい いしずえ ねんたい れきし さいこう
「戦後東南アジア世界形成の礎 1930～40年代 その歴史再考」

Historical Foundations of Postwar Southeast Asia: the 1930s and 1940s

なんとう し がっかいだい かい
東南アジア史学会第53回

3-4 June 1995

Nagoya University

Contact:

YAO Takashi, Osaka University of Foreign Studies

Tel 0727-28-3111 extension 736 Fax 0727-28-3557

An Anticlassical Political Economic Analysis

23-24 June 1995

The Center for Global Communications (GLOCOM), International University of Japan, Tokyo.

The conference focuses on the book *An Anticlassical Political Economic Analysis* by the late MURAKAMI Yasusuke.

Speakers:

Peter GOUREVITCH, HAMADA Koichi, Peter KATZENSEIN, Stephen KRASNER, Andrew MORAVCSIK, Ken PYLE, INOUCHI Takashi, YAMAMURA Kozo, YAKUSHIJI Taizo, KUMON Shumpei and others.

Contact:

Assoc. Prof. Stephen J. ANDERSON, GLOCOM, 6-15-21 Roppongi, Minato-ku, Tokyo 106

Fax +81-3-5412-7111 sja@glocom.ac.jp

The Seventh Annual Ph.D. Kenkyukai Conference

26 June 1995

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Contact:

The Ph.D. Kenkyukai Conference Committee, c/o Program Department (Attn. Ms. Haruna Ishizuka), The International House of Japan, 5-11-16 Roppongi, Minato-ku, Tokyo 106

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| SSJ Number | Deadline for Articles |
|------------|-----------------------|
| 4 (Aug 95) | 1 Jul 95 |
| 5 (Nov 95) | 1 Oct 95 |

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